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CULTURE AND TRANSITIONS IN INDIVIDUALITY 
Paulo C. Abrantes* 
 
Several biologists and philosophers have been arguing, for a while now, that a Darwinian 
evolutionary dynamics might take place not only in the distribution of phenotypic traits in a 
particular kind of population, but also in the very dimensions that are used to track those, 
bringing about new kinds of populations, given certain special circumstances. These 
"major" evolutionary transitions have sometimes been described as transitions in 
individuality. In this depiction, natural selection (maybe combined with other causes) often 
brings about new kinds of individuals, whose evolutionary dynamics takes place in a novel 
way. This topic became a big concern since the groundbreaking works of Buss (1987), 
Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry (1997), and Michod (1999). Godfrey-Smith's 2009 book 
follows this trend by emphasizing that "evolutionary processes are themselves evolutionary 
products" (2009, 15). One of the chief thesis he puts forth, by pushing population thinking 
even further, is that a transition in individuality is fully accomplished when a new, 
"paradigmatic", Darwinian population emerges. In collective entities, where there are 
nested populations embodied in one individual, the higher and the lower level populations 
follow different evolutionary paths during a major transition: the latter ones usually change 
their Darwinian status from a "paradigmatic" to a "marginal" one. This process of 
"de-Darwinization" of the lower level populations - as Godfrey-Smith describes the 
evolutionary transition taking place at that level (Ibid., 100) -, can be tracked by significant 
changes in the values of a set of parameters that describe their evolutionary dynamics or 
"evolvability" (Ibid., 41). The process of de-Darwinization of the populations of cells that 
make up multicellular organisms is a well-known case. In this paper, I want to investigate 
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whether it is fruitful to describe the role that culture begins to play at some point in the 
Hominin lineage - arguably that of the emergence of a new inheritance system on top of the 
genetic inheritance system and coevolving with it -, as being a transition in individuality.  
(I) REPRESENTING DARWINIAN DYNAMICS 
Godfrey-Smith criticizes, in his book, previous attempts to give an abstract "summary" of 
the essential elements that are required for describing evolution in Darwinian terms (2009, 
17). His way to open a new trail in what he calls the "classical approach" is to start with a 
"minimal concept" of a Darwinian population - which just requires that there be variation in 
the traits of individuals in a population that affect their reproduction and that part of this 
variation be heritable.1  
The 'minimal concept' - associated with a "kind of change", evolution by natural selection - 
is permissive and includes much more than the paradigmatic cases of Darwinian 
populations (Godfrey-Smith, 2011, 67). To avoid the pitfalls of those attempts in the 
classical tradition, he aims to describe not only the purportedly paradigmatic cases of 
Darwinian populations, but also go into the marginal cases, that don't have all the features 
of the former ones. The particular way a kind of population located in this spectrum evolves 
depends on further features that are not specified by the minimal concept, requiring new 
parameters to describe its dynamics. In other words, the minimal concept provides just a 
"set up" and has to be complemented with "middle-level" theories or models to take into 
account the diversity of living beings and, more generally, of systems whose dynamics can 
be fruitfully described in populational-Darwinian terms (Ibid., 39; cf. 31). 
Starting with the minimal concept as a scaffolding, Godfrey-Smith proposes a "spatial" 
representation in which the chief features of Darwinian populations, concerning their 
evolvability, are quantified in order to tell paradigmatic from marginal cases. This 
                                                          
1
 Godfrey-Smith criticizes the "replicator approach" proposed by Dawkins and Hull among others, and takes 
the "classical approach", embraced for instance by Lewontin, as the starting point of his own proposal of an 
abstract representation for a Darwinian populational dynamics, that might be applied to different kinds of 
systems, not restricted to the biological realm (Godfrey-Smith, 2009, p. 31-6).  
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representation is also used to depict evolutionary transitions as well, as being trajectories in 
that space. Different kinds of Darwinian populations, associated with different kinds of 
individuals, are located in different places in the Darwinian hyperspace (as I will, 
henceforth, be calling this representation) given the values these populations score in a set 
of parameters that are briefly described below: 
H - fidelity in inheritance 
C - continuity2 
S - relationship between fitness and intrinsic properties 
V - abundance of variation 
 - reproductive competition3 
 
Besides those, Godfrey-Smith emphasizes the relevance of three reproduction-related 
parameters (see Figure 1), summing up an eight-dimensional hyperspace: 
B - bottleneck 
G - reproductive specialization of the parts in a collective entity4 
I - overall integration of the collective entity 
 
 
                                                          
2
 The meaning of the parameter C can be grasped by using the idea of a fitness landscape. If it is rugged, 
small variations in the system's properties lead to big variations in fitness.This situation corresponds to a low 
value of the parameter C; in a landscape like this, the population can be easily trapped in a local fitness peak 
and not be able to cross a valley and to evolve towards a higher fitness peak on the landscape. The way the 
population might possibly evolve is, in this case, not Continuous, being as a result more susceptible to drift. 
3
 The parameter  measures the degree in which the reproductive success of one individual in a population 
affects the reproductive success of another one in the same population.  
4
 The parameter G is modeled on the Germ/Soma reproductive specialization in multicellular organisms. 
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Figure 1: The Darwinian hyperspace with just three dimensions representing the 
reproduction-related parameters B, G and I. Several organisms are located in this space given their 
coordinates along these dimensions (From Godfrey-Smith, 2009, p. 95). 
 
In the framework proposed by Godfrey-Smith, Darwinian populations have ontological 
priority, so to speak, vis-à-vis Darwinian individuals: "...the population-level concept 
comes first" (2009, 6). Therefore, any attempt to apply those parameters to track possible 
transitions in individuality associated with cultural change has first to address the question 
about what kinds of Darwinian populations might exist in this domain. This is the main 
topic of the next section. Afterwards, I will evaluate if it is fruitful to apply 
Godfrey-Smith's representation for telling paradigmatic from marginal Darwinian 
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populations in cultural evolution.5 
 (II) DARWINIAN POPULATIONS IN THE CULTURAL DOMAIN 
Godfrey-Smith argues that there are "several ways" in which Darwinian populations can be 
represented in the cultural realm (2009, 151). He distinguishes two "options" I will be 
naming in this paper 'BP' and 'CP'. They are first presented in an 'individualistic' way (BPi 
and CPi). Godfrey-Smith suggests that there are also group-level descriptions (BPg and 
CPg) of Darwinian populations in this domain (see Table 1): "... we have two cross-cutting 
distinctions, one concerning the type of thing that makes up the population, and hence the 
associated notion of reproduction, and the other concerning the level at which the 
population exists" (Godfrey-Smith, 2009, 151). 
 
                   Level 
Type of thing 
Individualistic Group-level 
BP (biological) BPi - agents having cultural 
phenotypes 
BPg - groups having cultural 
phenotypes 
CP (cultural) CPi - cultural variants 
(memes) 
CPg - cultural variants' 
bundles (memeplexes) 
 
Table1- Darwinian populations in the cultural realm 
 
Individualistic descriptions 
BPi)  In this option, the population is made up of "ordinary biological individuals" with 
different cultural phenotypes. Reproduction in this case is ordinary biological reproduction: 
                                                          
5
 This paper is part of a larger project in which I am attempting to figure out how fruitful might be to apply 
the whole set of parameters of Godfrey-Smith's Darwinian hyperspace to track a possible transition in 
individuality that could have happened in the Hominin lineage, associated with cultural change. 
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"When people reproduce, their offspring often resemble the parents with respect to these 
features, as a consequence of teaching and imitation (...) It is not a new application of the 
theory, in fact, but an ordinary one" (Godfrey-Smith, 2009, 150).   
As far as inheritance is concerned, in the BPi case we have just vertical transmission of 
cultural variants (or memes, if you like), through teaching and imitation.6 
CPi) In the second individualistic option, cultural variants themselves make up a 
(Darwinian) population. In the previous BPi option, the population is made up by the 
bearers of cultural variants. Here, cultural variants themselves make up the focal 
population and there is replication of cultural variants. I will come back later to the 
modality of reproduction associated with a CPi-like population. 
Group-level descriptions 
The "two options" previously described are individualistic in character but Godfrey-Smith 
makes explicit that there are group-level populations, as well, of biological and cultural 
"types of things": 
"It could be argued that human groups have cultural phenotypes that are transmitted to 
offspring groups (...), or that group-level cultural variants themselves (such as forms of 
political organization) may make up a pool of reproducing entities" (Godfrey-Smith, 2009, 
151). 
We end up with four kinds of populations in the cultural realm: at an 'individualistic' level, 
the populations are either composed of biological individuals (agents, for short) with 
cultural phenotypes (BPi) or made up by the cultural variants themselves (CPi). At the 
group-level, either groups of agents with different cultural phenotypes (cultural groups, for 
short) make up the population (BPg), or bundles of cultural variants (something akin to 
what memeticists call "memeplexes") themselves constitute the population (CPg). 
One might ask whether the kinds of Darwinian populations in each of the four cases (BPi, 
                                                          
6
 I prefer to use the expression 'cultural variants' that is more neutral, not committing myself to the properties 
usually attributed to memes. 
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BPg, CPi, CPg), admitting individualistic and group-level descriptions, are paradigmatic or 
marginal. To address this question we should locate each case in the proposed Darwinian 
hyperspace. 
In the following, I will focus on the BPg case. The chief question I want to address is 
whether this group-level population is paradigmatically Darwinian or just marginal. 
After presenting the BPg option, Godfrey-Smith mentions Henrich and Boyd's 1998 paper 
on the role played by a conformist bias in human evolution. I highlight this reference here 
because this transmission bias will be discussed at length in this paper.  
The BPg kind of Darwinian population is central to Richerson and Boyd's theory of human 
evolution, a particular brand of gene-culture coevolution theories. My bet is that their "dual 
inheritance" theory helps to shed light on some of the topics Godfrey-Smith addresses in 
his book, related to cultural evolution. And the other way around: Godfrey-Smith's way to 
represent transitions in individuality as trajectories in an abstract Darwinian hyperspace 
helps to develop further some aspects of Richerson and Boyd's theory.7 
(III) HOW IS BPg LOCATED IN THE DARWINIAN HYPERSPACE? 
Taking for granted the conceptual framework presented above, I want to put forth once 
more the chief questions I will be addressing in this paper: Might human groups with 
different cultural phenotypes be Darwinian individuals? Do we have in BPg a paradigmatic 
or a marginal Darwinian population? 
To tackle these questions, we must apply Godfrey-Smith's procedure, that is, we must 
locate the BPg population in the Darwinian hyperspace, by roughly indicating its 
coordinates along the eight dimensions presented above. This is a much bigger project than 
I will be able to accomplish in this paper. I will focus here on just a few of those parameters 
                                                          
7
 Boyd and Richerson share with Godfrey-Smith, furthermore, some more general points of view that invite 
the kind of approximation between their work I am exploring in this paper. First of all, they agree in pointing 
to population thinking as the most central aspect of Darwinism. They are also suspicious about the replicator 
approach (especially in the cultural domain) and argue that replicators are not necessary for evolution by 
natural selection to take place. They all embrace also a multilevel approach to natural selection. 
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(and point to some relationships between them) and look at how cultural groups fare in 
these dimensions of the Darwinian hyperspace.   
De-Darwinization in BPg 
The parameter V measures the abundance of variation in a population. How much 
variation, and of what kind, is required to fuel an evolutionary dynamics at the level of 
groups of an BPg type? Since we are dealing here with collective entities, we have to look 
also at how the population inside each group fares regarding the V parameter. In the human 
case, at least, the relevant lower level population is made up of agents exchanging cultural 
information in a social network. How abundant is the variation at this lower level, 
compared to the variation we find in the population of cultural groups? 
If we take as a model the already mentioned case of multicellularity, there is a suppression 
of variation at the lower level population of cells that make up the organism: they are very 
similar in their intrinsic, genotipic properties.8 
In the case of collectives, Godfrey-Smith describes an evolutionary transition as a 
combination of processes taking place simultaneously in nested populations, at several 
levels, that constitute the new individual. The evolutionary trajectory that represents the 
emergence of a new paradigmatic Darwinian population at the level of collectives in the 
hyperspace, and the simultaneous trajectory taken by the population of members of these 
collectives run in opposite directions. 
Using Godfrey-Smith's expression, those members are "de-Darwinized" in different 
aspects, including V. In other words, in a major transition, the lower level population 
                                                          
8
 The lower level populations in multicellular organisms, taken as a model for a collective entity, have also 
other features I will not be fully addressing in this paper: a) there is a division of labor between somatic and 
reproductive parts (cells, in this case); b) the latter are sequestered very early in the development of the 
organism and, therefore, are shielded from the evolutionary activity that happens in the population of somatic 
cells during the life of the organism; c) there is often a bottleneck in the modality of reproduction they 
instantiate; in the clear-cut cases, the development starts with a single cell, a condition that scores the highest 
value in the parameter (B = 1), and this is the reason why the population is quite uniform in their intrinsic 
properties (genotypic, in the multicellularity case). 
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usually changes its status from paradigmatic to marginal when the transition concludes.  
Reasoning the same way in the case of a population of agents making up a cultural group, 
we should expect that this population is, to some extent, de-Darwinized in the transition 
towards a paradigmatic Darwinian population of cultural groups. 
If we focus on the parameter V, when an evolutionary transition is achieved the population 
of group-member agents displays less variation (in the agent's intrinsic properties), 
compared to the population of cultural groups.9 
Why should we expect de-Darwinization of the lower level population when it comes to 
group-level phenomena? There is always the risk of subversion, by free-riders, of the 
cooperation and division of labor that maintains the integrity of the group (Godfrey-Smith, 
2009, 101; 123). Therefore, mechanisms for leveling the fitness of altruists, on the one 
hand, and the fitness of selfish agents, on the other hand, have to be put in place for 
cooperation to be preserved. 
Furthermore, variation at the group-level should be enhanced and kept (despite migration 
                                                          
9
 One might ask what would be intrinsic properties in BPg-like populations (at the low and high levels). This 
is relevant for the definition of the parameter S, as described by Godfrey-Smith (see above). This issue is not 
my focus in this paper and I will just offer some crude intuitions here. At the level of groups with different 
cultural phenotypes, we would expect, in an evolutionary transition, that these groups score higher values in 
the parameter S as well, that is, that their fitness becomes (more) related to their intrinsic properties (in other 
words, that their fitness Supervenes on the latter properties when the transition concludes). Maybe, it is better 
to say that group-level intrinsic properties emerge in an evolutionary transition (the same for fitness as a 
property at this level). It is plausible, therefore, to consider those cultural variants that distinguish a group 
phenotype from that of another group as being intrinsic properties of that group. If conformism and other 
biases are in place - as well as moral aggression and other mechanisms for suppressing cultural variation -, we 
have, as a consequence, a fairly uniform population at the level of the group-members' population. In a 
transition, we expect that the fitness of a group-member will be increasingly dependent on the fitness of the 
cultural group, what can possibly be interpreted as a suppression of S at the level of the group-member's 
population (since location in a particular group can be interpreted as an extrinsic property of a 
group-member). Much more has to be done to establish fruitful relations between S, V, H and the 
reproduction-related parameters for each level in an BPg-like collective entity. 
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etc.) for group selection to have strength, at the same time that (behavioral) variation inside 
the groups has to be suppressed.  
What is at stake is the intensity of selection at the cultural group-level, which arguably has 
been non-negligible in human evolution at least. In Richerson and Boyd's dual inheritance 
theory for human evolution, psychological biases like conformism play a central role in 
supressing variation inside each cultural group, at the same time that these biases increase 
variation between these groups and maintain this variation along the time. These processes, 
going on simultaneously at both levels, would achieve a transition towards a Darwinian 
population of groups with different cultural phenotypes (BPg).10 
We are touching here upon the problem of the evolution of cooperation, also discussed by 
Godfrey-Smith (2009, p. 115;163-4). What would be the analogues, in the cultural domain, 
of the ways of avoiding subversion we find in the biological domain?  
We know that just kin selection and reciprocal altruism are not enough to support 
cooperation in groups whose members are not genetically-related and/or in large groups.11 
Richerson and Boyd point, therefore, to other mechanisms of "variation supression" (to use 
Godfrey-Smith's expression): moralistic aggression and symbolic markers. Through these 
mechanisms, cultural groups score higher values in the parameter V and selection at the 
group-level becomes stronger. By the same token, cultural groups achieve a tight 
integration, that is, they score higher values in Godfrey-Smith's parameter I.12 
How could those mechanisms for promoting cooperation in human groups have evolved? 
                                                          
10
 Besides the conformist bias, Boyd and Richerson argue for the relevance of other transmission biases in the 
transmission of cultural variants: the model bias and the content bias. We discuss at length the role these 
biases play in their theory in Abrantes & Almeida, 2011. 
11
 Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Abrantes & Almeida, 2011. Cf. Godfrey-Smith, 115. 
12
 The former discussion suggests that through moral aggression each group "takes control over the lives and 
activities of [cultural agents, in this case], especially with respect to their reproduction" (2009, 124). This is 
one of the ways, pointed out by Godfrey-Smith, in which lower level populations in collectives are 
de-Darwinized (in their reproductive output also). I am not sure whether he would accept this interpretation of 
the quoted passage in the context of BPg-like populations.  
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Even though this question will not be thoroughly addressed in this paper, I will say a few 
other things on the role of transmission biases in the next section.13 
 (IV) RULES FOR UPDATING BEHAVIOR AND DARWINIAN POPULATIONS  
In the chapter on "Cultural evolution" of his 2009 book Godfrey-Smith engages himself in 
modeling the dynamics of a population of behaviors when a particular rule, among several 
possibilities, is followed by the agents for updating their behavior (2009,159-60). He 
investigates, especially, the evolutionary implications of the following rules that might be 
used in this context: 'imitate your best neighbor' (IBN), 'copy the common' and 'best 
response'. 
An agent that follows the IBN rule looks around his or her neighbors (in a local interaction) 
and compare their behaviors for their payoffs; the agent then chooses to imitate the 
behavior that gets effectively the highest payoff. A best response rule is "smarter" than IBN 
since the agent not only looks around for her neighbors actual behaviors but is able to find 
out what would have been the most appropriate behavior given their circumstances. The 
agent embraces the behavior that, in Godfrey-Smith words, "would have been the most 
appropriate overall response to the behaviors produced by the individual's neighbors on the 
previous time-step" (2009,157).  
The 'copy the common' rule is a kind of conformist rule: the agent imitates the behavior that 
is more common among those to which it is exposed.  
Godfrey-Smith argues that IBN can support a Darwinian dynamics in the population of 
behaviors, but not the 'copy the common' rule. His argument is based on two assumptions: 
                                                          
13
 The emphasis Godfrey-Smith puts on integration (the parameter I) in his account of the requirements for a 
paradigmatic darwinian population, can contribute to develop further dual inheritance theories. In my view, 
Hodgson and Knudsen (2010, p. 163-4) rigthly point out that a concern with social structure is lacking in 
Richerson and Boyd`s theory, for instance, and that we need more than psychological biases to deal 
adequately with the problem of the evolution of cooperation in human social groups. For an in depth 
discussion of the issue of cooperation, in the context of dual inheritance theory, see Abrantes & Almeida, 
2011. 
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 1) IBN is success-driven but not conformism. After all, in the first case the agent 
imitates the behavior that gets the highest payoff among those to which it is exposed. An 
agent that conforms is not, for whatever reason, in a position to evaluate the payoffs of the 
behaviors to which it is exposed, since the most common behavior is not necessarily the 
fitter one given the circumstances.14 If we accept this assumption, IBN would be a 
"smarter" rule than the copy the common rule. 
 2) If the agents in the population follow the 'copy the common' rule, then we can't 
expect a Darwinian dynamics in the population of behaviors, since the behaviors that are 
imitated by the agents do not have single 'parent' behaviors. This rule does not give rise, 
therefore, to a lineage of behaviors: "... any given behavior will not have a single 'parent' 
behavior on the previous time-step" (Godfrey-Smith, ibid.,157).  
He argues that if the IBN rule is followed instead by the agents,  
"A particular instance of a behavior might, through successive events of imitation, be the 
ancestor of a branching tree of descendant behaviors, spreading through the population. 
Each behavioral instance is transitory, but if successful it may be causally responsible for 
other behaviors of the same kind. Behaviors themselves in this system are replicators" 
(Ibid., 157). 
Godfrey-Smith concludes, assuming (1) and (2), that a conformist rule cannot give rise to a 
Darwinian change in the pool of behaviors themselves (Ibid., 160).  
In what follows, I will object to the first assumption of the argument reconstructed above. I 
will not address the second assumption, since I have not much to say about reproduction 
and inheritance in this paper, despite their indisputable relevance in demarcating different 
kinds of populational dynamics. 
Another perspective on behavior updating rules 
In his discussion of various rules for updating behavior, Godfrey-Smith is clearly focusing 
                                                          
14
 I will put aside, for now, the issue of the psychological requirements for being able to do this kind of 
appraisal. 
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just on what I have called the CPi case (see Table 1), that is, on the effects of following a 
particular rule in the dynamics of a population of behaviors (or, else, on the population of 
cultural variants that cause these behaviors). There is, however, another perspective that 
can be taken into account when addressing the evolutionary effects of following these rules, 
by changing the focus to the BPg case instead. What is now at stake is the evolutionary 
dynamics of a population of groups with different cultural phenotypes, whenever a 
particular rule is followed by the members of those groups.  
So that groups with different cultural phenotypes make up a (less marginal) Darwinian 
population, the agents that are members of these groups should follow a conformist rule, 
contrary to Godfrey-Smith's own expectations. I antecipated the argument supporting this 
thesis in the last section: a conformist rule leads to higher values of V for the population of 
cultural groups.  
Furthermore, I suspect that the effects of the IBN rule on the dynamics of behaviors 
internal to a particular cultural group might endanger its cohesion, which is not the case if 
the copy the common rule is embraced by the agents.15 In other words, an IBN rule might 
lead to higher values of V in the population of group-member behaviors, whereas the copy 
the common rule obviously favors a lower V for this population. 
At the same time, I argued before that a conformist rule for updating behavior conveys 
higher values of the parameter V for the population of groups (that is, this population 
becomes more diversified as far as culture is concerned). As a consequence, they become 
more isolated from each other, since cultural variation builds up barriers for migration 
(language is very effective in this regard). In addition, this situation enhances the strength 
                                                          
15
 Another point that can be made is that "smarter" rules such as IBN and the best response rule presuppose 
that the agent is able to appraise which of her neighbors' behaviors has the best payoff under the prevailing 
environmental conditions. Very often, however, an agent is not able to do this - to appraise whether a 
particular behavior, to which it is exposed, is adaptive or not - and the best bet is to imitate the most common 
behavior in the group. An alternative would be for the agent to rely on individual learning, which can be a 
very risky strategy if, for whatever reason, the environment is informationally translucent for the agent. For 
the distinction between informationally opaque, transparent and translucent environments, see Sterelny, 2003. 
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of selection at the group-level, as I had the opportunity to emphasize before. 
In other words, following a copy the common rule de-Darwinizes the group-member's 
population, as far as the abundance of behavioral variation is concerned.16 A conformist 
bias - and maybe other biases too, besides enforcement mechanisms such as moralistic 
aggression -, might also reduce reproductive competition among the members of a 
particular group: this population scores a lower value in the parameter .17 Therefore, we 
have the conditions for a more cooperative interaction between the members of a particular 
cultural group. Competition switches from the level of group-members to the group-level 
population, where V is higher. By the same token, we should also expect a stronger 
selection at the cultural group-level whenever a conformist bias shapes social learning at 
the lower level of group-members. 
Godfrey-Smith (2009, p. 157-8) makes it clear that models which address behavior 
updating rules, such as those built by Skirms, are attempts to simulate the conditions under 
which cooperation could have evolved. The group-level BPg point of view I am suggesting 
in this section, points to a scenario in which a conformist bias is one of the chief elements 
that favored the evolution of cooperation in human cultural groups. Richerson and Boyd, 
among others, offered reconstructions along these lines, as I mentioned before. 
Concerning the issue of the evolution of rules for updating behaviors, Godfrey-Smith says 
                                                          
16
 Possibly we might also have a de-Darwinization not only regarding V, but also in reproduction-related 
parameters as well, for the group-member's population. At the same time, a transition towards a more 
paradigmatic population at the cultural group-level is taking place, as far as the latter parameters are 
concerned. To argue thoroughly for this thesis is beyond the scope of this paper. 
17
 One might ask about what is being reproduced here. The CPi and CPg cases correspond to populations of 
cultural variants, therefore the latter are the entities being reproduced. Given Godfrey-Smith's distinctions 
between different kinds of reproducers, it would seem straightforward to classify this kind of reproduction 
using the categories of formal and scaffolded reproducers, but he is not clear about it (2009, p. 79, 154-5; cf. 
Dennett, 2011). It is even more complicated to conceive the modality of reproduction involved in the BPg 
case. Godfrey-Smith claims that there is no clear-cut (paradigmatic) reproduction in this case, which implies 
that we can't attribute to cultural groups the status of full individuals. I will argue against this claim at the end 
of the paper.    
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in passing:  
"So evolution can build agents who use social experience to influence their choices in a 
number of ways. It is a striking fact that some of these ways, including IBN, can generate a 
new Darwinian population in the pool of behaviors themselves. But evolution may or may 
not build such agents. And it may build them initially and then build something beyond 
them - suppose biological evolution produced a sequence of successively "smarter" rules in 
a population: first copy-the-common, then IBN, then a best-response rule. The pool of 
behaviors is initially non-Darwinian, becomes Darwinian, and then becomes 
non-Darwinian again" (Ibid., 160). 
Godfrey-Smith does not develop this scenario further in his book, but I want to point out 
that it refers, again, to the CPi case (see Table1).  
My focus on the BPg case points, instead, to a more constrained scenario, in which the 
evolution of a copy the common rule (arguably in the Hominin lineage) is much more 
probable than the evolution of other rules, given the environmental conditions that 
prevailed during the Pleistocene (Boyd & Richerson, 2005). I would guess also that an IBN 
rule has a higher cost for the agent in those environmental conditions.18 
From the point of view I am taking here, a conformist rule might be success-driven, after 
all, and it can be shown that it is able to support, actually, a Darwinian dynamics at the 
biological group-level population (BPg). 
There is a large amount of litterature on the role conformism might have played in Hominin 
                                                          
18
 Besides the point I made before concerning the effects on the parameter V of following the IBN rule, my 
intuition is that, compared to the conformist rule, the costs of following the IBN rule are higher: we have to 
consider the cost of the psychological machinery required for the evaluation of the payoffs and, in addition, to 
take into account the (cost of) risk of imitating a behavior that is not the most adaptive, given the environment 
in which the population has been living (refer also to the point I made in footnote 15 concerning 
informationally translucent environments). This is a situation in which intuition can mislead and mathematical 
modeling is indispensable to compare the various scenarios. 
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groups and on the conditions under which it might have evolved.19 According to several 
models built by Richerson and Boyd, among others, the evolution of imitation as a social 
learning modality is closely related to the evolution of a conformist rule for updating 
behaviors (the equivalent to what Godfrey-Smith calls a 'copy the common' rule). Social 
learning by imitation enhances the fitness of the agent when certain environmental 
conditions prevail: those conditions in which the environment is neither too unstable – 
which would favor, instead, individual learning – nor very stable - which would favor an 
innate behavior. These models give plausibility to a scenario in which a conformist 
transmission bias and high-fidelity imitation evolved in the very same environmental 
conditions. Therefore, a conformist bias has been probably selected for at the group-level, 
and one of its effects was a de-Darwinization of the lower level population, as I argued 
above.20 
CONCLUSION 
The arguments presented in the previous sections - inspired by some of the theses defended 
by dual inheritance theorists -, suggest that a population of groups with different cultural 
phenotypes might be more paradigmatically Darwinian than Godfrey-Smith is willing to 
acknowledge in his 2009 book. It is true, however, that the points I make in this paper are 
restricted to just a few dimensions of the Darwinian hyperspace. The BPg-like population 
might (still) be a marginal one, as far as other dimensions of this hyperspace are taken into 
account, especially those quantified by the reproduction-related parameters. Godfrey-Smith 
is explicit about what is at stake here: 
"Darwinian language is often applied to social groups and communities in such a way that 
the focus is on persistence of a group as contrasted with extinction, or growth as opposed to 
shrinkage (...) In this book I treat Darwinian processes involving growth and persistence 
                                                          
19
 Henrich & Boyd, 1998; Boyd & Richerson, 2005; Abrantes & Almeida, 2011. Hodgson & Knudsen argue 
for a replicator approach on tackling this issue (2010, esp. 140, 159-165). I emphasized at the beginning of the 
paper the reasons why Godfrey-Smith rejects this approach (see also 2009, p. 110-11). 
20
 Another possible scenario would be one in which a conformist bias coevolved with a capacity for 
high-fidelity imitation. We discuss some of those models in Abrantes & Almeida, 2011; Abrantes, 2011.  
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without reproduction as marginal cases (...) So "cultural group selection" of a significant 
kind requires differential reproduction, not just differential persistence, even though the 
border between these is vague" (Ibid., 151-2; cf. 118-9). 
Taking this stance, Godfrey-Smith is skeptical about the possibility of talking about 
reproduction in the case of cultural groups. My intuition, instead, is that it might be fruitful 
to come up with modalities of reproduction suitable to cultural groups, such as persistence. 
This strategy is compatible with the "permissive attitude" (2009, 91) he embraces along the 
book in other hard cases and concerning other parameters of the Darwinian hyperspace.21 
Further work has to be done to argue more forcefully in favor of the thesis that the 
emergence of cultural groups in the Hominin lineage might have been a transition in 
individuality. This is an speculative scenario, albeit plausible, suggested by 
Godfrey-Smith's novel approach to the issue of transitions. It is an empirical matter how far 
we have been going along any of those possible evolutionary paths.22 
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1 Introduction
Do animals lead moral lives? What exactly might be meant by claiming that they do and 
how might we be able to establish that fact? This is the focus of the following, programmatic, 
paper. My aim is to establish a framework for answering these questions and suggest a direction 
for further investigation.
Much of the literature on animals and morals focuses on the moral status of animals. Do 
they need to be considered in our moral calculations and if so how? To what extent does the 
moral status of animals suggest or dictate human attitudes towards them and human practices 
with respect to them? To borrow a phrase from Peter Singer the question is should the circle that 
encompasses the moral community of human beings be expanded to include some if not all 
animals? If so, what criteria are relevant for determining who is or is not to be included in this 
expanded circle? Utilitarians opt for the capacity for feel pain, Kantians and neo-Kantians opt for 
evidence of some degree of rationality or reflective capacity and virtue theorists, I suppose, 
would opt for some evidence of the manifestation of virtue. The point is that each of these 
approaches reflects what might be called an ‘anthropocentric perspective’ insofar as the key 
underlying question seems to be what the implications of including or excluding animals in the 
‘moral circle’ are for us? They are anthropocentric in another sense as well in that who counts as 
morally relevant is determined by criteria that are set by some understanding of human 
conceptions of morality.
My approach is somewhat different. The question I am interested in exploring is this: To 
what extent can we get a handle on the moral lives of animals from the perspective of the 
animals themselves? Does it make any sense and, if so, what sense, to talk of animals as leading 
moral lives independently of questions about how and whether to factor them into our moral 
deliberations? In terms of Singer’s ‘expanding circle’ metaphor we may put the question in the 
following way: Is there one moral circle that encompasses all those who warrant moral 
consideration or are there perhaps a number of (possibly overlapping)  circles centered around 
different focal points? Does it, for example, make sense to talk of a moral community of wolves 
or elephants where the norms of these communities and the criteria for membership are 
determined by and reflections of the social dynamics of the respective groups? In contrast to the 
traditional anthropocentric perspective this approach might be labeled ‘speciocentric.’
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is a brief summary of the main empirical 
and theoretical considerations that suggest that at least some non-human animals lead moral lives 
that can be appropriately characterized from a speciocentric point of view. Section 3 raises two 
questions that need to be addressed if the project of attributing moral lives to animals is to get off 
the ground. Section 4 explores the sense in which animals might be construed as moral agents. 
This discussion draws on some recent work by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord on the nature of 
normativity.i Section 5 is a discussion of a moral version of what is known as the ‘logical 
problem’ in the theory of mind literature. This material draws on some recent work by Robert 
Lurz.ii
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2. The empirical and theoretical background
Here I briefly summarizie material that is dealt with more fully in ‘The moral life of 
animals.’iii  The general empirical and theoretical support for attributing moral sensibilities to 
animals derives from three sources: evolutionary theory, neuroscience and cognitive ethology.  
The argument from evolution has its roots in the work of Charles Darwin and George 
Romanes.iv  The basic idea is that human beings, other mammals and even more distant lineages 
have a shared evolutionary history. This history records the development of the shared 
underlying biological mechanisms that give rise to psychological and affective states.  Different 
lineages may manifest those characteristics in different ways but the implication is that the 
differences between lineages are differences in degree and not differences in kind.  The 
attribution of mental and affective states to animals was blacked by the rise and dominance of 
behaviorism in the first half of the 20th century. However, developments in neuroscience in the 
past 40 years have led some to challenge the behaviorist paradigm that rejects all attributions of 
mental or affective states to animals as anthropomorphism gone wild.
The evidence from neuroscience is extensive although the implications for attributing 
mental and affective states to non-human animals are still somewhat controversial. Two of the 
major figures advancing the view that the neuroscience strongly supports the view that animals 
do have minds and experience affects are Paul Maclean and Jaak Panksepp. The basic idea of 
Maclean’s ‘triune brain hypothesis’ is that the evolved mammalian brain can be conveniently 
represented as the product of 3 developmental stages: A primitive reptilian brain located in the 
basal ganglia, an old mammalian brain located in the limbic system, and a new mammalian brain 
located in the neocortex.v The triune brain thesis argues for deep homologies between the brains 
of animals and the brains of human beings.  Neurological evidence points to deep structural 
similarities between the ancient brain systems that we share with other animals.  In particular, the 
ancient structures are the neural source of basic qualitative feels or affects. Jaak Panksepp has 
identified seven primary limbic emotional action systems which, he argues, are the basis of 
animal responsiveness and lie at the foundation of both emotional and cognitive states. In 
addition to this shared affective neurostructure, he has recently argued that mammals share brain 
structures that constitute what he calls “proto-selves” and “core selves.” Further study, he 
suggests, may reveal the basis for attributing a sense of self to a wide range of animals. It stands 
to reason, he argues, that animals with brain structures similar to those in humans not only react 
in ways that make them appear to have qualitative experiences similar to those of humans when 
the homologous brain structures are stimulated, but also that they do in fact have those 
experiences.vi
The unregenerate behaviorists among you may object that the attribution of affects to 
non-human animals is unjustified anthropomorphism. Frans de Waal, among others, however, 
argues that it is not.  de Waal argues that there is a double standard at work.vii  On the one hand, 
researchers take cognitive differences to justify the non-attribution of emotional and mental 
capacities to animals while, on the other hand, they ignore evolutionary evidence that suggests 
that animals and human beings have shared inherited brain structures associated with emotional 
and mental capacities.  de Waal labels this blind spot “Anthropodenial,” which he characterizes 
as the a priori rejection of the importance of the fact that although non-human animals are not 
human, humans are animals.
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The third line of relevant scientific findings comes from investigations by cognitive 
ethologists. In their book Wild Justice, Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce argue from the 
perspective of cognitive ethology that animals exhibit behaviors that are best interpreted as 
manifestations of empathy, cooperation, and a sense of fairness.  In essence, “animals have 
morality.”viii  Bekoff and Pierce understand morality to be “a suite of interrelated other-regarding 
behaviors that cultivate and regulate complex interactions within social groups.”ix  However, 
these behaviors do not constitute morality in themselves; a certain level of cognitive and 
emotional sophistication is necessary.  Bekoff and Pierce’s approach is data-driven, and they 
emphasize the need and importance of expanding research beyond non-human primates to other 
social mammals: Hunting predators such as wolves, coyotes, and lions, as well as elephants, 
mice, rats, meerkats, and whales, among others.  In addition, they emphasize the importance of 
studying animals in their natural habitats and not merely in the confines of laboratories where 
they are often asked to perform in accordance with the interests of animal behaviorists, which 
may or may not reflect the interests of the animals themselves.
Where is the line to be drawn between animals that evince morality in this limited sense 
and those that do not?  Bekoff and Pierce suggest that the line is shifting as more empirical 
evidence becomes available and as our philosophical understanding of what it means to be moral 
is modulated by reflection on the scientific data.  Although their focus is on social mammals, 
there is a widening body of evidence that suggests that some birds have the wherewithal to 
constitute a moral community, in the sense of relevant emotions, co-operation, and the like.
Although they argue that the data strongly support the attribution of morality to animals, 
Bekoff and Pierce also argue that what constitutes morality has to be understood as species 
specific.  Thus, what counts as morality for human beings may not apply well to wolves, for 
instance.  Nevertheless, they argue, the fact that human standards of morality are not appropriate 
for wolves does not mean that wolves do not possess some sense of moral relationships that is 
exhibited in their own manifestations of empathy, cooperation and a sense of fairness.  The net 
effect is that there is not one sense of moral community and that we humans, as prototypical 
moral agents, may expand our understanding of morality to include some organisms and exclude 
others.  The proper way to understand animal morality, they suggest, is to see that there are a 
number of distinct species-specific moral communities.  Within these diverse communities, what 
counts as moral needs to be  attuned to the characteristic features of the species themselves. 
Indeed, even within species, different communities may develop different social practices, so that 
what is acceptable in one wolf pack, for example, may not be acceptable in another.  
These considerations, taken together, are compelling support for the claim that at least 
some animals, especially the social animals, have moral lives. The evidence is compelling but 
not conclusive. Putting aside behaviorist qualms there are still significant hurdles to be overcome 
before we can be confident in concluding that animals are moral creatures in their own right. To 
these qualms we now turn.
3 Two questions
There is an extensive literature on the dual questions of whether animals have minds and 
whether, if they do, they have a ‘theory of mind.’ There are two fundamental issues: (1) Do 
animals have minds?, and (2) Given that they do, are they capable of attributing mental states to 
others and acting on those attributions? Parallel questions can be raised with respect to the moral 
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lives of animals. (1m) Do animals have moral lives, that is, are they motivated by ‘moral’ 
considerations, properly understood?  (2m) Given that they are, can they attribute moral 
motivations to others and act accordingly?
Robert Lurz, in a recent book, has identified two fundamental issues that need to be 
addressed in order to be in a position to answer questions about the mindreading capabilities of 
animals. One is theoretical and one is experimental. Parallel issues have to be addressed in order 
to be in a position to answer questions about the moral lives of animals.
For our problem, the theoretical issue is this: What does it mean to attribute moral lives to 
animals? In particular, what does it mean to attribute moral motivations to animals? The 
empirical issue is this: How best can we test for the existence moral sensibilities and moral 
motivations in animals?
I do not have a good answer to either of these two questions but I think we can make 
some headway in identifying the key questions that need to be answered and in identifying what 
is the proper perspective for answering them.
4. Levels of agency  
To the extent that we attribute psychological and moral states to animals they are, in some 
sense, persons and not merely biological organisms. What, then, does it mean to attribute 
personhood to animals? We can adopt either an anthropocentric or a speciocentric perspective on 
this question. From an anthropocentric point of view, something is a person if it has a sufficient 
number of properties that make it an entity like us. I am not sure what constellation of properties 
this includes but the fact that in some legal sense corporations can be persons shows that the 
applicability of the concept is not limited to living beings. The central ideas that legitimate the 
extension of the idea of personhood to corporations, for instance, are notions of agency and 
responsibility. Corporations can act as (legal) agents and can be held (legally) responsible for 
their actions. However, what degree of agency and responsibility they possess is conferred upon 
them by human beings and their social practices. What about the moral agency of animals? Is 
that to be construed as merely derivative as well? A speciocentric perspective would reject this 
way of understanding what it means for an animal to be a moral agent. To the extent that animals 
lead moral lives (as opposed to being merely factors in our moral calculations) we must be able 
to construe them as moral agents in their own right. Can this be done?
 In a recent paper responding to claims in the literature that attribute moral agency to 
animals, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord asks ‘Just what is it to be a moral agent?’.x  In effect, what is 
the nature of normativity? In his analysis, Sayre-McCord identifies several levels of ‘agency’ 
where an agent is understood to be something capable of representing its environment and acting 
on the basis of those representations (p. 5). These are, in order of increasing sophistication,  (1) 
‘stimulus-response agents who ‘represent the world as being a certain way and then respond 
directly (p. 5);’ (2) ‘planning agents,’ which are basically stimulus-response agents with the extra 
capacity to identify alternative courses of action and act in accordance with some plan of action. 
Sayre-McCord characterizes these agents as ‘decision-theoretical’ agents whose behaviors can be 
adequately modeled by decision theory (p. 5); (3) ‘strategic agents’ are agents who attribute 
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designs and plans to others and act accordingly. Their behavior can be modeled by game theory; 
(4) ‘norm-governed agents’ are ‘strategic agents . . . [who] introduce rules for behavior with 
which they are disposed to conform and disposed to enforce in various ways (p. 7);’ and finally, 
(5) ‘rational agents,’ that is, strategic norm-governed agents who are ‘able to represent the 
different options as better or worse, as right or wrong, or as justified or not and . . . [are] able to 
act on the basis of such normative representations (p. 7).’  
On Sayre-McCord’s account, truly moral agents need to be able to have a capacity for 
second-order reflection on first order states. That is, truly moral agents need not only follow 
norms but be capable of recognizing that they are following norms and be capable of using this 
reflective insight to guide their actions. This is a high bar for non-human animals to pass. 
Whether they are capable of passing it depends on how sophisticated their mental and 
psychological capacities are. Many who are willing to allow that some animals have 
sophisticated psychological states are reluctant to attribute reflective second-order capacities to 
them. Sayre-McCord, for one, allows that some animals are capable of rising to the level of 
norm-governed agents but he resists the attributing any rational, and hence, truly moral, agency 
to them. 
The distinction between norm-governed agents and rational agents roughly parallels 
Kant’s distinction between acting in accordance with duty and acting from duty. Indeed, this is 
the central theme of Sayre-McCord’s analysis (p. 2) . His main project is to provide a Kantian 
account of rational agency freed from the metaphysical baggage of Kant’s own account (p. 2) For 
our present purposes, the question is: ‘Is norm-governed agency good enough for non-human 
moral agency? It is clear that many cognitive ethologists see the structured behavior of social 
animals as manifesting norm governed behavior. Some, perhaps sympathetic to the idea that such 
behavior doesn’t rise to the Kantian level of moral agency, are content to qualify such animals as 
‘proto-moral’ beings. I don’t want to haggle over labels here but merely want to suggest that the 
resistance to qualifying animals as ‘truly’ moral may reflect a subtle anthropocentric bias. If we 
view human morality as one manifestation of a shared evolved set of social enabling 
mechanisms, then the peculiar feature of rational reflectivity, as Sayre-McCord understands it, 
looks more like a refinement of a capacity that is shared among many lineages rather than as a 
defining characteristic. If so then we can tentatively accept norm-governed agency as moral 
agency enough and move on to the empirical question of how to establish whether any animals 
do live moral lives, so understood.
5. The logical problem
Turning to the question of how to empirically test whether or not animals lead moral 
lives, we confront what has been labeled in the mind reading literature as the ‘logical problem.’ 
The mind reading problem is this: Is there any way to empirically distinguish between (1) 
animals that are mind readers, that is, animals that act in light of their attribution of intentional 
states to others, and (2) animals that are acting on behavioral cues but who do not attribute 
intentional states to others? The problem arises, in part, because, in the absence of language, the 
attribution of mind reading to animals is determined solely by their behavioral responses to 
environmental situations. In a recent book, Robert Lurz argues that all previous experimental 
results that suggest that some animals are mind readers are compromised by a failure to rule out 
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the hypothesis that the observed behaviors can be explained equally well by a ‘behavior-reading’ 
hypothesis to the effect that the animals are responding to behavioral cues and are not attributing 
mental states to either other conspecifics or to the experimenters.xi 
Some take this failure to be able to discriminate between cases of mind-reading and cases 
of behavior-reading to be an insurmountable barrier to the unequivocal attribution of mind 
reading to organisms that cannot communicate their thoughts and intentions through the use of 
language that is intelligible to us. Lurz, however, argues that it is possible to design experiments 
that will be able to discriminate between the two hypotheses and he proposes several, as yet 
untested designs, that he claims will yield different predictions depending upon whether the 
tested animals are mind-readers or not. I do not want to pursue this here but rather to formulate 
the analogous problem for determining whether or not non-human animals lives live moral lives.
The logical problem for the moral lives question boils down to this: Is it possible to 
experimentally distinguish between animals that are acting in accordance with moral norms and 
animals that are behaving as if they were but for whom no moral considerations, per se, are 
relevant? If we allow, for the sake of argument, that morally motivated animals are norm-
governed in Sayre-McCord’s sense then what we want to know is whether the animals behavior 
is directed by (first-order) moral motivations or whether the characterization of their behavior as 
norm-governed is imposed upon their behavior by the ethological investigators.
This problem dogs much, if not all, of the cognitive ethology data that suggests that many 
social animals exhibit behaviors that can be interpreted as a result of the animals acknowledging 
and enforcing social and moral norms within their respective communities. Unlike Lurz, I do not 
have any good sense that these alternative accounts are empirically distinguishable. If they are 
not, then the claim that animals lead moral lives will remain in limbo despite the suggestive 
evidence from evolutionary considerations and the neuroscientific data. However, I am 
persuaded by the work of the cognitive ethologists that any decisive conclusions one way or the 
other must be the result of investigations in situ where experiments and observations are set up to 
reflect the conditions and expectations of the animals under investigation and not the 
expectations of alien investigators (that is, us).
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Abstract
The classical interpretation of probability together with the Principle of Indiffer-
ence are formulated in terms of probability measure spaces in which the probability
is given by the Haar measure. A notion called Labeling Irrelevance is defined in
the category of Haar probability spaces, it is shown that Labeling Irrelevance is
violated and Bertrand’s Paradox is interpreted as the very proof of violation of La-
beling Invariance. It is shown that Bangu’s attempt [2] to block the emergence of
Bertrand’s Paradox by requiring the re-labeling of random events to preserve ran-
domness cannot succeed non-trivially. A non-trivial strategy to preserve Labeling
Irrelevance is identified and it is argued that, under the interpretation of Bertrand’s
Paradox suggested in the paper, the paradox does not undermine either the Princi-
ple of Indifference or the classical interpretation and is in complete harmony with
how mathematical probability theory is used in the sciences to model phenomena.
It also is argued however that the content of the Principle of Indifference cannot be
specified in such a way that it can establish the classical interpretation of probability
as descriptively accurate, predictively successful or rational.
1 The main claims
Bertrand’s Paradox, published first in [3], is regarded a classical problem in con-
nection with the classical interpretation of probability based on the Principle of
Indifference, and it continues to attract interest [17], [22], [2], [20] in spite of al-
leged resolutions that have been suggested in the large and still growing literature
discussing the issue ([12] and [16] are perhaps the most well-known suggestions for
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resolutions; the Appendix in [16] contains a brief summary of a number of typical
views of the Paradox).
It is not the aim of this paper to offer yet another “resolution” or criticize the
ones available; rather, we suggest a new interpretation of Bertrand’s Paradox and
analyze its relation to the classical interpretation of probability. The interpretation
proposed here should make clear that Bertrand’s Paradox cannot be “resolved” –
not because it is an unresolvable, genuine paradox but because there is nothing to be
resolved: the “paradox” simply states a provable, non-trivial mathematical fact, a
fact which is perfectly in line both with the correct intuition about how probability
theory should be used to model phenomena and with how probability theory is in
fact applied in the sciences.
The key idea of the interpretation to be developed here is that the category of
probability measure spaces with an infinite set of random events for which a clas-
sical interpretation of probability based on the Principle of Indifference can be
meaningfully formulated is the one in which the set X of elementary events is a
compact topological group, the Boolean algebra S representing the set of random
events is the set of Borel subsets of X and the probability measure pH is the (nor-
malized) Haar measure on S. After stating the General Classical Interpretation
in terms of the probability measure space (X,S, pH) together with the Principle
of Indifference, we will define a notion called Labeling Irrelevance in this cat-
egory of measure spaces: Labeling Irrelevance expresses the intuition that the
specific way the random events are named is irrelevant from the perspective of the
value of their probability understood according to the classical interpretation. It
will be shown that Labeling Irrelevance does not hold in this category of proba-
bility measure spaces and we interpret Bertrand’s Paradox as stating this provable
mathematical fact.
This interpretation makes it possible to formulate precisely the extra condition
on re-labelings that ensures that re-labelings do preserve the probabilities of events;
the condition is an expression of the demand that re-labelings do not affect our
epistemic status about the elementary events. We also will show that the recent
attempt by Bangu [2] to block the emergence of Bertrand’s Paradox by requiring
re-labelings to preserve randomness cannot succeed non-trivially.
The interpretation will also make it clear that Bertrand’s Paradox does not
affect the Principle of Indifference and does not, in and by itself, undermine the
classical interpretation of probability – the classical interpretation, the Principle
of Indifference and Labeling Irrelevance are independent ideas. This is not
to say that the classical interpretation is maintainable however; the main problem
with it is that it gives the impression that it is possible to infer empirically correct
probabilities from an abstract principle stating some sort of epistemic neutrality.
It would be a mystery if this were possible, but we will argue in the final section
that this is not possible and does not in fact happen in applications of probability
theory.
2 The elementary classical interpretation of
probability
Betrand’s Paradox appeared at a time when probability theory had already pro-
gressed from the purely combinatorial phase involving only a finite number of ran-
dom events to the period when it got intertwined with calculus. This development
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began in the early 18th century with the appearance of limit theorems (theorem
of large numbers, Bernoulli 1713, and central limit theorem, de Moivre 1733, [8]);
yet, by the late 19th century the theory had not yet reached the maturity that
would have made the mathematical foundations of the theory clear and transpar-
ent. This was clearly recognized by Hilbert, who, in his famous lecture in Paris in
1900, mentioned the need of establishing probability theory axiomatically as one of
the important open problems (Hilbert’s 6th problem [27], [26][p. 32-36]). Hilbert’s
call was answered only in 1933, when Kolmogorov firmly anchored probability the-
ory within measure theory [13]. (See [7] for the history of some of the major steps
leading to the Kolmogorovian axioms.)
In the measure theoretic approach probability theory is a triplet (X,S, p), where
X is the set of elementary random events, S (the set of general random events) is
a Boolean σ algebra of certain subsets of X and p (the probability) is a countably
additive measure from S into the unit interval [0, 1]. Typically, one also needs
random variables to describe certain features of the phenomenon to be described
probabilistically: A (real valued) random variable f is a measurable function f
from X into the set of real numbers R; measurability being the requirement that
the inverse image f−1(d) of any Borel set d in R belongs to S. The measurability
requirement entails that the distribution of a random variable d 7→ p(f−1(d)) is
well-defined, the distribution of f is in fact the probability measure p ◦ f−1 on
B(R) defined as (p ◦ f−1)(d) = p(f−1(d)) for all Borel sets d ∈ B(R). The number
p(f−1(d)) is the probability that f takes its value in d. Note that the events also
can be regarded as random variables: an element A in S can be identified with the
characteristic (also called: indicator) function χA of the set A (see e.g. [19] for the
mathematical notions of measure theoretic probability).
The significance of probability theory being part of measure theory is that
foundational-conceptual problems of probability theory, such as Bertrand’s Para-
dox, can best be analyzed in terms of measure theoretic concepts. With few ex-
ceptions, the papers on Bertrand’s Paradox typically do not aim at providing an
analysis on this level of abstraction however, and, as a result, the precise nature of
the paradox remains less clear than it should be. One such exception is Shackel’s
paper [22], which raises the issue of “Getting the level of abstraction right” [22][p.
156] explicitly. But the level of abstraction suggested by Shackel is a bit too high.
To see why, we recall first the classical interpretation of probability together with
the Principle of Indifference in measure theoretic terms.
The elementary version of the classical interpretation of probability concerns the
probability space (Xn,P(Xn), pu), where Xn is a finite set containing n number of
random events and the full power set P(Xn) of Xn represents the set of all events.
The probability measure pu is determined by the requirement that the probability
pu(A) be equal to the ratio of the “number of favorable cases to the number of all
cases”:
pu(A) =
number of elements in the set {xi : xi ∈ A}
n
(1)
This is equivalent to saying that pu is the probability measure that is uniform on the
set of elementary events. While it is not always stated and emphasized explicitly, it
also is part of the classical interpretation what we call here the Interpretive Link:
that the numbers pu(A) are related to something non-mathematical. Without such
an interpretive link, the classical interpretation is not an interpretation of proba-
bility at all: the numbers pu(A) defined by (1) are just pure, simple mathematical
relations. There are two standard Interpretive Links: The Frequency Link
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and the Degree of Belief Link. We formulate here the first only, the latter will
be discussed briefly in section 7. Thus we have the following specification of the
classical interpretation:
Elementary Classical Interpretation: In case of a finite number of elementary
events the probabilities of events are given by the measure pu that is uniform on
the set of elementary events and (Frequency Link:) the numbers pu(A) will be
(approximately) equal to the relative frequency of A occurring in a series of trials
producing elementary random events from Xn.
Notice the future tense in the above formulation: it is this reference for future
random trials that distinguishes the classical interpretation (with the Frequency
Link) from the frequency interpretation, in which the ensemble of elementary ran-
dom events determining A’s relative frequency must be specified before one can talk
about probabilities (cf. [25][p. 24]).
The classical interpretation so formulated is not maintainable however: simple
examples (such as throwing a loaded die) show that it is only under special circum-
stances that pu(A) is indicative of the frequencies with which A will occur in trials.
This is what the Principle of Indifference is supposed to express. To state this
principle we reformulate first the condition (1). Let Πn be the group of permuta-
tions of the n element set {1, 2, . . . n} and π ∈ Πn be a permutation. Then the
probability measure pu on P(Xn) which is uniform on Xn is determined uniquely
by the condition
for every π ∈ Πn one has: pu({xi}) = pu({xpi(i)}) for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . n} (2)
Elementary Principle of Indifference: If the permutation group Πn expresses
epistemic indifference about the elementary random events in Xn, then the (Ele-
mentary) Classical Interpretation is correct.
Thus the (Elementary) Principle of Indifference states that the (elementary
version of the) classical interpretation of probability is maintainable only if one is
epistemically neutral in some sense about the elementary events. For now, we leave
it open how to specify the content of the “epistemic neutrality”, we will return to
the issue of epistemic neutrality in section 7.
3 The general classical interpretation of prob-
ability in terms of Haar measures
Bertrand’s Paradox is typically regarded as an argument against the universal ap-
plicability of the Principle of Indifference: Bertrand’s Paradox type arguments
are intended to show that applying the Principle of Indifference can lead to
assigning different probabilities to the same event. Both the original version of the
argument and the numerous simplified versions of it involve an (uncountably) infi-
nite number of elementary random events however. But then it is not obvious at all
how one can apply the Principle of Indifference because the formulation of it in
the previous section looses its meaning if the set of elementary events is not finite:
there is no permutation group in the infinite case with respect to which one could
require invariance of the measure yielding the “right” probabilities; equivalently:
there is no probability measure on an infinite S that would be uniform on the infi-
nite set X of elementary events. What is then the Principle of Indifference in
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connection with such infinite probability spaces? Without answering this question
in suitable generality, Bertrand’s Paradox cannot be properly discussed in measure
theoretic concepts.
Shackel’s paper [22], which aims at an analysis of Bertrand’s Paradox in abstract
measure theoretic terms, realizes the importance of this question but does not offer
a convincing specification of the Principle of Indifference: Shackel just assumes
a measure µ on S and stipulates that the probabilities p(A) be given by µ as p(A) =
µ(A)/µ(X) (“Principle of indifference for continuum sized sets” [22][p. 159]). But
there are infinitely many measures µ on S that could in principle be taken as ones
that define a probability p. Which one should be singled out that yields a p that
could in principle be interpreted as expressing epistemic indifference about elements
in X? This crucial question remains unanswered in [22].
It is clear that without some further structure on an infinite X it is not possible
to single out any probability measure on S and hence it is impossible to formulate
an indifference principle on such a measurable space. The formulation of the Ele-
mentary Principle of Indifference in terms of the permutation group Πn gives
a hint about what kind of structure is needed in the more general case however: It
is a natural idea to try to replace the permutation group Πn by another group G
to be interpreted as expressing epistemic neutrality and hope that the elements g
of G determine a function αg : X → X (an action on X) in such a way that if one
requires the analogue of (2) by postulating
for all g ∈ G : p∗(A) = p∗(αg[A]) for all A ∈ S (3)
then the above condition (3) determines a unique probability measure p∗ on S, just
like in the case of a finite number of events. Problem is that for a general measurable
space (X,S) with a continuum sized X there is no guarantee in general that a G
exist leading to a p∗ – much less that it leads to a unique p∗. There is however such
a guarantee under some additional assumptions: If X itself is a topological group
satisfying certain conditions.
If X is a locally compact abelian topological group, or a not necessarily abelian
but compact topological group, then there exists a unique (up to multiplication
by a constant) measure (called: the Haar measure) pH on (the Borel sets of) X
which is invariant with respect to the group action. Furthermore, if X is compact
then the measure pH is normalized and pH is then a probability measure. (The
Appendix collects some elementary facts about the Haar measure; equation (29) in
the Appendix formulates the invariance of the Haar measure precisely).
The canonical example of an unbounded Haar measure is the Lebesgue measure
on the real line: the Lebesgue measure is the unique measure on the real line that
is invariant with respect to the real numbers as an additive group – the group
action is the shift on the real line. The same holds for the Lebesgue measure
on Rn. The normalized restrictions of the Lebesgue measure on Rn to bounded,
compact subsets of Rn are thus distinguished by the feature that they originate
from a shift-invariant measure; moreover, the Lebesgue measure on any interval
[a, b] also can be regarded as Haar measure in its own right and the same holds for
sets ×ni [ai, bi] in R
n (cf. Appendix). Both the original Bertrand’s Paradox and the
simplified versions of it take the normalized restriction of the Lebesgue measure to
some bounded, compact sets in Rn (n = 1, 2) as the measure that expresses the
Principle of Indifference. This amounts to interpreting (more or less tacitly)
the group that generates the Lebesgue measure as a symmetry expressing epistemic
neutrality about the elementary events.
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Thus in general, the group action on X determined by X itself as a group can
play the role of the action of the permutation group on Xn, and the Haar measure
pH on a compact X is the analogue of the uniform distribution on Xn if a non-zero
uniform distribution on the elements X does not exist, which is the case if X is
an infinite set. Note that taking the Haar measure as the analogue of the uniform
distribution is also justifiable using maximum entropy techniques (see [11]). In what
follows, (X,S, pH) stands for a probability measure space in which X is a compact
topological group with continuous group action, S is the Borel σ algebra on X
and pH is the Haar measure on S. In the terminology of these group and measure
theoretic notions the general classical interpretation of probability and the related
principle of indifference can be consistently formulated generally as follows:
General Classical Interpretation: If X is a compact topological group, then
the probabilities of the events are given by the Haar measure pH on (the Borel sets
of) X and (Frequency Link:) the numbers pu(A) will be (approximately) equal
to the relative frequency of A occurring in a series of trials producing elementary
random events from X.
General Principle of Indifference: If X is a compact topological group and if
the group action expresses epistemological indifference about the elementary random
events in X, then the General Classical Interpretation is correct.
4 Labeling Irrelevance
Part of the intuition ingrained in the classical interpretation of probability is what
can be called Labeling Irrelevance. Intuitively, the Labeling Irrelevance states
that from the perspective of the values of the probabilities it does not matter how
the events are named: re-naming them should not change their probability. To
formulate this idea precisely, we need the notion of re-labeling (re-naming) first:
If (X,S, pH) and (X
′,S ′, p′H) are two probability spaces describing the same phe-
nomenon then the map h : X → X ′ is called a re-labeling if it is a bijection between
X and X ′ and both h and its inverse h−1 are measurable, i.e. it holds that
h[A] ∈ S ′ for all A ∈ S (4)
h−1[B] ∈ S for all B ∈ S ′ (5)
(Here h[A] = {h(x) : x ∈ A} and h−1[A′] = {h−1(x′) : x′ ∈ A′}.) Note that without
the measurability condition required of h it can happen that a general event A ∈ S
has probability but its re-named version h[A] does not – in this case h cannot be
called re-naming of random events (and similarly for h′).
Labeling Irrelevance is the claim that from the perspective of probabilities (un-
derstood in the spirit of the classical interpretation), naming is irrelevant; that is to
say, if (X,S, pH) and (X
′,S ′, p′H) are two probability spaces and h is a re-labeling
between X and X ′ then it holds that
p′H(h[A]) = pH(A) for all A ∈ S (6)
pH(h
−1[A′]) = p′H(A
′) for all A′ ∈ S ′ (7)
Recall (see e.g. [1][p. 3]) that two probability measure spaces (X,S, p) and (X ′,S ′, p′)
are called isomorphic if there are sets Y ∈ S and Y ′ ∈ S ′ such that p(Y ) = 0 = p′(Y ′)
and there exists a bijection f : (X \Y ) → (X ′ \Y ′) such that both f and its inverse
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f−1 are measurable and such that both f and f−1 preserve the measure p and p′,
respectively; i.e. (8)-(9) below hold:
p′(f [A]) = p(A) for all A ∈ S (8)
p(f−1[A′]) = p′(A′) for all A′ ∈ S ′ (9)
The function f is called then an isomorphism between the probability measure
spaces. Labeling Irrelevance can therefore be expressed compactly by saying
Labeling Irrelevance: Any re-labeling between probability spaces (X,S, pH) and
(X ′,S ′, p′H) is an isomorphism between these probability spaces.
5 General Bertrand’s Paradox
Labeling Irrelevance is obviously a very strong claim and Bertrand’s paradox
can be interpreted as the proof that it cannot be maintained in general (see below).
But why would one think that Labeling Irrelevance holds in the first place?
The answer is: because Labeling Irrelevance does hold for an infinite number of
probability spaces: for probability spaces with any finite number elementary events
probabilities of which are given by the uniform probability measure. A bijection h
between two finite sets Xn and X
′ = Xm of elementary events exists if and only if the
sets Xn and Xm have the same number of elements, n = m, and this entails that the
two uniform distributions on those equivalent sets will assign the same probability
to A and h[A] (and to A′ and h−1[A′]) – no Bertrand’s Paradox can arise in this case.
Since the intuition about probability theory was shaped historically by situations
involving only a finite number of random events, it is not surprising that Labeling
Irrelevance became part of the intuition about probability. It turns out however
that this intuition is a poor guide if the set of elementary events is not finite: This
is precisely what Bertrand’s Paradox shows, general form of which is the following
statement:
General Bertrand Paradox: Let (X,S, pH) and (X
′,S ′, p′H) be probability spaces
with compact topological groups X and X ′ having an infinite number of elements
and pH , p
′
H being the respective Haar measures on the Borel σ algebras S and
S ′ of X and X ′. Then Labeling Irrelevance does not hold for (X,S, pH) and
(X ′,S ′, p′H) in the sense that
• either there is no re-labeing between X and X ′;
• or, if there is a re-labeling between X and X ′, then there also exists a re-
labeling that violates Labeling Irrelevance.
The General Bertrand’s Paradox is a trivial consequence of the following non-
trivial theorem in measure theory:
Proposition 1 ([24], [21]). If X is an infinite, compact topological group with the
Haar measure pH on the Borel σ algebra S of X, then there exists an autohomeo-
morphism θ of X and an open set E in S such that pH(θ[E]) 6= pH(E).
By definition an autohomeomorphism θ of X is a bijection from X into X such
that both θ and its inverse θ−1 are continuous. Since continuous functions are Borel
measurable, an autohomeomorphism is a re-labeling: a re-labeling of X in terms of
its own elements. Assume now that (X,S, pH) and (X
′,S ′, p′H) are two probability
spaces with infinite, compact topological groups X and X ′ and Haar measures pH
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and p′H . If h : X → X
′ is a re-labeling between X and X ′ then either h is an
isomorphism between the probability spaces (i.e. preserves the probability in the
sense of (6)-(7)) or it is not. If it is not, then Labeling Invariance is violated by h.
If h does preserve the probability (and is thus an isomorphism between (X,S, pH)
and (X ′,S ′, p′H)) then by Proposition 1 there exists an autohomeomorphism θ on
X and there exists an open set E ∈ S such that pH(θ[E]) 6= pH(E). This means
that for the re-labeling given by the composition h ◦ θ we have
p′H((h ◦ θ)[E]) = p
′
H(h[θ[E]]) = pH(θ[E]) 6= pH(E) (10)
so the re-labeling h ◦ θ violates (6) and thus h ◦ θ violates Labeling Invariance.
In either case Labeling Invariance is violated. Furthermore, the autohomeomor-
phism ensured by Proposition 1 provides a re-labeling of the elementary set of events
of any infinite compact group in terms of its own elementary events in such a way
that the Haar measure yielding the probabilities of the events in the spirit of the
classical interpretation are not preserved under the re-labeling.
The General Bertrand’s Paradox is thus a general feature of infinite probability
measure spaces with the Haar measure yielding the probabilities, and note that it
says more than the original Bertrand’s Paradox, which only claimed that there exist
Haar measures and re-labelings that violate Labeling Irrelevance: The General
Bertrand’s Paradox says that no two Haar probability spaces can satisfy Label-
ing Irrelevance; i.e. if there is at all a re-labeling between two probability spaces
(X,S, pH) and (X
′,S ′, p′H) with infinite X and X
′ then there is also re-labeling be-
tween these spaces that violates Labeling Invariance, and for any space (X,S, pH)
with an infinite X there exists a space (namely itself) and a self-re-labeling of
(X,S, pH) that violates Labeling Invariance. Thus Bertrand’s 1888 Paradox can
be viewed as the specific “Lebesgue measure case” of a mathematical theorem that
was proved in full generality in 1993 only.
We close this section by giving an explicit, elementary example of violation of
Labeling Invariance; this example will be referred to in the next section. In a
well-defined sense (explained in Remark 1) the example is general.
Example Let [a, b] and [c, d] be two closed intervals of the real numbers and
([a, b],S[a,b], p[a,b]) and ([c, d],S[c,d], p[c,d])
be the two probability spaces with p[a,b] and p[c,d] being the normalized Lebesgue
measures on the intervals [a, b] and [c, d], with S[a,b] and S[c,d] being the Borel measur-
able sets of the respective intervals. Elementary algebraic calculation and reasoning
show that one can choose the parameters α, β and γ in the definition of the simple
quadratic map h defined on the real line by
h(x) = αx2 + βx + γ (11)
in such a way that h maps [a, b] to [c, d] bijectively and both h and its inverse
are continuous hence (Borel) measurable. Thus (the restriction to [a, b] of) h is a
re-labeling between ([a, b],S[a,b], p[a,b]) and ([c, d],S[c,d], p[c,d]). Specifically, the pa-
rameters below have this feature
α =
d− c
(b− a)2
(12)
β = −2a
d− c
(b− a)2
(13)
γ = a2
d− c
(b− a)2
+ c (14)
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Furthermore, if ǫ is a real number such that [a, a + ǫ] ⊆ [a, b] then
p[a,b]([a, a + ǫ]) =
ǫ
b− a
and since h takes [a, a + ǫ] into [c, c + d−c
(b−a)2
ǫ2] one has
p[c,d](h
[
[a, a + ǫ]
]
) =
1
d− c
(
c +
d− c
(b− a)2
ǫ2
)
It is clear then that for many ǫ
p[a,b]([a, a + ǫ]) =
ǫ
b− a
6=
1
d− c
(
c +
d− c
(b− a)2
ǫ2
)
= p[c,d](h
[
[a, a + ǫ]
]
) (15)
which is a violation of Labeling Irrelevance.
Remark 1. Note that the above example is typical in the following sense: A proba-
bility measure space is called a standard probability space if X is a complete, separa-
ble metric space and S is the Borel σ algebra of X. Standard, non-atomic probability
spaces are isomorphic to ([a, b],L[a,b], p[a,b]) with some interval [a, b] where L[a,b] is
the algebra of Lebesgue measurable sets in [a, b] (see [1][Chapter 1, p. 3]). Hence
the above example gives a large number of re-labelings that violate Labeling Ir-
relevance in the category of spaces (X,S, pH) with X being a complete, separable
metric space. This covers all the spaces that occur in connection with Bertrand’s
Paradox.
6 Attempts to save Labeling Irrelevance
One may attempt to defend Labeling Irrelevance by trying to block the emergence
of Bertrand’s Paradox. The previous section makes it clear what the possible strate-
gies are to achieve this: One can impose some extra condition on re-labelings that
entails either that re-labelings satisfying the extra conditions do not exist (Strategy
A) or that the re-labelings satisfying the additional conditions force the re-labelings
to be isomorphisms of the probability spaces (Strategy B). Although not formu-
lated in this terminology, Bangu’s recent attempt [2] is an example of Strategy A.
We show below that Bangu’s suggestion for Strategy A is ambiguous however and
that resolving the ambiguity makes it either a trivial case of Strategy B or is unsuc-
cessful. A successful implementation of Strategy B is to say that it is unreasonable
to expect a re-labeling to preserve probabilities unless the re-labeling also preserves
our epistemic status with respect to the elementary events: after all, the Principle
of Indifference states that pH is the correct probability only if the group structure
of X expresses epistemic neutrality. So the following stipulation is in the spirit of
the Principle of Indifference:
Definition: The re-labeling h between probability spaces (X,S, pH) and (X
′,S ′, p′H)
preserves the epistemic status if it is a group isomorphism between X and X ′.
Since the probability measures pH and p
′
H are completely determined by the
respective group actions, re-labelings that preserve the epistemic status are isomor-
phisms between the measure spaces, hence no Bertrand’s Paradox can arise with
respect to such re-labelings; furthermore, not every re-labeling is a group isomor-
phism – thus this strategy works in a non-trivial way.
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Bangu’s suggestion is that one should only expect Labeling Irrelevance to hold
for bijections that “preserve randomness” – this is his Assumption R – Bertrand’s
paradox is only a paradox in his view if Labeling Irrelevance is violated by re-
labelings satisfying the randomness condition, which, he claims, has not been shown
and the burden of proof is on those who claim such re-labelings exist. It is clear from
the wording of his paper that he conjectures that no such proof can be given, i.e.
that no randomness preserving re-labelings exist that violate Labeling Irrelevance
(i.e. that he is following Strategy A).
As Bangu also points out, the notion of randomness is notoriously both vague and
rich: the adjective “random” can be applied to different entities (events, processes,
dynamics, ensembles etc.), it can come in the form of a pre-theoretical informal
intuition, in form of precise mathematical definitions, and it also can come in de-
grees. Thus one has to be very careful and specific when it comes to the problem
of whether “randomness is preserved” under a re-labeling of the elementary events.
Bangu leaves it deliberately open in what sense precisely “randomness” might not
be invariant under re-labeling of the random events; hence his suggestion remains
somewhat vague. No matter what kind of notion of randomness one has in mind,
if it is to be relevant for probabilistic modeling of a phenomenon, then it must be
expressible in terms of probabilities, since the basic principle guiding the modeling
of phenomena by probability theory is the maxim:
Distribution Relevance: “A property is probability theoretical if, and only if, it
is describable in terms of a distribution” [15][p. 171].
In the spirit of Distribution Relevance one can take the position that ran-
domness of a phenomenon expressed by “randomness” of the random variables that
describe the phenomenon are encoded in the distribution of the random variables.
Consequently, under this interpretation of randomness, if one is given two proba-
bility models (X,S, p) and (X ′,S ′, p′) of a given phenomenon and h : X → X ′ is
a re-labeling between (X,S, p) and (X ′,S ′, p′), then h preserves the randomness of
the two probabilistic descriptions if and only if it holds that if f : X → R is any
random variable in (X,S, p) with distribution p ◦ f−1 then the distribution p′ ◦ f
′−1
in (X ′,S ′, p′) of the re-named random variable f ′ = f ◦ h−1 coincides with p ◦ f−1:
(
p′ ◦ (f ◦ h−1)−1
)
(d) =
(
p ◦ f−1
)
(d) for all d ∈ B(R) (16)
and conversely: for every random variable g′ : X ′ → R which is the re-named version
of a random variable g = g′ ◦ h in (X,S, p) it holds that the distribution p′ ◦ g′−1 in
(X ′,S ′, p′) of g′ and the distribution p ◦ g−1 of g = g′ ◦ h in (X,S, p) coincide:
(p ◦ (g′ ◦ h)−1)(d) = (p′ ◦ g′
−1
)(d) for all d ∈ B(R) (17)
Since the random events themselves are random variables, the two equations (16)-
(17) must hold for every characteristic function χA (A ∈ S) in place of f and every
characteristic function χA′ (A
′ ∈ S ′) in place of g′ as well, so this requirement of
preserving randomness amounts to the demand that the following two equations
hold:
p′(h[A]) = p(A) for all A ∈ S (18)
p(h−1[A′]) = p′(A′) for all A′ ∈ S ′ (19)
which is precisely Labeling Irrelevance (eqs. (6)-(7)). So, if “preserving random-
ness by re-labeling” in Assumption R is understood in the spirit of Distribution
10
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Relevance as conditions (16)-(17) then the only randomness-preserving re-labelings
are the isomorphisms and no Bertrand paradox can arise indeed – requiring preserv-
ing randomness in this sense is equivalent to the requirement that the re-labelings
are isomorphism, Strategy A, so interpreted, is trivial.
One can try to argue that this is an extremely strong interpretation of “pre-
serving randomness” and that randomness also can be interpreted differently as ex-
pressed by some other property Φ(p) of the probability measure p. For instance, one
has the intuition that a probability measure sharply concentrated on a single point
in X is far less “random”, it represents much more certainty by having zero vari-
ance than a probability distribution that has a large variance. The usual (Shanon)
entropy of a probability measure also can be taken as a measure of “randomness”
of the phenomenon that the probability model describes [4][p. 61-62]. Thus one
can interpret the requirement of “preserving randomness under re-labeling” in As-
sumption R in different ways depending on what property Φ one chooses:
Assumption R[Φ]: If (X,S, pH) and (X
′,S ′, p′H) are two probability spaces and h
is a re-labeling between X and X ′ then we say that Assumption R[Φ] is satisfied
if both Φ(pH) and Φ(p
′
H) hold.
It is clear then that if there is a property Φ of randomness of a probability mea-
sure and there exists probability spaces (X,S, pH) and (X
′,S ′, p′H) with a re-labeling
h : X → X ′ such that Assumption R[Φ] is satisfied but Labeling Irrelevance is
violated by h then Bertrand’s paradox re-emerges.
The variance and the entropy are such properties: Consider the probability
spaces ([a, b],S[a,b], p[a,b]) and ([c, d],S[c,d], p[c,d]) described in the Example in section
5. The variance σ(p[a,b]) of the normalized Lebesgue measure p[a,b] on any interval
[a, b] is by definition equal to
σ(p[a,b]) =
∫ b
a
1
b− a
x2dx−
[ ∫ b
a
1
b− a
xdx
]2
=
(b− a)2
12
(20)
and the entropy E(p[a,b]) of p[a,b] is by definition
E(p[a,b]) = −
∫ b
a
x log(x)dx = log(b− a) (21)
It follows then that if b− a = d− c = t then
σ(p[a,b]) = σ(p[c,d]) =
t2
12
(22)
E(p[a,b]) = E(p[a,b]) = log(t) (23)
On the other hand, the map h defined in the Example remains a re-labeling even
if b − a = d − c and Labeling Irrelevance is violated by this map because for
b− a = d− c = t eq. (15) entails that for many ǫ we have
p[a,b]([a, a + ǫ]) =
ǫ
t
6=
1
t
(
c +
1
t
ǫ2
)
= p[c,d](h
[
[a, a + ǫ]
]
) (24)
Thus Bertrand’s paradox re-emerges: The probability space ([c, d],S[c,d], p[c,d]) can
be regarded as a re-named version of the probability space ([a, b],S[a,b], p[a,b]) via
the re-labeling h defined by (11) and (12)-(14), furthermore, if b − a = d − c then
this re-labeling satisfies Assumption R[Φ] with Φ being the variance or entropy,
and because of (15) h violates Labeling Irrelevance (6)-(7).
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One also can try to question Distribution Relevance. But if one gives up
Distribution Relevance and interprets “randomness” in a way that makes ran-
domness not expressible exclusively in terms of the distributions involved, then
the appropriately modified Assumption R constrains even less the emergence of
Bertrand’s Paradox. Rowbottom and Schackle [20] take Assumption R to be (a
technically undefined) “unpredictability” and argue (informally) that there are re-
labelings that preserve “unpredictability” and which are not isomorphisms, contrary
to what Bangu [2] seems to conjecture. As a technically more explicit example, as-
sume that a dynamic {αt : t ∈ R} is given on ([a, b],S[a,b], p[a,b]) and a dynamic
{α′t : t ∈ R} is given on ([c, d],S[c,d], p[c,d]), where αt and α
′
t are one parameter
groups of measure preserving maps on [a, b] and [c, d] respectively. As randomness
of the dynamical systems ([a, b],S[a,b], p[a,b]), {αt}) and ([c, d],S[c,d], p[c,d]), {α
′
t}) one
can take the randomness of the respective dynamics such as ergodicity, or mixing,
which are not expressible in terms of p[a,b] and p[c,d] only. Given the re-labeling
h between ([a, b],S[a,b], p[a,b]) and ([c, d],S[c,d], p[c,d]) described in the Example in
section 5 that violates Labeling Irrelevance one can then specify the dynamics
{αt} and {α
′
t} in such a way that they are both ergodic, [4][p. 34], generating a
Bertrand’s Paradox, or in such a way that {αt} is ergodic whereas {α
′
t} is not, which
would be a violation of preserving randomness (Assumption R) hence not a case
of Bertrand’s Paradox (according to Bangu’s requirement) – anything is possible
under such a dynamical interpretation of randomness.
Thus the emergence of Bertrand’s paradox cannot be blocked in a non-trivial way
by requiring the paradoxical examples to satisfy the randomness test and showing
that they cannot pass this test: unless one requires in effect that the re-labeling
be an isomorphism, Bertrand’s Paradox emerges: If Distribution Relevance is
accepted and randomness is interpreted as measured by the variance or entropy of
the probability measures then elementary examples can be given that show violation
of Labeling Irrelevance. If Distribution Relevance is abandoned then the
randomness requirement can be satisfied even more easily.
7 Comments on the classical interpretation
While Bertrand’s Paradox shows that Labeling Irrelevance cannot be maintained
in general, this does not undermine, in and by itself, either the classical interpreta-
tion of probability or the Principle of Indifference: It is clear from the discussion
in the previous sections that the Principle of Indifference and Labeling Irrel-
evance are independent ideas: One can in principle maintain the classical interpre-
tation based on the Principle of indifference and reject Labeling Invariance
completely or restricting it to the domain in which it holds: in the category of prob-
ability measure spaces with a finite number of random events, or to re-labelings that
preserve the epistemic status.
Thus Bertrand’s Paradox is defused; however this is not to be taken as defence
of the classical interpretation. The classical interpretation is deeply problematic for
simple, non-technical reasons that are related to the general issue of how one should
view the status of probability theory.
One has to distinguish applications of probability theory from interpretations of
probability as this latter term is used in philosophy of science. Probability theory is
part of pure mathematics in the first place. In an application of probability theory
one relates the mathematical elements in a triplet (X,S, p) to non-mathematical
12
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entities. This involves two tasks:
Event Interpretation To specify what the elements in X and S stand for.
Truth Interpretation To clarify when the proposition “p(A)=r” is true/false.
In an application, probability theory thus becomes a mathematical model of a cer-
tain phenomenon that is external to mathematics. A probability measure space is
a good model of the phenomenon if it has two features: descriptive accuracy and
predictive success. Descriptive accuracy means that under the fixed specification of
the Event and Truth Interpretations propositions such as p(A) = r are true about
events that have been observed in the past. Predictive success means that the prob-
abilistic propositions p(A) = r will be true in future observations. It is clear that
both descriptive correctness and predictive success are robustly empirical features;
hence, whether a probability space is a good model is a question that can be an-
swered only on the basis of empirical considerations. This is of course not new,
there is nothing peculiar or mysterious about probabilistic modeling, probabilistic
scientific theories are just like any scientific theory from this perspective. 1
The mathematical notion of isomorphism between probability measure spaces
is in complete harmony with the application of probability theory – and so is the
General Bertrand Paradox: The Event Interpretation and Truth Interpretation are
conceptually different issues, the former does not determine the latter, and, ac-
cordingly, two probability spaces are defined to be isomorphic if two conditions are
satisfied: the random events in the two spaces are connected by a re-labeling and
the re-labeling preserves the probabilities. From the perspective of the notion of
isomorphisms of probability spaces finite probability spaces with the uniform prob-
ability measure just happen to have the “contingent” feature that in this category
re-labelings are isomorphisms; in this case the re-labelings contain enough informa-
tion to make them isomorphisms.
Interpretations of probability are typical classes of applications of probability
theory, classes consisting of applications that possess some common features, which
the interpretation isolates and analyzes. The main problem with the Classical In-
terpretation (understood with the amendment of the Principle of Indifference)
is that it disregards the empirical character of the applications of probability the-
ory and gives the impression that descriptive accuracy and predictive success in
applications are based on (and can be ensured by referring to) an priori-flavored
principle that expresses some sort of epistemic indifference about random events.
But this is not possible, which is shown by the difficulty (often pointed out in con-
nection with the Principle of Indifference [9]) that it is unclear how to specify
the precise content of “epistemic neutrality” in such a way that the Principle of
Indifference does not become circular and holds nevertheless: The Principle of
Indifference holds only if epistemic neutrality does entail that the probabilities of
the events given by the uniform probability measure will be equal to the frequencies
of events in actual trials producing elementary random events, and such a conclu-
sion cannot be validly based on a priori considerations – if it could, the Principle
of Indifference would have solved the problem of induction.
1Although Marinoff [16] does not emphasize the empirical aspect of probabilistic modeling, his resolu-
tion of Bertrand’s Paradox is essentially in the spirit of probabilistic modeling described here: Marinoff
distinguishes different types of random generators representing different types of randomness and notes
that, depending on which random generator produces the random events featuring in a Bertrand Paradox
type situation, one obtains different probability distributions – there is nothing paradoxical about this.
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One might say that the classical interpretation and the Principle of Indiffer-
ence should be taken not with the Frequency Link but with the Degree of Belief
Link, according to which pH should be viewed as representing degrees of belief [5],
[17]. To assess the viability of such an interpretation of the classical interpretation
one has to distinguish two further specifications of the notion of degree of belief:
descriptive and normative.
In the descriptive interpretation the claim is that pH does represent the degree
of belief of a particular person (or a specific group of people) about random events
happening if the persons are epistemologically neutral about the events. Whatever
the precise content of this epistemological neutrality, this descriptive interpretation
of the degrees of belief is again an empirical claim about the thinking and behavior
of certain people, which may or may not be true; testing it (including testing if the
people in question have degrees of belief indeed) is a matter for empirical psychology
– but this interpretation has little to do with how probability theory is applied in
the sciences.
In the normative interpretation pH is declared to stand for the rational degrees of
belief of an abstract person (agent) if the agent is epistemologically neutral about the
elementary events. In this case one has to ask in what sense and why pH represents
rational degrees of belief? One answer can be that pH is rational if (X,S, pH) is a
good model of a certain phenomenon in the sense described earlier in this section
and a rational agent’s belief better be in harmony with the probabilities provided by
a good model. This interpretation of rationality of pH is essentially the content of
the Principle Principle [14] and, while it is very natural, one should realize that pH
features in it in two roles: (i) standing for the degree of belief and (ii) representing
some extra-mental, non-degree-of-belief-type quantities (for instance frequencies or
some other dimensionless physical quantities [23]) with which the degrees of belief
are required to be equal. Thus this interpretation reduces the Degree of Belief Link
to another Interpretive Link and thereby the rationality (or otherwise) of an agent’s
degree of belief is made again dependent on empirical matters. But then it does not
matter from the perspective of rationality of the degrees of belief whether the agent
is epistemically neutral about the elementary events or not, because the correctness
of the probabilistic model is an empirical matter that cannot be ensured on the
basis of an a priori neutrality, and probability measures different from pH can very
well be rational if they satisfy the Principle Principle and the probabilistic model
is good. Another possible specification of rationality of the agent’s degrees of belief
can be that they are consistent, i.e. that pH satisfies the axioms of probability.
Obviously, this does not single out pH as the only rational probability.
In sum: Bertrand’s Paradox interpreted as violation of Labeling Irrelevance
does not undermine the classical interpretation of probability understood with the
Principle of Indifference, and violation of Labeling Irrelevance is in complete
harmony with how mathematical probability theory is used in the sciences to model
phenomena; yet, irrespective of Bertrand’s Paradox, the content of the Principle
of Indifference cannot be specified in such a way that it can establish the classi-
cal interpretation of probability as descriptively accurate, predictively successful or
rational.
Appendix
This Appendix recalls some elementary facts about the Haar measure. Standard
references for the Haar measure are [18] and [10][Chapter XI.], for a more recent
presentation see [6].
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X is called a topological group with multiplication (x, y) 7→ x · y and inverse
x 7→ x−1 if the map (x, y) 7→ x−1 · y is continuous (x, y ∈ X). A measure p on the
Borel algebra S of the group X is called left invariant (respectively right invariant)
with respect to the group action if eq. (25) (respectively eq. (26)) below hold
p(A) = p(xA) for all x ∈ X A ∈ S (25)
p(A) = p(Ax) for all x ∈ X A ∈ S (26)
where for an x ∈ X, the sets xA and Ax are defined by
xA = {x · y : y ∈ A} (27)
Ax = {y · x : y ∈ A} (28)
The measure p is called invariant if it is both left and right invariant, i.e. if
p(A) = p(xA) = p(Ax) for all x ∈ X A ∈ S (29)
On any locally compact topological group there exists both a left pLH and a right
pRH invariant Haar measure and they are unique up to multiplication by a constant.
The left and right invariant Haar measures are in general different. Since both
the left and Haar measure is unique up to constant multiplication, and since for
any x ∈ X the measure px(A)
.
= pLH(Ax) is again a left invariant measure, there
exists a real number ∆(x) such that px(A) = ∆(x)p
L
H(A). The map x 7→ ∆(x) is
called the modular function of the group. If ∆(x) = 1 for all x, then the groups
are called unimodular; for unimodular groups the left and right invariant Haar
measures coincide and yield an invariant measure. Compact and locally compact
abelian groups are unimodular. The Haar measure is bounded if and only if X is
compact – the Haar measure is then a probability measure.
The canonical examples of unbounded Haar measures are the Lebesgue measure
on the real line and the Lebesgue measure on Rn. It is shown below that the nor-
malized restrictions of the Lebesgue measure on Rn to subsets of the form ×ni [ai, bi)
in Rn also can be regarded as Haar measures in their own right with respect to a
compact group G. This entails that the Lebesgue measure on the closed set ×ni [ai, bi]
also can be viewed as a Haar measure with respect to G because the Lebesgue mea-
sure space over ×ni [ai, bi) and over ×
n
i [ai, bi] are isomorphic. (Note that G is not
the shift; it cannot be since shifted subsets of [0, 1) are not necessarily subsets of
[0, 1) and the group of “shifts modulo 1” do not form a topological group due to
discontinuity of the “shift modulo 1” operation.) Since [0, 1) can be mapped onto
[a, b) by a continuous linear bijection connecting the (normalized) Lebesgue mea-
sures on the intervals [0, 1) and [a, b), to see how the Lebesgue measure on [a, b) is
a Haar measure in its own right, it is enough to see how the (normalized) Lebesgue
measure p[0,1) on the interval [0, 1) emerges as a Haar measure. Let
S1 =
{
z ∈ C : |z| = 1
}
be the unit circle on the complex plane. As S1 is a compact topological subgroup of
C with the multiplication of complex numbers as the group operation, there exists
a normalized Haar measure pH on S
1. The exponential function f defined by
f : [0, 1) → S1, f(t) = e2piit
is a continuous and continuously invertible bijection between the unit interval [0, 1)
and the unit circle S1; hence both f and its inverse are measurable. We claim that
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f is a measure theoretic isomorphism between the interval [0, 1) with the Lebesgue
measure on it and S1 with the measure pH on it; i.e. that
pH = p[0,1) ◦ f
−1 (30)
To verify (30), by the uniqueness of Haar measures, it is enough to show that
p[0,1) ◦ f
−1 is a Haar measure, i.e. that p[0,1) ◦ f
−1 is invariant with respect to the
group operation in S1, which is the multiplication of complex numbers. Since the
exponential function f turns addition of real numbers into multiplication of complex
numbers, for B ⊂ S1 and z ∈ C we have
f−1(B · z) = f [B] + t mod 1 (31)
where the translation
Y 7→ Y + t mod 1 (32)
is the standard shift of set Y ⊂ [0, 1) by t followed by “pulling back” into [0, 1) the
part of Y that is shifted out of the bounds of [0, 1); formally:
Y + t mod 1 =
(
Y ∩ [0, 1− t) + t
)
∪
(
Y ∩ [1− t, 1) − (1− t)
)
p[0,1) is translation invariant on [0, 1) in the sense that for any measurable set A ⊆
[0, 1) and 0 ≤ t < 1 we have
p[0,1)(A) = p[0,1)(A + t mod 1),
so we have
pH(B · z) = p[0,1)(f
−1(B · z)) = p[0,1)(f
−1(B) + t mod 1) = p[0,1)(f
−1(B)) = pH(B)
The Lebesgue measure pn[0,1) on the n-dimensional cube [0, 1)
n also can be regarded
as a Haar measure: one can consider the Haar measure pnH on the n-dimensional
torus
Tn = S1 × S1 × · · · × S1 (n times)
which is a compact topological subgroup of Cn with the coordinate-wise multipli-
cation of complex numbers as group operation. Put
f : [0, 1)n → Tn, f(t0, . . . , tn) =
(
e2piit0 , . . . , e2piitn
)
Then f is a continuous and continuously invertible bijection and, applying the
previous argument in each coordinates, one concludes
pnH = p
n
[0,1) ◦ f
−1
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Bell inequality and ommon ausal explanation
in algebrai quantum eld theory
Gábor Hofer-Szabó
∗
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†
Abstrat
Bell inequalities, understood as onstraints between lassial onditional probabilities, an
be derived from a set of assumptions representing a ommon ausal explanation of lassial
orrelations. A similar derivation, however, is not known for Bell inequalities in algebrai quan-
tum eld theories establishing onstraints for the expetation of spei linear ombinations of
projetions in a quantum state. In the paper we address the question as to whether a `om-
mon ausal justiation' of these non-lassial Bell inequalities is possible. We will show that
although the lassial notion of ommon ausal explanation an readily be generalized for the
non-lassial ase, the Bell inequalities used in quantum theories annot be derived from these
non-lassial ommon auses. Just the opposite is true: for a set of orrelations there an be
given a non-lassial ommon ausal explanation even if they violate the Bell inequalities. This
shows that the range of ommon ausal explanations in the non-lassial ase is wider than that
restrited by the Bell inequalities.
Key words: Bell inequality, ommon ause, nonommutativity, algebrai quantum eld theory.
1 Introdution
The original ontext whih led to the formulation of the Bell inequalities was the intention to ao-
modate quantum orrelations in a loally ausal theory. The learest formulation of suh a theory is
due to Bell himself (Bell, 1987, p. 54). In a number of seminal papers Bell arefully analyzed the in-
tuitions lying behind our notion of loality and ausality. His major ontribution, however, onsisted
in translating these intriate notions into a simple probabilisti language whih made these notions
tratable both for mathematial treatment and later for experimental testability. This probabilisti
framework made it possible to exatly identify the probabilisti requirements responsible for the vio-
lation of the Bell inequalities in the EPR senario. A deade later authors like Van Fraassen (1982),
Jarrett (1984) and Shimony (1986) spent muh time to analyze the philosophial onsequenes of
giving up either the one or the other of these probabilisti assumptions. It also turned out soon
that the oneptual framework in whih the Bell inequalities an be treated most naturally is the
ommon ausal explanation of orrelations, originally stemming from Reihenbah (1956) and later
adopted to the EPR ase by Van Fraassen (1982).
Sine the aim of these onsiderations was to aomodate the EPR senario in a lassial world
piture, both Bell and the subsequent writers used a lassial probabilisti framework in their anal-
ysis. All the assumptions representing loality and ausality and also the resulting Bell inequalities
were formulated in the language of the lassial probability theory. Now, if the Bell inequalities were
lassial, how ould they be violated in the EPR senario whih is well known to be desribed by
∗
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quantum theory? Well, the answer is that quantum theory with its mathematial struture and onto-
logial ommitments played no role at all in the Bell senario. Quantum mehanis was only used to
generate lassial probabilities, more speially, lassial onditional probabilities by the Born rule.
These lassial onditional probabilities, however, ould also have been gained diretly from the ex-
periments, and indeed later they have been gained so. In other words, the original ontext of the Bell
inequalities has no intimate link to quantum theory even if quantum theory produes probabilities
whih, reinterpreted as lassial onditional probabilities, violate those inequalities. This lassial
view on the Bell inequalities manifests itself in various authors. Niolas Gisin for example writes:
Bell inequalities are relations between onditional probabilities valid under the loality assumption.
(Gisin 2009, p. 126)
In the fae of all these, the Bell inequality has made its way into quantum theory. It has been soon
formulated as a general mark of entanglement of the given quantum state on a C∗-algebra (Summers
and Werner 1987a, b). A quote from Bengtson and Zyzkowski (2006, p. 362) might illustrate this
hange of fous in the role of Bell inequalities: The Bell inequalities may be viewed as a kind of
separability riterion, related to a partiular entanglement witness, so evidene of their violation for
ertain states might be regarded as an experimental detetion of quantum entanglement. How ould
the Bell inequality make its way to this non-lassial formalism so alien from its original ontext?
Does there exist a justiation for this `trespass'?
In this paper we would like to investigate a possible justiation for this transition. In this justi-
ation we intend to follow the route pioneered by Bell, Van Fraassen, Jarrett, Shimony and others in
that we stik to the onvition that the Bell inequalities follow from the requirement of implement-
ing orrelations into a loally ausal theory. We transend, however, this view in not assuming that
this theory has to be lassial. Or in other words, we pose the question whether the probabilisti
requirements representing loal ausality and onstituting the ore of the Bell inequalities an be
reasonable formulated also in a non-lassial theory.
A natural andidate for suh a non-lassial theory with lear oneptions of loality and ausal-
ity is algebrai quantum eld theory (AQFT) (Haag, 1992). In AQFT events are represented by
projetions with well dened spaetime support and loal ausality is ensured by a set of axioms.
Hene we an pose the question as to whether the Bell inequalities featuring in AQFT follow from a
loally ausal explanation of orrelations in a similar manner to the lassial ase. Sine we intend
to give a ausal explanation for orrelations between events, therefore ausal explanation is meant
to be a ommon ausal explanation. We will see that the onnetion between a ommon ausal
explanation and the Bell inequalities in AQFT is not so tight as in the lassial ase. In the lassial
ase ommon auses neessarly ommute (in the set theoretial `meet' operation) with their eets.
Sine the quantum events of AQFT form a nonommutative struture, one an deide whether to
require that ommon auses ommute with their eets or not. If ommutativity is required, the
Bell inequalities will follow from the ommon ause just like in the lassial ase. But, as we will
argue, requiring ommutativity is only a remininsene of the lassial treatment of orrelations and
is ompletely unjustied in the quantum ase (see e.g. (Clifton, Ruetshe 1999)). For nonommut-
ing ommon auses the Bell inequalities will turn out not to be derivable from the presene of the
ommon auseat least not in the similar way to the the lassial derivation. This raises the ques-
tion whether orrelations violating the Bell inequalities an have a nonommuting ommon ausal
explanation. We will answer this question in the armative showing up a situation when a set of
orrelations maximally violating a spei type Bell inequality has a ommon ausal explanation,
whih is loal in the sense that it an be aomodated in the intersetion of the ausal pasts of the
orrelating events. The model we use for this example is the loal quantum Ising model, the simplest
AQFT with loally nite degrees of freedom.
The paper is strutured as follows. In Setion 2 we briey ollet the most important onepts and
some of the representative propositions onerning the Bell inequality in AQFT. In Setion 3 and 4
we give the denition of the lassial and the non-lassial ommon ausal explanations, respetively,
2
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and show how these explanations relate to the Bell inequalities. Sine the orret `translation' of
the so-alled loality and no-onspiray onditions of the lassial ommon ausal explanation into
the non-lassial setting is a subtle point not needed for our main purpose, we transfer it into the
Appendix. Now, the ommon ausal explanations in the EPR-Bell senario is always meant as
providing a joint ommon ause for a set of orrelations. Providing a joint ommon ause for a
set of orrelations is muh more demanding than simply providing a ommon ause for a single
orrelation. Therefore in Setion 5, preparing for the more ompliated ase, we investigate the
possibility of a ommon ausal explanation of a single orrelation, or in the philosophers' jargon, the
status of the Common Causal Priniple in AQFT. In Setion 6 we return to our original question and
present a nonommutative ommon ausal explanation for a set of orrelations maximally violating
some Bell inequalities. In Setion 7 we briey analyze the philosophial onsequenes of applying
nonommuting ommon auses in our ausal explanation. We onlude the paper in Setion 8.
2 The Bell inequality in algebrai quantum eld theory
In this Setion we ollet the most important onepts and some of the representative propositions
onerning the Bell inequality in AQFT (see (Summers 1990) and (Halvorson 2007)). We start with
the general C∗-algebrai setting and then go over to the speial algebrai quantum eld theoretial
formulation.
In the general C∗-algebrai setting Bell inequality is treated in the following way. Let A and B
be two mutually ommuting C∗-subalgebras of some C∗-algebra C. A Bell operator R for the pair
(A,B) is an element of the following set:
B(A,B) :=
{
1
2
(
X1(Y1 + Y2) +X2(Y1 − Y2)
) ∣∣Xi = X∗i ∈ A; Yi = Y ∗i ∈ B; −1 6 Xi, Yi 6 1
}
where 1 is the unit element of C. For any Bell operator R the following an be proven:
Theorem 1. For any state φ : C → C, one has |φ(R)| 6 √2.
Theorem 2. For separable states (i.e. for onvex ombinations of produt states) |φ(R)| 6 1.
The Bell orrelation oeient of a state φ is dened as
β(φ,A,B) := sup{|φ(R)| ∣∣R ∈ B(A,B)}
and the Bell inequality is said to be violated if β(φ,A,B) > 1, and maximally violated if β(φ,A,B) =√
2. An important result of Baiagaluppi (1994) is the following:
Theorem 3. If A and B are C∗-algebras, then there are some states violating the Bell inequality
for A⊗ B i both A and B are non-abelian.
Going over to von Neumann algebras Landau (1987) has shown that the maximal violation of the
Bell inequality is generi in the following sense:
Theorem 4. LetN1 andN2 be von Neumann algebras, and suppose thatN1 is abelian andN1 ⊆ N ′2
(N ′ being the ommutant of N ). Then for any state β(φ,A,B) 6 1. On the other hand, if
both N1 and N2 are non-abelian von Neumann algebras suh that N1 ⊆ N ′2, and if (N1,N2)
satises the Shlieder-property,
1
then there is a state φ for whih β(φ,A,B) = √2.
1
The ommuting pair (A,B) of C∗-subalgebras in C obeys the Shlieder-property, if for 0 6= A ∈ A and 0 6= B ∈ B,
AB 6= 0. Sine in ase of von Neumann algebras A and B an be required to be projetions, Shlieder-property is the
analogue of logial independene in lassial logi.
3
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Adding further onstraints on the von Neumann algebras one obtains other important results suh
as the following two:
Theorem 5. If N1 and N2 are properly innite2 von Neumann algebras on the Hilbert spae H
suh that N1 ⊆ N ′2, and (N1,N2) satises the Shlieder-property, then there is a dense set of
vetors in H induing states whih violate the Bell inequality aross (N1,N2) (Halvorson and
Clifton, 2000).
Theorem 6. Let H be a separable Hilbert spae and let R be a von Neumann fator of type III1
ating on H. Then every normal state φ of B(H) maximally violates the Bell inequality aross
(R,R′) (Summers and Werner, 1988).
Type III fators featuring in Theorems 5-6. are the typial loal von Neumann algebras in AQFT
with loally innite degrees of freedom. Here we briey survey the basi notions of the theory.
In AQFT observables (inluding quantum events) are represented by unital C∗-algebras assoiated
to bounded regions of a given spaetime. The assoiation of algebras and spaetime regions is
established along the following lines.
(i) Isotony. Let S be a spaetime. A double one in S is the intersetion of the ausal past of a
point x with the ausal future of a point y timelike to x. Let K be a olletion of double ones
of S suh that (K,⊆) is a direted poset under inlusion ⊆. The net of loal observables is
given by the isotone map K ∋ V 7→ A(V ) to unital C∗-algebras, that is V1 ⊆ V2 implies that
A(V1) is a unital C∗-subalgebra of A(V2). The quasiloal observable algebra A is dened to be
the indutive limit C∗-algebra of the net {A(V ), V ∈ K} of loal C∗-algebras.
(ii) Miroausality. The net {A(V ), V ∈ K} satises miroausality (aka Einstein ausality):
A(V ′)′ ∩ A ⊇ A(V ), V ∈ K, where primes denote spaelike omplement and algebra om-
mutant, respetively. A(V ′) is the smallest C∗-algebra in A ontaining the loal algebras
A(V˜ ),K ∋ V˜ ⊂ V ′.
(iii) Covariane. Let PK be the subgroup of the group P of geometri symmetries of S leaving
the olletion K invariant. A group homomorphism α : PK → AutA is given suh that the
automorphisms αg, g ∈ PK of A at ovariantly on the observable net: αg(A(V )) = A(g ·
V ), V ∈ K.
To the net {A(V ), V ∈ K} satisfying the above requirements we will refer to as a PK-ovariant
loal quantum theory. If S =M is the Minkowski spaetime and K is the net of all double ones then
PK is the Poinaré group, and we obtain Poinaré ovariant algebrai quantum eld theories with
loally innite degrees of freedom. Restriting the olletion K one an obtain PK-ovariant loal
quantum theories with loally nite degrees of freedom, for instane our example, the loal quantum
Ising model (see below).
A state φ in a loal quantum theory is dened as a normalized positive linear funtional on the
quasiloal observable algebra A. The orresponding GNS representation πφ : A → B(Hφ) onverts
the net of C∗-algebras into a net of C∗-subalgebras of B(Hφ). Closing these subalgebras in the weak
topology one arrives at a net of loal von Neumann observable algebras: N (V ) := πφ(A(V ))′′, V ∈ K.
Von Neumann algebras are generated by their projetions, whih are alled quantum events sine
they an be interpreted as 0-1valued observables. The expetation value of a projetion is the
probability of the event that the observable takes on the value 1 in the appropriate quantum state.
Two ommuting quantum events A and B are said to be orrelating in a state φ if
φ(AB) 6= φ(A)φ(B).
2
The enter ontains no nite projetions.
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If the events are supported in spatially separated spaetime regions VA and VB , respetively, then the
orrelation between them is said to be superluminal. To see that superluminal orrelations violating
Bell inequalities abound in Poinaré ovariant algebrai quantum eld theories, one has to introdue
further requirements on the representations of A (see Haag 1992):
(iv) Unitary implementability. There is a strongly ontinuous unitary representation of the Poinaré
group, U : P → B(Hφ), suh that
πφ(αg(A)) = U(g)πφ(A)U(g)
∗, A ∈ A, g ∈ P .
(v) Vauum ondition. There is a (up to a salar) unique vetor Ω in the Hilbert spae H0
orresponding to the vauum state φ0 suh that U(g)Ω = Ω for all g ∈ P .
(vi) Spetrum ondition. The spetrum of the self-adjoint generators of the strongly ontinuous
unitary representation of the translation subgroup R
4
of P lies in the losed forward light
one.
(vii) Weak additivity. For any nonempty open region V , the set of operators ∪g∈R4N (g ·V ) is dense
in B(H0) (in the weak operator topology).
Now, under onditions (i)-(vii) the loal von Neumann algebras supported in spaelike separated
double ones satisfy the Shlieder property (Shlieder, 1969). Therefore Theorem 4 applies to these
algebras stating that there is a state maximally violating the Bell inequality aross these loal
algebras. Moreover, if the net is non-trivial
3
, then the loal von Neumann algebras are properly
innite. This makes Theorem 5 appliable to loal von Neumann algebras supported in spaelike
separated double ones stating that there is a dense set of vetors in H induing states whih violate
the Bell inequality.
Being properly innite the von Neumann algebras annot be of type In and II1 but they still an
be of type I∞ or II∞ . However, a set of independent results indiates that the loal von Neumann
algebras are of type III, more speially hypernite4 fators of type III1. Buhholz et al. (1987)
proved that the loal algebras for relativisti free elds are type III1 and it was also shown that
one an onstrut the loal von Neumann algebras as a unique type III1 hypernite fator from the
underlying Wightman theory by adding the assumption of saling limit (see (Fredenhagen (1985)).
Instead of deriving the type of the von Neumann algebras from more general physial require-
ments, one also an expliitely add this ondition as a new axiom of AQFT:
(viii) The type of the algebras. For every double one V the von Neumann algebra N (V ) is of type
III1.
Under onditions (i)-(viii) the loal von Neumann algebras supported in spaelike separeted double
ones satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 6, therefore every normal state will maximally violate the
Bell inequality aross pairs of algebras supported in spaelike separated double ones.
Finally, we mention a physially important onsequene of Theorem 6:
Theorem 7. The vauum state maximally violates the Bell inequality aross the wedge
5
algebras
(N (W ),N (W )′). (Summers, Werner 1988).
As said above, the Bell inequality typially used in AQFT is of the following form:
∣∣φ(X1(Y1 + Y2) +X1(Y1 − Y2))∣∣ 6 2, (1)
3
For eah double one V , A(V ) 6= C1.
4
The weak losure of an asending sequene of nite dimensional algebras.
5
Poinaré transforms of the region WR := {x ∈ M|x1 > |x0|}.
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where Xm ∈ N (VA) and Yn ∈ N (VB) are self-adjoint ontrations (that is −1 6 Xm, Yn 6 1 for
m,n = 1, 2) supported in spatially separated spaetime regions VA and VB , respetively. This type
of Bell inequality is usually referred to as the ClauserHorneShimonyHolte (CHSH) inequality
(Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt, 1969). Sometimes in the EPR-Bell literature another Bell-type
inequality is used instead of (1): the ClauserHorne (CH) inequality (Clauser and Horne, 1974)
dened in the following way:
−1 6 φ(A1B1 +A1B2 +A2B1 −A2B2 −A1 −B1) 6 0, (2)
where Am and Bn are projetions loated in N (VA) and N (VB), respetively. It is easy to see,
however, that the two inequalities are equivalent: in a given state φ the set {(Am, Bn);m,n = 1, 2}
violates the CH inequality (2) if and only if the set {(Xm, Yn);m,n = 1, 2} of self-adjoint ontrations
given by
Xm := 2Am − 1 (3)
Yn := 2Bn − 1 (4)
violates the CHSH inequality (1). Therefore, from now on we will onentrate only on the CH-type
Bell inequalities.
In the next two setions we turn to the ommon ausal explanation behind the Bell inequalities.
In the next Setion we introdue the basi notions of the lassial ommon ausal explanation leading
to the Bell inequalities; in the subsequent Setion we generalize these notions for the quantum ase.
3 Classial ommon ausal explanation
Let us begin with Hans Reihenbah's (1956) original denition whih is historially the rst prob-
abilisti haraterization of the notion of the ommon ause. Let (Ω,Σ, p) be a lassial probability
measure spae and let A and B be two positively orrelating events in Σ:
p(A ∧B) > p(A) p(B). (5)
Denition 1. An event C ∈ Σ is said to be the Reihenbahian ommon ause of the orrelation
between events A and B if the following onditions hold:
p(A ∧B|C) = p(A|C)p(B|C) (6)
p(A ∧B|C⊥) = p(A|C⊥)p(B|C⊥) (7)
p(A|C) > p(A|C⊥) (8)
p(B|C) > p(B|C⊥) (9)
where C⊥ denotes the orthoomplement of C and p( · | · ) is the onditional probability dened by
the Bayes rule. One refers to equations (6)-(7) as the sreening-o onditions and to inequalities
(8)-(9) as the positive statistial relevany onditions.
Reihenbah's denition, however, annot be applied diretly to AQFT for four reasons. First, the
positive statistial relevany onditions restrit one to ommon auses whih inrease the probability
of their eets; or in other words, they exlude negative auses. Seond, the denition also exludes
situations in whih the orrelation is not due to a single ause but to a system of ooperating
ommon auses. Third, it is silent about the spatiotemporal loalization of the events. Fourth and
most importantly, it is lassial.
Let us rst address the rst two problems. Let A and B be two orrelating events in a lassial
probability measure spae (Ω,Σ, p) that is
p(A ∧B) 6= p(A) p(B). (10)
6
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Denition 2. A partition {Ck}k∈K in Σ is said to be the ommon ause system of the orrelation
(10) if the following sreening-o ondition holds for all k ∈ K:
p(A ∧B|Ck) = p(A|Ck) p(B|Ck), (11)
where |K|, the ardinality of K is said to be the size of the ommon ause system. A ommon ause
system of size 2 is alled a ommon ause (without the adjetive `Reihenbahian', indiating that
the inequalities (8)-(9) are not required).
Conerning the third problem, namely, the loalization of the ommon ause, one has (at least)
three dierent options. Suppose that the two events A and B are loalized in two bounded and
spatially separated regions VA and VB of a spaetime S. Then one an loalize {Ck} either (i)
in the union or (ii) in the intersetion of the ausal past of the regions VA and VB; or (iii) more
restritively, in the spaetime region whih lies in the intersetion of ausal pasts of every point of
VA ∪ VB . Formally, we have
wpast(VA, VB) := I−(VA) ∪ I−(VB)
cpast(VA, VB) := I−(VA) ∩ I−(VB)
spast(VA, VB) := ∩x∈VA∪VB I−(x)
where I−(V ) denotes the union of the bakward light ones i.e. the ausal pasts I−(x) of every
point x in V (Rédei, Summers 2007). We will refer to the above three pasts in turn as the weak
past, ommon past, and strong past of A and B, respetively (see Fig. 1). The notion of these pasts
presupposes a spaetime loalization struture of the lassial event algebra. (For suh an attempt
see (Henson, 2005).)
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Figure 1: Possible loalizations of the ommon ause system in dierent pasts of VA and VB.
Now, suppose that we do not fae one orrelation (A,B) but a set of orrelations that is events
Am and Bn in Σ suh that for any m ∈M,n ∈ N
p(Am ∧Bn) 6= p(Am) p(Bn). (12)
If our aim is to explain all of these pair-orrelations {(Am, Bn);m ∈M,n ∈ N} by a single ommon
ause system, then we are led to the following denition:
Denition 3. A partition {Ck}k∈K in Σ is said to be a joint6 ommon ause system of the set of
orrelations {(Am, Bn);m ∈M,n ∈ N} if the following sreening-o ondition holds for all m ∈M ,
n ∈ N , and k ∈ K:
p(Am ∧Bn|Ck) = p(Am|Ck) p(Bn|Ck). (13)
6
In (Hofer-Szabó and Vesernyés, 2012a,b) alled ommon ommon ause system.
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Obviously, for a set of orrelations to have a joint ommon ause system is muh more demanding
than to simply have a separate ommon ause system for eah orrelation.
Now, let us ompliate the piture a little further by introduing onditional probabilities. Suppose
that events Am and Bn are outomes of measurements of the observables Am and Bn, respetively.
Let am and bn, respetively denote the events that the appropriate measurement devies are set
to measure the observables Am and Bn, respetively. Let us refer to these events as measurement
hoies. To be more spei, suppose that eah measurement hoie am in region VA an yield
only two outomes Am and A
⊥
m, and similarly the measurement hoies bn in region VB an again
yield only two outomes Bn and B
⊥
n . Finally, suppose that probability of the dierent measurement
hoies am in region VA add up to 1, and similarly for the measurement hoies bn in region VB .
Now, the events Am and Bn are said to be orrelating in the onditional sense if for all Am, Bn,
am, bn ∈ Σ (m ∈M,n ∈ N) the following holds:
p(Am ∧Bn | am ∧ bn) 6= p(Am|am ∧ bn) p(Bn|am ∧ bn). (14)
What does a joint ommon ausal explanation of these onditional orrelations onsists in? The
answer to this question is given in the following denition:
Denition 4. A loal, non-onspiratorial joint ommon ausal explanation of the onditional or-
relations (14) onsists in providing a partition {Ck} in Σ suh that for any m,m′ ∈M,n, n′ ∈ N the
following requirements hold:
p(Am ∧Bn|am ∧ bn ∧ Ck) = p(Am|am ∧ bn ∧ Ck) p(Bn|am ∧ bn ∧Ck) (sreening-o) (15)
p(Am|am ∧ bn ∧ Ck) = p(Am|am ∧ bn′ ∧Ck) (loality) (16)
p(Bn|am ∧ bn ∧ Ck) = p(Bn|am′ ∧ bn ∧Ck) (loality) (17)
p(am ∧ bn ∧ Ck) = p(am ∧ bn) p(Ck) (no-onspiray) (18)
The motivation behind requirements (15)-(18) is the following. Sreening-o (15) is simply the
appliation of the notion of ommon ause for onditional orrelations: although Am and Bn are
orrelating onditioned on am and bn, they will ease to do so if we further ondition on {Ck}.
Loality (16)-(17) is the natural requirement that the measurement outome on the one side should
depend only on the measurement hoie on the same side and the value of the ommon ause but
not on the measurement hoie on the opposite side. Finally, no-onspiray (18) is the requirement
that the ommon ause system and the measurement hoies should be probabilistially independent.
(For the justiation of the above requirements by Causal Markov Condition see (Glymour, 2006).)
Let us now proeed further. A straightforward onsequene of Denition 4 is the following proposition
(Clauser, Horne, 1974):
Proposition 1. Let Am, Bn, am and bn (m,n = 1, 2) be eight events in a lassial probability
measure spae (Ω,Σ, p) suh that the pairs {(Am, Bn);m,n = 1, 2} orrelate in the onditional sense
of (14). Suppose that {(Am, Bn);m,n = 1, 2} has a loal, non-onspriratorial joint ommon ausal
explanation in the sense of Denition 4. Then for anym,m′, n, n′ = 1, 2;m 6= m′;n 6= n′ the following
lassial ClauserHorne inequality holds:
−1 6 p(Am ∧Bn|am ∧ bn) + p(Am ∧Bn′ |am ∧ bn′) + p(Am′ ∧Bn|am′ ∧ bn)
−p(Am′ ∧Bn′ |am′ ∧ bn′)− p(Am|am ∧ bn)− p(Bn|am ∧ bn) 6 0 (19)
Proof. It is an elementary fat of arithmeti that for any α, α′, β, β′ ∈ [0, 1] the number
αβ + αβ′ + α′β − α′β′ − α− β (20)
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lies in the interval [−1, 0]. Now let α, α′, β, β′ be the following onditional probabilities:
α := p(Am|am ∧ bn ∧Ck) (21)
α′ := p(Am′ |am′ ∧ bn′ ∧ Ck) (22)
β := p(Bn|am ∧ bn ∧ Ck) (23)
β′ := p(Bn′ |am′ ∧ bn′ ∧ Ck) (24)
Plugging (21)-(24) into (20) and using loality (16)-(17) one obtains
−1 6 p(Am|am ∧ bn ∧ Ck)p(Bn|am ∧ bn ∧ Ck) + p(Am|am ∧ bn′ ∧ Ck)p(Bn′ |am ∧ bn′ ∧ Ck)
+p(Am′ |am′ ∧ bn ∧Ck)p(Bn|am′ ∧ bn ∧ Ck)− p(Am′ |am′ ∧ bn′ ∧ Ck)p(Bn′ |am′ ∧ bn′ ∧ Ck)
−p(Am|am ∧ bn ∧ Ck)− p(Bn|am ∧ bn ∧ Ck) 6 0 (25)
Using sreening-o (15) one gets
−1 6 p(Am ∧Bn|am ∧ bn ∧Ck) + p(Am ∧Bn′ |am ∧ bn′ ∧Ck) + p(Am′ ∧Bn|am′ ∧ bn ∧Ck)
−p(Am′ ∧Bn′ |am′ ∧ bn′ ∧ Ck)− p(Am|am ∧ bn ∧ Ck)− p(Bn|am ∧ bn ∧ Ck) 6 0 (26)
Multiplying the above inequality by p(Ck), using no-onspiray (18) and summing up for the index
k one obtains
−1 6
∑
k
(
p(Am ∧Bn ∧ Ck|am ∧ bn) + p(Am ∧Bn′ ∧ Ck|am ∧ bn′) + p(Am′ ∧Bn ∧ Ck|am′ ∧ bn)
−p(Am′ ∧Bn′ ∧ Ck|am′ ∧ bn′)− p(Am ∧Ck|am ∧ bn)− p(Bn ∧ Ck|am ∧ bn)
)
6 0 (27)
Finally, applying the theorem of total probability
∑
k
p(Y ∧ Ck) = p(Y )
one arrives at (19) whih ompletes the proof.
Proposition 1 plays a ruial role in understanding the CH inequality (19). It provides, so to
say, a `lassial ommon ausal justiation' of the lassial CH inequality by showing that (19) is a
neessary ondition for the existene of a loal, non-onspriratorial joint ommon ausal explanation
for a set of onditional orrelations.
The well-known situation in whih the lassial CH inequality (19) is violated and hene the or-
relations in question have no loal, non-onspriratorial joint ommon ausal explanation, is the
EPR-Bohm senario. Consider a pair of spin-
1
2
partiles prepared in the singlet state (see Fig. 2).
Let am (m = 1, 2) denote the event that the measurement apparatus is set to measure the spin
Figure 2: EPRBohm setup for spin-
1
2
partiles
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in diretion ~am in the left wing; and let p(am) stand for the probability of am. Let bn (n = 1, 2)
and p(bn) respetively denote the same for diretion ~bn in the right wing. (Note that m = n does
not mean that ~am and ~bn are parallel diretions.) Furthermore, let p(Am) stand for the probability
that the spin measurement in diretion ~am in the left wing yields the result `up' and let p(Bn) be
dened in a similar way in the right wing for diretion
~bn. Aording to the statistial algorithm
of quantum mehanis the onditional probability of getting an `up' result provided we measure the
spin in diretion ~am in the left wing; getting an `up' result provided we measure the spin in diretion
~bn in the right wing; and getting `up-up' result provided we measure the spin in both diretions ~am
and
~bn are given by the following relations:
p(Am|am ∧ bn) = 1
2
(28)
p(Bn|am ∧ bn) = 1
2
(29)
p(Am ∧Bn|am ∧ bn) = 1
2
sin2
(
θambn
2
)
(30)
where θambn denotes the angle between diretions ~am and
~bn. For non-perpendiular diretions ~am
and
~bn (28)-(30) predit onditional orrelations speied in (14). Now, in order to provide a lassial
loal, non-onspiratorial joint ommon ausal explanation for these orrelations, the onditional
probabilities (28)-(30) have to satisfy the lassial CH inequality (19). Sine for appropriate hoie
of the measurement diretions this inequalitity is violated, EPR orrelations annot be given a
lassial loal, non-onspiratorial joint ommon ausal explanation.
Observe that up to this point everything has been lassial. Quantum mehanis (QM) was simply
used to generate lassial onditional probabilities by the Born rule. These onditional probabilities,
however, ould also have been diretly obtained from the laboratory and in the atual experiments
they are gained in this diret way indeed. So it is ompletely satisfatory to interpret the EPR
senarioin aord with the quote from Gisin in the Introdutionas a lassial situation with
lassial onditional orrelation (between detetor liks) violating the lassial CH inequality (19)
(see (Szabó 1998)).
But this is not the standard interpretation. The standard way to desribe the above EPR
situation is to adopt another mathematial formalism, the formalism of quantum theory. Here
events are represented as projetions of the von Neumann lattie of the tensor produt matrix
algebraM2(C)⊗M2(C) and probabilities are gained by the quantum states. So instead of (28)-(30)
one writes the following:
φs(Am) = Tr
(
ρs (Am ⊗ 1B)
)
=
1
2
(31)
φs(Bn) = Tr
(
ρs (1A ⊗Bn)
)
=
1
2
(32)
φs(AmBn) = Tr
(
ρs (Am ⊗Bn)
)
=
1
2
sin2
(
θambn
2
)
(33)
where Am and Bn denote projetions onto the eigensubspaes with eigenvalue +
1
2
of the spin oper-
ators assoiated with diretions ~am and ~bn, respetively, and φ
s( · ) = Tr(ρs · ) is the singlet state.
Moreover, if we go over to AQFT, these projetions will be loalized in a well-dened spaetime
region.
Substituting the non-lassial probabilities (31)-(33) into the non-lassial CH inequality (2)
dened in the Introdution one nds a violation of this inequality for appropriate hoies of the
projetions Am, Bn. But what does it mean? First, it is important to be aware of the fat that now
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we adopt another theory to aount for orrelations. But then we need to take the onsequenes of
this move seriously. This means that we need to represent every event of the model as projetions
of a von Neumann algebra. Among them ommon auses! So the following questions arise: Can the
lassial notion of the ommon ause (system) generalized for the non-lassial ase? What is the
relation of this non-lassial notion of ommon ause to the non-lassial CH inequality (2)? Does
there exist a non-lassial ommon ausal justiation of the Bell inequalities used in AQFT similar
to the lassial one?
As it will turn out soon, one an generalize the notion of the ommon ause also for the alge-
brai quantum eld theoretial setting, and one an also give a preise denition of a loal, non-
onspiratorial joint ommon ausal explanation of a set of orrelations in AQFT. However, it also
will turn out that there is no diret relation between this ommon ausal explanation and the Bell
inequalities. Or to put it briey, orrelation violating the Bell inequality an still have a loal, non-
onspiratorial joint ommon ausal explanation. In order to see all these, rst we have to generalize
the notions of this Setion to the quantum ase.
4 Non-lassial ommon ausal explanation
Let us rst generalize the notion of the ommon ause system to the quantum ase in the following
way. Replae the lassial probability measure spae (Ω,Σ, p) by the non-lassial probability mea-
sure spae (N ,P(N ), φ) where P(N ) is the (non-distributive) lattie of projetions (events) and φ
is a state of a von Neumann algebra N . We note that in ase of projetion latties we will use only
algebra operations (produts, linear ombinations) instead of lattie operations (∨,∧). In ase of
ommuting projetions A,B ∈ P(N ) lattie operations an be given in terms of algebrai operations.
A set of mutually orthogonal projetions {Ck}k∈K ⊂ P(N ) is alled a partition of the unit 1 ∈ N
if
∑
k Ck = 1. Two ommuting projetions A and B ∈ P(N ) are said to be orrelating in the state
φ : N → C if
φ(AB) 6= φ(A)φ(B). (34)
Sine φ is linear, a kind of `theorem of total probablity',
∑
i φ(APi) = φ(A
∑
i Pi) = φ(A), holds for
any partition {Pi} of the unit, hene (34) is equivalent to
φ(AB)φ(A⊥B⊥) 6= φ(AB⊥)φ(A⊥B). (35)
Now, following the lines of Denition 2 one an haraterize the non-lassial ommon ause system
of the orrelation (34) as a sreener-o partition of the unit. To make the denition meaningful we
have to introdue the following onditional expetation Ec : N → C:
Ec(A) :=
∑
k∈K
CkACk, (36)
where {Ck}k∈K is a partition of the unit of N (Umegaki, 1954). The image C of this map is a
unital subalgebra of N ontaining exatly those elements that ommute with Ck, k ∈ K. There-
fore, Ec(A)Ck = Ec(ACk) = CkACk (A ∈ N , k ∈ K) for example. By means of this onditional
expetation we an dene the notion of the ommon ause system in the non-lassial ase:
Denition 5. A partition of the unit {Ck}k∈K ⊂ P(N ) is said to be the ommon ause system of
the ommuting events A,B ∈ P(N ), whih orrelate in the state φ : N → C, if for those k ∈ K for
whih φ(Ck) 6= 0, the following ondition holds:
(φ ◦ Ec)(ABCk)
φ(Ck)
=
(φ ◦Ec)(ACk)
φ(Ck)
(φ ◦ Ec)(BCk)
φ(Ck)
. (37)
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If Ck ommutes with both A and B for all k ∈ K, we all {Ck}k∈K a ommuting ommon ause
system, otherwise a nonommuting one. A ommon ause system of size |K| = 2 is alled a ommon
ause.
Some remarks are in plae here. First, using the `theorem of total probability' the ommon ause
ondition (37) an be written as
(φ ◦ Ec)(ABCk)) (φ ◦Ec)(A⊥B⊥Ck) = (φ ◦ Ec)(AB⊥Ck) (φ ◦ Ec)(A⊥BCk), k ∈ K. (38)
One an even allow here the ase φ(Ck) = 0, sine then both sides of (38) are zero.
Seond, the non-lassial harater of the ommon ause system of Denition 5 lies in the fat
that the ommon ause system need not ommute with the orrelating events. If the events A
and B ommute with Ck, k ∈ K, then not only Ck ∈ C but also A,B,A⊥, B⊥ ∈ C, and therefore
Ec(ABCk) = ABCk, for example. Thus, the onditional expetation Ec vanishes from the dening
equation (37); and (38) leads to
φ(ABCk)φ(A
⊥B⊥Ck) = φ(AB⊥Ck)φ(A⊥BCk). (39)
Finally, it is obvious from (39) that if Ck ≤ X with X = A,A⊥, B or B⊥ for any k ∈ K
then {Ck}k∈K serve as a ommon ause system (and hene a ommuting ommon ause system)
of the given orrelation independently of the hosen state φ. These solutions are alled trivial
ommon ause systems. In ase of ommon ause, |K| = 2, triviality means that {Ck} = {A,A⊥} or
{Ck} = {B,B⊥}.
Having generalized the notion of the ommon ause system for the quantum ase, the next step
is to loalize it. Suppose that the projetion A is loalized in the algebra A(VA) with support VA
and the projetion B is loalized in the algebra A(VB) with support VB suh that V ′′A and V ′′B are
spaelike separated double ones in a spaetime S. A ommon ause system {Ck}k∈K is said to be
a ommuting/nonommuting (strong/weak) ommon ause system of the orrelation between A and
B if {Ck}k∈K is loalizable in an algebra A(VC) with support VC suh that VC is in cpast(VA, VB)
(spast(VA, VB)/wpast(VA, VB)).
In the same vein, we obtain the denition of the joint ommon ause system in the non-lassial
ase. Let {(Am, Bn);m ∈ M,n ∈ N} be a set of pairs of ommuting projetions orrelating in the
sense that
φ(AmBn) 6= φ(Am)φ(Bn). (40)
Denition 6. A partition of the unit {Ck}k∈K ⊂ P(N ) is said to be a joint ommon ause system
of the set {(Am, Bn);m ∈ M,n ∈ N} of ommuting pairs of orrelating events, if for any k ∈ K,
when φ(Ck) 6= 0, the onditions
(φ ◦ Ec)(AmBnCk)
φ(Ck)
=
(φ ◦ Ec)(AmCk)
φ(Ck)
(φ ◦ Ec)(BnCk)
φ(Ck)
, m ∈M,n ∈ N (41)
hold, where Ec is the onditional expetation dened in (36). Again, if {Ck}k∈K ommutes with Am
and Bn for all m ∈M,n ∈ N , then we all it a ommuting joint ommon ause system, otherwise a
nonommuting one.
Equation (41) an again be understood in the more permissive way as
(φ ◦ Ec)(AmBnCk)) (φ ◦ Ec)(A⊥mB⊥n Ck) = (φ ◦ Ec)(AmB⊥n Ck) (φ ◦ Ec)(A⊥mBnCk) (42)
inorporating ases when φ(Ck) = 0.
And here omes a subtle point. Having introdued the notion of the joint ommon ause system
of a orrelation in the preeding Setion we went over to onditional orrelations and dened a loal,
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non-onspriratorial ommon ausal explanation of these orrelations. What is the analogue move in
the non-lassial ase? We laim that we need not introdue any new onept; the denition of a
loal, non-onspriratorial ommon ause system in the non-lassial ase is just idential to the one
given in Denition 6 that is to the denition of the joint ommon ause system. For the details see
the Appendix (and (Buttereld 1995)). So from now on we drop the prex `loal, non-onspiratorial'
before the term `joint ommon ause system' in the non-lassial ase.
Now, we are able to ask whether there is a proposition similary to Proposition 1 in the non-lassial
ase, that is whether one an derive a CH inequality (2) from the fat that the set of orrelating
projetions {(Am, Bn);m ∈ M,n ∈ N} has a joint ommon ausal explanation? The following
proposition provides a suient ondition.
Proposition 2. Let Am ∈ A(VA) and Bn ∈ A(VB) (m,n = 1, 2) be four projetions loalized in
spaelike separated spaetime regions VA and VB , respetively, whih orrelate in the loally faithful
state φ in the sense of (40). Suppose that {(Am, Bn);m,n = 1, 2} has a joint ommon ausal
explanation in the sense of Denition 6. Then for any m,m′, n, n′ = 1, 2;m 6= m′;n 6= n′ the CH
inequality
−1 6 (φ ◦ Ec)(AmBn +AmBn′ +Am′Bn −Am′Bn′ −Am −Bn) 6 0. (43)
holds for the state φ ◦ Ec. If the joint ommon ause is a ommuting one, then the CH inequality
holds for the original state φ:
−1 6 φ(AmBn +AmBn′ +Am′Bn −Am′Bn′ − Am −Bn) 6 0. (44)
Proof. Substituting the expressions
α :=
(φ ◦ Ec)(AmCk)
φ(Ck)
(45)
α′ :=
(φ ◦ Ec)(Am′Ck)
φ(Ck)
(46)
β :=
(φ ◦ Ec)(BnCk)
φ(Ck)
(47)
β′ :=
(φ ◦ Ec)(Bn′Ck)
φ(Ck)
(48)
into the inequality
−1 6 αβ + αβ′ + α′β − α′β′ − α− β 6 0
and using (41) we get
−1 6 (φ ◦ Ec)(AmBnCk)
φ(Ck)
+
(φ ◦ Ec)(AmBn′Ck)
φ(Ck)
+
(φ ◦ Ec)(Am′BnCk)
φ(Ck)
− (φ ◦ Ec)(Am′Bn′Ck)
φ(Ck)
− (φ ◦ Ec)(AmCk)
φ(Ck)
− (φ ◦ Ec)(BnCk)
φ(Ck)
6 0. (49)
Multiplying the above inequality by φ(Ck) and summing up for the index k one obtains
−1 6
∑
k
(
(φ ◦ Ec)(AmBnCk) + (φ ◦ Ec)(AmBn′Ck) + (φ ◦ Ec)(Am′BnCk)
−(φ ◦ Ec)(Am′Bn′Ck)− (φ ◦ Ec)(AmCk)− (φ ◦ Ec)(BnCk)
)
6 0, (50)
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whih leads to (43) by performing the summation. If {Ck}k∈K is a ommuting joint ommon ause
system, then Ec drops out from the above expression sine all the arguments are in C (see the remark
before (38)). Therefore (50) beomes idential to (44), whih ompletes the proof.
First note that similarly to Proposition 1, neither Proposition 2 refers to the spaetime loalization
of {Ck} in a diret way. Indiretly, however, it restrits the loalization of the possible joint ommon
ause systems for states violating the CH inequality (44): the support of {Ck} must interset the
union of the ausal past or the ausal future of VA ∪ VB . It is so beause otherwise the support of
{Ck}k∈K would be spaelike separated from those of A and B, and hene {Ck} would be a ommuting
joint ommon ause system for a set of orrelations violating the CH inequality (44), in ontradition
with Proposition 2.
Proposition 2similarly to Proposition 1provides a ommon ausal justiation of the CH
inequality (44). It states that in order to yield a ommuting joint ommon ausal explanation for
the set {(Am, Bn);m,n = 1, 2} the CH inequality (44) has to be satised. But what is the situation
with nonommuting ommon ause systems? Sineapart from (43)Proposition 2 is silent about
the relation between a nonommuting joint ommon ausal explanation and the CH inequality (44),
the question arises: Can a set of orrelations violating the CH inequality (44) have a nonommuting
joint ommon ausal explanation? Before addressing this question, we pose an easier one: Can a
single orrelation have a ommon ausal explanation in AQFT? This leads us over to the question
of the validity of the Common Cause Priniples in AQFT.
5 Common Cause Priniples in algebrai quantum eld theory
Reihenbah's Common Cause Priniple (CCP) is the following hypothesis: If there is a orrelation
between two events and there is no diret ausal (or logial) onnetion between the orrelating
events, then there exists a ommon ause of the orrelation. The preise denition of this informal
statement that ts to the algebrai quantum eld theoretial setting is the following:
Denition 7. A PK-ovariant loal quantum theory {A(V ), V ∈ K} is said to satisfy the Commu-
tative/Nonommutative (Weak/Strong) Common Cause Priniple if for any pair A ∈ A(V1) and
B ∈ A(V2) of projetions supported in spaelike separated regions V1, V2 ∈ K and for every loally
faithful state φ : A → C establishing a orrelation between A and B, there exists a nontrivial
ommuting/nonommuting ommon ause system {Ck}k∈K ⊂ A(V ), V ∈ K of the orrelation (34)
suh that the loalization region V is in the (weak/strong) ommon past of V1 and V2.
What is the status of these six dierent notions of the Common Cause Priniple in AQFT?
The question whether the Commutative Common Cause Priniples are valid in a Poinaré o-
variant loal quantum theory in the von Neumann algebrai setting was rst raised by Rédei (1997,
1998). As an answer to this question, Rédei and Summers (2002, 2007) have shown that the Commu-
tative Weak CCP is valid in algebrai quantum eld theory with loally innite degrees of freedom.
Namely, in the von Neumann setting they proved that for every loally normal and faithful state
and for every superluminally orrelating pair of projetions there exists a weak ommon ause, that
is a ommon ause system of size 2 in the weak past of the orrelating projetions. They have also
shown (Rédei and Summers, 2002, p 352) that the loalization of a ommon ause C < AB annot be
restrited to wpast(V1, V2)\I−(V1) or wpast(V1, V2)\I−(V2) due to logial independene of spaelike
separated algebras.
Conerning the Commutative (Strong) CCP less is known. If one also admits projetions loalized
only in unbounded regions, then the Strong CCP is known to be false: von Neumann algebras
pertaining to omplementary wedges ontain orrelated projetions but the strong past of suh wedges
is empty (see (Summers andWerner, 1988) and (Summers, 1990)). In spaetimes having horizons, e.g.
those with RobertsonWalker metri, the ommon past of spaelike separated bounded regions an
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be empty, although there are states whih provide orrelations among loal algebras orresponding
to these regions (Wald 1992).
7
Hene, CCP is not valid there. Restriting ourselves to loal algebras
in Minkowski spaes the situation is not lear. We are of the opinion that one annot deide on
the validity of the (Strong) CCP without an expliit referene to the dynamis sine there is no
bounded region V in cpast(V1, V2) (hene neither in spast(V1, V2)) for whih isotony would ensure
that A(V1 ∪ V2) ⊂ A(V ′′). But dynamis relates the loal algebras sine A(V1 ∪ V2) ⊂ A(V ′′ + t) =
αt(A(V ′′)) an be fullled for ertain V ⊆ V ′′ ⊂ cpast(V1, V2) and for ertain time translation by t.
Coming bak to the proof of Rédei and Summers, the proof had a ruial premise, namely that
the algebras in question are von Neumann algebras of type III. Although these algebras arise in a
natural way in the ontext of Poinaré ovariant theories, other loal quantum theories apply von
Neumann algebras of other type. For example, theories with loally nite degrees of freedom are
based on nite dimensional (type I) loal von Neumann algebras. This raised the question whether
the Commutative Weak CCP is valid in other loal quantum theories. To address the problem Hofer-
Szabó and Vesernyés (2012a) have hosen the loal quantum Ising model (see Müller, Vesernyés)
having loally nite degrees of freedom. It turned out that the Commutative Weak CCP is not valid
in the loal quantum Ising model and it annot be valid either in theories with loally nite degrees
of freedom in general.
But why should we require ommutativity between the ommon ause and its eets at all?
Commutativity has a well-dened role in any quantum theories: observables should ommute
to be simultaneously measurable. In AQFT ommutativity of observables with spaelike separated
supports is an axiom. To put it simply, ommutativity an be required for events whih an happen
`at the same time'. But ause and eet are typially not this sort of events. If one onsiders ordinary
QM, one well sees that observables do not ommute even with their own time translates in general.
For example, the time translate x(t) := U(t)−1xU(t) of the position operator x of the harmoni
osillator in QM does not ommute with x ≡ x(0) for generi t, sine in the ground state vetor ψ0
we have
[
x, x(t)
]
ψ0 =
−i~ sin (~ωt)
mω
ψ0 6≡ 0. (51)
Thus, if an observable A is not a onserved quantity, that is A(t) 6= A, then the ommutator
[A,A(t)] 6= 0 in general. So why should the ommutators [A,C] and [B,C] vanish for the events
A,B and for their ommon ause C supported in their (weak/ommon/strong) past? We think that
ommuting ommon auses are only unneessary reminisense of their lassial formulation. Due to
their relative spaetime loalization, that is due to the time delay between the orrelating events and
the ommon ause, it is also an unreasonable assumption.
Abandoning ommutativity in the denition of the ommon ause is therefore a natural move.
To our knowledge the rst to ontemplate the possibility of the nonommuting ommon auses were
Clifton and Ruetshe (1999) in their paper ritiizing Rédei (1997, 1998) who required ommutativity
from the ommon ause. They say: [requiring ommutativity℄ bars form andiday to the post of
ommon ause the vast majority of events in the ommon past of events problematially orrelated (p
165). And indeed, the benet of allowing nonommuting ommon auses is that the nonommutative
version of the result of Rédei and Summers an be regained: as it was shown in (Hofer-Szabó and
Vesernyés 2012b), by allowing ommon auses that do not ommute with the orrelating events,
the Weak CCP an be proven in loal UHF-type quantum theories.
Now, let us turn to our original question as to whether a set of orrelations violating the CH
inequality (2) an have a nonommuting joint ommon ausal explanation in AQFT. Sine our answer
is provided in an AQFT with loally nite degrees of freedom, in the loal quantum Ising model,
we give a short and non-tehnial tutorial to this model in the next Setion. (For more detail see
(Hofer-Szabó, Vesernyés, 2012).)
7
We thank David Malament for alling our attention to this point and the paper of Wald.
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6 Nonommutative ommon auses for orrelations violating
the CH inequality
Consider a `disretized' version of the two dimensional Minkowski spaetimeM2 whih is omposed
of minimal double onesOm(t, i) of unit diameter with their enter in (t, i) for t, i ∈ Z or t, i ∈ Z+1/2.
The set {Omi , i ∈ 12Z} of suh minimal double ones with t = 0,−1/2 denes a `thikened' Cauhy
surfae in this spaetime (see Fig. 3). The double one Omi,j stiked to this Cauhy surfae is dened
to be the smallest double one ontaining both Omi and Omj : Omi,j := Omi ∨ Omj . Similarly, let
Om(t, i; s, j) := Om(t, i)∨Om(s, j). The direted set of suh double ones is denoted by Km, and the
direted subset of it whose elements are stiked to a Cauhy surfae is denoted by KmCS . Obviously,
KmCS will be left invariant by integer spae translations and Km will be left invariant by integer spae
and time translations.
1O OO0OO
1/2OO−1/2 O3/2O−3/2
−1−2
m m m m m
mmm m
2
Figure 3: A thikened Cauhy surfae in the two dimensional Minkowski spae M2
The net of loal algebras is dened as follows. The `one-point' observable algebras assoiated to
the minimal double ones Omi , i ∈ 12Z are dened to be A(Omi ) ≃ M1(C) ⊕M1(C). Between the
unitary selfadjoint generators Ui ∈ A(Omi ) one demands the following ommutation relations:
UiUj =
{ −UjUi, if |i− j| = 12 ,
UjUi, otherwise.
(52)
Now, the loal algebras A(Oi,j),Oi,j ∈ KmCS are linearly spanned by the monoms
Ukii U
k
i+ 1
2
i+ 1
2
. . . U
k
j− 1
2
j− 1
2
U
kj
j (53)
where ki, ki+ 1
2
. . . kj− 1
2
, kj ∈ {0, 1}.8
Sine the loal algebras A(Oi,i− 1
2
+n), i ∈ 12Z for n ∈ N are isomorphi to the full matrix algebra
M2n(C), the quasiloal observable algebra A is a uniformly hypernite (UHF) C∗-algebra and on-
sequently there exists a unique (non-degenerate) normalized trae Tr : A → C on it. We note that
all nontrivial monoms in (53) have zero trae.
In order to extend the `Cauhy surfae net' {A(O),O ∈ KmCS} to the net {A(O),O ∈ Km}
in a ausal and time translation ovariant manner one has to lassify ausal (integer valued) time
evolutions in the loal quantum Ising model. This lassiation was given in (Müller, Vesernyés)
and it also was shown that the extended net satises isotony, Einstein ausality, algebrai Haag
8
For detailed Hopf algebrai desription of the loal quantum spin models see (Szlahányi, Vesernyés, 1993), (Nill,
Szlahányi, 1997), (Müller, Vesernyés)).
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duality
A(O′)′ ∩A = A(O), O ∈ Km, (54)
Z× Z ovariane with respet to integer time and spae translations and primitive ausality:
A(V ) = A(V ′′), (55)
where V is a nite onneted piee of a thikened Cauhy surfae (omposed of minimal double
ones). V ′′ denotes the double spaelike omplement of V , whih is the smallest double one in Km
ontaining V . We will be interested here only in a speial subset of these ausal automorphisms
given by:
β(Ux) = Ux− 1
2
UxUx+ 1
2
, x ∈ Z+ 1
2
. (56)
(In our following example we need not speify the hoie for β(Ux), x ∈ Z.) Now, onsider the double
ones OA := Om(0,−1) ∪ Om(12 ,− 12 ) and OB := Om(12 , 12 ) ∪ Om(0, 1) and the `two-point' algebrasA(OA) and A(OB) pertaining to them. (See Fig. 4.) A linear basis of the algebra A(OA) is given
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Figure 4: Projetions in A(OA) and A(OB)
by the monoms
1, U−1, β(U− 1
2
) ≡ U−1U− 1
2
U0, iU−1β(U− 1
2
) ≡ iU− 1
2
U0 (57)
(where i in the fourth monom is the imaginary unit). They satisfy the same ommutation relations
like the Pauli matries σ0 = 1, σx, σy and σz in M2(C). Therefore, introduing the notation
U := (U−1, U−1U− 1
2
U0, iU− 1
2
U0) (58)
any minimal projetion in A(OA) an be parametrized as
A(a) :=
1
2
(1+ aU) (59)
where a = (a1, a2, a3) is a unit vetor in R
3
. In the same vein, any minimal projetion in A(OB)
an be paremetrized as
B(b) :=
1
2
(1+ bV) (60)
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where
V := (U1, −U0U 1
2
U1, iU0U 1
2
) (61)
is the vetor omposed of the generators of A(OB) and b = (b1, b2, b3) is a unit vetor in R3.
The projetions A(a) and B(b) an be interpreted as the event loalized in A(OA) and A(OB),
respetively pertaining to the generalized spin measurement in diretion a and b, respetively.
Now, onsider two projetions Am := A(a
m);m = 1, 2 loalized in OA, and two other projetions
Bn := B(b
n);n = 1, 2 loalized in the spaelike separated double one OB . Suppose that our system
is in the faithful state φ( · ) = Tr(ρ · ) where
ρ = ρ(λ) := 1+ λ
(
U−1U− 1
2
U 1
2
U1 − U−1U1 + U− 1
2
U 1
2
)
, λ ∈ [0, 1). (62)
For λ = 1 the state dened by (62) gives us bak the usual singlet state. It is easy to see that in the
state (62) the orrelation between Am and Bn will be:
corr(Am, Bn) := φ(AmBn)− φ(Am)φ(Bn) = −λ
4
〈am,bn〉 (63)
where 〈 , 〉 is the salar produt in R3. In other words Am and Bn will orrelate whenever am and
b
n
are not orthogonal. Now, if a
m
and b
n
are hosen as
a
1 = (0, 1, 0) (64)
a
2 = (1, 0, 0) (65)
b
1 =
1√
2
(1, 1, 0) (66)
b
2 =
1√
2
(−1, 1, 0) (67)
the CH inequality (2) will be violated at the lower bound sine
φ(A1B1 +A1B2 +A2B1 −A2B2 −A1 −B1
)
=
−1
2
− λ
4
(〈
a
1,b1
〉
+
〈
a
1,b2
〉
+
〈
a
2,b1
〉− 〈a2,b2〉) = −1 + λ
√
2
2
, (68)
whih is smaller than −1 if λ > 1√
2
. Or, equivalently, the CHSH inequality (1) where
Xm := 2Am − 1 (69)
Yn := 2Bn − 1 (70)
will be violated for the above setting sine
φ(X1(Y1 + Y2) +X1(Y1 − Y2)) =
= −λ (〈a1,b1 + b2〉+ 〈a2,b1 − b2〉) = −λ2√2 (71)
is smaller than −2 if λ > 1√
2
. Both the CH and the CHSH inequality are maximally violated for the
singlet state, that is if λ = 1.
The question whether the four orrelations {(Am, Bn);m,n = 1, 2} violating the CH inequality
(2) have a joint ommon ausal explanation was answered in (Hofer-Szabó, Vesernyés, 2012) by
the following
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Proposition 3. Let Am := A(a
m) ∈ A(OA), Bn := B(bn) ∈ A(OB);m,n = 1, 2 be four projetions
dened in (59)-(60), where a
m
and b
n
are non-orthogonal unit vetors in R
3
establishing four
orrelations {(Am, Bn);m,n = 1, 2} in the state (62). Let furthermore C be any projetion loalized
in OC := O− 1
2
∨ O 1
2
∈ KmCS (see Fig. 5.) of the shape
C =
1
4
(
1+ U− 1
2
U 1
2
)(
1+ c1U0 + c2U 1
2
+ c3iU0U 1
2
)
+
1
4
(
1− U− 1
2
U 1
2
)(
1+ c′1U0 + c
′
2U 1
2
+ c′3iU0U 1
2
)
(72)
where c = (c1, c2, c3) and c
′ = (c′1, c
′
2, c
′
3) are arbitrary unit vetors in R
3
. Then {C,C⊥} is a joint
ommon ause of the orrelations {(Am, Bn)} if am3 bn3 = 0 for any m,n = 1, 2 and c2 = 0.
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Figure 5: Loalization of a ommon ause for the orrelations {(Am, Bn)}.
Sine for the diretions a
m
and b
n
dened in (64)-(67) the requirement am3 b
n
3 = 0 holds for any
m,n = 1, 2, therefore the orrelations (maximally) violating the CH/CHSH inequality do have a
joint ommon auseany C of form (72) with c2 = 0.
Finally, here is a Proposition (onsistently with the derivability of a CH inequality from the
ommuting joint ommon ause system) laiming that there exists no ommuting joint ommon ause
for these orrelations even without any restrition to their loalization (Hofer-Szabó, Vesernyés,
2012):
Proposition 4. Let Am ∈ A(OA), Bn ∈ A(OB);m,n = 1, 2 be projetions dened in (59)-(60) with
a
m
and b
n
given in (64)-(67). The orrelations {(Am, Bn);m,n = 1, 2} in the state (62) do not have
a ommuting joint ommon ause {C1, C2} in A.
Proposition 3 answers the question raised at the end of the last Setion as to whether there is
a ommon ausal justiation of the CH inequalities in the general, that is in the nonommuting
ase. The answer to this question is learly no. The violation of the CH inequality for a given
set of orrelation does not prevent us from nding a ommon ausal explanation for them. All
we have to do is to extend our sope of searh and to embrae nonommuting ommon auses in
the ommon ausal explanation. So the Bell inequalities in the non-lassial ase do not play the
same role as in the lassial one. In the lassial ase there was a diret logial link between the
possibility of a ommon ausal explanation and the validity of the Bell inequalities; here the violation
of the Bell inequalities exludes only a subset of the possible ommon ausal explanations ontaining
the ommuting ones. To put it dierently, taking seriously the ontology of AQFT where events are
represented by not neessarily ommuting projetions, one an provide a ommon ausal explanation
in a muh wider range than simply stiking to ommutative ommon auses.
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7 On the meaning of nonommuting ommon auses
But what are the onsequenes of applying nonommutative ommon auses? Let us see the story
from the beginning, going bak to Reihenbah's original denition of the ommon ause. The
Reihenbahian ommon ause has the nie property that the presene of a ommon ause implies
a (positive) orrelation between the events in question. This fat is a simple onsequene of the
following identity:
p(A ∧B)− p(A) p(B) = p(C)p(C⊥)[p(A|C)− p(A|C⊥)][p(B|C)− p(B|C⊥)]. (73)
It is straightforward to hek that if C is a Reihenbahian ommon ause fullling requirements
(6)-(9) then the right hand side of (73) is positive therefore there is a positive orrelation between
A and B. In this sense the ommon ause provids a Hempelian explanation for the orrelation.9
Going over to the notion of the ommon ause system this `explanatory fore' of the ommon ause
disappears: from the presene of the ommon ause (11) the orrelation (10) between A and B does
not follow. (For an attempt to dene the notion of the ommon ause system suh that it preserves
this dedutive relation between the ommon ause system and the orrelation see (Hofer-Szabó and
Rédei 2004, 2006).)
The nonommutative generalization of the ommon ause system is one step further into the
diretion of relaxing the relation between the ommon ause and the orrelation. Here not only the
dedutive relation between the ommon ause and the orrelation gets lost, but also the relation
between the onditioned and unonditioned probalitity of the orrelating events. Namely,
φ(A) = φc(A) := (φ ◦ Ec)(A) ≡
∑
k
(φ ◦ Ec)(ACk)
φ(Ck)
φ(Ck) (74)
holds in general i A = Ec(A), that is i [A,Ck] = 0 for all k ∈ K. That is the state φc diers from
φ for A ∈ A\ ImEc in general, whih means that the statistis of A an dier depending on whether
we alutate it diretly from the state φ or as a weighted average of onditional probabilities over
the subensembles Ck.
But then one might ome up with the following onern: Nonommuting ommon auses are not
atual but only ontrafatual entities sine if the Ck-s had been realized, then we would have ended
up with another probability (the right hand side of (74)) for the orrelating events than the atual
ones (the left hand side of (74)). So these ommon auses annot be realized in the same (atual)
world in whih those event are aomodated whih they are supposed to explain.
We do not onsider this objetion to be serious against the appliation of nonommuting ommon
auses. An analogy between the notion of the ommon ause and the notion of the ause in QM
might help to illuminate why. An observable/event X an be said to be the ause of another
observable/event Y in QM, if X evolves in time into Y . But if X and Y do not ommute, then
had X been earlier realized, the unitary dynamis would have been distorted, so X would not have
evolved into Y . Still, we regard X to be the ause of Y . Similarly, C is a ommon ause of A and
B if onditioned on it the orrelation between A and B disappears. If C does not ommute with A
and B, then had C been realized, the statistis would have been distorted, so the probability of A,
B and AB would be dierent. Still, we think that C is the ommon ause.
What is important to see here is that the denition of the ommon ause does not ontain the
requirement (whih our lassialy informed intuition would ditate) that the onditional probabilites,
when added up, should give bak the unonditional probabilities, that is φ = φc should full. Or in
other words, that the probability of the orrelating events should be built up from a ner desription
of the situation provided by the ommon ause. To put it in a more formal way: the theorem of
9
One is tempted to speulate that this desired property might just have been the reason why Reihenbah took up
the statistial relevany onditions (8)-(9) in the denition of the ommon ause.
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total probability is not part of the denition of the ommon ause.
10
The dening property of the
ommon ause is simply the sreening-o.
So ommon auses might not be realized without the distortion of the statistis of the original
orrelating events. But this fat is ubiquitous for nonommuting observables in QM. If we tolerate
this fat in general, then why not to tolerate it for ommon auses? As we have seen, allowing non-
ommuting ommon auses helps us to maintain Bell's original intuition onerning loal ausality.
8 Conlusions
In the paper we saw that the Bell inequalities used in AQFT annot be given a ommon ausal
justiation similar to the lassial Bell inequalities if we allow nonommuting ommon auses in
the explanation. Just the opposite is true: for a set of orrelations violating the CH inequalities a
nonommutative ommon ausal explanation an be given and this ommon ause an be loalized in
the ommon past of the orrelating events. Thus, abandoning ommutativity gives us extra freedom
in the searh of ommon auses for orrelations. But how big is this freedom? Is it big enough to
nd a ommon ause for any set of orrelations? We saw that for the worst andidate, so to say,
for the set maximally violating the CH inequality we have found suh a ommon ause. But does
it mean that this strategy an be applied aross the board? What is the range of orrelations for
whih a joint ommon ausal explanation an be given? Is this range determined only by the size of
the set of orrelations or by some other properties thereof? Is it true for example that for any nite
set of orrelations a weak joint ommon ausal explanation an always be given? Or to put it in a
more formal way, an one always nd a partition of the unit for any nite set of orrelations suh
that the neessary ondition (43) for a joint ommon ausal explanation fullls? All these questions
are still open.
Appendix: In what sense non-lassial joint ommon ause sys-
tems are loal and non-onspiratorial?
In Setion 4 we laimed that Denition 6 of the joint ommon ause system is the orret non-lassial
generalization of Denition 4 of the (lassial) loal, non-onspiratorial joint ommon ause system.
But how an the single non-lassial sreening-o ondition (41) generalize not only the lassial
sreening-o ondition (15) but also the loality onditions (16)-(17) and non-onspiray (18)? This
is the question we address in this Appendix.
Let us rst introdue a lassial probability measure pCk on a ommon measure spae (Ω,Σ) for
every element of a lassial ommon ause system {Ck, k ∈ K}, if p(Ck) 6= 0:
pCk(X |x) :=
p(X ∧Ck|x)
p(Ck)
. (75)
With this denotation sreening-o (15), loality (16)-(17), and no-onspiray (18) will read as
pCk(Am ∧Bn|am ∧ bn) = pCk(Am|am ∧ bn) pCk(Bn|am ∧ bn), (76)
pCk(Am|am ∧ bn) = pCk(Am|am ∧ bn′), (77)
pCk(Bn|am ∧ bn) = pCk(Bn|am′ ∧ bn), (78)
pCk(Ω|am ∧ bn) = 1, (79)
10
As it is not part of the denition of the ause either: if one measures X, one annot reonstrut the probability
of a nonommuting Y from the onditional probabities over the subensembles pertaining to the outomes of X.
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if one uses no-onspiray (18) in the rst three equations. The subsript Ck of the probability
measure might remind the reader to the standard hidden variable approah where a parameter
λ is used to index a set of probability measures on a ommon event algebra. In this approah
the derivation of the Bell inequalities then proeeds through the summation/integration over this
parameter. In our opinion this indexial treatment of the ommon ause oneals an important fat,
namely that the ommon ause and the orrelating events stand on the same ontologial footing: they
are all events, aomodated in a ommon event algebra with a single probability measure. Therefore
the index in (76)-(79) is simply an abbreviation of the onditionalization (75), whih abbreviation
is motivated by trying to nd a lassially equivalent form, where the non-lassialy meaningless
expression am∧bn∧Ck of non-ommuting quantities an have a denite interpretation. (See below.)
Now, how does the non-lassial Denition 6 of the joint ommon ause system relate to the
above haraterization of a lassial loal, non-onspiratorial joint ommon ause system? The link
is provided by the (in our oppinion) orret interpretation of the non-lassial probabilities aording
to whih quantum probabilities are lassial onditional probabilities. The quantum probability φ(X)
of a projetion X is to be interpreted as a onditional probability p(Xcl|xcl) of getting the outome
Xcl given the quantity xcl has been set to be measured. The preise mathematial formulation of
this interpretation is given in the so-alled `Kolmogorovian Censorship Hyptothesis'. Here we just
state the proposition; for the proof see (Bana and Durt 1997), (Szabó 2001) and (Rédei 2010).
Kolmogorovian Censorship Hypothesis. Let (N ,P(N ), φ) be a non-lassial probability spae.
Let Γ be a ountable set of non-ommuting selfadjoint operators in N . For every Q ∈ Γ, let P(Q)
be a maximal Abelian sublattie of P(N ) ontaining all the spetral projetions of Q. Finally, let a
map p0 : Γ→ [0, 1] be suh that∑
Q∈Γ
p0(Q) = 1, p0(Q) > 0. (80)
Then there exists a lassial probability spae (Ω,Σ, p) suh that for every projetion XQ in any
P(Q) there exist events XQcl and xQcl in Σ suh that
XQcl ⊂ xQcl (81)
xQcl ∩ xRcl = 0, if Q 6= R (82)
p(xQcl) = p0(Q) (83)
φ(XQ) = p(XQcl |xQcl) (84)
The intuitive ontent of the above proposition is the following. A set of inompatible observables
represented by nonommuting selfadjoint operators in the set Γ are seleted for measurement with the
probabilities p0(Q) speied in (80). This measurement and seletion proedure is then represented
by lassial events XQcl and x
Q
cl, respetively: X
Q
cl represents a ertain measurement outome of the
measurement Q, and xQcl is the lassial event of setting up the measurement devie to measure
Q. Condition (81) expresses that no outome is possible without this setting up of a measuring
devie. Condition (82) expresses that inompatible observables Q and R annot be simultaneously
measured: the measurement hoies xQcl and x
R
cl are disjoint events. Condition (83) states that
the lassial probability model aptures the presribed probabilities p0(Q) as the probability of the
measurement hoies. Finally, ondition (84) is the entral relation of the Hypothesis, it states that
quantum probabilities an be written as lassial onditional probabilities: onditional probabilities
of outomes of measurements on ondition that the appropriate measuring devie has been set up.
Applying the above proposition to our ase,
11
we obtain that the quantum probabilities φ(Am),
11
From now on, we will denote both the lassial event and the projetion representing it by the same symbol.
However, the quantum state φ or the lassial probability p will always indiate in whih sense we use it.
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φ(Bn) and φ(AmBn) an be interpreted as lassial onditional probabilities p(Am|am), p(Bn|bn)
and p(Am ∧ Bn|am ∧ bn), respetively, with Am, Bn, am and bn (m ∈ M,n ∈ N) aomodated in a
lassial probability spae (Ω,Σ, p). Hene the quantum orrelations
φ(AmBn) 6= φ(Am)φ(Bn) (85)
between the elements of the set {(Am, Bn);m ∈M,n ∈ N} an be interpreted as onditional orre-
lations
p(Am ∧Bn | am ∧ bn) 6= p(Am|am) p(Bn|bn) (86)
between lassial measurement outome events onditioned on measurement hoie events in aor-
dane with (14).
To see the link between the lassial and non-lassial version of the ommon ause let us rst
introdue a similar notation for the onditionalization on Ck in the non-lassial ase, if φ(Ck) 6= 0,
as was introdued above in (75) for the lassial ase, that is let
φCk(X) :=
(φ ◦ Ec)(XCk)
φ(Ck)
=
φ(CkXCk)
φ(Ck)
. (87)
With this notation the denition of the non-lassial joint ommon ause system reads as follows:
φCk(AmBn) = φCk(Am)φCk(Bn). (88)
Using the Kolmogorovian Censorship Hypothesis the lassial interpretation of (88) is the following:
pCk(Am ∧Bn|am ∧ bn) = pCk(Am|am) pCk(Bn|bn) (89)
whih is almost the sreening-o (76) exept that the onditions on the right hand side are not
am ∧ bn. This defet will be ured however by the loality onditions. Observe namely that sine
Am and Bn ommute, therefore
φCk(Am) = φCk(AmBn) + φCk(AmB
⊥
n ) (90)
φCk(Bn) = φCk(AmBn) + φCk(A
⊥
mBn) (91)
whih translated into lassial onditional probabilities due to the Kolmogorovian Censorship Hy-
pothesis read as:
pCk(Am|am) = pCk(Am ∧Bn|am ∧ bn) + pCk(Am ∧B⊥n |am ∧ bn) = pCk(Am|am ∧ bn) (92)
pCk(Bn|bn) = pCk(Am ∧Bn|am ∧ bn) + pCk(A⊥m ∧Bn|am ∧ bn) = pCk(Bn|am ∧ bn) (93)
Now, observe that (92)-(93) are equivalent to loality (77)-(78), so loality is `automatially' fullled
for the non-lassial ommon ause due to the ommutativity of Am and Bn. (This fat is sometimes
referred as the `no-signalling theorem'; for more on that see (Shlieder 1969).) Moreover (92)-(93)
also ure the defet of (89), sine
pCk(Am|am) pCk(Bn|bn)
on the right hand side of (89) an be replaed with
pCk(Am|am ∧ bn) pCk(Bn|am ∧ bn)
turning (89) into the lassial sreening-o property (76).
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Putting all this together, a non-lassial, loal, non-onspiratorial joint ommon ausal expla-
nation of the orrelations (85) is a partition {Ck}k∈K ⊂ P(N ) if for any k ∈ K the following
requirements hold:
φCk(AmBn) = φCk(Am)φCk(Bn) (94)
φCk(Am) = φCk(AmBn) + φCk(AmB
⊥
n ) (95)
φCk(Bn) = φCk(AmBn) + φCk(A
⊥
mBn) (96)
φCk(1) = 1. (97)
whih using the Kolmogorovian Censorship Hypothesis as a `translation manual' leads us over to
the lassial, loal, non-onspiratorial joint ommon ausal explanation (76)-(79) of the orrelations
(86). But reall that (95)-(97) representing loality and no-onspiray are just identities, and hene
the sreening-o ondition (94) arries the whole ontent of the ommon ausal explanationin
aordane with our Denition 6.
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ABSTRACT
In Western common sense, one speaks of there being ﬁve human senses, a 
claim apparently challenged by the biological and psychological sciences. Part of 
this challenge comes in the form of claiming the existence of additional senses 
(proprioception, pain, a human pheromone sense). Part of the challenge comes 
from positing multiple senses where common sense only speaks of one, such as 
with the fractionation of “touch” into pressure and temperature senses. One con-
ceptual difﬁculty in thinking about the number and division of senses is that it's 
not clear whether the different senses constitute natural kinds and, if not, what 
kind of kind they are. Should we favor antirealism with respect to the senses, 
akin to the arguments of some concerning the nature of species or race? I will 
argue that this ﬁrst problem is compounded by another: that we ought to be plu-
ralists with respect to the senses—what is meant by the term “sense” varies from 
context to context, varying even between scientiﬁc contexts.
I. Introduction
In a recent paper, “The senses as psychological kinds,” Matthew Nudds 
(2011) observes and asks, “We see, hear, touch, smell, and taste things. In dis-
tinguishing determinate ways of perceiving things, what are we distinguishing be-
tween? What, in other words, is a sense modality” (311)? He goes on to note that 
there are many differences to be found between the senses, but asks, “...which, if 
any, of these differences are those that really matter?” (311, my emphasis). This 
1
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is all just a way of asking a question about the metaphysical nature of the 
senses.
At ﬁrst glance, it might seem that the difference between the senses would 
be a paradigm case of a difference in kind. On many different commonsense cri-
teria, seeing and hearing, say, are fundamentally different: They are carried out 
by different organs (eyes and ears, respectively). They bring us information about 
very different aspects of the world (colors and pitches). They involve the trans-
duction of different kinds of energy (electromagnetic and mechanical). Further, 
the experiences of one are not easily confused with those of the other. The dif-
ferences here would seem to be brute; a starting point for further analysis, not 
something open for much analysis itself. Apparently, seeing and hearing are just 
different.
In exploring these questions, Nudds considers the possibility that the 
senses are natural kinds—more precisely: “psychological kinds”—and are differ-
entiated in virtue of the different perceptual (psychological) mechanisms that op-
erate in the cases of the differing senses. However, although he sees such an 
account as having merit, he is not ultimately willing to bet on it.1 Instead, he pro-
poses that, 
...we could accept that in distinguishing different perceptions 
we are distinguishing them on the basis of how they were pro-
duced but give up on the idea that we can explain or give an 
account of the different ways that perceptions are produced 
that is independent of our practice of making the distinction. 
Keeley, “Senses as Kinds”    — Draft: Do not cite                                        Page 2 of 31
1 Heʼs bothered that embracing such an account very likely will lead to the conclusion that the 
claim of common sense that humans have ﬁve (and exactly ﬁve) senses will be refuted. He ﬁnds 
this anathema and would prefer to avoid embracing such an eliminative materialist line of 
reasoning. As they say, one personʼs modus ponens is another personʼs modus tolens.
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According to this approach, all visual perceptions are pro-
duced in the same way, and different ways of perceiving are 
individuated relative to a social practice of explaining and un-
derstanding behavior. On this view a sense modality is what 
might be called a social kind rather than a natural kind. Such 
an account may provide the best account of what a sense mo-
dality, as we commonly understand it, actually is. (338, em-
phasis in original)
Nudds is exploring an interesting issue: are the senses natural kinds? So-
cial kinds? My own reaction is that there are deeper issues here of which he is 
only scratching the surface. Nuddsʼ paper is one of the only ones I am familiar 
with that grapples with the question of what it is that we are presupposing in the 
ﬁrst place when we talk of different senses.2 But even Nuddsʼ analysis is pretty 
slim on what the options are. For example, the paragraph I quote above (the ﬁnal 
paragraph of the paper) is pretty much all he says on what a “social kind” is sup-
posed to be. Similarly, although the notion of “natural kinds” is central to the pa-
per, Nudds has almost nothing to say about what he takes that concept to mean; 
it is left largely unpacked. He draws no connection to the literature in philosophy 
of science over the metaphysical nature of natural vs. other kinds.
Further, we shouldnʼt take it for granted that the senses are, in fact, prop-
erly thought of as different kinds, whether paradigmatically or not. This oversight 
is important because, as I will show in this paper, it is far from clear what kind of 
kind the senses are, if they are any “kind” at all. Further, I will argue that what 
kind the senses are, in fact, varies from context to context. Treating “the senses” 
uniformly as kinds of a particular kind confuses rather than clariﬁes the situation.
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II. Why does the question matter? 
Why does the question concerning the kind-hood of senses matter? So 
what? First, the questions here are centrally important to the metaphysics of 
mind. Ought we be realists with respect to the senses? Is there some fact of the 
matter about, say, how many senses species-typical humans have and what they 
are? If not, what should we say about the metaphysical standing of the individual 
senses? To get the idea of what might be at stake here, let me point to some re-
lated metaphysical questions.
Species: Species are clearly a central ontological category within the sci-
ence of biology—it is no accident that Darwinʼs book was entitled On the Origin 
of Species. It is important, therefore, to understand the metaphysical nature of 
this central concept, and this in turn is a vexed issue in both philosophy of biol-
ogy as well as biology itself. Recently, much ink has been spilled over whether 
we ought to be realists with respect to species, as well as the closely related 
question of what is the nature of the species concept.3 Darwin can be understood 
as overthrowing the essentialist understanding of species that had reigned in bi-
ology at least since Aristotle. Given that species evolve, as Darwin showed us, 
then they cannot have the immutable, God-given essences non-evolutionary 
models proposed. These days, there are those, such as Hull (1978) and Ghiselin 
(1974), who argue that species are best thought of as spatiotemporally extended 
individuals. Others, such as Kitcher (1984; 1989), argue that species are sets, 
while others (e.g., Boyd (1999), Grifﬁths (1999)) argue that they are homeostatic 
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property clusters. Still others are one form or another of antirealists about spe-
cies, e.g., (Stanford 1995) and arguably even Darwin himself. All of this discus-
sion is made relevant, in part, because of the central role that the concept spe-
cies plays in the ﬁeld. It seems only right that we know exactly what sort of thing 
weʼre talking about when biologists develop their theories.4
Race: Where species is centrally important to biology, race is clearly an 
important social category, for better or for worse. For many of the same reasons 
as with species, it is crucial to understand the nature of the category of race. To 
what extent are racial categories “biologically real”? To what extent are they “so-
cially constructed”? Again, this is a topic of ongoing controversy and discussion. 
As with species, for centuries race was conceived in essentialist terms, a view K. 
Anthony Appiah (1996) calls “racialism”. Appiah rejects the biological reality of 
races, arguing instead that race categories are best thought of as identities that 
individuals chose to take on or which are culturally imposed on them. Others, 
such as Kitcher (1999) and Andreasen (2005), argue that racial categories do re-
ﬂect biological realities, but nonetheless argue that such realities cannot support 
the kinds of discrimination that have historically been associated with them.5
I would like to propose that an understanding of the metaphysics of the 
senses shares some of the same features that make understanding species and 
race important. Parallel with the concept of species, the sensory modalities are 
Keeley, “Senses as Kinds”    — Draft: Do not cite                                        Page 5 of 31
4 A parallel discussion exists in biology and philosophy of biology over the metaphysics of the 
concept gene. As with the debate over the nature and reality of species, there is also debate over 
whether genes exist and, if so, what is their metaphysical nature, cf. (Beurton, Falk et al. 2000; 
Moss 2003; Fox Keller and Harel 2007).
5 I could have spelled out much the same point about gender categories as I do about race here.
12-14 June 2012; Mugla, Turkey -75-
centrally important categories to any study of perception. Pick up any number of 
books about perception, say in sensory psychology or neuroscience or sensory 
anthropology, and you will ﬁnd discussions of individual senses. It is not uncom-
mon to ﬁnd books on perception broken up into chapters, each focussing on a 
different sensory modality. Further, this division often is presented with little or no 
discussion of what grounds or justiﬁes such a division. Such a division is taken 
literally for granted.
That lack of explicit justiﬁcation for the division of perception into the cate-
gories of vision, audition, smell, etc. derives from the trait that the concept of 
sensory modalities shares with race (and gender): its ubiquity as a human cate-
gory. While there is some disagreement over the speciﬁc senses posited,6 the 
practice of dividing up the senses is apparently universal. As anthropologist Kath-
ryn Linn Geurts (2002) puts it, “...a cultureʼs sensory order is one of the ﬁrst and 
most basic elements of making ourselves human. I deﬁne sensory order (or sen-
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6 For example, the Anlo-Ewe of Western Africa count a balance sense among the basic senses 
(see (Geurts 2002)). As sensory anthropologists Howes & Classen (1991) put it, 
Other cultures do not necessarily divide the sensorium as we do. The 
Hausa recognize two senses [citing Ritchie];  “the Javanese have ﬁve 
senses (seeing, hearing, talking, smelling and feeling), which do not coin-
cide exactly with our ﬁve” [citing Dundes]. In short, there may be any num-
ber of “senses,” including what we would classify as extrasensory percep-
tion—the “sixth sense.” According to the Peruvian curer interviewed by 
Douglas Sharon in Wizard of the Four Winds, for example, a sixth clairvoy-
ant sense opens up when all ﬁve other senses have been stimulated 
through the use of hallucinogens and other ritual elements.... Eduardo, the 
curer, describes this sixth sense as 'a ʻvisionʼ much more remote... in the 
sense that one can look at things that go beyond the ordinary or that have 
happened in the past or can happen in the future.” (257-8)
Oddly, Nudds cites the book that this passage was taken from (Howes 1991) in support of his 
pronouncement that, “It is possible that some cultures distinguish fewer than ﬁve senses (by 
grouping together two senses we distinguish), but I have not been able to ﬁnd a description of 
any culture that distinguishes more than ﬁve senses” (311). 
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sorium) as a pattern of relative importance and differential elaboration of the 
various senses, through which children learn to perceive and to experience the 
world and in which pattern they develop their abilities” (5, emphases in original). 
In other words, Geurts is observing that across human culture, sensory organiza-
tion is one of the basic ways in which we enculturate our children and teach them 
who they are and how we all, as humans, interact with our world. Even if sensory 
categories do not have the powerful social implications that race and gender 
categories do, there is a value to studying other deeply held conceptual 
schemes, even if they do not lead to prejudice and injustice.7
In sum, the division of perception into different senses is centrally impor-
tant to the study of perception and such a division is a ubiquitous and central 
human practice. Given this, it would behoove us to understand what kind of divi-
sion this talk of the senses involves.
Further, if the discussion and arguments I present in this paper are cor-
rect, we (both we, the folk, and we, the investigators of sense) may be more con-
fused about the nature of the senses and what kind of kind they are. If identifying 
(and, better, clearing up) confusion is a virtue, then I strive for that here.
III. Kinds of Kind
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at social attitudes of “neurotypicals” towards those who are blind, deaf, etc. to see that there are 
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“disability studies” that is relevant to this point. I only wish to argue that even if sensory categories 
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categories with more apparent social implications. If they are not so innocent, then so much the 
better for my point here.
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What are the possible answers to the question “what kinds of kind are the 
senses?” Here are a couple of possibilities:8
a) Senses as natural kinds: Some division of the senses (leaving open 
what that division is) constitute a set of natural or scientiﬁc kinds. That is, the 
division of perception into a number of senses is something that is discovered 
about the nature of the universe, not invented by humans; it is some kind of 
mind-independent metaphysical division of the universe. As Bird & Tobin 
(2010) put it: “To say that a kind is natural is to say that it corresponds to a 
grouping or ordering that does not depend on humans. We tend to assume 
that science is successful in revealing these kinds; it is a corollary of scientiﬁc 
realism that when all goes well the classiﬁcations and taxonomies employed 
by science correspond to the real kinds in nature. The existence of these real 
and independent kinds of things is held to justify our scientiﬁc inferences and 
practices” (emphasis in original). Therefore, this reading would say that the 
senses are kinds analogous to the way in which different chemical elements 
or, perhaps, fundamental subatomic particles are kinds. At one point, species 
were taken to be a paradigm case of natural kinds, but as noted earlier, Dar-
win upended that account.9 Iʼll return to the senses as natural kinds in the ﬁnal 
section.
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Mill and John Venn in the late nineteenth century, although they were only giving a modern label 
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b) Senses as phenomenal kinds: In an oral response to an earlier paper of 
mine, Tom Polger once said, “Much of the bad press over qualia is well-
deserved; but if there is one place experiential qualities have a safe home, I 
wouldʼve thought it would be with the sense modalities.” He is not alone in his 
intuition; the natural place to talk about the phenomenal qualities of con-
sciousness is the perceptual realm. Philosophers of mind like to speak of the 
sharp pain of a papercut, the tanginess of a lemon, the deep, velvety red of a 
rose.10 The division of the senses into kinds could be the division of conscious 
perceptual experiences into different categories based on how it feels to expe-
rience them. This will be the topic of §V, below.
c) Senses as social kinds: While the senses clearly can be divided (we do 
so and have done so apparently since prior to the invention of written culture), 
such a division is conventional. Humans divide up the senses in response to 
cultural conditions. On this account, the senses are kinds analogous to the 
way that nonverbal gestures can be individuated. For example, in some Arabic 
cultures, sitting in such a way as to show the soles of one's feet to another is 
an offensive gesture, whereas Western Europeans might not even recognize 
sitting in this way as any kind of “gesture” at all. As noted above, this is Nuddsʼ 
ﬁnal position on the question and Iʼll return to this option at the end of §V, con-
cerning phenomenal kinds, below.
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d) Senses as functional kinds: Functional kinds are deﬁned by the causal 
role they play in some larger system, rather than by any constitutive or phe-
nomenal property that they might have. On a functional account, the senses 
are kinds analogous to the way that the different organ systems of the mam-
malian body can be individuated into systems: the respiratory system, the di-
gestive system, or the circulatory system, or perhaps better: the way that dif-
ferent parts of any one of those systems can be divided up. It is important, 
however, to make sure that this use of function is ﬁrmly connected to the 
related-but-different concept of function as it is used in evolutionary theory. 
This is the topic of the next section, §IV.
IV. Senses as functional kinds
A functionalist is one who claims that psychological states are neither 
physical nor physiological states of a system but rather that they are Functional 
states, deﬁned by their role within a causal description of some sort. Putnam 
(1967) introduces the notion of a functional Description by proposing that psycho-
logical systems can be described in relation to a Turing machine framework:
A Description of S where S is a system, is any true statement 
to the effect that S possesses distinct states S1, S2, . . . Sn 
which are related to one another and to the motor outputs and 
sensory inputs by the transition probabilities given in such-
and-such a Machine Table. The Machine Table mentioned in 
the Description will then be called the Functional Organization 
of S relative to that Description, and the Si such that S is in 
state Si at a given time will be called the Total State of S (at 
that time) relative to that Description. (226)
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Cummins (1975) generalizes Putnamʼs account and reframes it in more 
general terms: “a function-ascribing statement explains the presence of the func-
tionally characterized item i in a system s by pointing out that i is present in s be-
cause it has certain effects on s” (741). He notes that we ﬁnd these kinds of ex-
planatory strategies all the time in the description of artifacts, as when engineers 
produce schematic ﬂowchart diagrams with symbols representing the different 
items; items described in terms of the functions they carry out (resistors, capaci-
tors, etc.) (760). Cummins goes on to discuss how,
Functional analysis in biology is essentially similar. The bio-
logically signiﬁcant capacities of an entire organism are ex-
plained by analyzing the organism into a number of “sys-
tems”—the circulatory system, the digestive system, the nerv-
ous system, etc.,—each of which has its characteristic capaci-
ties. These capacities are in turn analyzed into capacities of 
component organs and structures. Ideally, this strategy is 
pressed until pure physiology takes over, i.e., until the analyz-
ing capacities are amenable to the subsumption strategy. We 
can easily imagine biologists expressing their analyses in a 
form analogous to the schematic diagrams of electrical engi-
neering, with special symbols for pumps, pipes, ﬁlters, and so 
on. Indeed, analyses of even simple cognitive capacities are 
typically expressed in ﬂow charts or programs, forms designed 
speciﬁcally to represent analyses of information processing 
capacities generally. (760-761)
So, in the case of the senses, we can use an approach like this to under-
stand the nature of perception.  As Cummins just described, after identifying the 
nervous system as one of the components of an organism, it is then further ana-
lyzed into its components, one of which would likely be a sensory system, along-
side the motor system, as well as any number of systems situated between the 
“input” and “output” of the organism.  Further, this sensory system would be fur-
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ther analyzed into the different subsystems that we commonly think of as the dif-
ferent senses: a visual system, an auditory system, and so on. This is a not un-
reasonable way of capturing what some sensory scientists do in neuroscience 
and psychology. 
It is important to keep in mind that these functional kinds are also func-
tions in the sense of evolutionary biology; they are Darwinian functions that ex-
plain why organisms have evolved to have the traits that they have.11 This char-
acteristic of functional kinds is important for re-identifying those kinds in different 
evolutionary lineages, such as when biologists speak of the convergent evolution 
of vision in different taxa: Both vertebrates (e.g., humans) and mollusks (e.g., oc-
topus) have evolved vision and possess eyes, but biologists believe that the 
most-recent common ancestor of vertebrates and mollusks had neither eyes nor 
vision. Given that humans and octopus eyes are physically different (as a result 
of their unrelated phylogenetic origins) what makes these structures both “eyes” 
is that they share an identiﬁable evolutionary function. 
This is the sort of approach that Nudds (2011) has in mind when he 
speaks of “psychological kinds”12:
My suggestion, then, is that the most plausible explanation of 
the distinction we make between senses is that we distinguish 
perceptions into perceptions of different senses on the basis of 
a reﬂective understanding of how those perceptions were pro-
duced. In doing so, we are distinguishing between perceptions 
produced by different kinds of sensory mechanism, and so our 
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concepts of the senses must be concepts of different kinds of 
sensory mechanism. This provides an answer to the question 
of what constitutes a sense modality. A sense modality just is a 
kind of sensory mechanism, and all instances of, say, seeing 
something are instances of seeing that thing in virtue of their 
having been produced by a single kind of sensory mecha-
nism—the sensory mechanism of vision. (314, emphasis in 
original)
Most of Nuddsʼ paper is an exploration and eventual rejection of this ap-
proach. In particular, he understands this approach to require one-to-one map-
pings of sensory mechanisms onto the functional kinds, a requirement that he 
argues that contemporary perceptual psychology shows to be violated. Vision 
and audition (which he considers in some detail) have been shown to involve the 
operation of multiple perceptual mechanisms, such as the “dual stream hypothe-
sis” of Milner and Goodale (1995; Goodale 1998), according to which there are 
separate pathways underlying the visual identiﬁcation of objects (the “what” 
pathway) and the guidance of motor action (the “where” pathway). On the basis 
of this and the presence of similar features found by sensory psychologists in the 
other senses, Nudds concludes:
That, I think, undermines the suggestion that the senses are 
natural kinds—it undermines the suggestion that the distinc-
tion we actually make between different senses tracks a natu-
ral distinction between kinds of psychological processes, and it 
shows that we cannot appeal to the psychological processes 
involved in perception to answer the question with which I be-
gan: What do all instances of seeing have in common in virtue 
of which they are instances of seeing? Whatever it is they 
have in common—whatever it is that makes a visual percep-
tion a visual perception—it is not that they are produced by a 
single kind of sensory mechanism. (335, emphases in original)
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A few things should be noted here, in response. First, on Nuddsʼ reading, 
functional kinds just are a subspecies of natural kind.13 This makes sense if we 
take one of the key features of natural kinds to be that they are human-
independent categories. The identiﬁcation of sensory mechanisms within a func-
tionalist frameworks seem appropriately mind-independent here; they are scien-
tiﬁc discoveries, not inventions (if we are to adopt any reasonably realist account 
of science). 
But, second, notice that his functionalist account is one that doesnʼt make 
much reference to the evolutionary aspects of function. As mentioned earlier, at-
tributions of evolutionary function are useful in heading off the dead-end that 
Nudds ﬁnds himself in his deployment of sensory mechanisms. The sensory 
mechanisms of the octopus and human eyes are markedly different, but we can 
identify them both as functionally equivalent because of the role each organ 
plays in the lives/reproductive ﬁtness of the organisms which possess them. As 
Kitcher (2003) puts it, “When we attribute functions to entities that make a causal 
contribution to complexes, there is, I suggest, always a source of design in the 
background. The constituents of a machine have functions because the machine, 
as a whole, is explicitly intended to do something. Similarly with organisms” 
(169).  That background evolutionary context allows us to group together sensory 
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mechanisms that too narrow a focus on the proximate causal analysis of mecha-
nisms would classify as separate.
So, returning to the earlier point, if the senses are to be natural kinds in 
virtue of being functional kinds, what Nudds has shown us is that we cannot un-
derstand functional analysis here solely in proximate, psychological mechanism 
terms; instead, we need to understand functions more broadly in ultimate evolu-
tionary terms, understanding not just the operation of the mechanisms, but un-
derstanding the role those mechanisms play in the evolutionary history of the or-
ganisms that possess them.14
V. Senses as phenomenal kinds.
One complication in all this questioning of the kind-hood of the senses is 
that the senses are not just biological categories, traits possessed by biological 
organisms. They are also phenomenal categories; that is, they are categories of 
conscious experience. As such, they lay at the foundation of a very deep way of 
dividing things up into kinds. They are qualities in the way of speaking where one 
says, “These two things differ not only quantitatively, but qualitatively.” Or, “What 
we have here is not a difference in degree but a difference in kind.” 
This connection between this general sense of qualities and the elements 
of phenomenal experience is borne out by the importance of the concept quale/
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qualia to 20th century philosophy of mind. On the one hand, the concept of qualia 
is that they are, in some sense, the basic building blocks of phenomenal experi-
ence. Any given conscious experience will have a number of different qualia that 
make it up, including qualia of color and smell, as well as emotional tone, feelings 
of recognition or novelty, and the like. On the other hand, the term itself derives 
from talk of kinds. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “quale” derives 
from the Latin qualis (“Of what kind”) and the term means “The quality of a thing; 
a thing having certain qualities.”  So, quale stands as an important link between 
the idea of sensory qualities and the idea of kinds.15
There is some sense to saying that there is some kind of fundamental 
qualitative distinction between the experiences of different senses.16 It is com-
mon to suppose that visual experiences are just qualitatively different from audi-
tory experiences. This line of thought naturally gives rise to an understanding of 
the senses as natural kinds in the sense that the difference between the senses 
here is given to us, not invented by us. Metaphysically, the difference between 
the senses is as given as the difference between the chemical elements. 
However, this account is problematic in a number of different ways. The 
crucial element of the account is that the basis for the difference between the 
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Keeley (2009a).
16 As Nudds (2011) observes, “Many philosophers suppose that there is an obvious answer to 
[the question of what differentiates the senses]. In order to perceive something one must have an 
experience of it. Seeing something requires having a visual experience of it, hearing something 
requires having an auditory experience of it, and so on. The different kinds of experiences 
involved in perceiving are what constitute perceiving with different senses. We see something just 
in case we perceive it in virtue of having a visual experience of it; hear something just in case we 
perceive it in virtue of having an auditory experience of it, and so on. To answer the question in 
this way is to give an experiential account of the senses.” (312, emphases in original).
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senses is given in experience. One can challenge the claim that a relevant datum 
is given.17
The issues here relate to concerns over the transparency of perception. In 
debates over the nature of phenomenal experience, there are those who argue 
that we can never ﬁx on the nature of phenomenal experience per se, but that 
instead we always peer through the experience to that which is represented by 
the experience. As Block (2007) puts it, the idea of transparency is that, “...when I 
try to introspect my experience of the redness of a tomato, I only succeed in at-
tending to the color of the tomato itself, and not to any mental feature of the ex-
perience. The representationalist thinks that we can exploit this intuition to ex-
plain phenomenal character in non-phenomenal terms” (611).
 The experience itself is diaphanous, transparent. Or, so the transparency 
thesis holds. This alleged transparency of experience is taken by proponents of a 
representationalist account of consciousness as a “powerful motivation” for their 
view (Tye 2000: 45). According to strong versions of representationalism, the 
phenomenal character of experience is exhausted by the representational con-
tent of experience; there is nothing more to phenomenal experience beyond what 
is represented. This view is bolstered by the transparency thesis, in that if all we 
ever experience is perception is that which is represented in perception—be-
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cause we “see through” the experience to the represented properties—then there 
is nothing “left over” requiring a non-representational explanation.18 
My concern here is not debates concerning representationalist theories of 
consciousness.19 Currently, there are philosophers of mind on both sides and the 
issue seems to be unsettled. Rather, the issue points to two signiﬁcantly different 
ways in which the senses as phenomenal kinds might work. If one rejects repre-
sentationalism, then one would hold that the experiences of different senses will 
differ intrinsically; that there is some “vision-y” character that all visual experi-
ences share and which is experienced simply as different from the experiences 
of other senses.20 On this account, visual experiences would wear their visual 
status on their sleeves, as it were. Put another way, the sensory modality of a 
perceptual experience would be given in that experience.  This brute phenome-
nal difference between experiences would be the grounds for differentiating dif-
ferent phenomenal kinds; this would ground a literal qualitative distinction of 
kinds here.  Letʼs call this view a Nonrepresentationalist Phenomenal Kinds view.
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some reasons to demur, see (Kind 2003).
19 As an aside, in his 2011 paper, Nudds explicitly endorses the transparency thesis and denies 
that there is anything intrinsic to perceptual experiences themselves that can be used to 
differentiate the senses (cf., 312ff). In a footnote, he identiﬁes this as a “a fundamental 
disagreement” with what I say in the opening sentences of my 2002 paper. For the record, I was 
taking no substantive stand in those introductory sentences. Indeed, I saw myself to be setting up  
the phenomenon or problem, much as Nudds himself does in the ﬁrst paragraph of his own 
recent paper (which I quoted above on page 1).
20 Perhaps because I havenʼt read enough on the non-representationalist side of this debate, Iʼm 
unaware of somebody making precisely this line of argument (speciﬁcally that the sensory 
modality of a perceptual experience is given in experience). Please let me know if you know 
somebody who makes this speciﬁc claim.
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Representationalists (because of the transparency thesis) deny the exis-
tence of any such intrinsic character of experience beyond what is perceptually 
represented.  Indeed, talk of some “vision-y” character of experience is precisely 
the kind of thing they are wont to deny. However, this is not to say that they do 
not talk of phenomenal kinds—their talk of perception is rife with such talk; they 
just ground it differently.  For example, consider the following passages from 
arch-representationalist Michael Tye.  He begins by reminding us of the repre-
sentationalist view, taking vision as his example:
Visual phenomenal qualities or visual qualia are supposedly 
qualities of which the subjects of visual experiences are di-
rectly aware via introspection. Tradition has it that these quali-
ties are qualities of the experiences. Tradition is wrong. There 
are no such qualities of experiences. If we stipulate that some-
thing is a visual phenomenal quality or a quale only if it is a 
directly accessible quality of experience, then there are no 
visual phenomenal qualities or qualia. Still there are qualities 
of which the subjects of visual experiences are directly aware 
via introspection. They are qualities of external surfaces (and 
volumes and ﬁlms), if they are qualities of anything. These 
qualities, by entering into the appropriate representational con-
tents of visual experiences, contribute to the phenomenal 
character of the experiences. Thus, they may reasonably be 
called “phenomenal qualities” in a less restrictive sense of the 
term. (2000: 49, emphasis in original)
Tye then goes on to point out that such an analysis is not restricted to vi-
sion, but instead extends easily to the rest of perception:
All of the above points generalize to other perceptual modali-
ties. For example, we hear things by hearing the sounds they 
emit. These sounds are publicly accessible. They can be re-
corded. Similarly, we smell things by smelling the odors they 
give off. They, too, are publicly accessible. You and I can both 
smell the foul odor of the rotting garbage. Odors, like sounds, 
move through physical space. We taste things by tasting their 
tastes. One and the same taste can be tasted by different 
Keeley, “Senses as Kinds”    — Draft: Do not cite                                        Page 19 of 31
12-14 June 2012; Mugla, Turkey -89-
people. Some tastes are bitter, others are sweet. When we in-
trospect our experiences of hearing, smelling, and tasting, the 
qualities of which we are directly aware are qualities we expe-
rience as being qualities of sounds, odors, and tastes. It 
seems very natural to suppose that among these qualities are 
the following: pitch, tone, loudness, pungency, muskiness, 
sweetness, saltiness, sourness. But this supposition is not 
needed by the argument. The crucial point again is that the 
qualities of which we are directly aware via introspec-
tion—whatever they turn out to be—are not qualities of the ex-
perience of hearing, smelling, and tasting. Rather, they are 
qualities of public surfaces, sounds, odors, tastes, and so 
forth, if they are qualities of anything at all (for, as before, the 
experiences may be hallucinatory). Change these qualiti-
es—the ones of which we can be directly aware via introspec-
tion—and, necessarily, the phenomenal character of the expe-
rience changes. Again, then, phenomenal character is best 
taken to be a matter of representational content. And again, 
there are no phenomenal qualities, conceived of as qualities of 
experiences. (2000: 49-50, emphasis in original)21
In these passages, it is clear that Tye is distinguishing between the phe-
nomenal qualities of the different senses. The entire discussion is organized in 
relation to the different senses. But what exactly grounds these distinctions? The 
answer is revealed when Tye responds to counter examples raised by Ned Block 
(1995; 1996) and others that there are cross-modal cases where we have differ-
ent phenomenal experiences despite those experiences having the same repre-
sentational content, as when we come to know that there is a round surface in 
front of me either by seeing that surface or by reaching out and feeling it with my 
hands. In this case, there is a clear phenomenal difference (seeing vs. tactually 
feeling a surface) despite the same representational content (that there is a 
round surface 15 centimeters in front of my nose). 
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In responding to this kind of counter example, Tye has to lay out how a 
representationalist distinguishes phenomenal kinds of one modality (visual) from 
another (tactile):
One obvious immediate reply the representationalist can make 
is that in seeing the shape, one has an experience as of color. 
But color isnʼt represented in the content of the haptic experi-
ence. Conversely, temperature is represented in haptic expe-
rience but not in the visual one (or at least not to the same ex-
tent). Likewise, there is much more detailed representation of 
degree of solidity in the haptic experience. Another represen-
tational difference pertains to the location of the shape. In vi-
sion, the shape is automatically represented as having a cer-
tain two-dimensional location relative to the eyes. It is also 
normally represented as being at a certain distance away from 
the body. In the haptic case, however, shape is represented 
via more basic touch and pressure representations of contours 
derived from sensors in the skin.22 Here the shape is repre-
sented as belonging to a surface with which one is in bodily 
contact. Moreover (and relatedly) in the haptic experience, 
there is no representation of the shape's two-dimensional lo-
cation relative to the eyes. Finally, and very importantly, in the 
visual case, there is representation not only of viewer-
independent shape but also of viewer-relative shape (e.g., be-
ing elliptical from here). The latter property, of course, is not 
represented in the haptic experience.23 (95)
 This then allows us to spell out what I will call the Representationalist 
Phenomenal Kinds view. What Tye seems to be proposing here is that we can 
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23 As with the previous footnote, I also ﬁnd this last point somewhat bafﬂing. In claiming that the 
haptic sense does not represent the body-relative position of the surface, Tye must be 
distinguishing the contents of proprioception from those of pressure sensation. That is, if I feel my 
ﬁngers pressed up against a surface 15cm in front of my face, the pressure sensors themselves 
do not give rise to that representation of distance; that distance representation is a product of the 
simultaneous proprioceptive sense of the positions of my limbs at that moment (elbow and wrist 
bent just this much, etc.)  Fine, but it is odd to segregate pressure and proprioception sensation 
while simultaneously lumping pressure and temperature sensation together as a single sense of 
“touch” despite the fact that these are carried out by different peripheral sensory systems in the 
skin. At least, without further discussion, these distinctions seem arbitrary, especially given that 
the sense of touch is famously the most problematic for a proper objects account of the senses 
(see (Keeley 2002; 2009b)).
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distinguish between the different senses on the basis of what Aristotle called the 
“proper” or “special objects” of perception.24 The proper object(s) of a sense are 
those qualities that only that sense can elicit; for example, we only come to expe-
rience color by vision, only come to experience temperature through touch. This 
exclusive connection between each sensory modality and some particular proper 
object experienced as a result of its action—color for vision, temperature/
pressure for touch, odor for smell, ﬂavors for taste, pitch/loudness for hear-
ing—gives us a representationalist means for dividing up the senses into distinct 
categories. And circling back to the points made at the beginning of this section, 
pitch, ﬂavor, color, etc. are paradigm examples of “qualities” at play when we talk 
about differences of quality vs. difference of quantity. The difference between a 
whisper and a nearby crash of thunder is a difference of quantity (of loudness) 
whereas the difference between a whisper and a nearby ﬂash of lightning is a dif-
ference of quality.
 A phenomenal kinds account of the senses—in either the Representa-
tionalist or Nonrepresentationalist version—is interesting and has a degree of 
plausibility in the way that it matches up with our own perceptual experience. In 
the end, it may turn out to offer a coherent and empirically-adequate account of 
the division of the senses into kinds.  However, I have my doubts. 
First, I donʼt understand how such an account can make sense of senses 
that lack any phenomenal character, such as a putative “pheromone (or vomero-
Keeley, “Senses as Kinds”    — Draft: Do not cite                                        Page 22 of 31
24 I discuss this Aristotlean approach at length in (Keeley 2002; 2009b).
Seventh Quadrennial Fellows Conference of the Center for Philosophy of Science -92-
nasal) sense” in humans.25 Some scientists report a phenomenon akin to the 
once-common philosophical example of “chicken sexing” whereby subjects can 
reliably make behavioral discriminations of vomeronasal stimuli, but these same 
subjects report no phenomenal differences in their experiences. They feel as 
though they are guessing. Proponents of phenomenal kinds can simply (and 
consistently) deny that this putative sense actually is a sense; indeed, they seem 
to be forced to. OK, but what of the senses of non-human animals; especially 
those where the presence of a vomeronsal sense is well established, and is stud-
ied alongside other senses? How exactly do we make the sense/nonsense dis-
tinction in nonhuman animals; that is, how do we tell when they are “guessing” or 
acting unconsciously?  Again, it would be consistent for believers in phenomenal 
kind accounts of the senses to deny that animals have senses, but that seems to 
be a more draconian move, to say the least.
A second problem for phenomenalist accounts is that recent work in sen-
sory psychology is increasingly undermining the empirical viability of the pro-
posed connection between senses and their unique qualities. In other words, sci-
entists are increasingly showing that, in practice, the phenomenal qualites of ex-
periences we have are the product of multiple senses, not just one. So, in the 
McGurk effect, the sound that you hear is a product of both what your ears hear 
and what your eyes see. Change (only) what the eyes see (in this case, what an 
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interlocutors lips look like) and your auditory experience changes.26 Similar re-
sults have been found for other sensory combinations: what you hear effects 
what things taste like, what you hear effects what things look like, etc.27 This is 
important for the representationalists because, such cases threaten to show that 
the representational feature they need to be uniquely connected to a given sense 
(if it is to play the role of identifying the phenomenal kind) is not, in fact, unique. 
For the nonrepresentationalist, these results from sensory psychology are 
threatening in a slightly different way, which brings me to my third concern with 
phenomenalist accounts of the senses. In arguing that the senses can be differ-
entiated into kinds by the presence of some given phenomenal quality, such ac-
counts ignore the potential theory-ladenness of introspection. What the theory-
ladenness of introspection means is that what we experience (and therefore what 
we can claim to introspect) is, in part, a function of the theoretical categories we 
bring to that introspection.28 If this is the case, these experienced qualities are 
not given, in that if we had different categories and a different understanding of 
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(Feyerabend 1963).
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how the action of our senses gives rise to our perceptual experiences, we expe-
rience perception differently. Further, as indicated by the anthropology of senses 
(see footnote 6 above), humans do, in fact, have different categories and differ-
ent understandings of the nature and number of senses. 
If the theory ladenness of introspection is true, then it would imply that, in 
essence, the senses as phenomenal kinds are, in fact, in part, a product of social 
categories. That is, phenomenal kinds would be, in part, reducible to social kinds, 
in that how one is raised and enculturated would provide one with the categories 
of sense and these, in turn, would play an important role in how one phenome-
nally experiences the process of perception. At least, the possibility of the theory 
ladenness of introspection poses some interesting lines of investigation for sen-
sory anthropologists—a rather young sub-discipline of anthropology—to explore. 
Does counting balance among oneʼs basic categories of the senses change how 
one reports experiencing perception?
However, these three worries are just that: worries. They involve more 
open questions to those that want to defend and explicate a phenomenalist ac-
count of the senses than refutations of this approach.  
IV. Implications and Conclusions
In this paper, I have considered a number of different ways of thinking of 
the senses as kinds. OK, but which way is the correct way? Ultimately, are the 
senses natural kinds? And, if so, speciﬁcally functional kinds? Phenomenal 
kinds? Social kinds? Some other notion of kinds?  My response is to resists the 
Keeley, “Senses as Kinds”    — Draft: Do not cite                                        Page 25 of 31
12-14 June 2012; Mugla, Turkey -95-
implication of such questions by resisting the implication that there has to be a 
single answer to the question of what kinds of kind are the senses. I propose that 
we embrace a form of pluralism with respect to the senses.  To see why I say 
this, however, let me take a quick detour in what might seem to be the opposite 
direction: the notion that the senses are not any kind at all; that the application of 
“kind talk” to the senses is just a bit confused from the get go.
Consider the following explanation of what a natural kind is supposed to 
be, taken from the Concise Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy: “Objects be-
longing to a natural kind form a group of objects which have some theoretically 
important property in common. ... Natural kinds are contrasted with arbitrary 
groups of objects such as the contents of dustbins, or collections of jewels. The 
latter have no theoretically important property in common: They have no unifying 
feature” (Daly 2000: 612-613). Notice that this account of natural kinds has two 
important features. First, there is the collection of entities brought together under 
the natural kind description (“a group of objects”). Second, there is the property 
that so deﬁnes that collection (the “theoretically important property,” the “unifying 
feature”).   That is, when we normally speak of natural kinds, there are two com-
ponents, reﬂected in the term itself: There are the kinds (the collection of entities) 
sorted according to some property (in this case, a nonhuman, natural property. 
This, in contrast to, say, artiﬁcial kinds which is a collection of things delineated 
by some perhaps arbitrary, human property). 
Noticing this reveals that there is something deeply odd about much of the 
discussion I have engaged in above.  Unlike what is the case when considering 
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situations such as species, genes, races and genders, the sensory examples I 
have been discussing actually sound much more like the properties that deﬁne 
the kinds and not the kinds themselves. That is, when talking about the meta-
physical nature of vision as versus hearing, for example, that nature is closer to 
talk of the thing by which we deﬁne a collection of entities, not the entities them-
selves. Consider the senses as functional kinds: Vision is a function (a property) 
that allows one to class certain mollusks and vertebrates (a collection of entities) 
together into the same category. Even on the less evolutionary reading of func-
tions that Nudds discusses, a sense is identiﬁed with a particular perceptual 
mechanism; possessing that mechanism is something either organisms have or 
do not. It is a state that an entity can (or cannot) be in. Again, the sense is a 
property not an entity.  Or, consider the case of phenomenal kinds: Here it is 
even more explicit that what we are dealing with are properties (the possession 
of phenomenal qualities) instead of collections of entities.  In all of these discus-
sions, we have not been careful enough to distinguish the properties (e.g., having 
vision) from entities (e.g., the sighted). The latter are the “kinds”; the former are 
the properties that deﬁne the kinds.
Recognizing that senses are more properly thought of as the deﬁning 
properties of groups of kinds rather than the kinds (as collections of entities) 
themselves in turn supports a kind of pluralism in relation to talk of the senses. It 
is a commonplace to identify a large number of properties possessed by any 
given entity and it is equally commonplace to cross-categorize the kind-groupings 
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into which we place a given entity depending on what properties one is attending 
to.
Further, as the Daly quotation above also stresses, the properties that are 
important in natural kinds are “theoretically important” properties. It is far from 
clear that there is only one theory—and, hence, only one set of theoretically im-
portant properties—in the study of the senses. I take it that my discussion of 
functional and phenomenal approaches to the senses demonstrates that. The 
concerns of psychophysicists and philosophers of perception concerned with the 
understanding phenomenal character of perceptual experience are different from 
neuroethologists, comparative biologists, and those interested in the evolution of 
sensory systems. This plurality of theoretical interest begets a plurality of kind-
talk. Add in the “folk” (who, according to previously cited anthropologists, do not 
universally share intuitions about the number and identity of the senses) and you 
get even more ways of speaking about the senses.29  
At the end of the day, I am not conﬁdent that I have answered my titleʼs 
question to anybodyʼs satisfaction. I plan to think about it further myself and look 
forward to your own thoughts.  But, I hope I have demonstrated the complexity of 
the issues involved and will spur you to come up with your own answer.
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Abstract 
This paper explicates the concepts of matter and space that Newton develops in De gravitatione.  As I 
interpret Newton’s account of created substances, bodies are constructed from qualities alone, as 
configured by God.  Although regions of space and then “determined quantities of extension” appear to 
replace the Aristotelian substrate by functioning as property-bearers, they actually serve only as logical 
subjects.   An implication of the interpretation I develop is that only space is extended by having parts 
outside parts; material bodies are spatially extended only in a derivative sense, via the presence of their 
constitutive qualities or powers in space. 
 
 
 
Newton develops his account of material body in what Howard Stein has called the 
“creation” story or hypothesis. This account has also been called the “determined quantities of 
extension hypothesis” (Slowik, 2009), since Newton marks the account as speculative and 
develops it by associating various conditions with “determined quantities of extension”.
1
  I shall 
follow Stein’s terminology, however, for reasons concerning Newton’s account of minds, as 
explained later.
2
  Understanding the account of body depends upon properly understanding these 
determined quantities of extension and their relation to space (extension) itself.  It is therefore 
important briefly to review De gravitatione’s claims about space.   
 
Features of space    
For Newton, space is an existence condition for any substance and “an affection of every 
kind of being”.
3
 This latter description refers to the manner of existing in nature, a manner of 
existing quite different from that of an abstract entity or a number, as J.E. McGuire has 
                                                           
1
 See De gravitatione in Isaac Newton: Philosophical Writings, 27: “I am reluctant to say positively what the nature of bodies is, 
but I would rather describe a certain kind of being similar in every way to bodies...”; and 28: “And hence these beings will either 
be bodies, or very similar to bodies. If they are bodies, then we can define bodies as determined quantities of extension which 
omnipresent God endows with certain conditions.” 
2
 See Stein, “Newton’s Metaphysics”, 275.  Slowik refers to that account of bodies as the “Determined Quantities of Extension” 
or “DQE” hypothesis (see “Newton’s Metaphysics of Space”, 2009, 438.)  I follow Stein’s terminology in part to avoid reifying 
the quantities of extension, and in part for a reason concerning minds, as discussed at the end of §4.   
3
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 21. 
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explained.
4
  As space is an affection of every kind of being, so is it a condition for their 
existence.  As Newton asserts in a well known remark, one repudiating the concept of spirits as 
transcendent, “No being exists or can exist which is not related to space in some way.  God is 
everywhere, created minds are somewhere, and body is in the space that it occupies; and 
whatever is neither everywhere nor anywhere does not exist.”
5
   
Since space is an existence condition of substances, it is not surprising that Newton takes it 
to have its own manner of existing.  It is neither substance, he emphasizes, nor accident.
6
  That it 
is not an accident inhering in a subject means, in part, that as an affection of every kind of being, 
it cannot be localized to any one being.  Accordingly, it is independent of bodies; if all bodies 
were annihilated, it would continue to exist unchanged.
7
  Space more nearly resembles a 
substance than an accident, Newton indicates, and as we shall see later, he ascribes a degree of 
“substantial reality” to it.  Indeed, he cites it as the one thing that can in some circumstances be 
conceived apart from God—a feature he will use to attack Descartes’ account of matter as 
atheistic.
8
  Yet though it has some substantial reality, still space is not a substance.  For one 
thing, it is “not absolute in itself, but is as it were an emanative effect of God.”
9
  Its not being 
                                                           
4
  Pointing to the manuscript ‘Tempus et Locus’ (c. 1692-93), as providing “Newton’s most succinct statement of how place and 
time relate to existing things”.  McGuire explicates that statement as follows: “Newton answers the question: what is it for 
anything to exist in nature?  It is to exist in a place and at a time.  As the text implies, existing in place and time is what counts as 
actually existing, in contrast, for example, to existing in the manner of an abstract entity or as a number.  This contention is 
supported by Newton’s use of the phrase ‘rerum natura’.....” (McGuire, “Existence, Actuality and Necessity: Newton on Space 
and time”, 465) 
5
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 25.  
6
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 21-22.  The ultimate source of Newton’s view that space is 
neither substance nor accident is Renaissance thinker Francesco Patrizi da Cherso (1529-1597).  Patrizi additionally held space to 
be wholly distinct from body, indeed a condition for matter’s existence, and to be immutable, indivisible, and immobile.  See F. 
Patrizi, ‘On Physical Space’ (De Spacio Physico), translated and commentary by B. Brickman, Journal of the History of Ideas, 
4:2 (1943), especially 224–245.  As Edward Grant explains (Much Ado about Nothing, 206-207), Patrizi is also the source of a 
surprising explanatory remark following Newton’s claim that space has distinguishable parts, whose common boundaries may be 
called surfaces.  Newton then goes on to explain that in space there are “there are everywhere all kinds of figures, everywhere 
spheres, cubes, triangles, straight lines, everywhere circular, elliptical, parabolical, and all other kinds of figures, and those of all 
shapes and sizes, even though they are not disclosed to sight....so that what was formerly insensible in space now appears before 
the senses....We firmly believe the space was spherical before the sphere occupied it, so that it could contain the sphere....And so 
of other figures.” (Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 21-22).  
7
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 22. See also 21: as “an affection of every kind of being”, it is not 
a “proper affection” which is to say an action. 
8
 See Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 31: “If we say with Descartes that extension is body, do we 
not manifestly offer a path to atheism, both because extension is not created, but has existed eternally, and because we have an 
idea of it without any relation to God, and so in some circumstances it would be possible for us to conceive of extension while 
supposing God not to exist?”  On space’s inability to produce effects, see Newton: Philosophical Writings, p 21-22, 34.   
9
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 21. That space is not a substance cannot fully be explained by its 
dependence upon God, in virtue of being an emanative effect of God.  For as will be emphasized later, Newton accepts not only 
the strong sense of substance but also the weak sense, which applies to things dependent upon God, in particular, created minds 
and bodies.  Although I cannot here address the question of how Newton understands an emanative effect, I am sympathetic to 
McGuire’s view that the relation of space to God is one of “ontic dependence”.  (See McGuire, “Existence, Actuality and 
Necessity: Newton on Space and time”, 480:  “the relation between the existence of being and that of space is not causal, but one 
of ontic dependence”.)  McGuire’s view provides an alternative to the three that Gorham (September, 2011) identifies as 
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absolute could not by itself explain why it is not a substance; for neither are created substances 
absolute in themselves, being dependent upon God.  Yet created substances have a different 
relation to God, precisely in virtue of having been created.  There is also another important 
difference.  Substances act, whereas space produces no effects.
10
  
Though neither substance nor attribute, space is not nothing, Newton emphasizes, for it has 
properties.  The properties he describes indicate a Euclidean space, three-dimensional, 
homogeneous, and infinite.  Space is also eternal and immutable, and though parts may be 
distinguished within it, those parts are motionless and indivisible.
11
  It is these features—the 
immobility and indivisibility of space’s distinguishable parts—that are especially significant for 
Newton’s account of body.   
 
The creation hypothesis and the definition of body    
Newton develops his creation hypothesis in two stages, first ignoring mobility but 
subsequently introducing it.  He begins from the realization that we can temporarily make 
regions of space impervious to other bodies by moving our own bodies into them, observing that 
this might somehow simulate the divine power of creation.  By his will alone, God “can prevent 
a body from penetrating any space defined by certain limits”.
12  
 Such an entity would either be a 
body, or would be indistinguishable from bodies by us.
13
  For if God made some region above 
the earth impervious to bodies and all “impinging things”, it would be like a mountain; it would 
reflect all impinging things, including light and air, and it therefore would be visible and colored, 
and would resonate if struck.
14
   
These entities would be very similar to corporeal particles, Newton notes, except for this 
important feature: he has imagined them to be motionless.  For an entity to be a body, or at least 
                                                           
‘Independence’, ‘Causation’, and ‘Assimilation’.  Gorham defends Assimilation, arguing that space and time are attributes of 
God, and indeed identical to God (and thus to one another); see Gorham, September, 2011, especially 289-92 and 298-304.   
10
 As I argue in §4, Newton takes God to be identical to his attributes, and fundamental to his creative power, that is, 
omnipotence; yet in doing so Newton does not eliminate substance but rather gives a reductive account of it.  I note here that I 
reject the interpretation recently advanced by Geoffrey Gorham, though his arguments are intriguing.  According to Gorham, God 
is identical to his attributes, but his attributes include space and time, and hence he is identical to space and time. (See Gorham, 
September, 2011, especially 289-92 and 298-304).  In §4, I indicate the difficulties I see with that view.  
11
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 22, 25, 26.  
12
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 27.  
13
 Newton means to emphasize that we cannot know matter’s “essential and metaphysical constitution” (De Gravitatione, in 
Newton: Philosophical Writings, 27), or indeed the essence of any substance.  This conviction reappears in later writings, 
including the General Scholium, where he writes, "We certainly do not know what is the substance of any thing.  We see only the 
shapes and colors of bodies, we hear only their sounds, we touch only their external surfaces….But there is no direct sense and 
there are no indirect reflected actions by which we know innermost substances.”(Principia, 942.)  In this respect his account of 
body is strongly empirical.   
14
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 28.  
Seventh Quadrennial Fellows Conference of the Center for Philosophy of Science -104-
This paper, presented  on June 14, 2012 at the 7
th
 Quadrennial Fellows Conference, is an excerpt from  
Kochiras: “By y
e 
Divine Arm: God and Substance in De gravitatione“, currently under review.  
 4 
to resemble bodies in all humanly perceptible ways, it must be mobile.  He therefore now adds 
that the hypothesized entities are capable of being moved from place to place, and in a law-
governed way, a feature that is relatively new to conceptions of body.
15
  Additionally, the entities 
can stimulate perceptions in minds and be operated upon by minds.
16
  The hypothesized entities 
are now just like bodies, being perceptible, and having shape, tangibility, mobility, and the 
ability both to reflect and be reflected.  They therefore could be “part of the structure of things”, 
just like “any other corpuscle”.
17
  This enables Newton to provide a definition of body (insofar as 
we can know them).   
 
We can define bodies as determined quantities of extension which omnipresent God endows with 
certain conditions.  These conditions are: (1) that they be mobile, and therefore I did not say that 
they are numerical parts of space which are absolutely immobile, but only definite quantities which 
may be transferred from space to space; (2) that two of this kind cannot coincide anywhere, that is, 
that they may be impenetrable, and hence that oppositions obstruct their mutual motions and they are 
reflected in accord with certain laws; (3) that they can excite various perceptions of the senses and 
the imagination in created minds, and conversely be moved by them, which is not surprising since 
the description of their origin is founded on this.
18
 
 
One of the interesting things about this definition is that Newton sees it as serving 
theological goals, as will become evident from his commentary, and yet it is firmly rooted in 
experience.  The fundamental features of our experience with bodies appear in the definition: 
their mobility; the mutual impenetrability that results in law-governed reflections of other bodies, 
light, and air; and the sensations they produce in us, such as those of color.  Newton’s remark at 
the end of the passage highlights the fact that experiences, specifically perceptions, make his 
description of the bodies’ origin possible.  For if bodies lacked the power to produce sensations, 
we could never have any ideas of them.
19
  It is notable that Newton specifies condition (3), the 
                                                           
15
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 28.  In an otherwise quite different thought experiment, which 
appears in Le Monde, Descartes imagines bodies that move "in accordance with the ordinary laws of nature"; see CSM 1, 90.  Of 
interest here is Katherine Brading’s article “On Composite Systems: Descartes, Newton, and the Law-Constitutive Approach” 
(2011).  
16
 “For it is certain that God can stimulate, our perception by means of his own will, and thence apply such power to the effects of 
his will.” (Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 28) 
17
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 28.   
18
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 28-29.  A definition given in 1678 by Robert Hooke contains 
some intriguing similarities. After asserting that the universe consists in body and motion, he writes, “I do therefore define a 
sensible Body to be a determinate Space or Extension defended from being penetrated by another, by a power from within.” He 
also speculates that body and motion might ultimately be “one and the same”. See Hooke, Lectures Potentiae Restitutiva, or of 
Spring, Explaining the Power of Springing Bodies, 1678, 338-340.  How near the similarity really is, however, is a question I will 
not pursue here.   
19
 Geoffrey Gorham interprets this remark very differently.  On his view, Newton’s remark that the description of bodies’ origin 
is founded upon sensations indicates that he takes the capacity to produce sensations to be both necessary and sufficient for body-
hood.  In connection with that claim, Gorham argues that Newton ultimately sees his conditions of mobility and impenetrability 
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power to produce sensations, as distinct from condition (2), impenetrability.  One reason for 
distinguishing them is that in the hypothesis’ context, the first creation of matter, impenetrability 
could not be sufficient to produce sensations in minds. For if any minds existed when God first 
created matter, no human bodies would exist to touch it, and so the mutual impenetrability of 
bodies could not then produce sensations in minds.  Yet there is another explanation for 
including condition (3) as independent of condition (2): even in the context of actual 
experiences, Newton does not seem to consider sensations as explicable solely in terms of 
impenetrability.  He rather seems to share a belief common in the early modern period—that 
while the contact of light particles with the eye and food particles with the tongue seem to play 
some necessary role, they are not sufficient for the production of sensation, and so some role 
must be attributed to God.
20
   
The definition’s third condition is thus the basis for Newton’s claim that Descartes’ account 
of matter leads to atheism, while his own confirms God’s existence.  As indicated above, he 
takes space to be the one thing sometimes conceivable apart from God, since it produces no 
sensations or other effects, and so by identifying matter with extension (space), Descartes allows 
that matter is conceivable apart from God.
21
  For as Newton indicates elsewhere, "we find almost 
no other reason for atheism than this notion of bodies having, as it were, a complete, absolute 
and independent reality in themselves."
22
  On his own account, bodies are not conceivable apart 
                                                           
as superfluous; these “do no independent work of their own”(Gorham, Jan.2011, 24).  I contest Gorham’s conclusion about those 
conditions in §2.5.  
20
 Here I disagree with Geoffrey Gorham, who argues that Newton actually intends his third condition, the capacity to produce 
sensations in minds, to resolve a problem about distinguishability (a problem that has concerned several commentators but did 
not, in my view, concern Newton, for reasons I indicate later in this section).  On Gorham’s view, if Newton did not intend his 
third condition to resolve that problem, it would be superfluous: “If the DQE’s are impenetrable, they will be solid to touch, 
reflect light, perturb the air when struck, and so on.  Since these are the means by which the senses perceive familiar bodies, why 
the need for God to affix also the special power to produce sensations?  The answer seems to be that impenetrability alone is 
inadequate to distinguish bodies from the unfavored portions of absolute space.” (Gorham, January 2011, 23).  Yet as I have 
argued, Newton does not see the production of sensation as reducible to impenetrability, either in the context of matter’s first 
creation, when no human bodies would exist even if minds did, or in his actual context, in which human bodies do exist. He takes 
a line similar to that found in Locke’s Essay.  Despairing of the ability of the mechanical hypothesis to reduce sensations to the 
shapes, sizes, and motions of particles, Locke suggests that the production of sensations must be attributed to God.  Or, on an 
interpretation associated with Ayers, Locke thinks that we invoke superaddition because our powers of understanding are too 
limited to grasp how God might have enabled matter to produce sensations; my thanks to James Hill for discussion of the point. 
21
 "If we say with Descartes that extension is body, do we not manifestly offer a path to atheism, both because extension is not 
created but has existed eternally, and because we have an idea of it without any relation to God, and so in some circumstances it 
would be possible for us to conceive of extension while supposing God not to exist?" (De Gravitatione, Philosophical Writings, 
31).  Interestingly, Newton’s language here suggests the strong mental exercise that Descartes calls ‘exclusion’, as opposed to the 
weaker one of abstraction.  For Descartes, a successful attempt to conceive something while actually separating or excluding 
another reveals that the two are really distinct, as opposed to being merely conceptually distinct but really identical; see Pr I.62, 
CSM, 214. Newton’s phrase, “supposing God not to exist”, suggests the strong mental act of exclusion; he suggests that space 
may be conceived while actually excluding God, by supposing him not to exist. 
22
 De Gravitatione, in Philosophical Writings, 32. 
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from God, because their capacity to produce sensation cannot be so conceived, and that 
inconceivability is expressed directly by his definition’s third condition.  
 
 Interpreting Newton’s account: determined quantities of extension and the role of divine 
action  
 
 Yet what exactly are the “determined quantities of extension” endowed with the three 
conditions that Newton asserts?  The question is essential to an understanding of his account of 
body, but it also has implications for the nature and extent of divine providence, as we will see.  
It is often supposed that in his creation hypothesis, Newton takes God to create bodies from parts 
of absolute space itself.  For example, Christopher Conn speaks of a body in De gravitatione as 
“nothing more than a divinely-modified region of space”.
23
  Geoffrey Gorham also takes 
Newton’s determined quantities of extension to be parts of absolute space itself, contrasting the 
“favored regions of space”, which God endows with powers, against the “normal” regions 
(though on his soft occasionalist interpretation, the favored regions of space are given only 
powers of producing sensations.)
24
  If Newton were seeking some sort of substrate in which 
properties could inhere, space might initially seem suitable, since as noted earlier, he considers it 
                                                           
23
 Conn, 1999, 316, n. 23. Alan Gabbey allows the possibility without committing to it, in the following passage: “But 
alternatively, and of equal possibility, the properties of bodies might be the result of God choosing to 'inform' extensions, parts of 
absolute space, with corporeality and mobility. The parts of absolute space that God can and perhaps does endow with the 
properties of bodies are as empty of matter as the materia prima of the scholastics is void of intelligibility, or bereft of existence. 
But there is a crucial difference. Each of these parcels of empty extension is a quid, and a quale, and a quantum, whereas materia 
prima is none of these.” (Gabbey,  “The term materia in Newton and the Newtonian Tradition”, 16 in proofs).  I implied this 
myself in an earlier article (Kochiras, 2009, 269).  
24
 See Gorham, “How Newton Solved the Mind-Body Problem”, January, 2011, 22:  “Newton proposes that God creates bodies 
by imposing three conditions on certain regions of space or ‘determinate quantities of extension’(DQE).”) See also Gorham, 
“Newton on Godʼs Relation to Space and Time: The Cartesian Framework”, September, 2011, esp.  297, where he speaks of “a 
favored portion of extension”.   
As a result of taking this line, Gorham understands Newton’s account of body as intended to respond to a problem of 
distinguishing the favored regions of space from the normal ones.  The problem (a variant of which was raised by Bennett and 
Remnant, 1978), may be described by the following two claims.  (i) Newton claims that the parts of space are immobile, and 
therefore the favored portions of space must be distinguishable from the normal parts of space in order to become mobile; yet (ii) 
the property of impenetrability cannot accomplish the task of making the favored portions of space distinguishable from the 
normal parts of space, because the normal parts of space are themselves impenetrable to one another precisely because they are 
immobile.  This problem, and the need to resolve it, then motivates Gorham’s interpretation of Newton’s account of body.  In 
Gorham’s view, Newton intends the third condition of his account, i.e., the capacity to produce sensations, to resolve the 
problem, for in his view, that condition would be superfluous if not intended for that purpose.  (Gorham writes, “Condition (3) 
solves this problem by ensuring that the favored regions of space stand out because God superadds to them something lacking 
from the unfavored regions: the power to produce sensations.” Gorham, January, 2011,  23.) 
But the third condition would not be superfluous absent that problem, as I argue in §2.5.  Nor is it clear that the problem 
about distinguishability, which motivates Gorham’s account, is genuine.  For one thing, if God did modify parts of actual space, 
surely he himself could distinguish them from one another (as indeed he would have to be able to do, if he were to confer any 
properties at all upon them.)  For another thing, as I argue, Newton’s creation story and its associated definition of body does not 
suppose parts of space itself to be modified.  And there is an even more important consideration: even if the problem were 
genuine, why should we allow the need to resolve it to color our interpretation of Newton’s account, given that he himself is not 
addressing such a problem?  Even if the problem were genuine, it should be invoked only to evaluate Newton’s account, not to 
interpret it, since again, Newton himself is not addressing that problem.   
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to be more like a substance than an accident.  Nevertheless, there are powerful reasons to deny 
that he supposes God to create bodies by modifying parts of absolute space itself.
25
 
The starting point of the creation hypothesis, though hardly decisive, is potentially 
significant.  That starting point is the observation that we can make spaces impenetrable by 
moving our bodies into them—an action that does not, notably, alter the nature of space itself.  
Also significant, I think, is the “metaphysical truth” that God “has created bodies in empty space 
out of nothing”
26
; to square his account with that truth, as he means to do, Newton cannot say 
that God creates bodies out of space, since space is not nothing.  A consideration that should be 
decisive, however, is the nature of space as he describes it, together with the implications of 
supposing that actual parts of space figure in his creation story and definition.  He described 
space as being eternal, immutable, immobile, unable to produce effects, and as having parts that 
are distinguishable but indivisible.  To suppose that certain parts of space could be divinely 
modified, rendered able to produce sensations, solidified and set into motion, is to suppose a full 
contradiction of Newton’s claims . It is to suppose that space is not eternal, because some parts 
of it may be turned into bodies; that space is not immutable, because some parts could be made 
impenetrable and able to produce sensations; and that its parts are not immobile and indivisible, 
because some parts, once made impenetrable, could be torn away from their neighbors and set 
into motion.  And if some parts could be torn away, what exactly would ensue—would space be 
left with gaps, or would additional space appear to fill the gaps?   
These are the sorts of conceptual problems that Newton points to when clarifying the first 
condition of his definition.  Mobility is the first stated condition with which determined 
quantities of extension are endowed, and since space is immobile, he immediately clarifies that 
he is not speaking about the parts of space itself, but rather about their quantities: “therefore I did 
not say that they are numerical parts of space which are absolutely immobile, but only definite 
quantities which may be transferred from space to space.”
27
  Significantly, a quantity of some 
part of space is not identical to the part of space itself—after all, some numerically distinct parts 
                                                           
25
 It should be noted that despite taking parts of space itself to figure in Newton’s account of body, Gorham ultimately defends a 
soft occasionalist interpretation, on which Newton takes the regions of space to be modified only to the extent of temporarily 
assuming powers to produce sensations in minds.  For as noted in §2.5, Gorham argues that the first two conditions of Newton’s 
definition turn out to be superfluous, and the “favored” parts of space, instead of being made actually impenetrable and actually 
torn away from the “normal” regions of space, are simply “spatial occasions” for God to produce perceptions in minds. Denying 
that Newton takes the parts of space to be altered and torn apart seems especially important for Gorham since he also argues that 
space is ultimately identical to God.  Therefore, allowing that space could be altered would not only conflict with Newton’s claim 
that space is immutable, it would also imply that God is not immutable; Gorham avoids that implication by arguing that 
conditions (1) and (2) of the definition “do no independent work”.  
26
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 31.  
27
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 28. 
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of space have the same volume.  Thus as Newton’s own clarification indicates (a clarification we 
should keep firmly in mind when he seems to stray from it by employing more abbreviated 
locutions
28
), it is a mistake to reify his determined quantities of extension, by mistaking them for 
parts of space itself.
29
   
 Since Newton associates only quantities with the qualities or powers identified by his three 
conditions, and not parts of absolute space itself, bodies are constructed from powers alone.  
Insofar as it is useful to speak in terms of subject and the properties predicated of it, the quantity 
of any given region of space in which the powers are present may serve as a logical 
(grammatical) subject, but the utility of such locutions should not lead us to suppose that bodies 
consist in anything beyond powers.  There is nothing like a substrate.  Rather, bodies consist in 
sets of powers, distributed at multiple points of one region of space if the body is resting, or at 
points of successive regions if the body is moving.  This interpretation does require that 
Newton’s first condition, mobility, be considered differently from the other two, in that mobility 
must apply to something.  I therefore suggest that Newton takes bodies (insofar as we can know 
them) to consist in mobile sets of spatially configured powers for mutual impenetrability and 
production of sensation.  These mobile sets of powers must somehow be unified, so as to 
maintain their characteristic configurations as they either rest or move through space, and I 
propose that he assigns the task of unifying them to God.  The powers are unified and maintained 
as enduring configurations by God—by y
e
 divine arm, to borrow a phrase that Newton uses 
elsewhere.
30
  The divine will accomplishes the task that he takes to be performed in the 
Aristotelian account by prime matter or substrate.  
This interpretation fits well with his emphasis upon perceived qualities as the basis of a 
substance. In one of the explanatory points following his definition of body, he explains that the 
                                                           
28
 At one point, for instance, Newton speaks of the form that God “imparts to space”.(De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical 
Writings 29)  Because of such instances, commentators must choose between (i) accepting the surface meaning of such remarks 
and thus understanding bodies as mobile, solidified regions of space, while paying the price of implying a serious conceptual 
problem (the question of what would remain, if regions of space could be torn out) as well as conflicts with Newton’s own claims 
(i.e., that space is immutable and immobile, and that his definition concerns definite quantities, not the numerical parts of space); 
and (ii) avoiding any conflict with his claims that space is immutable and immobile, while paying the price of implying that some 
of his locutions are abbreviated or careless.  I argue for the latter option, as indicated throughout.  
29
 My interpretation can be reconciled with the definition that Newton gives of body at the outset of De gravitatione (and I thank 
Eric Schliesser for reminding me, at the conference at Ghent, of the need to reconcile them).  As is well known, the bulk of De 
gravitatione consists in a lengthy digression, in which Newton attacks Cartesian physics and addresses various metaphysical 
questions, including those focused upon here.  But Newton begins the manuscript with the intention of treating the weight and 
equilibrium of fluids and of solids in fluids, and while still engaged in that project, he defines body as “that which fills place” (De 
gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 13.)  On the interpretation that I develop, that definition can be retained, since a 
set of spatially distributed powers of mutual impenetrability will repel any other such set; and while such sets do not fill place by 
actually having parts outside parts, the phenomenal effect is the same.  
30
 The phrase is from Newton’s second letter to Bentley (17 January, 1692/93; 240 in Turnbull):  “Secondly I do not know any 
power in nature wch could cause this transverse motion without ye divine arm.”  
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entities he has described are no less real than bodies and may be called substances bccause 
“whatever reality we believe to be present in bodies is conferred on account of their phenomena 
and sensible qualities.”
31
  And a remark elsewhere in the manuscript, which I discuss in more 
detail in a subsequent section, points to attributes as the basis of “substantial reality”.  An 
interesting implication of my interpretation is that the extension of bodies is parasitic upon the 
extension of space.  Since bodies are extended in virtue of the presence of their constituent 
qualities or powers in space—a view whose conceptual predecessor is a concept of immaterial 
spirits as spatially located powers, as noted later
32
—only space is extended in the sense of having 
parts outside parts, a complete reversal of the Aristotelian view that all extension is corporeal, an 
attribute of matter.  
 
An objection and response 
Still, more needs to be said, because some of Newton’s remarks may seem to conflict with 
the interpretation I have given.  In an explanatory remark claiming an advantage for his own 
account over that of the Aristotelians, he writes, “Extension takes the place of the substantial 
subject in which the form of the body is conserved by the divine will.”
33
  This remark, which 
refers to extension itself, might make one wonder whether Newton does after all mean that God 
creates bodies by modifying regions of actual space.   
I already noted a powerful reason to reject the view that this objection recommends, namely, 
that it conflicts with Newton’s own concept of space and his own clarification that his definition 
refers to definite quantities, not to numerical parts of space.  It should also be acknowledged that 
the mere mention of extension (space) cannot by itself imply anything, since the mobility 
condition ensures that absolute space must play some role in Newton’s account and hence in any 
interpretation.  Still, the remark figuring in the objection must be explained.  To investigate 
                                                           
31
 This claim appears in the second of the four explanatory remarks following Newton’s definition of body; De gravitatione, in 
Newton: Philosophical Writings, 29.   
32
 For a discussion of concepts of spirits and space, see Kochiras, 2012.  
33
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 29.  I thank an anonymous referee for urging me to explain how 
my interpretation can accommodate that remark.  The referee also suggests that the following remark may conflict with my claim 
that the powers comprising bodies are maintained by the divine will: “I do not see why God himself does not directly inform 
space with bodies, so long as we distinguish between the formal reason of bodies and the act of divine will.  For it is 
contradictory that it [body] should be the act of willing or anything other than the effect which that act produces in 
space.”(Newton, De gravitatione in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 31.)  Newton makes this remark while considering the 
question of whether God creates bodies directly, as opposed to delegating the task to some intermediary, and he is concerned to 
distinguish God’s action from its effects.  The interpretation that I have given does not contravene that distinction.  For the 
powers that God creates, which constitute the body, are the effect of his action and distinct from it; and his action of maintaining 
those powers in certain configurations is distinct from both the prior action and its effect.  
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Newton’s meaning, then, I quote the remark in full, along with a second explanatory remark 
following his definition, which will help illuminate the one particularly at issue.   
 
That for the existence of these beings it is not necessary that we suppose some unintelligible 
substance to exist in which as subject there may be an inherent substantial form; extension and an act 
of divine will are enough. Extension takes the place of the substantial subject in which the form of 
the body is conserved by the divine will; and that product of the divine will is the form or formal 
reason of the body denoting every dimension in which the body is to be produced.   
 
Between extension and its impressed form there is almost the same analogy that the Aristotelians 
posit between prime matter and substantial forms, namely when they say that the same matter is 
capable of assuming all forms, and borrows the denomination of numerical body from its form.  For 
so I posit that any form may be transferred through any space, and everywhere denote the same 
body.
34
   
 
In both of these passages, Newton compares his account to the Aristotelian one, but the first 
repudiates the Aristotelian framework while the second points to a structural similarity between 
that account and his own.
35
  We will need to understand that structural similarity as well as the 
criticism in order to understand the remark figuring in the objection.  Newton’s criticism of the 
Aristotelian account, as elaborated elsewhere in the manuscript, is clear enough: its notions of 
prime matter or substrate (substantial subject, here) and of a substantial form inhering in that 
                                                           
34
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 29. These passages are the first and third explanatory remarks 
following Newton’s definition of body. The original of the third explanatory remark (i.e., the second quoted here) reads: “Inter 
extensionem et ei inditam formam talis fere est Analogia qualem Aristotelici inter materiam primam et formas substantiales 
ponunt; quatenus nempe dicunt eandem materiam esse omnium formarum capacem, et denomina- tionem numerici corporis a 
forma mutuari. Sic enim pono quamvis formam per quaelibet spatia transferri posse, et idem corpus ubique denominare.” 
(Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 107.) 
35
  An interesting interpretation of De gravitatione has been given by Benjamin Hill, who does not see the mere structural 
similarity that I take Newton to assert between his view and the scholastic one, but rather sees significant scholastic content in 
Newton’s ideas (“Newtonʼs De Gravitatione et Aequipondio Fluidorum and Lockean Four-Dimensionalism”, 2003.)  One point 
of agreement between my view and Hill’s is that both deny that the determined quantities of extension figuring Newton’s account 
of body are regions of actual space.  Apart from that, however, our views differ in a number of ways.  For one thing, Hill 
understands the account in terms of extensio interpreted as potentiality.  He argues that Newton retains “the metaphysical 
structures of the Scholastics’ hylomorphism but substituted into those structures extension for prime matter and impenetrability + 
mobility for substantial form.”(Hill, 2003, 317)  On Hill’s analysis, these substitutions are possible because Newton’s extensio 
(which is a quantity, and thus distinct from space itself) is similar to the Scholastics’ prime matter in a crucial way:  “In Newton’s 
thought, extension was, like prime matter, pura potentia”. (Hill, 2003, 318; see also 321: “Although he did not strictly adhere to 
it...Newton seems to have distinguished extensio from spatium. Spatium denoted physical space whereas extensio denoted the 
abstract and metaphysical extensive quantity.”) 
 Although his interpretation is ingenious, I am not convinced by it, and the difficulties I see are instances of an objection he 
anticipates and addresses, namely, that he has exaggerated Newton’s scholasticism (see Hill, 320-321).  Specifically, I am not 
convinced that Newton distinguishes extensio and spatium, as Hill claims, or that he understands the former as pura potentia.  In 
connection with this, Hill’s interpretation does not easily accommodate Newton’s claim that the scholastic notion of prime matter 
is unintelligible.  If we suppose that Newton understood prime matter as pura potentia, it is not clear why he would attack it as 
unintelligible (particularly if we also suppose that Newton understood the determined quantities of extension figuring in his own 
account of body as potentia).  His charge that prime matter is an unintelligible notion is explained, however, if we suppose that 
he understands and represents it uncharitably (as he often represents Descartes) as a propertyless substrate that is an actual, 
component in substances; and his attack upon the scholastic account suggests that that is the way he understands it, as I indicate 
in §4.  For instance, Newton writes, “Further, they attribute no less reality in concept (though less in words) to this corporeal 
substance regarded as being without qualities and forms, than they do to the substance of God; abstracted from his attributes.”  
(Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 32.)  Here Newton takes the Scholastics to explain bodies in terms 
of a propertyless, corporeal substrate, and he criticizes them for attributing reality to this concept.   
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prime matter are unintelligible.
36
  This charge motivates the advantage he claims for his own 
account: since extension “takes the place of the substantial subject”, he avoids the unintelligible 
notion of prime matter.   
Turning to the structural similarity, Newton takes extension (space) in his own account to be 
analogous to prime matter in the Aristotelian account; and form in his account (which he also 
refers to as the product of the divine will) to be analogous to their substantial form.  Before 
proceeding, we must ask what could he mean by ‘form’ in connection with his own account. I 
think he means ‘form’ to refer to the extent and shape of the configured set of powers.  For in a 
limited class of cases, the Aristotelians do take form to be little more than shape, and that is a use 
of the term that Newton can accept, even as he rejects the notion of substantial form more 
generally.  Thus, when he writes that the form of the body is conserved by the divine will, he 
means that the spatial configuration of the set of powers is maintained by God’s action, as I 
argued earlier.
37
   
Proceeding, then, we next need to understand the relation Newton sees between prime 
matter and substantial form in the Aristotelian account, since that will enable us to understand 
the relation he asserts between extension and form in his own account.
38
  He represents the 
Aristotelians to be saying the following.  Since prime matter can be associated with any form, its 
association with any body, via a particular form, is merely contingent; and so it is the substantial 
form that individuates the body.
39
  That is to say, although prime matter facilitates a body’s 
                                                           
36
 See, for instance 31-32 of De gravitatione. It may be remarked that the unintelligibility of Aristotelian substratum is due at 
least in part to Newton’s portrayal of it as something already complete in itself, as opposed to an incomplete material principle, 
which together with a substantial form contributes to the production of a complete, accident-bearing substance.  Also, Newton’s 
representation of prime matter as lacking all qualities overlooks the view, held by all Scholastics other than strict Thomists, that 
prime matter possesses the capacity for extension (extensio in potentia), a point I owe to Dennis Des Chene.  And the Scholastics 
did grapple with the question about prime matter’s intelligibility.  It may also be remarked that although Newton sometimes uses 
the term ‘inhere’ (or its cognates) in his own assertions—notably in Definition 3 of the Principia, which defines the vis insita 
(inherent force), also called the vis inertia (force of inertia)—he is not there employing the scholastic sense of the term.  For as is 
eventually made clear via the explanatory remarks at the end of Rule 3, Newton means to contrast the vis insita/ vis inertiae 
against relational forces, notably the gravitational force.  Unlike gravity, the vis insita/ vis inertiae is monadic—it belongs to the 
body itself.  
37
 This reading is supported by his remark, at the end of the first passage, that the form denotes each dimension in which it is 
produced.  That is to say, the form or spatially configured set it marks out the same dimension (quantity of space), as it moves 
through numerically distinct parts of space.  To borrow Principia terminology, the set of powers provides a sensible measure of 
each space it occupies, by reflecting other such sets, including light. 
38
 Alan Gabbey (forthcoming, 10), commenting upon both this passage and a similar remark that Newton makes in a much later 
text (Add 3965 (no. 13), ff. 422r) writes, “Right to end of his life Newton saw an analogy between the Peripatetic couple, materia 
prima and forma substantialis, and the Newtonian couple, the endlessly transmutable matter common to all bodies and their 
properties, phenomena available to one or other of the senses.”(Gabbey, “The Term Materia in Newton and in the Newtonian 
Tradition”, forthcoming, 12).  I do not mean to imply that Gabbey accepts my interpretation of Newton’s account of body, but I 
find his remark illuminating.  
39
 Since matter can assume all forms, Newton implies, then if matter rather than form individuated substances, there would be 
only a single substance persisting, no matter how dramatic the change in qualities.  As a point of clarification that I owe to 
Dennis Des Chene, Newton incorrectly implies in this passage that there was agreement among the Scholastics about the 
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existence (since both prime matter and substantial form are needed for the body to exist), it never 
really belongs to the body because its association with that body is contingent; and therefore, to 
refer to the body is really to refer to its form.   
Newton sees the same sort of relation in his own account, writing that “any form may be 
transferred through any space, and everywhere denote the same body.”  Space facilitates a 
body’s existence, in that the body’s powers must be distributed in space—for as noted earlier, no 
being can exist without being somehow related to space.  Yet any given region of space may be 
associated with any body, since any body may occupy or pass through it; and since that region’s 
association with the body (set of powers) is contingent, it cannot be said to belong to the body.  
This is Newton’s point when he writes that the form denotes the same body, even as it is 
transferred through different spaces.  Thus the interpretation that I have given can make sense of 
the passages discussed.  (And if fact it makes better sense of them than does the interpretation 
claiming bodies to be divinely modified parts of actual space.  That interpretation cannot account 
for the contingent, transitory relation the passages assert to hold between a part of space and the 
form, for if a part of space were modified so as to become a body, its relation to the form would 
not be contingent or transitory.)   
   
The account of body and the extent of God’s providence  
 In another of the explanatory remarks following the definition of body, Newton states that 
the entities he has described subsist “through God alone”.
40
  The interpretation I have given 
provides a specific way of understanding this: the entities subsist through God alone in that the 
sets of powers are unified and maintained in their configurations by divine action.  Since this 
action is direct, God’s providence is much greater than if he merely concurred with the bodies’ 
continued existence.  Still, Newton also leaves ample room for secondary causation, for as 
indicated earlier, he sees the account of body and thus God’s direct action as limited to 
corpuscles.  This suggests a view similar to that found in a much later text, Query 31 of the 
Opticks.  Query 31 sidesteps the problem of cohesion at the sub-corpuscular level by suggesting 
that corpuscles are created by God, but it speculatively attributes the cohesion of aggregate 
                                                           
principle of individuation.  Des Chene further explains (in correspondence) that there was some agreement among them that 
“substantial form would individuate corporeal substance, were it not that matter can exist, by the absolute power of God, without 
form and even without quantity”.  
40
 Ibid.  Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 29.   
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bodies to interparticulate forces, and thus to secondary causes.
41
  Here too, by restricting his 
account of bodies to corpuscles, Newton leaves the cohesion of aggregate bodies to secondary 
causes.   
The role that Newton assigns to God in De gravitatione therefore falls considerably short of 
occasionalism.  This is consistent with the expectations that he evinces in other texts. In a letter 
of 1680, Newton writes, “Where natural causes are at hand God uses them as instruments in his 
works”.
42
  And as I have argued elsewhere, Newton never endorses the hypothesis that God 
causes gravitational effects directly, and his ongoing search for an explanation expresses his 
expectation of secondary causes.
43
   
I therefore disagree with the interpretation defended recently by Gorham, who attributes 
occasionalism to Newton, albeit a soft sort.
44
  The occasionalism is soft in that God does not 
cause perceptions in minds directly, instead endowing varying regions of space with the power to 
do so, in a continuous creation of matter.
45
  Yet it is still a kind of occasionalism, because 
Gorham argues that that the first and second conditions of Newton’s definition of body are 
superfluous, doing “no independent work of their own”,
46
 and that bodies consist in only the 
powers to produce sensations. Regions of space are the “spatial occasions” for the sensations, 
and God creates matter continuously by creating the powers to produce sensations in varying 
regions of space.
47
  Gorham claims a powerful advantage for his interpretation: it implies that 
Newton solves the mind-body problem, avoiding problems about mental causation “by 
embracing a quasi-idealistic ontology of matter.”
48
  Yet his interpretation requires us not only to 
accept that conditions (1) and (2) of Newton’s definition are superfluous, but also that condition 
(3), the power to produce perceptions in minds, is not merely necessary for body-hood but also 
sufficient.  Gorham reaches this latter conclusion partly through his reading of the comment that 
Newton adds to this third condition—that it is not surprising that bodies have the power to cause 
                                                           
41
 An illuminating discussion of Locke and the foundational problem about cohesion may be found in James Hill (2004), 
“Locke’s Account of Cohesion and its Philosophical Significance”.  
42
 Newton to Burnet, 1680; Newton, The Correspondence, II, 334.  
43
 See Kochiras, 2009, 2011.  
44
 Gorham indicates that he sees Newton as belonging to a tradition that locates the ground of causation in God’s will (Gorham, 
January, 2011, 25).  
45
 See Gorham, January, 2011, 24. 
46
 Gorham, January, 2011, 24.  
47
 See Gorham, January, 2011: “The continuous creation of matter amounts simply to the distribution within space of God’s 
power to produce sensations”(24); and “various quantities of extension are the mere ‘spatial occasions’ for God to bring out our 
perceptions in the successive and law-like ways we associate with moving bodies.”(25). 
48
 Gorham, January 2011, 30. 
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perceptions in minds, “since the description of their origin is founded on this”.
49
  Yet there is a 
natural reading of that remark which does not require either dismissing the definition’s first two 
conditions as superfluous or supposing the third to be sufficient.  That natural reading, which I 
explained earlier, is simply that if bodies lacked the power to produce sensations, we could never 
have any ideas of them. The remark is an instance of Newton’s oft-repeated acknowledgement 
that we can  know only perceived qualities, not the “essential and metaphysical constitution" of 
things.
50
  Since I reject the occasionalist interpretation, I also reject Gorham’s conclusion that 
“Newtonian bodies do not seem to qualify as self-standing substances”.
51
  On my interpretation, 
Newton considers bodies to be created substances.  This is a desirable result, since bodies would 
have to be substances in order for Newton to accept a substantial distinction between mind and 
body—and he does, as I argue elsewhere.  
In closing, I suggest that the account of body Newton develops in De gravitatione might 
have indirectly helped facilitate a concept belonging to his later rational mechanics, that of point 
mass. On the interpretation I have given, his concept of body has as its conceptual ancestor a 
spirit which consists in causal powers, which lacks parts outside parts, and which is extended 
only in the derivative sense that its constituent causal powers are present in some extension.  An 
entity consisting in spatially present causal powers, as opposed to one possessing parts outside 
parts, may more easily be conceived as existing in a larger or smaller area—even as contracted to 
a point.  Thus the bodies of De gravitatione, which consist in powers of mutual impenetrability 
or resistance, might have helped facilitate Newton’s realization that mass can be considered at a 
point.  Or at least, because they lack parts outside parts, such bodies would not stand in the way 
of that realization.   
                                                           
49
 De gravitatione, 29.  There is another passage that Gorham interprets as showing that Newton takes condition (3) to be 
sufficient as well as necessary for being a body.  In that passage, Newton is attacking the Cartesian view of matter:  
“Let us abstract from body (as he demands) gravity, hardness, and all sensible qualities, so that nothing remains except 
what pertains to its essence.  Will extension alone then remain?  By no means.  For we may also reject that faculty or power 
by which they [the qualities] stimulate the perceptions of thinking things.  For since there is so great a distinction between 
the ideas of thought and of extension that it is not obvious that there is any basis of connection or relation [between them], 
except that which is caused by divine power, the above capacity of bodies can be rejected while preserving extension, but 
not while preserving their corporeal nature.”(Newton, De gravitatione in Isaac Newton: Philosophical Writings, 33-34; 
emphasis added)   
Commenting upon this passage, and quoting the italicized portion, Gorham writes, “So, the capacity to produce sensations in 
minds is sufficient and necessary for a quantity of space to possess the nature of body. This explains why Newton privileges 
condition (3) when he introduces his theory of creation: “The description of their [bodies’] origin is founded on this” (De Grav 
29).”(Gorham, January, 2011, 24.)  I do not see how Newton’s remarks imply that condition (3) is sufficient as well as necessary 
for body-hood, as Gorham takes it to do.  There is certainly a way of understanding the passages that does not imply any such 
thing.  As I read the passage, Newton is saying that if one mentally abstracts qualities such as hardness away from a body, one 
has abstracted away only something that is necessary to body, not everything, since bodies also have the power to produce 
sensations.  He is saying that condition (3) is necessary to body-hood, but he is not saying that it is sufficient.   
50
 De gravitatione, 27; Cf. Principia, 942.  
51
 Gorham, January 2011, 24.  
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 GÖDEL ON TRUTH AND PROOF:       
Epistemological Proof of Gödel’s Conception of the Realistic Nature of Mathematical Theories and the 
Impossibility of Proving Their Incompleteness Formally   
  
 Dan Nesher, Department of Philosophy University of Haifa, Israel 
 
No calculus can decide a philosophical problem. A calculus cannot give us information about the 
foundations of mathematics. (Wittgenstein, 1933-34: 296) 
 
1.  Introduction: Pragmaticist Epistemological Proof of Gödel’s Insight of the Realistic Nature of 
Mathematical Theories and the Impossibility of Proving Their Incompleteness Formally 
 In this article, I attempt a pragmaticist epistemological proof of Gödel’s conception of the realistic 
nature of mathematical theories representing facts of their external reality. Gödel generated a realistic 
revolution in the foundations of mathematics by attempting to prove formally the distinction between 
complete formal systems and incomplete mathematical theories.  According to Gödel’s Platonism, 
mathematical reality consists of eternal true ideal facts that we can grasp with our mathematical intuition, an 
analogue of our sensual perception of physical facts.  Moreover, mathematical facts force us to accept 
intuitively mathematical true axioms, which are analogues of physical laws of nature, and through such 
intuition we evaluate the inferred theorems upon newly grasped mathematical facts. However, grasping ideal 
abstractions by means of such mysterious pure intuitions is beyond human cognitive capacity. Employing 
pragmaticist epistemology, I will show that formal systems are only radical abstractions of human cognitive 
operations and therefore cannot explain how we represent external reality. Moreover, in formal systems we 
cannot prove the truth of their axioms but only assume it dogmatically, and their inferred theorems are 
logically isolated from external reality. Therefore, if Gödel’s incompleteness of mathematical theories holds, 
then we cannot know the truth of the basic mathematical facts of reality by means of any formal proofs.  
Hence Gödel’s formal proof of the incompleteness of mathematics cannot hold since the truth of basic facts of 
mathematical reality cannot be proved formally and thus his unprovable theorem cannot be true.  However, 
Gödel separates the truth of mathematical facts from mathematical proof by assuming that mathematical facts 
are eternally true and thus, the unprovable theorem seems to be true.  Pragmatistically, realistic theories 
represent external reality, not by formal logic and not the abstract reality, but by the epistemic logic of the 
complete proof of our perceptual propositions of facts and realistic theories.  Accordingly, it can be explained 
how all our knowledge starts from our perceptual confrontation with reality without assuming any a priori or 
“given” knowledge. Hence, mathematics is also an empirical science; however, its represented reality is 
neither that of ideal objects nor that of physical objects but our operations of counting and measuring physical 
objects which we perceptually quasi-prove true as mathematical basic facts (Nesher, 2002: V, X). 
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2.  Gödel’s Platonism and the Conception of Mathematical Reality with Its True Conceptual Facts  
 Gödel’s basic insight of the realistic nature of mathematics that it is a science represents mathematical 
reality and not just a conventional formal system. Yet, Gödel's Platonist mathematics is an abstract science 
representing ideal true mathematical reality though analogical to the empirical sciences (Gödel, 1944).  As a 
metaphysical realist, Gödel separates the mathematical reality of abstract true facts from formal proofs, and it 
is only by pure intuition that we can grasp these facts.  Figure 1 presents a schema of Gödel’s different 
conceptions of logic and mathematics: 
 
 [1] The Gödelian Epistemology of Three Conceptions of Logic and Mathematics:  
 
         A      B        C 
      Russell- Principia   
      Wittgenstein-Logic:  Tractatus              Frege, Hilbert,         Gödel-Platonism: Conceptual Realism 
         Carnap-Syntax         Wittgenstein-Language: Tractatus      of Scientific Mathematical Theories 
           [(Tautological)       (Analytical)                 (Realistic)]:   Gdel:1951 
              Axiomatic               Axiomatic                            Theories: 
             Syntactical                     Semantical          Platonistic Realism,  
          Formal System                        Formal System                  or Empirical Realism 
            and Its language  
                                      /|\ Representing reality 
Miraculously Assumed/|\         Miraculously Assumed   /|\                The Axioms   ///\\\  
     Set of Axioms     /||||||\    Set of Axioms /||||||\              / ////\\\\\  
    /|||||||||||\                  / |||||||||||\            /     |      \ 
Rules of Inferences /     |      \           Rules of Inferences   /     |      \           Rules of Proofs    /Deductive\ 
(As Proofs)           /Deduction\              (As Proofs)         /Deduction\                       /  Consistent \ 
             /         |          \          /   |           \                                       /     Inference   \                         
             /__________\          /____ ____ _\            Intuitive         /                        \        Intuitive Evaluation 
         /         T h e  \           Inference      /                          \      of Conclusions Upon 
       No External Reality         /   Conclusions         \           of Axioms   /  The Conclusions   \    Mathematical Facts 
         Simile-Reality    |       Assigned            |                            
         Isolated from     |    Interpretation of    |      Intuitively    ____________________ 
       External Reality |    Intended Model     |                Grasped       /  P r o s i t i o n a l F a c t \ 
           (Weyl, 1925)                       /         \ 
           (Zach, 2003)          Representation       / Mathematical         \  
                                     (Hintikka, 2005)          /       EXTERNAL REALITY      \  
  
 Gödel’s tri-partitions are between (A) Complete Analytic Formal Systems with their formal syntactic 
tautologies, (B) Complete Formal Semantic analyses, and (C) the Incomplete Realistic Theories of conceptual 
mathematics (Gödel, 1951: 319-323; Poincaré, 1902: Chap. I).   
  
The two significations of the term analytic might perhaps be distinguished as tautological and analytic 
(Gödel, 1944:139, n. 46). 
 Epistemologically the tautological and analytic of complete formal systems are, respectively, 
syntactically closed upon their fixed axioms and formal rules of inference and semantically closed upon 
axioms, formal rules, and the assigned model. The realist incomplete theory is only relatively closed upon 
its relative proof-conditions, the formal proofs, the operations of pure intuition, and conceptual facts of 
external reality (Nesher, 2002: X).  Since Gödel’s mathematical theories are regarded as axiomatic formal 
systems with formal inferences, yet their external reality can be grasped only by pure intuition (Gödel, 
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1931a: 203, 1964: 268).  
For Gödel, pure mathematical intuition has three functions: (1) to grasp the true ideal mathematical 
facts of mathematical reality, (2) to enforce by these ideal facts to accept the true axioms of mathematical 
theories in order to infer the theorems formally, and (3) to evaluate how the theorems represent truly facts 
of mathematical reality (Gödel, 1953-54?: fn. 34; Nesher, 2001a, 2010). Gödel’s conception of 
mathematical intuition is based on his mathematical experience, which he calls the “psychological fact of 
the existence of an intuition,” but as a “given” without any explanation. 
  
However, the question of the objects of mathematical intuition (which incidentally is a replica of 
the question of the objective existence of the outer world) is not decisive for the problem under 
discussion here. The mere psychological fact of the existence of an intuition which is sufficiently 
clear to produce the axioms of set theory and an open series of extensions of them suffices to give 
meaning to the question of the truth or falsity of propositions like Cantor’s continuum hypothesis 
(Gödel, 1964: 268).  
 
How with mathematical intuition we grasp pure meanings of mathematical propositions is the 
essential problem to the possibility of Gödel's conceptual realism (Gödel, 164:268). 
  
3.   Gödel’s Incomplete Distinction between Formal Systems and Realistic Theories  
 Gödel revolutionized the conception of the nature of mathematics through his distinction between 
complete logical formal systems and incomplete mathematical theories (Gödel, 1931:195, 1964). However, 
he did not conclude this revolution, because of his acceptance the formalist methods of mathematical 
proofs and the subjective conception of pure intuition owing to his Platonist realism that motivated this 
revolution (Gödel, 1931:#1).  
 
[2] Epistemological Gap between Logical Formal Systems and Mathematical Theories 
 
              Realist Theory 
     Formal System       representing reality   
  and its language          /|\ 
        Miraculously Assumed   /|\        The Axioms   ///\\\  
          Set of Axioms /|||||||\       /////\\\\\  
             /|||||||||||||\     /     |       \ 
          Rules of Inferences   /     |        \               /Deductive \ 
   (As Proofs)       /Deducting                  /    Formal     \ 
       /   |   \                           /     Inference     \                         
                           /__________ \                   /                        \      
              /         T h e      \    Axioms force   /                   \     
                                  /   Conclusions         \ themselves /    The Conclusions      \      The conclusions 
      Quasi-Reality     |       Assigned            |   Intuitively   _____________________       Evaluated     
     Isolated from     |   Interpretation in     |                    / Intuitively Grasped         \     Intuitively 
   External Reality  |   Intended Model     |        /  P r o s i t i o n a l  F a c t      \ 
                      / External Conceptual Reality \                                 
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 The difference between formal system and realist theory lies in their proof-conditions when the 
formal system is by definition hermetically closed upon its fixed formal proof-conditions without relation 
to external reality; the mathematical realistic theory is relatively closed upon its proof-conditions: the 
mathematical facts of external reality, the formal inferences, and the pure intuitions that complete the 
representation of reality, while the axioms change by our continually grasping new mathematical facts. 
Yet, the formal systems are artificially abstracted from human mathematical operations and cannot explain 
them, and thus they can never be “ideal machines” by lacking any human cognitive self-consciousness and 
self-controlled operations upon reality (Gödel, 1931: 195 & n. 70; 1951: 310; Feferman, 2006; Putnam, 
2011; Penrose, 2011). Apparently Gödel did not completely conceive his epistemological revolution of the 
realistic nature of mathematics and considered the three classes of logico-mathematics, A, B, and C, as 
formal systems, while neglecting the essential distinction between formal systems and mathematical 
theories. 
 
The development of mathematics toward greater precision has led, as is well known, to the 
formalization of large tracts of it, so that one can prove any theorem using nothing but a few 
mechanical rules. The most comprehensive formal systems that have been set up hitherto are the 
system of Principia mathematica (PM) on the one hand and the Zermelo-Frankel axiom system of 
set theory  . . .  on the other. These two systems are so comprehensive that in them all methods of 
proof today used in mathematics are formalized, that is, reduced to a few axioms and rules of 
inference. (Gödel, 1931: #1; cf. 1931a; Kleene, 1967: 253) 
 
 Gödel’s incompleteness theorem essentially shows that PM and ZF are mathematical theories, not 
formal systems; however, since they use formal inferences, then without the help of mathematicians' 
conceptual intuition, those systems are isolated from mathematical reality.  According to pragmaticist 
epistemology, the formal inference is only one component of the epistemic logic which includes also the 
Abductive and Inductive material inferences of the complete proof enable also to prove the basic 
mathematical facts of external reality. Yet, even after proving the incompleteness of mathematics, Gödel 
still oscillated between mathematics as axiomatic formal systems and as scientific theories, and thus he 
could not complete his realistic revolution of mathematics (Gödel, 1953-54? II; Feferman, 1984: 9-11). 
4.  Gödel’s Paradoxical Formal Proof of Incompleteness, Based on Separating Truth from Its Proof 
 If Gödel’s incompleteness holds, then mathematics is theory and a not formal system so, can Gödel 
prove formally his incompleteness in mathematical theory that cannot prove formally true theorems 
(Hintikka, 2000: V)? Gödel’s formal proof of incompleteness is actually an “arithmetization of syntax,” 
which attempts to prove his epistemological conception of the nature of mathematics. But Gödel’s 
incompleteness is a general claim that can be proved only epistemologically, and not through any specific 
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theory about itself. It could be that in respect of a special mathematical theorem it can be prove that a 
specific theory (e.g., PM or ZF) is incomplete in respect to specific propositions and the given true 
mathematical facts; but it cannot provide a general proof of the nature of mathematics (Gödel, 1944:121).   
Gödel arithmeticized the proof of the undecided proposition G1: “I am unprovable,” by means of a 
metamathematical description in order to prove this unprovable mathematical proposition, “We therefore 
have before us a proposition that says about itself that it is not provable [in PM]” (Gödel, 1931: 151).  The 
question is whether this formal proof can be considered proof of G1: “I am unprovable”?  There are two 
problems here: (1) Can at all there be metalanguages, since meta-descriptions of mathematical languages 
can , at most, describe physical-syntactical signs, following Tarski, and not their meaning-contents, which 
we can only interpret, yet not in abstract models but in respect to experience (Wittgenstein, 1921, 1933-34: 
II.12; Gödel, 1953-54?: fn.34, p.203: Nesher, 1987, 2002: V)? (2) Can G1 be meaningful and “contentually 
true” that eventually represents a mathematical true fact (Gödel, 1931a: 203)?  
 If G1: “I am unprovable” is proved formally true in PM, then its claim of being unprovable is false 
because it was proved true [in PM] and cannot be unprovable, but when G1 is false then being unprovable 
in PM is true as it claims, and thus presenting a paradox like the liar paradox, and Gödel’s trick of using a 
kind of paradoxical argument fails. 
 
The analogy of this argument with the Richard antinomy leaps to the eye. It is closely related to the 
“Liar” too.14 (Any epistemological antinomy could be used for a similar proof of the existence of 
undecidable propositions). (Gödel, 1931: 149) 
 Since any epistemological antinomy is void of truth, this means that its proof is also void of truth.  It 
seems that Gödel felt this difficulty, and his way out of this paradoxical situation is to locate the proof at the 
metamathematical arithmetical language and thus separate this formal proof from the language of G1 with 
the assuming truth of its bizarre meaning. 
 
From the remark that [R(q);q] says about itself that it is not provable, it follow at once that [R(q);q] 
is true, for [R(q);q] is indeed unprovable (being undecidable). Thus, the proposition that is 
undecidable in the system PM still was decided by metamathematical considerations.  
(Gödel, 1931: 151) 
 Why did Gödel take recourse in this “epistemological antinomy” as a trick and not proving the 
incompleteness of PM by showing that propositions “of the type of Goldbach or Fermat” are unprovable in 
it (Gödel1931a: 203)?  It seems that Gödel intended a general proof of the nature of all mathematical 
theories in respect of their infinite mathematical reality (Agazzi, 1974: 24). Gödel’s Platonist realism leads 
him to formulate his proof with the suffix able as his “provable” and “unprovable” terms. This means that 
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since there are eternal and infinite true mathematical facts that eventually can be grasped by pure intuition, 
they are either provable or unprovable in any mathematical theory (Hintikka, 2000:29).  In such Platonic 
epistemology, truth in reality and proof in theories are separated, which enables Gödel to separate the proof 
of G1 from the truth of the mathematical fact it is to represent, in order to avoid the paradox in proving his 
incomplete theorem of being “closely related to the ‘Liar.’”   
 
Finally it should be noted that the heuristic principle of my construction of undecidable number 
theoretical propositions in the formal systems of mathematics is the highly transfinite concept of 
‘objective mathematical truth’ as opposed to that of ‘demonstrability’ . . .  , with which it was 
generally confused before my own and Tarski’s work (Gödel in a letter to Wang, Dec. 7, 1967, in 
Wang, 1974: 9; Feferman, 1984: 106-107; Franzn, 2005: 2.4). 
 Hence, Gödel leans on the distinction between the liar proposition P
L: “I am lying” and the 
unprovable proposition P
U: “I am unprovable” since in the former we reach the liar paradox that if it is true 
then it is false and vice versa, whereas there is no such paradox of truth and falsity in the latter, since proof 
and truth are separated (Gödel, 1934 #7, 1951: 322-323; Hintikka, 2000:35-36; Devlin, 2002).   
 
So we can see that the class  of numbers of true formulas cannot be expressed by the propositional 
function of our system, whereas the class  of provable formulas can. Hence    and if we assume 
   (i.e., every provable formula is true) we have   , i.e., there is a proposition A which is true 
but not provable.  A then is not true and therefore not provable either, i.e., A is undecidable (Gödel, 
1934: 363). 
 Generally, Gödel separates the truth of mathematical facts, which can be grasped intuitively, from 
the formal proof of propositions in mathematical theories and thus also, he can separate the attempted 
formal proof of G1 from its seemingly representing the truth of a fact in the mathematical reality of PM.  
Leaning on his Platonistic realism he could do it in order to avoid the possibility that G1 would be both true 
and false like the Tarskian liar proposition.  
 
Thus if truth for number theory were definable within itself, one could find a precise version of the 
liar statement, giving a contradiction. It follows that truth is not so definable. But provability in the 
system is definable, so the notions of provability and truth must be distinct. In particular if all 
provable sentences are true, there must be true non-provable sentences.  The self-referential 
construction applied to provability (which is definable) instead of truth, then leads to a specific 
example of an undecidable sentence (Feferman, 1984: 106). 
 However, if the notions of truth and proof are not separated there are no “true non-provable 
sentences” and “the self-referential construction” of G1 leads to an “epistemological antinomy,” a kind of 
the liar paradox.  Metaphysical realists, such as Platonists and formal semanticists (e.g., Tarski), assume 
that truth is independent of proof and, by the bivalence of truth values, the principle of excluded middle, 
identify truth with reality, yet, not for complete formal systems (Gödel, 1929: 63; Penrose, 2011: 342-343).  
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Pragmaticists, however, show that for humans the truth and falsity of propositions consist only of that 
which we have already proved as such, since we cannot know truth from a Godly perspective (Nesher, 
2002: V). Since there is no separation between truth and being proved, then we have to drop the expressions 
“provable” and “unprovable” from our epistemology. This terminology belongs to Metaphysical Realism, 
such as Gödel’s Conceptual Realism, Popper’s absolute truth, among others, in distinction from 
Pragmaticist Representational Realism (Nesher, 2002: III, V, VIII).  
Therefore, without being proved true or false, propositions remain doubtful, and since no one has 
proved the truth or the falsity of the liar proposition, it is doubtful and there cannot be any paradox (Nesher, 
2002: V).  Hence the separation of truth from proof is epistemologically untenable and so also the 
separation between the liar paradox and the unprovable-provable antinomy, and thus, with the doubtful 
unprovable proposition we cannot prove anything (Hintikka, 2000:31-35).  Although Wittgenstein sensed 
the paradoxical difficulty in Gödel’s alleged proof of incompleteness, he could not explain it without having 
an epistemology of truth (Wittgenstein, 1937; Nesher, 1992; Floyd and Putnam, 2000; Floyd, 2001; Berto, 
2009: # 9).  
 
How can Gödel prove that his crucial proposition is not logically provable by using the very same 
logic? And how we can know that the proposition in question is true if we cannot prove it? 
(Hintikka, 2000:29)  
 What, then, is the meaning of G1 if it were proved to represent a conceptual true fact in 
mathematical reality? And can we specify this true fact that the alleged meaning-content of G1 represents?  
Indeed, there is no mathematical fact that G1 represents, since it is not a proposition with real subject matter 
and clear content and if anything at all, it has only a shadowing meaning (Gödel, 1931a: 203; Weyl, 1949: 
51; Feferman, 1984: 106).  However, if G1: “G1 is unprovable” is void of real meaning and thus cannot be 
“contentually true” then it cannot represent any intended “mathematical objects or facts exist,” according to 
Gödel’s criticism of the syntactic conception of mathematics (Gödel, 1931a: 203, Gödel, 1953-54?: #30; 
Agazzi, 1974: 24; Feferman, 1984: 103).  Hence the arithmeticized proof of G1 is only mechanically 
connected to the object language and has nothing to do with its meaning (Tarski, 1944; Nesher, 1987, 2002: 
V; Floyd, 2001: III).  Then if G1 can be proved formally, any sentence can be proved emptily and the 
system or theory in which it is proved is inconsistent (Gödel 1931a: 203).  
 
This formulation of the non-feasibility of the syntactic program (which also applies to finitary 
mathematics) is particularly well suited for elucidating the question as to whether mathematics is 
void of content [in the sense that no mathematical objects or facts exist]. For, if prima facie content 
of mathematics were only a wrong appearance, it would have to be possible to build up mathematics 
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satisfactorily without making use of this “pseudo” content. (Gödel, 1953-54?: #30; Hintikka, 2000: 
29) 
 However, the meaning-contents of scientific theories are based on our experiential confrontation 
with external reality and mathematical reality, as well. Thus, the basic facts of mathematical reality cannot 
be proved formally in theory from its axioms and the question is how we prove their truths and whether we 
can grasp their truths by pure mathematical intuition (Gödel, 1944: 21). 
 
It is turned out that (under the assumption that modern mathematics is consistent) the solution of 
certain arithmetical problems requires the use of assumptions essentially transcending arithmetic, 
i.e., the domain of the kind of elementary indisputable evidence that may be most fittingly compared 
with sense perception. (Gödel, 1944: 121; cf. Gödel, 1953: #34) 
 This Gödel insight fits the pragmaticist understanding of the role of epistemic logic proofs in all 
empirical sciences, mathematics included (Gödel, 1947: 182-183, 1964: 268-269; Nesher, 2002, 2007; 
Chihara, 1982).  The central problem in the epistemology of mathematical theories concerns an explanation 
of mathematical reality: What is it and how do we prove the propositional facts of mathematics (Kitcher, 
1984; Nesher, 2002: X)? Since this reality cannot be known by any axiomatic mathematical theory, there 
may be other methods to know it, such as Gödel’s mathematical intuition grasping mathematical true facts, 
or rather the epistemic logic we operate to quasi-prove the truth of our perceptual judgments representing 
mathematical reality (Agazzi, 1974: 24). 
 
(Assuming the consistency of classical mathematics) one can even give examples of propositions 
(and in fact of those type of Goldbach or Fermat) that, while contentually true, are unprovable in the 
formal system of classical mathematics. Therefore, if one adjoins the negation of such a proposition 
to the axioms of classical mathematics, one obtains a consistent system in which a contentually false 
proposition is provable.  . . .  (Gödel 1931a: 203). 
 The discrepancy between Gödel’s intuition about the realistic nature of mathematics and his attempt 
to prove propositional facts formally can be resolved by the Peircean epistemic logic of complete proofs.  
Through it, we can prove the truth of the basic propositional facts of mathematics, discover hypothetical 
axioms, and evaluate their truth upon the true facts of mathematical reality.  
 The question is, why nevertheless did Gödel’s formal proof of the incompleteness of mathematical 
theories were accepted almost without questioning the problematic “epistemological antinomy?”  It may be 
that the generation of Frege and Hilbert, and the next one, were captivated by the deductivist-formalist 
agenda and the analytic formal semantic epistemology with the metalanguages hierarchies, which could not 
seriously reevaluate this proof (Dawson, 1984). Since the realistic conception of mathematics expresses 
mathematicians’ intuition about their work, then what Gödel offered about the incompleteness of 
mathematical theories is accepted naturally: i.e., that there are “contentually true” propositions in the 
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language of theory that cannot be proved except by extended axiomatic theories (Hintikka, 2000: V). 
 
           5. The Pragmaticist Epistemology of Cognitive Empirical Representations of External Reality 
 The deviation of formal systems from human working with mathematical theories can be explained 
by suggesting that formal systems are only realistic theories in disguise or utopian; i.e., impossibly "ideal 
machines" of different degrees (Dawson, 1984:79; Nesher, 2001b). 
 
By the turn of this century mathematics, 'the paradigm of certainty and truth', seemed to be the real 
stronghold of orthodox Euclideans. But there are certainly some flaws in the Euclidean organization 
even of mathematics, and these flaws caused considerable unrest.  Thus the central problem of all 
foundational schools was: 'to establish once and for all the certitude of mathematical methods'. 
1
 (
1
 
Hilbert, 1925).  However, foundational studies unexpectedly led to the conclusion that a Euclidean 
reorganization of mathematics as a whole may be impossible; that at least the richest mathematical 
theories were, like scientific theories, quasi-empirical. Euclideanism suffered a defeat in its very 
stronghold (Lakatos, 1978: 30). 
The formal systems with their formal proofs, though aiming to increase the power of formal 
computations, yet as far as they estranged from human cognitive operations representing reality their 
efficiency is decreased. The advantage of human cognitive operations lies in its having self-consciousness 
and self-control in confronting the mathematical, physical, and other realities, which enable correcting 
errors and evolving human knowledge (Gödel, 1972a: 305-6; Nesher, 1990, 1999; Hintikka, 1997: 5.7, 
2000: X; Putnam, 2011: 15.4).  In this perspective, we can understand the epistemology of the “Exact 
Sciences,” the issue of the Königsberg Conference in September 1930, in which Gödel announced his 
discovery of incompleteness; namely, that even mathematics is not pure science and is only relatively exact 
(Nesher, 2002: X). 
 
. . .  as far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are 
certain, they do not refer to reality. (Einstein, 1921) 
  Gödel’s incompleteness theorem is about the relativity of any mathematical theory in respect to its proof-
conditions in representing mathematical reality. 
 
There is in fact in the light of hindsight a major puzzle about Gödel’s insights and about the way he 
put them to use. One of his greatest achievements, arguably the greatest one, was to show the 
deductive incompleteness of elementary arithmetic. (Hintikka, 2005: 536)   
 Hintikka obscures the issue that the incompleteness of any scientific theory, including elementary 
arithmetic, is due not only to the incompleteness of formal deductive inferences; scientific theories with 
their complete epistemic logical proofs are also incomplete and are true only upon their specific proof-
conditions and therefore, they are incomplete in respect to reality we endeavor to represent.  Since all our 
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knowledge of reality is based on perceptual experience in confrontation with reality, so also is our 
mathematical experience in confrontation with its reality, which cannot comprise Platonist abstract objects. 
The distinction between completeness of axiomatic formal systems and the incompleteness of mathematical 
and other scientific theories is not logical but, rather, epistemological and can be proved with pragmaticist 
epistemic logic (Nesher, 2002, 2007; Wittgenstein, 1933-34: 296).  
 
The nontriviality of the proof of completeness for limpid logic must be forcefully presented the 
possibility to Platonist Gödel that there were propositions that are arithmetically true but not 
provable within a formal system of arithmetic. (Goldstein, 2005: 154) 
 Thus, Gödel’s “evident without proof” of true propositions that were not proved in specific formal 
systems, illustrates that cognitive confrontation with external reality cannot be formalized. According to 
Gödel the basic true mathematical facts can be grasped intuitively and from them the axioms are intuitively 
accepted as true without proofs.   
 
Of course, the task of axiomatizing mathematics proper differs from the usual conception of 
axiomatics insofar as the axioms are not arbitrary, but must be correct mathematical propositions, 
and moreover, evident without proof. There is no escaping the necessity of assuming some axioms 
or rules of inference as evident without proof, because the proofs must have some start point. 
(Gödel, 1951: 305). 
However, since there is no human truths without proofs this can be undertaken only by quasi-proofs 
of basic perceptual judgments representing reality in complete epistemic logic, the trio sequence of  the 
material logical inference of Abductive discovery, the Deductive necessary inference and  the material 
inference of Inductive evaluation (Nesher, 2002: V, X).  Hence, the impossibility of proving formally in 
metamathematics the theorem of unprovability is also due to the impossibility of proving formally the truth 
of propositional facts of external mathematical reality, “because the proofs must have some start point” and 
their proved truth is the “start point.”  This is hinted by Russell about the empirical assumptions of 
mathematics, and so Gödel, too, cannot prove G1 formally in an incomplete mathematical theory (Russell, 
1914; Nesher, 2002: V).  With the cognitive epistemic logic, we start from the quasi-proof of the basic 
perceptual facts of our knowledge of reality without any miraculous “given.”  Thus, we can discard the 
transcendental a priorism while all our knowledge is empirical (Nesher, 2007). 
 
 [3] The Entire Perceptual Operation: Complete Trio of Abduction, Deduction, and Induction: 
Abduction((CAb(AAbCAb)=>AAb)+Deduction((AC)Ab AAb)CDd)+Induction((AAb, CIn)>(AAbCIn)) 
Where: => is the Abductive  plausibility connective suggesting the concept A
Ab
,  is the Deductive 
necessity connective from which the abstract object C
Dd
 is inferred, and >  is the Inductive  probability 
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connective evaluating the relationship between the concept A
Ab
 and the new experiential object C
In 
, when 
C
In
 is similar to C
Dd
.  From this epistemological position, it is amazing that Gödel, by using pure intuition 
and thus admitting the limitation of formal proofs, nevertheless attempted to prove the incompleteness of 
mathematical theories by incomplete formal inference (Gödel, 1931: #1, 1951: 304-306; Dawson, 1984: #2; 
Hintikka, 2005: 536).   
Indeed, Lakatos and Putnam's conception of the quasi-empirical proofs in mathematics seem 
analogical to Gödel's mathematical proofs with intuitive grasps of true facts and his other intuitive 
inferences. Howevr, the Peircean epistemic logic of the trio inferences is the solution to the limitation of 
formal logic, yet not as the quasi-empirical method based on convention but empirically quasi-proving the 
truth of the basic propositions upon mathematical external reality. Thish is the only way to reach 
convention and for realism in human knowledge including mathematical knowledge (Lakatos, 1967[1978]: 
36; Putnam, 1975: 63-77). The Pragmaticist overcoming of Gödel’s Platonism is that all our knowledge 
develops from our sense-perception confrontation with external reality, and therefore conceptual realism 
with its pure intuition is only disguised empirical knowledge of reality.  Since for Gödel mathematical 
reality consists of abstract entities, the analogy with empirical sciences is incomplete. The following is a 
schema of perceptual quasi-proof of perceptual judgment representing external reality (cf. [3]): 
 
 [4] Perceptual Experience of Interpreting Cognitive Signs in Representing Physical Objects: 
Quasi-proof of the Truth of Perceptual Judgment 
 
         I n t e r p r e t a t i o n relations evolve hierarchically 
      From Pre-verbal Sensorimotor Signs  to Propositional Judgment 
 Interpretational relations 
 Percept-Sign Iconic Presenting Indexical Operating Symbol: Perceptual Judgment 
         Object Shapes    Immediate Object   Concept of Object 
       Feeling  Reaction    Thought     
        \         Iconic     Indexical    The  
    Replicas     Feeling    Reaction      Meaning-Content of 
                    \          \         Iconic           Symbol-Concept 
               \           \          Feeling       
     
                            \      \                     
                                                                           
         Represented   Real   Physical   Object   
 The signs representing a Real Object constitute the Iconic Feeling of Object Shapes, the Indexical 
reaction to it being the Immediate Object pre-symbolic representation, and their synthesis in the Symbolic 
Concept represents the Real Object by the true Perceptual Judgment.  Recognizing that our knowledge 
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starts from perceptual confrontation with reality, we can understand Gödel’s problem with grasping ideal 
entities through pure intuition, like the Kantian Intellectual Intuition in grasping supersensible objects, 
which only a supernatural being can do (Gödel, 1951; Dummett, 1981: 251-252).  It is upon such basic 
knowledge that all our theories develop through the discovery of hypotheses (Nesher, 2008). 
  
But despite their remoteness from sense-experience, we do have something like a perception of the 
objects of set theory, as it seems from the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us as being 
true. I don’t see any reason why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception, i.e., in 
mathematical intuition, than in sense-perception, which induces us to build up physical theories and 
to expect that future sense perceptions will agree with them, and, moreover, to believe that a 
question not decidable now has meaning and may be decided in the future. (Gödel, 1964: 268; 
emphasis added; Weyl, 1949: 235)  
 We can compare this feeling of force to Frege’s feeling the force of truth in indicative sentences: 
 
We declare the recognition of truth in the form of an indicative sentence. We do not have to use the 
word “true” for this. And even when we do use it, the real assertive force lies not in it but in the 
form of the indicative sentence, and where this loses its assertive force the word “truth” cannot put it 
back again. (Frege, 1918: 89-90, emphasis added; cf. Nesher, 2002: VI.5.)  
 Such a feeling of the force of truth is the feeling of the self-controlled perceptual quasi-proofs of our 
perceptual judgments, and “the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us” is the feeling of the 
Abductive discovery and Inductive evaluation of the axioms as hypotheses, through the instinctive, practical 
and rational operation of epistemic logic. Thus, mathematical theories are also based on perceptual 
experience confronting its external reality. The question is how mathematical reality differs from physical 
reality (Putnam. 1975: #4, 1994: # 12).  
 
           6.  What, Therefore, Is the Mathematical Reality That Mathematical Theories Represent? 
  Since all our knowledge of reality is based on perception and introspection, then basic mathematical 
knowledge is also based on such experiences (Wang, 1974: VII.3; Nesher, 2002: III).  The basic 
Mathematical reality that we initially represent consists of our operations of counting, grouping, and 
measuring physical objects when confronting our environment (Nesher, 1990, 2002: V, 2007).  
  
. . . the primitive man could count only by pointing to the objects counted, one by one. Here the 
object is all-important, as was the case with early measures of all peoples. The habit is seen in the 
use of such units as the foot, ell (elbow), thumb (the basis for our inch), hand, span, barleycorn, and 
furlong (furrow long). In due time such terms lost their primitive meaning and we think of them as 
abstract measures. In the same way the primitive words used in counting were at first tied to 
concrete groups, but after thousands of years they entered the abstract stage in which the group 
almost ceases to be a factor. (Smith, 1923: 7)   
 Hence, arithmetic and geometry were historically basic human modes of quantitative operations on 
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physical objects. With our sensual perception, we represent these operations, yet not the engaged physical 
objects and not the involved conceptual number signs, but their combination in these operations themselves. 
Hence, the perceptual representation of these operations, being our basic representation of mathematical 
reality, is “a kind of visual justification which the Egyptian employed” (Gittleman, 1975: 8, 27-31; Parsons, 
1995: 61). The arithmetical numbers are neither physical objects nor abstract concepts, but the conceptual 
components of our quantitative operations with physical objects. We assign numbers to these intentional 
cognitive operations cum physical maneuvers as signs of these operations. The discovery of the first 
concepts of these operations of enumeration consist of natural numbers; and the further discovering of their 
expansion through abstractions and generalizations constitutes our new mathematical hypotheses, which 
will be evaluated upon the extended mathematical reality (Gödel, 1944:128, 1964:268; Martin, 2005: 207; 
Spinoza, 1663).   
 
But consider a physical law, e.g., Newton's Law of Universal Gravitation. To say that this law is true 
. . .  one has to quantify over such non-nominalistic entities as forces, masses, distances. Moreover, 
as I tried to show in my book, to account for what is usually called 'measurement' – that is, for the 
numericalization of forces, masses, and distances – one has to quantify not just over forces, masses, 
and distances construed as physical properties . . . , but also over functions from masses, distances 
etc. to real numbers, or at any rate to rational numbers. In short –  and this is the insight that, in 
essence, Frege and Russell already had – a reasonable interpretation of the application of 
mathematics to the physical world requires a realistic interpretation of mathematics. (Putnam, 1975: 
74)     
 
The realistic understanding of mathematics that I suggest here is that mathematical reality is not an 
interpretation in the physical reality the physical sciences represent but it is the human operations of 
counting, groping, and measuring physical objects and their relations, being the basic mathematical reality 
upon its true representation the mathematical abstract and generalized theories are developed (Putnam, 
1975: 77-78; Weyl, 1949: 235).   
These basic operations are known by their perceptual representations; however, when we abstract, 
generalize, and further recombine the arithmetical components of these operations with our intellectual 
intuition, we continue to self-control them perceptually. Although the new mathematical structures are 
based on our perceptual confrontation with the reality of operations, when we elaborate them into more 
complicated kinds of mathematical structures they seemed detached from their reality as abstract conceptual 
entities grasped by pure intuition. Actually they are evolving in hierarchical relations between sense-
perception and intellectual intuitions in our knowledge of mathematical reality without this reality being 
divided into “two separate worlds (the world of things and the world of concepts”) (Gödel, 1951: 321). 
 
On the other hand, we have a debate between Realism—mathematical things exist objectively, 
independently of our mathematical activity—and Constructivism—mathematical things are created 
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by our mathematical activity. We want to know how much of this can be regarded as continuous 
with the practice itself. (Maddy, 1997: 191)  
 The question is about the relationship of our mathematical activity with mathematical structures 
such that if they are external mathematical reality how we know them, and if they are our constructions, 
how can we apply them in our empirical theories (Heyting, 1931: 52-53; Dedekind, 1901:15-16)?  The 
solution to this predicament between Metaphysical Realism and Phenomenological Constructivism is that 
mathematical reality exists objectively, yet not independently of our mathematical activity.  Mathematical 
reality is our intentional self-controlled mathematical operations on physical objects, such as 1 apple and 1 
apple are 2 apples, which are connected with our perceptual representation of this operation as a certain 
behavioral reality.  Hence, we perceptually quasi-prove the truth of our perceptual judgment that “1 + 1 = 
2,” representing a mathematical operation, and thereby discover the structures of arithmetical numerical 
signs. Then, by discovering and proving the true representation of new mathematical operations, we 
hypothesize general theories, such as Peano’s Arithmetic; finally, by evaluating them, we extend our 
knowledge of mathematical reality (Smith, P., 2007: #28.3).  In this way we discover the construct of 
mathematical theories although the Constructivists consider the theories themselves as mathematical reality 
and not as representations of mathematical operations reality (Resnik, 1997). Hence, only by quasi-proving 
the truth of perceptual facts representing mathematical operations do we represent mathematical reality. 
 
 [5] The Double Layer of Mathematical Operations: (1) Counting Physical Objects; (2) 
Perceptual Quasi-proving the Truth of Discovering the Numerical Signs of the 
Operation (Peirce, 7.547) 
 
 I n t e r p r e t a t i o n Relations evolve From Pre-verbal Signs to Propositional Judgment 
 
 The Cognitive Representation of Mathematical Reality: Discovering and Operating Numerical Signs  
     Reflective Interpretational Relations 
  (2) Percept-SignIconic PresentingIndexical OperatingSymbolic Notion: Perceptual Judgment  
                  Object Shapes             Immediate Object    Representing Reality     Numerical Counting           (1) Human Self-Controlling of Numerical Operations of Counting and Measuring Physical Objects 
    Mathematical Reality 
 
 
 Gödel considers abstract mathematical theories analogous to physical theories such that 
mathematical axiomatic theories representation of mathematical abstract reality precedes their application 
to the empirical world but it is not the reality of human mathematical operations themselves on physical 
objects:  
“. . . the applications of mathematics to the empirical world, which formerly were based on the 
intuitive truth of the mathematical axioms,  . . .” (Gödel, 1953:#12) 
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In contrast to Gödel's role of intuition to grasp the truth of mathematical abstract facts, we can 
perceptually prove the truth of propositional facts representing the reality of mathematical operations 
(Wittgenstein, 1956: III, 44).  By understanding that mathematical reality consists of perceptually self-
controlled operations, we can see how Gödel confuses the meaning-contents of mathematical symbols, 
which are the immediate modes representing numerical operations, with his Platonist mathematical 
abstract objects. These immediate modes of representation are the Peircean indexical representations of 
real objects which in mathematics are the factual operations of mathematical reality.  Here we can discern 
Gödel’s close insight of Peirce's conception of the perceptual “immediate object” component of symbols 
representing mathematical reality (Peirce, CP: 8.183, 8.343 [1908]; Nesher, 2002: II). 
 
It should be noted that mathematical intuition need not be conceived of as a faculty giving an 
immediate knowledge of the objects concerned. Rather it seems that, as in the case of physical 
experience, we form our ideas also of those objects on the basis of something else which is 
immediately given. Only this something else here is not or not primarily, the sensations. That 
something beside the sensations actually is immediately given follows (independently of 
mathematics) from the fact that even our ideas referring to physical objects contain constituents 
qualitatively different from sensations or mere combinations of sensations, e.g., the idea of object 
itself, whereas, on the other hand, by our thinking we cannot create any qualitatively new 
elements, but only | reproduce and combine those that are given. Evidently the “given” 
underlying mathematics is closely related to the abstract elements contained in our empirical 
ideas. It by no means follows, however, that the data of this second kind, because they cannot be 
associated with actions of certain things upon our sense organs, are something purely subjective, 
as Kant asserted. Rather they, too, may represent an aspect of objective reality, but, as opposed to 
the sensations, their presence in us may be due to another kind of relationship between ourselves 
and reality. (Gödel, 1964: 268)   
 
 Here Gödel’s distinction between sensual perceptions and mathematical intuitions of the reality of 
abstract mathematical objects is the Pragmaticist distinction between the immediate iconic-sensual sign 
and the indexical-reaction being the “immediate object,” the “abstract element” which is only the sign 
representing the real object. This Gödel's distinction is based on a confused epistemology that replaces 
the meaning-contents of such mathematical propositions with the external reality they represent (Gödel, 
1953/54?: #35).  It is Peirce’s conception of the cognitive “immediate object,” representing the real object 
that Descartes calls “objective reality” in distinction from “formal reality,” the real object, without being 
able to explain it as perceptual cognitive representation of external reality (e.g., Peirce, CP: 8.183, 8.343; 
Nesher, 2002: II, III, V; Feferman, 1998; Parsons, 2008: Chap. 6).  The following is a schema of a 
mathematical reality operation represented by the perceptual immediate object as the meaning-content of 
the symbolic sign of mathematics: 
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 [6]   Perceptual Representation of the Cognitive Operation of Counting Physical Objects by 
Quasi-proving the Truth of Its Perceptual Judgment of Mathematical Operation   
    I n t e r p r e t a t i o n relations evolve From Pre-verbal Signs to Propositional Judgment 
The Cognitive Representation of Mathematical Reality: Discovering and Operating Numerical Signs  
      Reflective Interpretational Relations 
 Percept-SignIconic PresentingIndexical OperatingSymbolic Sign:  Perceptual Judgment of   
       Feeling     Reaction        Thought      Counting: “2 & 2 are 4"  
           Objects Shapes         Immediate Object       Represent Objects   
       \                Iconic   Indexical     The  
       \   Replicas     Feeling    Reaction       Meaning-Content of 
         \                    \           Iconic            Symbol-Concept 
           \                       \            Feeling                   
             \                        \   \             Relation of 
                                                                          Representation 
 
 Human Self-Controlling of Numerical Operations of Counting and Measuring Physical Objects 
    Mathematical Reality 
 
 An echo of this explanation is noticed in Gödel’s insight into the realist nature of mathematics: 
. . . [mathematics] in its simplest form, when the axiomatic method is applied, not to some 
hypothetico-deductive system as geometry (where the mathematician can assert only the 
conditional truth of the theorems), but mathematical proper, that is, to the body of those 
mathematical propositions, which hold in an absolute sense, without any further hypothesis. 
There must exist propositions of this kind, because otherwise there could not exist any 
hypothetical theorems | either. For example, some implications of the form: 
 
If such and such axioms are assumed, then such and such theorems hold, must necessarily 
be true in the absolute sense. Similarly, any theorem of finitistic number theory, such as  
2 + 2 = 4, is no doubt, of this kind. (Gödel, 1951: 305; cf. 322)   
  
 The perceptual representation of basic mathematical operations is the quasi-proved true empirical 
facts of mathematical reality, but not an ideal one.  Yet this seems to be an unbridgeable gap for Penrose. 
. . .  real numbers are called ‘real’ because they seem to provide the magnitudes needed for the 
measurement of distance, angle, time, energy, temperature, or of numerous other geometrical and 
physical quantities. However, the relationship between the abstractly defined ‘real’ numbers and 
the physical quantities is not as clear-cut as one might imagine. Real numbers refer to 
mathematical idealization rather than to any actual physically objective quantity. (Penrose, 1989: 
112-113; cf.  Penrose, 2011: 16:1) 
 
Hence, Popper’s amazement as to why mathematics can be applicable to reality is resolved by 
explaining that mathematics indeed originated in human perceptual true representations of mathematical 
reality, the “empirical basis” of mathematical theory being more abstract component of this empirical 
science (Popper, 1963: #9; Dedekind, 1901: 17; Poincare, 1902: Author's Preface, Chap. II).  
 
7.  Mathematics Is an Empirical Science Based on True Propositional Facts of Mathematical Reality 
 
 Hence the problem is to explain the nature of mathematical science and what are the “data,” the 
basic facts upon them the mathematical theories develop and evaluated? 
Seventh Quadrennial Fellows Conference of the Center for Philosophy of Science -134-
 
17 
. . .  mathematics has always presented itself, throughout the history, as an abstract discipline, but 
has nevertheless always dealt with specific subject matter of its own. Considering mathematics in 
this light one might ask: what kind of knowledge can be attained through it? How can it be said to 
deal with contents and objects which are offered as 'data,' and yet are not data at all from the point 
of view of sensible experience?  We are here confronted with the problem of mathematical 
intuition, considered as a real source of knowledge, to be clearly distinguished from that further 
form of mathematical activity which consists in the systematic construction of various theories. 
Indeed, the most delicate point of this problem is precisely the comparison between the intuitive 
moment and the moment of theoretical construction, since it is impossible to deny that, in many 
cases at least, mathematical theories are in fact an exact and systematic codification of what is 
known intuitively, and that, on the other hand, intuition is not sufficiently reliable unless it is 
supported by logical proof (Agazzi, 1974: 9-10). 
 The formal logical proof cannot support or replace the intuitive grasp of the mathematical basic 
true fact in Gödelian Platonism, and only the epistemic logic of Peircean trio can quasi-prove the truth of 
the perceptual judgments as the basic mathematical propositional facts (Nesher, 2002: X).  Only this logic 
can replace the mysterious unexplainable intuition of mathematical facts and can prove mathematical 
truths by the epistemic complete proof.  Thus it also replaces the assuming roles of such intuition for 
discovery and evaluation of the axioms of mathematical theories (Agazzi, 1974: 12).   
 From the quasi-proof of the truth of the basic mathematical propositional facts of mathematical 
reality, the mathematical hypotheses are Abductively discovered to infer Deductively their predicted 
theorems and evaluated Inductively upon empirically newly discovered and proved mathematical facts. 
The following is a pragmaticist epistemological explanation of the general structure and operation of the 
theories of mathematical empirical science: 
 
 [7] Pragmaticist Epistemological Presentation of Mathematical Empirical Theory: 
           Empirical Theory 
         //|\\ 
                   The Hypothesis   ////\\\\  
              //////\\\\\  
            /       |      \ 
                       / Deductive\ 
            /     Formal     \     
                          /     Inference      \   
  Abductive         /                         \       
   Discovery /    The Conclusions    \       Inductive   
              ______________________   Evaluation 
                                /  Q u a s i–P r o v e d      \ 
                    /  T r u e Propositional Facts  \    
          /       of Mathematical Reality    \  
                     __________________________
 /    O p e r a t i o n s of counting,      \     
/ grouping, and measuring structures  \  
                                          /and motions of components of Nature: \                        
            /    Mathematical External Reality     \    
12-14 June 2012; Mugla, Turkey -135-
 
18 
The proof-conditions of mathematical empirical theory are the epistemic logic, the trio 
comprising inferential rules of the complete proof of the truth of basic propositional facts representing 
external reality. With this epistemic logic we also prove the truth of scientific hypotheses (Gödel's 
axioms), through their Abductive discovery, Deductive formally inferred theorems and their Inductive 
evaluation upon the basic propositional facts. Yet, Gödel's conception of mathematical intuition covers 
those different components of the Pragmaticist epistemic logic which though he felt their operations but 
could not explain the truth of these basic propositional facts of mathematical reality and the truth of the 
axioms which the epistemic logical complete proof can do (Feferman, 1998: #1; Parsons, 2008: #5). 
Hence, empirical theories are only relatively true by being “closed” upon their proof-conditions, which 
can change with newly discovered facts of reality (Heisenberg, 1971:43-44; Nesher, 2002: V.5, X.10).  
 
Yet if mathematical facts are facts, they must be facts about something; if mathematical truths 
are true, something must make them true. Thus arises the first important question: what is 
mathematics about? If 2 plus 2 is so definitely 4, what is it that makes it so? (Maddy, 1990:1)    
 Although mathematical theory is about mathematical operations of counting, grouping, measuring, 
and so on, the question is, how do we prove the mathematical facts representing such operations; i.e., 
“what is it that makes it so” that 2 plus 2 are definitely 4?  We operate in such a manner that we count 
with our indexical ostensions while representing this operation in our perceptual judgment as a true fact of 
such arithmetical counting. Since all our basic knowledge comprises such quasi-proofs of our perceptual 
judgments, so too do the truths of our basic mathematical facts represent such operations of mathematical 
reality (comp. Hempel, 1945).  
 Indeed, we do not create on our will the patterns of mathematical reality, but we discover the 
mathematical concepts of our counting, grouping, and measuring operations with physical objects in the 
operations of mathematical reality, and this is “[mathematics] in its simplest form,  . . . mathematical 
proper, that is, to the body of those mathematical propositions, which hold in an absolute sense, without 
any further hypothesis” (Gödel, 1951: 305; Dedekind, 1901:15-16).  Epistemologically we can understand 
that when we intuit the force of the truth of our basic mathematical propositions we feel that they “hold in 
an absolute sense” but without conceiving the epistemic logic we cannot explain them as our own 
empirically quasi-proved true mathematical propositions (Steiner, 2000: 337-339).  
 
Namely, it is correct that a mathematical proposition says nothing about the physical or psychical 
reality existing in space and time, because it is true already owing to the meaning of the terms 
occurring in it, irrespectively of the world of real things (Gödel, 1951: 320).    
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 Yet Gödel is right that mathematical reality consists of neither physical nor psychical realities but 
it is the specific connection between them; namely, the mathematical “world of real things” is our 
cognitive operations of quantifying components of physical reality, and the meaning-contents of 
mathematical signs evolve in this perceptual experience (Wittgenstein, 1956: III, 44; Benacerraf, 1973; 
Tait, 1986; Resnik, 1992: #1; Martine, 2005: 210). 
 
To mention another example, the Pitta-Pitta, a tribe [of aborigines] in Queensland, are able to 
count the fingers and toes without a system of numerals, but only by the aid of marks in the sand. 
. .  (Smith, D., 1923: 7; Gullberg, 1997: Ch. 4).  
 This is evidence of arithmetical facts that are iconic cum indexical sensori-motoric operations of 
counting and grouping with pre-conceptual signs of properties and relations that eventually develop into 
conceptual components, the numerical symbols involving in mathematical facts (Gödel, 1951: 320).  
 
From its earliest beginnings science has used mathematics. Counting, measuring, ordering, and 
estimating are basic mental operations necessary for science as well as for many other human 
activities, and their nature is mathematical (Bos, 1993: 165). 
 Hence, mathematics, from “the ubiquitous use of elementary mathematics” to “the great variety of 
high level applications of mathematics” (Bos, 1993: 165-166), is an empirical science of the operational 
quantification of physical components of nature. Its development is from the use of elementary to the 
variety of high level mathematics evolved from the elaboration of abstract mathematical theories related 
to their advance applications by scientists working toward the advancement of scientific theories. 
 
              8.   Conclusion: Mathematics Is an Empirical Science Representing Its Own Reality, Being Neither 
Queen Nor Servant of Other Empirical Sciences but Their Quantitative Backbone 
  The problem is to explain the difference between mathematical science and other sciences and 
their collaboration, when all are empirical sciences representing different realities and with different roles 
in developing our knowledge of nature (Wang, 1974: VII). Thus, in mathematics we cannot have true 
theories without proving them upon mathematical reality.  Mathematicians develop their theories by 
discovering general hypotheses as mathematical formulations of theoretical models, typically of physics, 
like of fields of forces and topology of fluid flows, but of all other sciences, and evaluate them upon 
mathematical reality of quantitative operations on predicted physical observations. 
 
The rich interplay between mathematics and physics predates even their recognition as separate 
subjects.  The mathematical work that in some sense straddles the boundaries between the two is 
commonly referred to as mathematical physics, though a precise definition is probably 
impossible.  (Jaffe & Quinn, 1993: 4) 
 Mathematical theories formularize models for theoretical physical hypotheses, but there is a 
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distinction between proving the truth of mathematical theories and proving the truth of the relevant 
physical theories themselves (Feferman, 1998). 
 
Fore as far as verifiable consequences of theories are concerned the mathematical axioms are 
exactly as necessary for obtaining them as the laws of nature (cnf. footn. 41).  If, e.g., the 
impredicative axioms of analysis are necessary for the solution of some problem of mathematical 
physics, these axioms will imply predictions about observable facts not obtainable without them. 
Moreover it is perfectly conceivable that an inconsistency with observation may be due to not to 
some wrong physical assumptions but to an inconsistency of these axioms. (Gödel, 1953-54 II: 
#44, p. 188) 
That it is arbitrary to call mathematics void of content because, without laws of nature, it has no 
verifiable consequences also appears from the fact that the same is true for the laws of nature 
without mathematics or logic. cf. also #44. (Gödel, 1953-54 II: fn. 41, p. 207) 
Thus, physicists and mathematicians have different realities to represent with their theories, and 
the mathematical theory which proved true in the measurement of observed physical facts is only the 
condition for the evaluation of physical theories. Thus, in distinction from Gödel's conceptual 
epistemology of mathematics, according to the above explanation, the mathematical reality is also 
empirical.  The truth of mathematical theory enables proving experimentally the truth but also the falsity 
of physical theories.  In this way, we can understand the Gödelian epistemic intuition about the nature of 
mathematical theories, yet not the Quinean “mathematical naturalism,” which confuses mathematics with 
other sciences and identifies mathematical reality with physical reality.  
 When there are difficulties with a physical picture of reality and the mathematical model for it, 
such that it becomes impossible to make measurable predictions, then the problem is to inquire what is 
wrong that we are unable to evaluate experimentally the physical hypothesis (Woit, 2007: x-xiii, Ch. 14; 
Feferman, 1998: #2, #4). 
 
I can’t say whether string theory will ever get past its most serious hurdle–coming up with a 
testable prediction and then showing that the theory actually gives us the right answer.  (The 
math part of things, as I have said, is already on a much firmer ground.)  Nevertheless, I do 
believe the best chance for arriving at a successful theory lies in pooling the resources of 
mathematicians and physicists, combining the strengths of the two disciplines and their different 
ways of approaching the world. (Yau & Nadis, 2010: 304) 
 Hence, mathematics without operational measuring the predicted and eventually observed true 
facts of reality cannot be true and cannot be “on a much firmer ground” than physics without “a testable 
prediction.”  Both have to prove their own truths upon “their different ways of approaching the world.”  
 
However mathematical intuition in addition creates the conviction that, if these formulas express 
observable facts and were obtained by applying mathematics to verified physical laws (or if they 
express ascertainable mathematical facts), then these facts will be brought out by observation (or 
computation) (Gödel, 1953/9-III: #16; cf. ##13-15 & n. 34). 
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 How may one understand this hinted explication of the relationship between intuitive 
mathematical truth representing its own reality and its application to physical theories to enable 
observable predictions of them (Gödel, 1953II: #15)?  In the end, mathematics is neither the queen of 
science nor its servant but its quantitative backbone—that is, the quantified formulations of scientific 
theoretical models and their operations on scientific observations—without which physical and other 
theories cannot be evaluated experimentally (Bos, 1993: #10). The explanation to the puzzlement why 
mathematics is considered exact or pure science while being empirical like other experimental sciences, is 
the relative simplicity of its represented reality in respect to the physical and the psychological realities. 
Mathematics may be the queen of the science and therefore entitled to royal prerogatives, but the 
queen who loses touch with her subjects may lose support and even be deprived of her realm. 
Mathematicians may like to rise into the clouds of abstract thought, but they should, and indeed 
they must, return to earth for nourishing food or else die of mental starvation. They are on safer 
and saner ground when they stay close to nature. (Kline, 1959: 475) 
 This is a poetic metaphor that illustrates the above explanation of the empirical nature of 
mathematical reality, upon which mathematical theories can be evaluated and be proved true. This 
empirical explanation can be seen in Gödel’s late philosophical writings on the foundations of 
mathematics: 
 
If mathematics describes an objective world just like physics, there is no reason why inductive 
methods should not be applied in mathematics just the same as in physics.  . . .  This whole 
consideration incidentally shows that the philosophical implications of the mathematical facts 
explained do not lie entirely on the side of rationalistic or idealistic philosophy, but that in one 
respect they favor the empiricist viewpoint. It is true that only the second alternative points in 
this direction. (Gödel, 1951: 313)  
 Hence, we can know experientially the mathematical facts of the mathematical empirical reality. 
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Modern day writers often endow Einstein with a 21st century prescience about
physical theory that, it just so happens, is only now vindicated by the latest results
of the same writers' research. There is a second side to Einstein. His science,
methods and outlook were also clearly rooted in 19th century physics.
1. The Young and the Old Einstein
The Einstein of popular thought is the young Einstein. This is the intellectual rebel of 1905 who, in one
year, laid out the special theory of relativity and E=mc
2
, postulated the light quantum and used Brownian
motion to make the case for the reality of atoms. These achievements were made prior to Einstein holding
an academic position. He was then still a patent examiner in the Bern patent ofﬁce. The years that followed
brought Einstein a succession of ever more prestigious academic appointments; and, in the mid 1910s, he
delivered his masterpiece, the general theory of relativity.
In all this, there was a real sense that Einstein was ahead of his peers, leading the way. The special theory of
relativity was absorbed into the mainstream of physics fairly quickly. The general theory of relativity was
1
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not quite so readily accommodated. This was in part due to its burdensome mathematical demands of the
theory, at least relative to the standards of mathematical expertise then found among physicists. But the tide
was ﬂowing with Einstein. When the eclipse expeditions of 1919 vindicated Einstein's theory and he
became a popular hero, critics risked being seen as unimaginative reactionaries.
Einstein's work on the light quantum did not fare so well. It was regarded by many as an odd aberration
from an otherwise brilliant mind. Even in the early 1920s, it was doubted by Niels Bohr, who had a decade
before developed the ﬁrst quantum model of the atom.
By the end of the 1920s, however, another Einstein began to emerge. As the quantum theory enjoyed
success after success, Einstein found himself unconvinced. He took on the role of critic, complaining that
the new quantum theory, for all its virtues, could not be the ﬁnal theory. This was Einstein's new place in
the physics community for his ﬁnal quarter century, ending with his death in 1955. He remained a revered
ﬁgure. But he became increasingly isolated and marginalized, as he labored on his alternative theories with
the help of a few assistants. In the years after his death, it became clear that Einstein's objection to quantum
theory failed, but not, I believe, for the reasons articulated by his arch antagonist Niels Bohr.
 
The old Einstein is a recalcitrant Einstein, unwilling to swim with the new quantum tide that ﬂooded over
physics. We should not judge that harshly. No thinker can ever think purely new thoughts. We all sit at the
junction of the old and the new. Einstein was one of the ﬁrst of new physicists of the twentieth century. His
discoveries and methods exercised a profound, deﬁning inﬂuence on the development of twentieth century
physics. However, there is also a strong sense in which he was one of the last of the nineteenth century
physicists. Perhaps he was the greatest of them.
2
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2. Themes of Nineteenth Century Physics
To see why this is not such an unreasonable assessment, we should review the major discoveries and
themes of the nineteenth century and then see how they came to be realized and even fulﬁlled in Einstein's
research. We shall look at three categories: Einstein's science, his methods and his outlook.
2.1 Science
Nineteenth Century... Einstein...
Electrodynamics
The great discovery in physics of the nineteenth
century  was  Maxwell's  electrodynamics  and  its
development by later physicists, including H. A.
Lorentz.
Newton's  physics  had  been  very  successful  in
recovering the properties of things like apples and
planets that move at ordinary speeds, much less
than that of light.
Nineteenth  century  electrodynamics  now
succeeded  in  probing  the  properties  of  things
moving  close  to  the  speed  of  light:  charges
accelerated to high speeds and light itself.
Mixed in were now familiar kinematical effects:
rapidly moving systems shrink in length and slow
in time; and there are temporal dislocations over
space.  These  were  encoded  in  mathematical
transformation  equations  discovered  by  H.  A.
Lorentz and others.
Special relativity
Einstein  took  special  note  of  the  kinematical
effects mixed in with the electrodynamical effects
of  Lorentz's  theory.  He  saw that  they  could  be
separated out as a novel theory of space and time,
independent  of  the  electrodynamics.  The  result
was  the  special  theory  of  relativity.  Its  central
equations were the same transformation equations
that Lorentz had employed in his development of
electrodynamics.
Einstein is  commonly understood as repudiating
nineteenth  century  electrodynamics  in  his
rejection of its ether. That assessment is altogether
too  narrow.  In  extracting  the  kinematics  as  an
independent theory,  Einstein was harvesting one
of  the  greatest  fruits  of  the  nineteenth  century
theory. The ether was merely surplus foliage that
needed to be trimmed away during the harvest.
The  special  theory  of  relativity  is  the  natural
completion of nineteenth century electrodynamic
theory.
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Nineteenth Century... Einstein...
Thermal and statistical physics
Another  signiﬁcant  achievement  of  nineteenth
century  physics  was  the  ﬁnal  recognition  that
thermal  processes  were  to  be  understood
statistically,  as  the  average  behavior  of  systems
made of very many components.
The simplest case was ordinary matter. It is made
of  atoms and molecules  and heat  resides  in  the
energy distributed randomly over them.
The  same  analysis  could  be  given  of  heat
radiation.  The  many  components  are  the  many
frequencies that comprise radiation.
In  all  cases,  equilibrium  thermal  systems  arise
when energy  is  distributed  in  its  most  probable
conﬁguration  over  these  components.
Probabilities arise merely out of our ignorance of
the precise microstate of the system.
Reality of atoms
When Einstein began work on thermal physics,
this statistical approach was still struggling for
mainstream acceptance. Boltzmann had shown
that a molecular theory would ﬁt with the known
thermal properties of matter.
However he had failed to convince a signiﬁcant
portion of his community that they ought to adopt
his molecular approach. Thermodynamicists, such
as Nernst, had found their thermodynamic
theories adequate to all observed thermal
processes. Why should they trouble themselves
with molecules too small to be seen?
If that attitude puzzles you, note that it is merely
the analog of the electrodynamicist who is quite
happy with the theory of electric and magnetic
ﬁelds and resists ether theories that account
further for these ﬁelds in terms of hidden ether
machinery--little wheels spinning and meshing at
microscopic scales in the ether.
Einstein's work of 1905 on Brownian motion was
a major advance, perhaps even the major advance,
that made acceptance of atoms inevitable. He
showed that there were thermal phenomena that
could ONLY be understood by Boltzmann's
statistical methods. The thermodynamicists now
had to adopt these methods; and they did.
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2.2 Methods
Nineteenth Century... Einstein...
Revealing the hidden mechanism
Einstein's  earliest  papers,  starting in  1901,  were
devoted  to  discovering  the  discrete  molecular
mechanisms  that  underlie  the  continuity  of
thermal  appearances.  That  goal  is  a  nineteenth
century one: completing the molecular program of
Boltzmann.  This  was work that  Einstein largely
abandoned. However, during this early work, he
developed  methods  for  inferring  from  the
observable  thermal  properties  of  substances  to
their microscopic structure.
The  easiest  and  simplest  of  these  was  the
observation  of  the  ideal  gas  law in  the  thermal
appearances. Robust argumentation showed that it
must derive from a microstructure of very many,
spatially localized components.
Systems  of  this  simplest  type  were  the  ones
Einstein  investigated  in  his  annus  mirabilis  of
1905. The tiny particles of Brownian motion form
such a system. So do the sugar molecules in dilute
solution  investigated  in  his  1905  doctoral
dissertation.
Light quantum
When  it  comes  to  Einstein's  boldest  posit,  the
light  quantum,  it  is  easy  to  ﬁnd  a  prescient
Einstein,  somehow anticipating  all  the  quantum
craziness to come. In 1905, in a letter to a friend,
Einstein  was  already  calling  this  one  result,
among all those of 1905, "very revolutionary."
The result was properly called revolutionary when
set in the context of electrodynamical theory. For
it  contradicted  the  picture  of  light  as  a  wave
whose energy is spread out over space.
There is another way to see it, as I reported in the
chapter  "Atoms  and  the  Quanta."  Set  in  the
context  of  thermal  physics,  it  was  less
adventurous. Heat radiation is a thermal system.
Einstein found in that system the same observable
signature  of  discreteness  as  he  found  in  ideal
gases  and  dilute  sugar  solutions.  So  Einstein
merely needed to hold true to the methods he had
already  developed  to  infer  that  heat  radiation,
under  the  conditions  he  speciﬁed,  consists  of
many  independent,  spatially  localized  units  of
energy. What results is the light quantum.
The  result  follows  from  applying  his  statistical
methods to heat radiation. Making sense of that
result,  however,  proved  harder  and,  over  a
hundred  years  later,  the  project  remains
incomplete.
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Nineteenth Century... Einstein...
Geometry
If the twentieth century was the century of novel
physics, the nineteenth century was the century of
novel mathematics.
Geometry had always been central to science, but
it  was  languishing.  Newton's  mathematical
techniques in his Principia  of  1687 would have
been immediately intelligible to Euclid himself.
That changed in the nineteenth century. There was
an explosion of new ideas and methods. One of
the foremost achievements of the century was a
new conception of geometry. It included the idea
of  non-Euclidean  geometries  and  their
accommodation  to  yet  more  sophisticated
geometries, notably projective geometry.
Felix  Klein's  "Erlangen  Program"  uniﬁed  the
many  new geometries  found  in  this  century  by
means  of  another  mathematical  advance  of  that
century, group theory.
General relativity
Einstein's general theory of relativity provided a
qualitatively new way to think about gravity that
is Einstein's signature novelty.
From a physical point of view, Einstein's theory
was  a  bold  departure.  From  a  mathematical
perspective, however, it simply applied nineteenth
century  mathematical  techniques  to  a  new  and
highly interesting application. Where Newton had
employed  Euclid's  mathematics  to  display  his
account  of  gravity,  Einstein  employed  the
nineteenth  century  advances  in  geometry  as  the
basis of his new theory.
The  explicit  framework  was  provided  by  Ricci
and Levi-Civita's "absolute differential calculus,"
now  called  "tensor  calculus."  Einstein's
mathematician friend,  Marcel  Grossmann,  found
Ricci and Levi-Civita's review article of 1901 on
the calculus and drew it to Einstein's attention. It
provided  the  framework  he  needed  for  his  new
theory.
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2.3 Outlook
Nineteenth Century... Einstein...
Uniﬁcation
A major theme of nineteenth century physics was
the theme of uniﬁcation. The conception was that
all the forces of nature were somehow related and
that  the  burden  of  physics  was  to  reveal  those
relations.
Nineteenth  century  physics  is  punctuated  by
successful  uniﬁcations.  Electromagnetic  theory
managed  to  bring  electricity  and  magnetism
together in the one theory. Light then proved to be
merely a wave propagating in this electromagnetic
ﬁeld.
The single notion of energy uniﬁed many powers,
such as heat, work and everything into which they
may transform.
Uniﬁed ﬁeld theory
Einstein's  ambitions  clearly  held  to  this  goal  of
uniﬁcation.  He had  merged gravitation  with  the
geometry of space and time in his general theory
of relativity, completed in 1915.
In  the  decades  that  followed,  he  resolved  to
continue the uniﬁcation. He now sought a single
geometrized  theory  that  embraced  both  gravity
and electromagnetism, his uniﬁed ﬁeld theory.
Ether
The  grounding  of  nineteenth  century
electromagnetic theory was the ether. Electric and
magnetic  ﬁelds  were  not  distinct  processes,  but
were merely manifestations of different states of
an all-pervading medium, the ether.
Einstein's metrical "ether"
Einstein  famously  did  away  with  the  ether;  or,
more precisely, he announced it  superﬂuous and
railed against the preferred state of rest attributed
to it.
However,  in his general  theory of relativity and
his  uniﬁed  ﬁeld  theories,  Einstein  retained  an
analogous  background  medium.  It  was  not  the
ether  of  the  nineteenth century.  Rather  it  was a
kind of geometrized version of it: the geometry of
spacetime provided a substratum whose properties
would  be  manifested  as  gravity  and
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electromagnetism.  Indeed,  as  a  concession  to
Lorentz,  for  a  short  time around 1920,  Einstein
talked  of  the  metrical  ﬁeld,  the  carrier  of
geometrical properties, as an "ether."
Nineteenth Century... Einstein...
Causation
The  nineteenth  century  conception  of  causation
was determinism: to say the world is causal is just
to say that  conditions now ﬁx conditions in the
future. This was a bare notion purged of the many
ﬁner  aspects  routinely  assumed  by  a  causal
metaphysics.
Years  later,  Einstein  himself  described  this
nineteenth century conception:
"...the laws of the external world were also taken
to be complete, in the following sense: If the state
of  the  objects  is  completely  given  at  a  certain
time,  then  their  state  at  any  other  time  is
completely determined by the laws of nature. This
is just what we mean when we speak of 'causality.'
Such  was  approximately  the  framework  of  the
physical thinking a hundred years ago."
Albert Einstein, "Physics, Philosophy, and Scientiﬁc Progress,"
International Congress of Surgeons, Cleveland, Ohio, 1950; printed in
Physics Today, June 2005, pp.46-48.
Objections to quantum theory
Part of the original shock of quantum theory was
the  sense  that  its  stochastic  laws  deprived  the
world  of  its  causal  character  in  this  nineteenth
century  sense.  There  is  a  tendency  now  to
discount  Einstein's  complaint  against  quantum
theory, "God does not play dice." However it was
repeated so often by him that we surely must take
it  as  heart-felt.  On  its  face,  it  is  an  honest
expression of the nineteenth century alarm at the
loss of causation.
1
Einstein  was  quite  nineteenth  century  in  his
expectation  that  the  probabilities  of  quantum
theory would somehow emerge from the supposed
incompleteness of quantum description; that was
precisely  how  the  probabilities  of  statistical
physics of the nineteenth century arose. Einstein's
positive  hope  was  that  physics  would  continue
along the lines of his general theory of relativity.
Somewhere in his efforts to extend the theory to
electromagnetism,  Einstein  hoped,  the  odd
quantum phenomena would emerge. These hopes
hold the quantum up to a nineteenth century ideal
of a ﬁeld theory in which notions of separability
and locality are most fully implemented.
8
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3. Einstein as the Bend in the Road
Imagine that we come to a bend in the road, to use a metaphor of Thomas Kuhn's.
2
 When we stand at the
corner, we see clearly the road that we have passed and also the road that is to come. The bend belongs to
both parts. After we have passed the corner, all we see is the new road and the bend that started it. We no
longer see earlier part it completed. Einstein is the bend in the road that joins the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries of physics.
"...belongs equally to both ..., or it belongs to neither."
This image of Einstein as a transitional ﬁgure at the bend in the road seems to me to balance most
effectively his connections with the times before and after him. The broader society, both popular and
scientiﬁc, has found it harder to locate Einstein propertly. Time magazine did well when it declared him
"Person of the Century" in their last issue of the 20th century of December 31, 1999. That seems fair.
However Einstein has also become a prescient ﬁgure whose hunches somehow anticipate every modern fad
and excitement. "Einstein was right" has become a popular slogan amongst scientists, especially when they
want to suggest that Einstein would endorse their latest discovery or conjecture.
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Notes
1. It is interesting to speculate on just how much Einstein was troubled by the loss of determinism in
quantum theory. Was is as important as his concern that quantum theory was giving up on the notion of a
local reality? I'm not sure that Einstein ever makes quite clear in his writings which was the more troubling
failing. However we have an indirect report from Wolfgang Pauli, a physicist who knew Einstein well. The
following is from a letter Pauli wrote to Max Born on March 31, 1954:
"...Einstein does not consider the concept of 'determinism' to be as fundamental as
it is frequently held to be (as he has told me emphatically many times), and he
denied energetically that he had ever put up a postulate such as (your [citation to a
letter of Born's]): 'the sequence of such conditions must also be objective and real,
this is, automatic, machine-like, deterministic'. In the same way, he disputes that he
uses as criterion for the admissibility of a theory the question: 'Is it rigorously
deterministic?'
Einstein's point of departure is 'realistic' rather than 'deterministic', which means
that his philosophical prejudice is a different one..."
Max Born, ed., The Born-Einstein Letters. New York: Walker & Co., 1971.p. 221.
2. Here is Kuhn's writing about Copernicus:
“To ask whether his [Copernicus’] work is really ancient or modem is rather like asking whether the bend
in an otherwise straight road belongs to the section of road that precedes the bend or to the portion that
comes after it. From the bend both sections of the road are visible, and its continuity is apparent. But
viewed from a point before the bend. the road seems to run straight to the bend and then to disappear; the
bend seems the last point in a straight road. And viewed from a point in the next section, after the bend, the
road appears to begin at the bend from which it runs straight on. The bend belongs equally to both sections,
or it belongs to neither.”
T. S. Kuhn, Copernican Revolution, p. 182.
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From Kantian schematism to the system of experience’s invariants: the 
coordination of concepts and spatio-temporal objects in Cassirer’s philosophy 
 
Summary 
This paper analyzes Cassirer‟s account of the coordination of concepts and spatio-
temporal objects. We shall see that, in contradistinction to Kantian schematism, Cassirer 
maintains that this coordination is not achieved by means of a third element (the schema), 
which albeit intellectual is nevertheless also sensible. Rather, in Cassirer‟s view, the 
coordination will take place through a specification of the concepts that should be sought 
“within the domain of concepts itself.” 
Keywords  
Cassirer, Kant, concept, schema, object, causality  
Introduction 
It has been argued recently that the key to solving many interpretation problems of 
the Kantian doctrine of schematism is to determine correctly the object that is to be 
subsumed under categories by means of schemata. More precisely, it has been maintained 
that this object is not merely an appearance taken as an object in general, but an appearance 
considered as a concrete, empirically given object. From this viewpoint, the proper task of 
schematism is to guarantee the coordination of concepts (in particular categories) and 
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individual spatio-temporal objects.1 The aim of this paper is to analyze an alternative 
proposal to the Kantian solution of the coordination problem, which can be found in Ernst 
Cassirer‟s philosophy. We shall see that, in contradistinction to Kantian schematism, 
Cassirer maintains that the coordination of concepts and objects is not achieved by means 
of a third element (the schema), which albeit intellectual is nevertheless also sensible.2  
Rather, in Cassirer‟s view, the coordination will take place through a specification of the 
concepts that should be sought “within the domain of concepts itself.”3 
The thread that will enable us to reconstruct Cassirer‟s argumentation will be his 
interpretation of the causality principle. We shall see that this principle is the ultimate 
condition upon which the possibility of the coordination of concepts and spatio-temporal 
objects depends.   
The structure of the paper will be the following. We shall begin by discussing the general 
framework of Cassirer‟s investigations on the causality principle. This is the framework 
provided by the transcendental method (§1). Then, we shall analyze the problems that 
Cassirer finds in the Kantian doctrine of causality, in particular regarding the schematism of 
that category, once the transcendental method is assumed (§2). Later, we shall discuss the 
main structure of the system of physical knowledge, for it is within this system that 
concepts and spatio-temporal objects get coordinated (§3). Finally, we shall investigate the 
                                                          
1
 Caimi (2010).  
2
 “Obviously there must be some third thing, which is homogeneous on the one hand with the category, and 
on the other hand with the appearance, and which thus makes the application of the former to the latter 
possible. This mediating representation must be pure, that is, void of all empirical content, and yet at the same 
time, while it must in one respect be intellectual, it must in another be sensible. Such a representation is the 
transcendental schema.” KrV, B 177. 
3
 Cassirer (1956), p. 166. Our emphasis.  
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transcendental role that Cassirer assigns to the causality principle, and we shall show how 
this principle makes the coordination of concepts and objects in the system of physical 
knowledge first possible (§4). 
 §1 Cassirer and the transcendental method 
The Neo-Kantianism of the Marburg school conceives itself as Kantian not 
regarding the content of its philosophy but rather regarding the form of its philosophizing. 
Neo-Kantians stress that they do not accept dogmatically any result of the Kantian doctrine. 
They just adopt the only real legacy of Kant: the philosophical method. This method is the 
transcendental one.4 
According to the transcendental method, philosophy should take a certain factum as the 
starting point for the reflection and proceed to seek the possibility conditions of that fact. In 
the case of theoretical philosophy, the fact to be considered is experience. But experience is 
identified with physico-mathematical science. In this sense, Hermann Cohen maintains that 
experience is given in mathematics and in pure natural science,5 and, more precisely, in 
Newtonian science.6 The task of transcendental philosophy, as a theory of experience, will 
be then to determine the conditions of possibility of Newtonian science.7 
Cassirer adopts this Cohenian conception of the transcendental method. But, while Kant 
took as a fact the science of his time, Cassirer applies this method to the new facta provided 
                                                          
4
 Natorp (1912), p. 194. However, it should be pointed out that the expression “transcendental method” is not 
to be found in Kant‟s texts. See: Baum (1980).  
5
 Cohen (1877), pp. 24 – 25. 
6
 Cohen (1910), p. 32. 
7
 Cohen (1918), p. 93. 
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by the progress of physico-mathematical sciences, which include, in particular, non-
Euclidean geometry and the relativity and quantum theories. In this way, Cassirer thinks 
that, starting with Kantian presuppositions, it is possible and even necessary to take the 
philosophical investigation beyond the stage reached by Kant himself. This progress, 
Cassirer remarks, is just the reaffirmation of the spirit of Kantian philosophy, since “the 
purpose of the Critique of Pure Reason was not to ground philosophical knowledge once 
for all in a fixed dogmatic system of concepts, but to open up for it the „continuous 
development of a science‟; in which there can be only relative, not absolute, stopping 
points.”8 
Cassirer discusses the role of the causality principle in the framework provided by such an 
analysis of the possibility conditions of the new scientific facts, according to the 
transcendental method. In the next section we shall consider the problems that Cassirer 
finds in the Kantian interpretation of that principle. 
§2 Cassirer on Kantian causality 
Cassirer maintains: “Of all the various explanations of the causal concept offered in 
the Critique of Pure Reason, perhaps the most precise and most satisfying is the one in 
which it is said that the concept represents nothing but a direction for the formulation of 
definite empirical concepts.”9 At this point, Cassirer quotes the following passage of the 
first critique: “That everything that happens has a cause cannot be inferred merely from the 
concept of happening in general; on the contrary, it is this fundamental proposition which 
                                                          
8
 Cassirer (1923), p. 355. 
9
 Cassirer (1956), p. 127.  
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shows how in regard to that which happens we are in a position to obtain in experience any 
concept whatsoever that is really determinate.”10 The causality principle is a rule that 
indicates how we should conceive and form our concepts in order that they can fulfill their 
transcendental task: that of turning mere appearances into objective knowledge.11 Thus, the 
causality principle is a principle about cognitions and not about things or events.12 Even 
though in our everyday use of the principle we identify things as causes and effects, such a 
use is misleading if we are looking for a scientific foundation of causality. For what we call 
thing in our everyday experience is a complex of conditions that should be analyzed until 
the authentic scientific causal judgments are reached.13 Such a characterization of thing as a 
complex of conditions expresses the core of Kant‟s doctrine, according to which the 
concepts of lawlikeness (Gesetzlichkeit) and objectivity are connected in a synthetic a 
priori judgment: only by means of a lawlike ordering can appearances be referred to an 
object of experience. In this sense, Cassirer indicates: “Objectivity or objective reality, is 
attained only because and insofar as there is conformity to law –not vice versa.”14 
Therefore, we do not cognize objects, as if they (logically) preceded their laws, but rather 
by means of these laws we cognize objectively, as far as we establish certain limits and 
permanent connections in the uniform course of experience.15   
                                                          
10
 KrV, A301 = B357. 
11
 Cassirer (1956), p. 19.  Similarly, Kant declares: “They [the pure concepts of the understanding] serve as it 
were only to spell out appearances, so that they can be read as experience.” Prol, AA IV 312.  
12
 Cassirer, (1956), p. 65. 
13
 Cassirer, (1956), p. 21.  
14
 Cassirer, (1956), p. 132.  
15
 Cassirer, (1956), p. 137; Cassirer (1923), p. 303.  
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However, Cassirer maintains, in the deduction of the causality principle carried out in the 
second analogy of experience, Kant wrongly directs his inquiry to empirical things and 
events, instead of exclusively focusing on empirical knowledge.16 According to Cassirer, 
Kant rightly maintains the logical preeminence of the concept of law upon the concept of 
object, but the implications of such Copernican inversion are not fully assumed by the 
Kantian analysis of the causality principle. Here, Kant still struggles against representations 
of things and substances, as though a causal connection could be established by merely 
considering successive states of the same thing and determining the earlier as cause of the 
later.17 Thus, following the example used by Kant, the objective series of a boat going 
down the river should not be established, for Cassirer, simply by determining the upstream 
state of the boat as the cause of its downstream state. Rather, the determination of the 
objective series requires considering the forces at issue and, more precisely, the physical 
laws (of gravitation, hydrodynamics and hydrostatics) that govern the movement of the 
boat. According to Cassirer, “these laws are the real components of the assumed causal 
connection.”18 In doing this, however, difficulties appear, since the exact formulation of 
those laws demands the symbolic language of physics, which differs significantly from the 
language of “things.”19 The determination of the transcendental role of causality as a 
condition of the possibility of scientific knowledge requires an analysis much more precise 
than the one carried out by Kant in the second analogy of experience. In particular, it is 
                                                          
16
 Cassirer (1956), p. 60. 
17
 Cassirer (1956), pp. 21 - 22.  
18
 Cassirer (1956), p. 22.  
19
 Cassirer (1956), p. 22.  
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necessary to give up any consideration of “things and events” and the underlying concept of 
substance in order to focus on the functional form of experience. For this reason, Cassirer 
criticizes Kant and declares: “Kant did not follow to the end the road which he took in his 
solution of the Humean problem.” 20 
Cassirer shares the Kantian position concerning the dependence of the concept of object on 
the concept of law, but he rejects the way in which Kant describes the proper role of the 
causality principle, for Kant then seems to invert the direction of the dependence. In fact, 
one might think that Kant initially assumes certain states of an object (like the upstream and 
downstream states of the boat) which then in a second move are represented in a causal 
relationship in order to determine their temporal order. However, this reconstruction of 
Kant‟s argument would not be correct. Rather, for Kant, it is precisely the causality 
principle that enables an objective determination according to the concept of law: the 
principle of causality determines the objective series of experience by means of a lawlike 
connection of successive appearances. In contradistinction to what Cassirer suggests, 
Kant‟s argument tries to show that only the representation of a law of my subjective 
perceptions enables their objective reference. Accordingly, the upstream and downstream 
states of the boat are represented as objective states only with the application of the 
principle of causality. Thus, Kant maintains the dependence of the concept of object on the 
concept of law in his analysis of causality. 
However, according to Cassirer, Kant‟s position still has another shortcoming. The mere 
thought of lawlikeness, which for Cassirer expresses the core of the concept of causality, 
                                                          
20
 Cassirer (1956), p. 59.  
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leaves indeterminate how this conformity to law is to be empirically realized. Therefore, 
Cassirer says, Kant stresses that the category of causality should be specified in order to be 
useful and applied to experience.21 This specification is achieved by means of the 
transcendental schematism. It is precisely this doctrine that explains how categories (in 
particular causality) may be applied to empirical phenomena. But, according to Cassirer, 
the validity of Kantian schematism is confined to the framework of Euclidean geometry 
and Newtonian mechanics. Therefore, Cassirer points out: “it is precisely these schemata 
which have lost their universal significance through the discovery of non-Euclidean 
geometry on the hand and the results of the special and general relativity theories on the 
other.”22 In the same sense, Cassirer maintains that the “crisis of causality” produced by 
quantum physics is not a crisis of the concept of cause, but rather a crisis of the way in 
which that concept is empirically applied through schemata. Thus, “such schematization 
has been definitely limited through the advent of the quantum theory. We can no longer 
combine causality with space-time description, let alone amalgamate the two in the manner 
of classical physics.”23 
Nevertheless, Cassirer indicates, Kant himself presents a version of the causality principle 
in which the latter remains free from the conditions imposed by schematism.24 This is the A 
version of the principle, that reads: “Everything that happens, that is begins to be, 
                                                          
21
 Cassirer (1956), p. 166.  
22
 Cassirer (1956), p. 166.  
23
 Cassirer (1956), p. 166. For an overview on Cassirer‟s reception of the scientific progress of late 19th 
century and early 20th century, see: Plümacher (1996). 
24
 Cassirer (1956), p. 162.  
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presupposes something upon which it follows according to a rule.”25 In Cassirer‟s opinion, 
this formulation solely demands the possibility of connecting through rules that which 
happens, without presupposing anything about those rules. Causality just implies the mere 
conformity of natural events to law. But, in the proof of the causality principle, Kant takes a 
further step by introducing time through the schema of cause and effect. Finally, Kant 
relates causality and continuity. The cause does not produce the effect instantaneously, but 
in a certain time interval tb – ta, such that a real magnitude b-a increases through all its 
intermediate degrees from its initial value a in ta to its final value b in tb.26 However, 
quantum theory rejects this continuity requirement by accepting that certain magnitudes 
may only have discrete values and vary from an initial to a final value without adopting the 
intermediate ones. Therefore, the connection between causality and continuity, as Kant 
understands it, should be abandoned. 
Given this criticism of Kantian schemata, one might well expect that Cassirer would search 
for new transcendental schemata that could perform the task that the Kantian ones, 
dependent on an earlier stage of science, are no longer able to carry out. However, 
Cassirer‟s proposal is much more radical. The new scientific facts, upon which a 
philosophical investigation carried out according to the transcendental method finally rests, 
demand a reinterpretation of the whole problem of Kantian schematism. In this sense, 
Cassirer maintains: “Transcendental logic can thus no longer be connected with or be 
dependent on transcendental aesthetics, as was the case in Kant‟s system. The demanded 
                                                          
25
 KrV, A 189.  
26
 KrV, B 253 f. 
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specialization, indispensable for the empirical use of the causal concept, must now be 
looked for within the domain of concepts itself.”27  
In the next section we shall see that the conformity to law required by the principle of 
causality does not get specified by means of non-conceptual conditions. Rather, Cassirer 
puts forward a mere logical specification achieved in a system of invariants of experience.  
§3 Physical knowledge as a system of invariants 
Cassirer conceives physics as a system in which three types of statements are to be 
distinguished: the statements of measurement results, the statements of laws and the 
statements of principles.28  
The statements of measurement results are the first step of the transition from the world of 
senses to the world of physics. This step is characterized by the conversion of sense data 
into determinations that may be subsumed under mathematical concepts. That which is 
perceived is represented in terms of measure and number and the immediate sense 
apprehension leaves its place to experimental observation.  
From the point of view of the extension of knowledge, the statements of measurement 
results constitute a clear progress, because by means of measurement instruments it is 
possible to go beyond the contingent limits of our senses, as we do when we study, e.g., the 
                                                          
27
 Cassirer (1956), p. 166. Our emphasis.  Nuzzo analyzes the modification of Cassirer‟s position on the 
relationship between logic and time from that maintained in Substanzsbegriff und Funktionsbegriff to the one 
of the Philosophie der symbolischen Formen. According to Nuzzo, in a theory of social sciences, a theory of 
invariants is not possible any more. Rather, logic becomes a kind of Hegelian phenomenology. See: Nuzzo 
(1996), pp. 76 – 77.  
28
 Cassirer (1956), pp. 29 ff.  
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lunar surface with a telescope or blood cells with a microscope. However, this extension is 
not the key point at issue here. In parallel to an expansion of our world image, a 
concentration takes place too. The variety of sensible qualities leaves its place to a few 
fundamental determinations, from which the richness of the sensible data should be 
explained. 
This concentration makes a crucial modification of our knowledge possible. Multiple 
perceptions just make up an aggregate: the sensible qualities of a perceived thing are 
merely juxtaposed. Color, smell, flavor and texture of an apple are independent from each 
other. Any combination of these qualities may contingently take place. Unlike a mere 
aggregate, the properties of a physical object, such as, e.g., and ideal gas, are organized into 
a system. Thus, the modification of one property entails the modification of the rest of 
them. In this way, temperature, pressure and volume of the gas are not independent 
properties, but rather their values are interconnected in a necessary manner.  
Such relationships between the properties of a physical object are expressed by a different 
type of statement: the statements of laws. Whereas the statements of measurement results 
are characterized by an unavoidable reference to a “here and now,” law statements have the 
logical form “if, then.” Accordingly, a law statement cannot be taken as a mere summary of 
a number of statements of measurement results. Laws do not connect in a hypothetical 
manner individual magnitudes to which we may ascribe a spatio-temporal index. Rather, 
laws relate classes of magnitudes. For this reason, the statements of laws are not reached by 
means of an (always controvertible) inductive inference that, starting from many cases, 
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aims at their totality. To the contrary, in a law statement the “here and know” viewpoint is 
completely abandoned and the representation of a necessary connection is reached.  
However, the transition from statements of measurement results to statements of laws is not 
the end stage in the process of physical knowledge. For just as the multiplicity of properties 
of a physical object acquires unity through laws, these laws are in turn unified by means of 
principles. Such unification is accordingly expressed by a third type of statement: the 
statements of principles. While the statements of measurement results are individual and 
the statements of laws are general, the statements of principles are universal. These 
statements do not refer to individual magnitudes or classes of magnitudes, but they connect 
different domains of physical knowledge, such as optics, mechanics or electrodynamics. 
The differentiation of these domains is thought of as relative to the higher principle, which 
therefore grounds the differentiation and, at the same time, unifies the domains.29 Physics 
does not stop in front of the multiplicity of its laws, but seeks rules that enable the 
transition from one law to another. These rules are principles. Examples of them are 
Carnot‟s principle, the principle of energy conservation and the principle of least action, to 
which we shall immediately return.  
The different types of statements are invariants of different order.30 The statements of 
measurement results express values of physical magnitudes that do not depend on the 
subjectivity of the one carrying out the measurement. For example, in the same place and at 
the same moment, one observer may be warm, while a second one is cold. In each case, the 
                                                          
29
 Cassirer (1956), p. 44.  
30
 On this issue, see: Ihmig (2001), pp. 81 ff. Ihmig develops in extenso Cassirer‟s theory of experience‟s 
invariants in: Ihmig (1995). See also Ihmig (1996). 
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perception has only subjective validity, varying from observer to observer. To the contrary, 
the statement of measurement result that expresses the room temperature remains invariant, 
since it is the same for all observers.  
However, even though the temperature value is invariant in this sense, the statement of 
measurement result contains a spatio-temporal index: temperature has the value T in place 
x at time t. When knowledge progresses from statements of measurement results to law 
statements, this index disappears. A law statement does not include the particular 
temperature value in a certain place at a certain moment, as would be the case if a law were 
nothing more than a condensed expression of a collection of statements of measurement 
results. Rather, temperature is present in the law as a magnitude class that gets connected 
with other classes in a way that is invariant regarding the values of those magnitudes at 
different times and in different places. For example, the laws of Boyle, Mariotte and Gay 
Lussac connect temperature, pressure and volume of an ideal gas according to a rule 
independently of the absolute values of the spatio-temporal coordinates.31  
But, as we have seen, the multiplicity of laws is to be distinguished from the rule that 
unifies them. In this case, the rule is contained in a statement of principle. Physics 
investigates how different laws, in particular those governing different areas of physics, are 
logically connected to each other. In doing this, the clue is not to be found in the different 
kinds of facts, but on the equations that express the structure of those areas. Cassirer puts 
forward the principle of least action as the paradigmatic example. In its application to 
particular cases, this principle was already known by Heron of Alexandria, who used it to 
                                                          
31
 Cassirer (1956), p. 42.  
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find the reflection laws of light, while Fermat also deduced the law of refraction by means 
of a more extended and deeper version of the principle. Leibniz made use of the principle in 
mechanics and Maupertuis even founded a proof of God‟s existence upon it. Euler gave a 
rigorous formulation and an exact physical meaning to the principle and Lagrange 
presented it in a complete and precise manner. Later, Helmholtz enunciated it as a universal 
physical principle, the validity of which went well beyond mechanics. The principle of least 
action, under the name of Hamilton‟s principle, is now a fundamental principle of modern 
physics, both of relativity and quantum theory.  
The essential feature of the principle of least action is that it is not bound to any 
determinate content, since it is a variational principle. The principle establishes that certain 
magnitudes should have a minimal value, but these magnitudes can be quite diverse, e.g., 
the path covered by light (Heron), the required time for light to cover a path (Fermat), the 
product of velocity and path length (Maupertius), the mean value of potential energy 
(Euler) or the difference between kinetic and potential energy (Hamilton). The demand that 
such magnitudes acquire an extreme value determines the general form of the laws of 
diverse physical disciplines, providing in this way a heuristic rule for the search and 
discovery of such laws. These laws will be multiple, but the principle will remain invariant 
against them. 
The statements of physics join together according to their invariance degree. The 
statements of measurement results are invariant against the subjectivity of the observer. 
Nevertheless, they vary against laws. These laws are in this respect invariant, but they are 
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not invariant against principles. Rather, principles are invariant against laws, and in being 
so they unify different branches of physics. 
We can therefore see a reciprocal conditioning among statements that provides to the whole 
a systematic character. Neither are laws mere aggregates of measurement results nor are 
principles mere aggregates of laws. Physical knowledge does not originate from “an sich” 
elements, which may have sense and meaning independently of their relationship with 
others and that are accommodated in a kind of knowledge pyramid. Instead, we just find a 
functional coordination, in which all statements take part: the statements of “lower” type 
are entailed and presupposed by those of “higher” type. Thus, the right geometrical symbol 
of the system of physical knowledge would not be a pyramid, but rather a sphere, like the 
one that Parmenides uses to describe being.32 
§4 Causality and the coordination of concepts and spatio-temporal objects 
Even though the transition between statements of different type amounts to a 
qualitative jump, since it is in each case a modification of the kind of invariance that the 
statements express, the consideration of the causality principle entails a much more radical 
move. The causality principle is neither a metaphysical statement about the world in itself, 
nor an empirical statement about the sensible world, like those we have discussed so far. 
The causality principle does not talk about objects, but rather about our knowledge of 
objects and it is in this sense a transcendental principle.33 More precisely, the principle is a 
statement about our empirical knowledge of objects and, thus, about the statements of 
                                                          
32
 Cassirer (1956), p. 35.  
33
 Cassirer (1956), p. 58.  
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measurement results, about the statements of laws and about the statements of principles. 
According to Cassirer, the causality principle declares that all these statements “can be so 
related and combined with one another that from this combination there results a system of 
physical knowledge and not a mere aggregate of isolated observations.”34 In other words, 
the causality principle states that the conversion of sensible data into measurement results, 
their ordering according to laws and the unification of the multiplicity of these laws under 
principles is always possible. Thereby, even though such a process of systematization can 
never be considered as complete, its achievement should be sought as if an ultimate system 
were possible, by assuming that natural phenomena do not resist being systematically 
ordered. 
Therefore, Cassirer understands the causality principle in a transcendental sense, as a 
condition of the possibility of scientific knowledge, but he ascribes to it a meaning that 
does not coincide with the Kantian one. According to Kant, the causality principle is 
constitutive for the possibility of experience, in so far as it makes the distinction between 
the subjective series of perceptions and the objective series of experience first possible. For 
Cassirer, the causality principle has instead a regulative character,35 guiding our 
understanding towards the systematic unity of experience.36 
                                                          
34
 Cassirer (1956), p. 60.  
35
 At this point, Cassirer agrees with Helmholtz, for whom the law of causality expresses that regulative 
principle of our thought that requires us to always look for more general laws: Cassirer (1956), pp. 61 ff. On 
the constitutive/regulative distinction in Cassirer‟s philosophy, see: Pätzold (1996). 
36
 Cassirer indicates that, if we wanted to use Kantian terminology, we should call the causality principle a 
“postulate of empirical thought”, since, as a purely methodological principle, it does not concern the content 
of the different types of statements but only the character of their objective validity. See: Cassirer (1956), p. 
60. But, against Cassirer‟s interpretation of causality it should be pointed out that the causality principle in 
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Kant distinguishes the necessary task of three different cognitive faculties, which cooperate 
in knowledge: sensibility, understanding and reason. Sensibility provides us with intuitions. 
Understanding synthesizes these intuitions by means of concepts and thereby refers them to 
an object. Reason brings about the systematic unity of such objective cognitions. “Thus,” 
Kant declares, “all human knowledge begins with intuitions, proceeds from thence to 
concepts, and ends with ideas.”37 From this viewpoint, the subsumption of spatio-temporal 
objects under concepts is the problem that the theory of schematism deals with. Schemata 
are precisely those representations that enable the spatio-temporal objects given by sensible 
intuitions to be thought by the concepts of understanding.  
 
Cassirer, in contradistinction to Kant, does not pose the problem in terms of cognitive 
faculties, since in that way the danger of psychologism seems unavoidable.38 The problem 
of the coordination between concepts and spatio-temporal objects is not that of the 
heterogeneity between intellectual concepts and sensible appearances.39 Cassirer rather 
assumes a transcendental perspective from which there is just one single objectifying 
function. In this regard, Cassirer indicates: “According as the function of objectivity, which 
is unitary in its purpose and nature, is realized in different empirical material, there arise 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
modern physics does perform the very specific task of guaranteeing the objective character of the series of 
events, as it can be most clearly seen in relativity theory. On this issue, see: Schmitz-Rigal (2002), pp. 277 ff. 
37
 KrV, B730. 
38
 In fact, according to Cassirer, the true subject of the theory of schematism is the problem of the 
psychological possibility of a general concept. Cassirer (1922), p. 713. See also: Plümacher (1996), p. 119. 
However, Kant does not seem to aim at explaining here how a concept is formed, but rather how an already 
formed concept is applied.  
39
 “Fassen wir den Verstand nicht lediglich als ein Vermögen der abstrakten Gattungsbegriffe, sondern, wie 
wir es nach der transzendentalen Deduktion der Kategorien tun müssen, als das ,,Vermögen der Regeln“ auf, 
so hört er in der Tat auf, der Anschauung völlig ,,ungleichartig“ zu sein.” Cassirer (1922), p. 716. 
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different concepts of physical reality; yet these latter only represent different stages in the 
fulfillment of the same fundamental demand.”40 The transcendental task of each Kantian 
faculty is thereby reinterpreted as a different moment of fulfillment of that unitary 
function.41 The statements of measurement results provide us with spatio-temporal data that 
are to be brought under rules expressed by statements of laws, the unity of which is attained 
by statements of principles.  
 
However, since “in all scientific knowledge laws precede objects,” Cassirer stresses that no 
object is „given‟ to us “other than through laws.”42 Thus, the Kantian distinction between 
the sensible conditions under which objects are given in intuition and the intellectual 
conditions under which objects are thought by means of laws cannot be maintained any 
more. The data for objective knowledge, the “statements of the first level,” cannot be 
isolated from statements of higher order as if “there would always be the possibility of 
imagining the higher layers removed without destroying the bottom layer or even altering it 
essentially.”43 To the contrary, “everything significantly factual is already theory.”44   
According to Cassirer, each type of statement expresses a peculiar moment of the 
conformity to law demanded by the causality principle. More precisely, each moment 
                                                          
40
 Cassirer (1956), pp. 137 – 138.   
41
 “In diesem gesetzmäßigen Aufbau der Erkenntnis, in der Stufenfolge von Anschauung, Verstandesbegriff 
und Idee wir für uns alle empirische Wirklichkeit erst fassbar.” Cassirer (1921), p. 61. 
42
 Cassirer (1956), p. 143.   
43
 Cassirer (1956), p. 35.  
44
 Cassirer (1956), p. 35. 
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corresponds to a certain order of logical invariance. In this way, concepts and spatio-
temporal objects get coordinated in a system of invariants of experience. 
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Living Together in an Ecological Community
David E. Schrader
There is perhaps no area of ethical thinking that pushes us to examine the foundations of 
ethical thought more than environmental ethics.  Should we think of the ethical demands placed 
upon our behavior in terms of the maximization of pleasure over pain?  If so, should it be human 
pleasure and pain or the pleasure and pain of all sentient beings?  Should we think of those 
demands in terms of the maximization of human happiness or of some other notion of human 
well-being?  Should we think of those demands in terms of the promotion of certain types of 
virtue?  Should we think of those demands in terms of rules governing some sort of moral 
community, perhaps a Kantian “kingdom of ends” or a Jamesian “Ethical Republic?”  The 
practical question, of course, is how we are to live our lives.  In particular, how are we to 
conduct ourselves when what is involved is our behavior as it affects the environment in which 
we and our children, grandchildren, and descendants well into the future?  The philosophical 
question is what kind of analytical framework can be help us to think more clearly about how we 
are to live.
To address the philosophical question adequately it is important to keep clear focus on 
the range of practical problems that arise in our interaction with our environment.  Suppose that 
we adopt an ethical framework according to which we judge our behavior on the balance of 
pleasure over pain that we produce.  As Peter Singer has rightly noted in a large body of work, if 
pleasure and pain are the key moral criteria, it seems arbitrary to privilege human pleasure and 
pain over pleasure and pain in other forms of sentient life.  At the same time, if we adopt a 
principle of determining our behavior so as to promote pleasure over pain in whatever forms of 
sentient life they may arise, we find some seriously counter-intuitive consequences.  Suppose 
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that we find ourselves in the wilderness needing food, confronted with a choice of killing a 
common white-tailed deer or an endangered caribou.  If our ethical principle is simply promoting 
the highest level of pleasure over pain it would seem that we could equally well kill the deer or 
the caribou.  Either would likely experience roughly the same level of pain in its death.  We find 
ourselves with an ethical principle that has no place for consideration of species membership. 
Such an ethical approach is unable to support the broadly shared view that preservation of 
species is a good.
A number of philosophers have attempted to frame environmental ethics in terms of the 
alleged intrinsic goodness of various natural objects.  Quite apart from the inadequacy of most of 
the popular arguments for the position, it also fails to provide an analytic framework for 
addressing species problems.  Perhaps worse yet, it would fail to provide any principled 
distinction between caribou and broccoli.  This would seem to be the case with any approach that 
takes individual entities in the environment, whether human individuals or individuals of other 
sorts, as the starting point of ethical analysis without understanding those individuals as, in some 
sense, parts of a larger whole.
These considerations lead me to the view that the pressing ethical problems that arise in 
our interaction with the environment in which we live provide important support for 
understanding ethical agents centrally as parts of some sort of community of interrelated parts. 
For reasons that will become clear over the course of this paper, the kind of community in terms 
of which ethical life should be framed is best rooted in William James’s “Ethical Republic” 
rather than Immanuel Kant’s “Kingdom of Ends.”
In current thinking about the environment, sustainability has become a very fashionable 
topic of conversation.  We are, for example, presently in the middle of what UNESCO has 
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declared as the Decade of Education for Sustainable Development.  I suspect that this declaration 
has generated responses in virtually every UN member nation.  Among the many organizational 
responses in the United States has been the Disciplinary Associations Network for Sustainability, 
group of which the American Philosophical Association is a member.  The APA has affiliated 
itself with the Network because we philosophers are surely among those whose discipline has an 
important contribution to make to the great discussions on how human beings can live together 
on this planet in ways that will facilitate not only our own well-being, but also the well-being of 
our descendants into the distant future.
While sustainability is in many respects a rather recent public concern, philosophers have 
for over two thousand years been concerned with the question of how human communities can 
be structured and can function in ways that will facilitate human well-being that will be 
sustainable from generation to generation.  From Plato and Aristotle to thinkers of the present 
day, writers on social and political philosophy have been concerned with conditions that tend to 
undermine societies’ capacity to endure from generation to generation.  The central difference 
between this long-standing concern for sustainable communities and the contemporary interest in 
sustainability is that earlier discussions focused on the sustainability of the social and economic 
environments in which people lived, while contemporary discussion expands to include the 
physical environment in which people live as well.  
The basic premise for most discussion of sustainability is that the capacity for growth in 
any system is not unlimited.  Aristotle famously argues that the state will be most sustainable if it 
is not too large, either in population or territory (Politics, VII, 4-5).  The historical record is clear 
that our particular judgments at any given time about the limits on growth are regularly mistaken. 
However the claim that the capacity for growth is greater than we might be able to foresee is 
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clearly far removed from the claim that the capacity for growth is unlimited.  John Stuart Mill’s 
discussion of “The Stationary State,” in his Principles of Political Economy, is particularly apt 
on this point as it relates to economic growth.
It must always have been seen, more or less distinctly, by political economists, 
that the increase of wealth is not boundless: that at the end of what they term the 
progressive state lies the stationary state, that all progress in wealth is but a postponement 
of this, and that each step in advance is an approach to it. We have now been led to 
recognize that this ultimate goal is at all times near enough to be fully in view; that we 
are always on the verge of it, and that if we have not reached it long ago, it is because the 
goal itself flies before us. The richest and most prosperous countries would very soon 
attain the stationary state, if no further improvements were made in the productive arts, 
and if there were a suspension of the overflow of capital from those countries into the 
uncultivated or ill-cultivated regions of the earth. (334)
Mill makes two central and correct points here.  First, he notes that the limits of growth 
do expand with increases in technological development, although not unlimitedly so.  Second, he 
notes that the growth of the richest countries expands as they use their capital to exploit the 
resources of less economically advanced regions of the earth.  Mill also takes the position, 
almost alone among the great political economists of his time, that the stationary state, the 
condition in which the quest for growth has essentially come to an end, is a more desirable 
human condition than that in which growth dominates human aspiration.
I cannot, therefore, regard the stationary state of capital and wealth with the 
unaffected aversion so generally manifested towards it by political economists of the old 
school. I am inclined to believe that it would be, on the whole, a very considerable 
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improvement on our present condition. I confess I am not charmed with the ideal of life 
held out by those who think that the normal state of human beings is that of struggling to 
get on; that the trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each other's heels, which 
form the existing type of social life, are the most desirable lot of human kind, or anything 
but the disagreeable symptoms of one of the phases of industrial progress. (336)
Mill’s point is that the quest for perpetual growth brings with it a certain social 
instability, the “trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading” that pits class against class and 
person against person.  That social instability does not promote a sustainable human well-being.
As I noted above, present-day talk about sustainability is concerned not only with the 
sustainability of the social or economic environment, but also with the sustainability of the entire 
environment, including the physical environment.  We have learned from Mill’s contemporary, 
Charles Darwin, that humans are an interactive part of an embracing physical environment, just 
as all other living creatures are interactive parts of an embracing physical environment.  Just as 
other species of living creatures can adapt to or fail to adapt to their environments, so humans 
can adapt to or fail to adapt to their physical environment.  As Mill notes with respect to our 
social and economic environment, we have very substantial capacity to adapt through 
“improvements … in the productive arts,” but in the end we too are subject to the inexorable 
demands placed on us by our total environment.
One of the pioneers in developing the study of ecology in the United States was Aldo 
Leopold, a forester by training.  In a very brief section of Leopold’s iconic A Sand County 
Almanac, Leopold advocates what he called a “Land Ethic.”  While the land ethic is not 
developed in any detail in Leopold’s work, it rests on two foundations that provide material for 
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the development of a philosophical foundation for sustainability.  First, Leopold claims that 
ethics “has its origin in the tendency of interdependent individuals or groups to evolve modes of 
co-operation” (202).  While this is largely simple assertion on Leopold’s part, the claim that 
ethics involve the evolution of modes of social cooperation presents an understanding of ethics 
that seems very much akin to the ethical views of pragmatists like William James.  James’ ethics 
replaces Kant’s “kingdom of ends” with an “ethical republic” in which humans negotiate their 
needs and demands in a set of ever-developing equilibria.1  On this basis Leopold puts forward 
the basic claim that “All ethics so far evolved rests upon a single premise: that the individual is a 
member of a community of interdependent parts” (203), a claim that echoes James’ view that 
ethical terms only acquire any meaning in the context of a “moral universe,” a context in which 
humans interact in ways that place mutual and sometimes conflicting demands upon one another 
(MP, 148-150).  For the purposes of this paper, I will simply accept Leopold’s first foundational 
claim, understood in roughly the manner in which I have elaborated James’ ethical views 
elsewhere.
Leopold’s second foundational claim moves squarely in the direction of grounding a 
contemporary understanding of sustainability.  The “community of interdependent parts” that 
constitutes Leopold’s community of moral concern is not simply a community of human agents. 
Rather it is a community that “include[s] soils, water, plants, and animals, or collectively: the 
land” (204).  Leopold’s extension of the moral community is, at one level, obviously correct.  At 
the same time, it is, at another level, profoundly problematic.
The level at which Leopold’s extension of the moral community is obviously correct, lies 
in a recognition that is borne out by the knowledge of evolutionary biology that we have gained 
1 See David E. Schrader, “Simonizing James: Taking Demand Seriously,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce  
Society, Vol. XXXIV, No. 4 (Fall, 1998), pp. 1005-28.
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since the work of Darwin.  We humans clearly are parts of a system of “interdependent parts” 
that includes that includes “soils, water, plants, and animals.”  The basic biological mechanism 
of natural selection is a process of species developing in response to the various factors that their 
environments present.  Thus species develop in response to the availability of various forms of 
nourishment, the variety of predators that threaten to eat them before they are able to reproduce, 
competition with other species that require the same sources of nutrition, characteristics that 
affect mate selection, etc.  In short, the various parts of an ecological system are interdependent 
in a multitude of ways that leaves each part dependent upon all the others.
The level at which Leopold’s extension is problematic, lies in how this collection of 
interdependent parts can constitute a “community.”  The problem becomes clear if we focus on 
the contrast between Kant’s idea of a “kingdom of ends” and James’s idea of an “ethical 
republic.”  Kant’s “kingdom of ends” is a “systematic union of different rational beings under 
common laws” (100).  Kant thinks that, to the extent that we are all rational, we will agree about 
the content of that “common law.”  James, correctly and by contrast, recognizes the frequent 
“falsity of our judgments, so far as they presume to decide in an absolute way on the value of 
other persons’ conditions or ideals” (CB, 132).  The necessary response to the “falsity,” on 
James’s view, is that the Kingdom of Ends must be replaced by an Ethical Republic in which the 
various members of the community are able to debate and challenge one another, working out a 
system of morality as an equilibrium in which both their consonant and competing demands may 
be most fully met.  Central to the Ethical Republic is the ability of human agents to communicate 
with one another, to voice their various concerns and demands in a public forum.  Accordingly, 
just as the Ethical Republic does not generate unanimous agreement, so it also does not generate 
eternal agreement either.  The social equilibrium developed in the Ethical Republic must be an 
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ever-emerging equilibrium.  This must be so because of the fact that, for each of us, our 
knowledge of the concrete needs and concerns of the other members of our community is never 
perfect and final.  Moreover, it must also be so because of the fact that we will encounter 
different people over time, with different needs and concerns – people, needs and concerns of 
which we may well have been unaware at earlier points in time.  The social equilibrium should 
always, however, be improving, becoming more encompassing, as we learn from our interaction 
with those others.
So the question that requires a satisfactory answer before we can accept Leopold’s 
second foundational claim is “How can the ecological community, or what Leopold speaks of as 
the ‘biotic community’, the community that includes ‘soils, water, plants, and animals’ be a 
genuine moral community?”  How can the interdependent parts of that collection of things 
communicate their needs relative to each other in ways that will make it possible for them to 
constitute, if not a moral republic, at least a moral polity of some functioning sort?  The answer 
is not an easy one.
The first thing to note is that the claims of various environmental philosophers to the 
effect that natural objects have intrinsic value or that we should treat nature with respect or with 
empathy are simply not very helpful.  Consider what it means to treat another with respect or 
empathy.  I suspect that it means something like treating the other as I would like to be treated in 
similar circumstances.  It is important to recognize that this cannot mean that I should treat the 
other as I would want to be treated if the other were like me.  That would involve the deep 
arrogance of failing to recognize that the other is, in fact, distinct from me, that the other has a 
unique history, unique connections to the things with which it relates, and thus is a neighbor of 
mine, not a clone of me.  Rather it must mean something more like that I should treat the other as 
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I would want to be treated if I were in his or her circumstances.  Here, of course, we run up 
against James’ important caution about the frequent “falsity of our judgments, so far as they 
presume to decide in an absolute way on the value of other persons’ conditions or ideals.”  There 
is a real problem in my presumption to know what it is like to be in the other’s circumstances. 
Given that our knowledge is a least largely based on experience, it is regularly much more 
particular in scope than we are inclined to think.  To some extent it is accurate to say that I know 
what it is like to be human, but that claim must surely be understood in the context of the fact 
that my experience of being human has been gained through the experience of a sixty-four year 
old, well educated, reasonably affluent, male American.  I simply do not know very much about 
what it’s like to be a young Indonesian woman living in a small village.  Much less, of course, do 
I know “What it’s Like to be a Bat,” or a dog, or a cow, or a coho salmon.  Even worse, it may 
not even make sense to talk about my knowing what it’s like to be a bacterium or a broccoli 
plant.
In the case of human communities we can see the central strength of James’ idea of the 
ethical republic.  While, as I have noted, I may not know much about what it’s like to be a young 
Indonesian woman, we can at least construct contexts in which it is possible for young 
Indonesian women to talk about what their lives are like.  Human history has shown that those in 
positions of power are often reluctant to listen to or to hear claims that threaten their power or 
privilege.  Nevertheless, the idea of the ethical republic raises a framework that shows conditions 
for moral community, at least in principle.
While the problem of communication would seem to make it impossible for any kind of 
ecological community containing “soils, water, plants, and animals” to constitute a Jamesian 
ethical republic, I think it is still possible for us to make sense of an ecological community of a 
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somewhat morally less robust sort.  In the last part of this talk I want to present a sequence of 
communities or putative communities, starting with the full-blooded moral community that 
James speaks of as “the ethical republic,” and moving progressively through related moral 
communities in which communication is increasingly problematic.
An ethical republic is a community characterized by what many political philosophers 
speak of as “deliberative democracy.”  The principles governing the behavior of members of the 
ethical republic emerge as the members communicate with one another in richly varied ways. 
Central to the richness of communication in an ethical republic is the level of communication 
that humans achieve through their use of language.  In an ethical republic we treat those around 
us as genuine ends, and not mere means, not because we have reflected on the desires of fully 
rational agents and reasoned to what principles such agents could will, but because we have 
listened to those other agents and have engaged them in deliberative processes to come to some 
mutual understanding of what we, as concrete and limitedly rational beings, in fact will.
There is surely some irony now in that I will reverse the procedure of Aristotle.  Rather 
than moving from the household to the polis, I move from the ethical republic to the ethical 
household.  My point, of course, is to move from a community of adult, functionally, albeit 
limitedly, rational and communicative human to a community of humans that includes infants 
and children.  All of us who have had the experience of raising children have occasionally 
experienced the unhappy baby.  The problem with the unhappy baby is that it is often difficult to 
determine what makes the baby unhappy.  Is the baby tired, and hence in need of a good nap?  Is 
the baby hungry?  Does the baby have some sort of pain that might indicate some illness or is it 
the routine pain that comes with new teeth cutting through the skin inside the mouth?  The baby 
is, of course, part of the family, part of a very important form of community.  We presume that 
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the parents or caretakers of the baby are concerned for the welfare of the baby.  They want to do 
what will ease the baby’s distress.  But in order to know what to do they must determine what is 
causing the baby’s distress.  All those of us who have experienced unhappy babies know that this 
situation is not easy.  Yet we also know that it is not hopeless.  The baby’s inability to speak and 
tell us precisely what is bothering it makes it more difficult to determine what the baby’s needs 
are, but it does not make it impossible.  Essentially, in such situations, we experiment, with the 
experimentation informed by both our own experience and what we have learned from the 
experience of others.  We try various options that we think will ease the baby’s distress.  Quite 
commonly we succeed in fairly short order, and hit upon the right solution.  Sometimes we 
recognize that the baby’s distress is caused by something serious, but we find ourselves unable to 
determine the cause.  In such cases we frequently take the baby to be examined by a pediatrician 
whose special training carries with it an enhanced ability to determine the causes of the baby’s 
distress.  A note of caution is in order, however.  Quite commonly we succeed, but not always. 
We have all heard of stories in which babies have died because those around it were not able to 
determine adequately and in time what it was that caused the baby’s distress.  Because the baby 
cannot tell us what is bothering it, the process of determining how to respond is more difficult, 
frequently more time consuming, and accordingly sometimes not successfully accomplished.  It 
is, in short, distinctly fallible.
My point in moving to the household community is to dislodge the hyper-rationalization 
of human communities that has been a feature of so much philosophy at least from Kant to 
Rawls.  No one seriously doubts that children and even infants are genuine members of our 
human communities.  At the same time, no one can seriously doubt that the ability of children 
and infants to participate in rationally deliberative elaborations and negotiations of their needs 
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and interests is, in varying degrees, limited.  The ability of humans to participate in such 
elaborations develops from being virtually non-existent at birth to being quite well developed at 
some point in adulthood.  It is clearly not an “all or nothing” phenomenon.  The course of the 
development varies somewhat from individual to individual, yet follows fairly general patters 
studied by developmental psychologists.  For all that, they are members of our moral community 
from birth.
There is one other putative community that I want to consider before moving to the idea 
of an ecological community, the traditional farm.  The family community is now expanded to 
include animals and plants.  I don’t know how many of you have any experience with farming.  I 
spent most of the first twenty-two years of my life on the farm that is still my parents’ home.  We 
had horses, cattle, sometimes pigs and sheep, two dogs, and several cats.  We raised corn, oats, 
and hay.  Like babies, animals and plants lack language with which to explain the nature of their 
distress.  Like babies, even more than very young babies, animals do engage in rather complex 
forms of behavior that frequently provide significant information about the nature of their 
distress.  Plants present a more difficult case.
Certainly on a traditional farm there is a relationship of mutual dependence and 
interaction among the humans, the non-human animals, the plants, and even the soil on the farm. 
Each provides food for the others.  Dogs provide help to the humans by herding cattle and 
chasing predators.  Cats hunt mice, rats, and other pests.  Like an unhappy baby, an animal 
experiencing distress has no language to communicate the problem.  Yet like babies, and often in 
even more sophisticated ways, animals clearly give certain behavioral indications that convey 
information about the sources of their distress.  Farmers who have substantial experience with 
animal behaviors can frequently gain useful information about the nature of distress.  Again, as 
12
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with babies, there will be cases in which, even after some experimentation, the farmer either will 
not be able to determine the problem on the basis of animals’ behavior or will determine that the 
behavior indicates a problem that lies beyond the farmer’s ability to help mitigate the distress.  In 
such cases the farmer will regularly seek expert advice, frequently in the form of a veterinarian.  
The situation with plants is more difficult.  First, plants can manifest various signs that 
they are in distress, but they lack the behavioral capacities of animals.  Second, the resources 
from which the farmer can get expert advice in interpreting the signs of distress are not as 
powerful.  This, however, does not mean that there are no such resources.  While there are no 
“plant doctors,” in the sense in which veterinarians are “animal doctors,” most states in the 
United States have long provided what are called “County Agricultural Extension Agents.” 
Virtually every state in the United States has a “land grant” university with a College of 
Agriculture and a department of something like Plant and Soil Sciences.  One of the historical 
and present purposes of these land grant universities has been to study the sciences that enable 
farmers to better understand problems they may encounter in the raising of livestock and crops. 
The work done by researchers at the College of Agriculture is communicated to the broader 
community through a set of structures in which the County Agricultural Extension Agents serve 
as the central points of contact providing working farmers with access to the substantial bodies 
of horticultural and plant science research produced by the faculties of the land grant 
universities.  Thus a farmer may learn that the yellow pallor of young corn may be caused by 
poor drainage of the farmer’s field, or perhaps by an undesirable chemical composition of the 
soil.
This last possibility highlights the fact that one of the resources with which the farmer 
must work in the tending of plants is the soil.  Farmers cannot be successful without attending to 
13
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the health of the soils on which they grow the various plants that they tend.  There is an intimate 
relationship between plants and soils.  One cannot simply plant a random plant in random soil 
and expect successful growth.  Soil must be of a suitable type, contain suitable nutrients, be 
situated so as to receive suitable drainage, etc., in order to grow particular plant life. 
Accordingly, soil can fail to be “healthy” in a number of ways.  The experienced farmer has a 
fairly good level of experience-based understanding of healthy soil and of various conditions that 
we might speak of as distressed soils.  And again, the farmer has available expert resources on 
which to draw in determining the causes of soil distress that go beyond the competence of even 
the most experienced farmer.
The sequence of different kinds of communities or quasi-communities that I have just 
outlined provides a first step in addressing the question of how we can speak of an ecological 
community.  The farmer’s concern with the health of the “soil, water, plants, and animals” and 
the farmer’s attempts to act on that concern provides an entre to understanding the “biotic” 
community of which Aldo Leopold speaks.  Obviously the ecological community cannot be 
much like the robust “ethical republic” that constitutes the moral community of adult humans. 
At the same time, the family, surely a form of human community, cannot be a robust “ethical 
republic” either.
A robust moral community, be it an ethical republic or a kingdom of ends, requires 
members who can make generally reliable, albeit fallible and corrigible, judgments about their 
own needs and interests.  The fundamental advantage of James’ “ethical republic” over Kant’s 
“kingdom of end” its more realistic acknowledgement of the fallibility of our judgments about 
the needs and interests of others and a more reliable framework within which our judgments 
about both our own and others needs and interests can be corrected.  The moment we introduce 
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children, the reliability of whose judgments about their own needs and interests vary 
considerably over a course of cognitive development, and even more so infants, who lack the 
linguistic capacities to participate in the normal human processes of asserting and adjudicating 
needs and interests in community settings, we have been forced to adopt a more modest and 
nuanced model of moral community.
If we accept, as we surely must, that the collectivity of humans constitutes a genuine 
moral community, and we accept something like the account that I have given above about how 
human communities incorporate the needs and interests of infants and children into the process 
of framing collective judgments about how we are to live together in a way that pays due heed to 
the needs and interests of the full membership of the human community, we are well on the way 
to giving a plausible version of a “land ethic.”
The two foundational claims on which Leopold rests his advocacy of a land ethic are 1) 
that ethics rests upon the premise that the individuals are members of a communities of 
interdependent parts, and 2) that we humans live in a community of interdependent parts that 
“include[s] soils, water, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land.”  I have, I believe, 
established that community, in the morally relevant sense, does not require either full rationality 
or full communicative ability.  The move from the human community to a biotic community, 
then, requires that we recognize a complex system of mutually interdependent parts that includes 
“soils, water, plants, and animals,” and that we be able to give an account of how we can frame 
generally reliable, albeit fallible and corrigible, judgments about the needs and interests of the 
non-human parts of such a system.
15
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I have looked at the traditional farm as a kind of intermediary between the family and the 
putative biotic community.  The farm cannot constitute robust ethical republics because of the 
limits constraining exchange of information and exchange of needs among its parts.  The even-
more severe limits constraining exchange of information and exchange of needs among the 
members of the biotic community likewise prevent its moral character from being robustly 
democratic.  Yet our increasing knowledge of our larger physical environment has made it quite 
clear that humans do live on this planet within a system of interdependent parts that includes 
soils, water, plants, and animals.  And humans do have resources through which we can learn a 
considerable amount about the well-being of that system of interdependent parts.  As I have 
noted, those resources do not give us the depth or the richness of information that we gain 
through communication in the full-fledged ethical republic of human adults.  Nevertheless the 
information is considerable.
The key, I think, to the parent’s regular success in gaining information about the well-
being of the unhappy child and the farmer’s regular success in gaining information about the 
well-being of the soils, water, plants, and animals that comprise the farm community is interest, 
another notion to which James devoted considerable attention.  Parents are drawn, I take it, by 
love to take a passionate interest in the well-being of their children, unhappy babies included. 
Farmers are drawn to a strong interest in the well-being of the soils, water, plants, and animals 
that make up the farm because they recognize the mutual interdependence of all of the parts that 
are required for farming to function.  The first condition that is required for humans to 
understand themselves as members of an ecological or biotic community is likewise interest. 
One of the challenges of the contemporary world is urbanization.  People living in cities are 
significantly removed from the natural processes that constitute our biotic environment.  As a 
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result, it becomes easy for people to ignore the well-being of the interdependent parts of that 
system, and even their interdependence itself, in a way in which it would not be possible for a 
farmer to ignore the well-being of the soils, water, plants, and animals that interact on the farm 
every day.  I take it that an important part of the motivation for UNESCO’s declaration of a 
Decade of Education for Sustainable Development has been the recognition of the need to use 
the resources of education to promote such interest.  Undoubtedly we must not be overly 
idealistic about the extent to which even the best environmental education can generate interest 
in the well-being of the biotic community.  Nevertheless, it would seem that education is really 
the only resource we have in a world where large numbers of people lack significant experience 
of their interdependency with the other parts of the biotic community.
The second condition necessary for humans to be positively contributing members of an 
ecological community follows from the first.  Both parents and farmers are strongly motivated to 
seek and usually heed the advice of people with expert knowledge concerning appropriate 
aspects of the well-being of babies, on the one hand, and soils, water, plants, and animals, on the 
other.  An audience like this one knows well that universities train, in addition to philosophers, 
pediatricians, veterinarians, and horticulturalists, people who acquire expert knowledge on 
various aspects of the system of interdependent parts that constitutes our environment.  Clearly 
in the United States, and I suspect most other places as well, there are demagogic politicians who 
tell people that popular or profitable ideas concerning our physical environment have nothing to 
learn from the work of environmental scientists.  Part of our job, both as citizens and as teachers, 
is to help our communities fully realize that we ignore the results of environmental science at 
great peril, just as we ignore the advice of pediatricians and veterinarians only at the peril of our 
children and our farms. 
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I conclude then that living together in an ecological community is a challenging 
possibility, but a possibility nonetheless.  It requires recognition that an ecological community 
must be something more modest than a full-blown moral community, a polity less robust than the 
ethical republic.  The chief requirements of this polity are a genuine interest in the role of those 
parts that lack robust means of communication with us, and a willingness to acknowledge the 
superior, albeit always fallible and corrigible, knowledge of the scientists who claim some sort of 
expertise concerning the working of those parts.  These conditions both present serious 
challenges.  Neither can be met easily.  Even in the best of circumstances, neither can be met 
adequately.  Those facts, however, do not mean that we cannot make significant progress.  Just 
as the ethical republic is an ongoing project, never getting it fully right, but hopefully making 
slow and steady improvement, so we have some reason to hope that living together in a biotic or 
environmental community may likewise be an ongoing project at which we may make slow but 
steady improvement.  In both cases the cost of failure to make such improvement is seriously 
threatening to our ability to live decent human lives.
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Abstract
Evidence acquired inside the mono-disciplinary matrices of neurobiology, clinical psychology 
and  psychopathology  is  deeply  insufficient  in  terms  of  their  validity,  reliability  and 
specificity,  and  can  not  reveal  the  explanatory  mechanisms  underlying  mental  disorders. 
Moreover no effective trans-disciplinary connections have been developed between them. In 
epistemological perspective current diagnostic tool are different but overlapping instruments 
exploring the same phenomenology. In line with the more scientific re-definition of mental 
disorders  we  defend  the  view  that  this  process  should  take  place  under  intensive  (not 
extensive) dialogue with neuroscience. As Kato suggested only neurobiological studies using 
modern technology could form the basis for a new classification.This is to say that categorical 
approach in diagnosis should be abandoned in favor of broader diagnostic constructs (such as 
dimensional  and  prototype  units)  which  are  endorsed  or  "flanked"  with  data  from 
neuroscience.  Those broader units should be a subject of comprehensive evaluation of the 
personal narrative in context.
1. Epistemological foundations. Mind-brain translation
Many terms like “emotions”  are frequently employed in many disciplinary systems, such as 
psychology, psychopathology, and neurosciences. Therefore “emotions” is a shared construct 
with all derivative terms which are used to describe human experiences in health and disease, 
e.g. “depression” or “anger”, “grief” and so forth.  There are established vertical (bottom-up 
and top-down; reductive vs. emergent) connections in order to sustain biological explanations.
My intuition is that there exists another kind of important  horizontal structures in mental 
health knowledge which require consistent translation. We can define and understand the 
realm of mentality  of  its  own right  but  any cognitive  structure in  it  (regularity  or  notion 
representing  certain  aspects  of  consciousness)  has  to  be  underpinned  with  correspondent 
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cognitive structure in the realm of neural processes, which is demonstrated in the following 
diagram.
Diagram 1:  Horizontal and vertical mechanisms 
  determining explanations in mental health knowledge
If regarded as bridge psychophysical laws, these lines of explanation must be supported with 
sufficient evidence to predispose reconciliation between paradigms in mental health and 
adequate translation between domains of neuroscience and humanities. However I do not 
embrace Nagel’s demand for ontological elimination of the reduced entities besides the most 
basic sciences (neuro-biochemistry in our case). As it has been argued in a number of our 
previous papers a program for ultimate reduction (like those proposed by the eliminative 
materialism and eiphenomenalism) is predestinated to failure due to a number of meta-
empirical reasons.
2. The impact of translation on the debate on psychiatric validity. The 
Pittsburgh model
Currently each of the disciplinary matrices (sources) concerned with mental health is discrete 
from the  others.  This  means  that  neuroscience,  clinical  psychology  and  psychopathology 
employ operational disciplinary language and methods of its own right and has limited if any 
intelligible  sense  in  the  other  two  fields.  In  addition  there  is  plethora  of  paradigm 
controversies which precludes the inter-disciplinary communication.
If we decide to focus for example on the case with the clinical assessment then a careful 
examination of the current methods reveals that a clinical psychiatric interview and a clinical 
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psychological  rating  scale  consist  of  same  kind  of  cognitive  content.  Nonetheless  both 
psychiatrists  and clinical  psychologists  claim that  their  tools  (sources  of  information)  are 
liable to mutual cross-validation. 
Psychological  tests  (e.g.  MMPI, Neo-FFI) are composed of self-evaluation reports  (items) 
formulated as questions or statements. Psychopathological structured interview (e.g. PANSS, 
MADRS, DSM-IV structured interview) are typically formulated in the terms of subjective 
experience indicated as symptoms (actually these are self reports recorded by the physician) 
complemented with the so called ‘signs’ or the presumably ‘objective’ observations of the 
overt behavior of the patient. 
The vast majority of the psychological assessment tools are standardized according to entirely 
“atheoretic” empirical procedure. In other words the items have been selected and keyed on 
the  basis  of  their  ability  to  distinguish  diagnostic  groups.  The  basis  for  the  presumed 
“independent” assessment is actually the clinical judgment of the psychiatrist.
The current diagnostic  hypothesis  is raised and developed under the dominant psychiatric 
standard and is then is supplemented with the clinical psychological results. It is assumed that  
the psychological  inventories  are  validated  back to  the psychopathological  constructs  and 
forward to the psychosocial outcome of the treatment.
Insofar none of the compounds of the structured psychopathological interview and the clinical 
psychological  rating  scales  is  independent  to  the  inter-subjective  patient  and professional 
narratives. Both kinds of dimensions (psychiatric and psychological) lay inside the domain of 
value-in subjective assessment of human psychology, namely the narrative. 
Therefore repeated  protocols  from various clinicians  which serve to sustain the reliability 
claim  of  the  ‘scientific’  DSM can  not  be  regarded  as  independent  measurement  for  the 
cognitive content and the value of the psychological rating scales or vica versa. Furthermore 
this undermines the potential to explain the mechanisms of production of mental disorders.
This is why they can not be credited as truly ‘external’ and ‘independent’ validity operations. 
We assert therefore that only value-free facts from neurobiological research can play this 
role. 
At the same time the inter-disciplinary structure of psychiatry involves many facets  from 
neuroscience which might regarded as one possible source of external validity as well as of 
explanation. Neuroscience shares many categories with psychopathology as mentioned above. 
However there are not introduced any relevant rules for "translation" of the data among these 
inter-connected domains of common interest.
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Instead in conventional context, expert committees have combined phenomenological criteria 
in variable ways into categories of mental disorders, repeatedly defined and redefined over the 
last half century. The diagnostic categories are termed “disorders” and yet, despite not being 
validated by biological criteria as most medical diseases are, are framed as medical diseases 
identified by medical diagnoses without any shared explanation of the mechanisms which 
produce them.
The  more  scientific  re-definition  of  mental  disorders  requires  intensive  dialogue  with 
neuroscience to reveal the connections with the person- and values-based understanding. One 
possible approach to achieve this goal would be to abandon the categorical taxonomy in favor 
of broader diagnostic constructs (such as dimensional and prototype units) which are endorsed 
or  “flanked”  with  data  from  neuroscience.  Those  broader  units  should  be  a  subject  of 
comprehensive evaluation of the personal narrative in context.
The epistemic  tool  of this  dialogue in  my perspective  should be the  translational  cross-
validation, represented in the Pitt model bellow1.
The  figure  bellow  represents  the  trans-disciplinary  nomothetic  network  of  clinical 
psychology,  psychiatry  and  neuroscience.  They  are  regarded  as  three  interconnected 
disciplinary matrixes, stabilized with cross-validity “bridging” structures. Each box illustrates 
a provisional common used term, where “A” stands for paranoia and “B” – for depression. 
The blue arrows indicate the bridges of convergent inter- and trans-disciplinary validity; the 
red arrows indicate divergent (discriminative) inter-disciplinary validity and the green arrows 
- discriminative trans-disciplinary validity.
1 Known also as SMS paradigm, the latter has been coined most recently by C. Robert Cloninger from the names 
of its authors: Stoyanov, Machamer and Schaffner.
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Experimentally this model entails simultaneous administration of clinical assessment tools 
with neurobiological measures. Its end-point implications are as follows:
(i) Replacement of  the neutral (or inert) visual picture stimuli in current neuroimaging 
designs,  since  those  can  serve  namely  and only as  neutral  in  terms of  diagnosis  
emotional stimuli. This is to say that such kind of stimuli have no diagnostic value 
and hence can not relate or be embodied into validity operations and have no capacity 
to integrate explanatory mechanisms. To overcome this issue we suggest that the brain 
imaging should involve real-time rating with disorder-relevant scales (such as MMPI) 
performed simultaneously with fMRI. 
(ii) Implement  this approach to mental states and dynamic mental disorders e.g. bipolar 
depression;
(iii)  Perform  it  as  convergent  validity  operation  between  clinical  and 
neurobiological  measures  in  order  to  contribute  to  psychiatric  validation  and 
explanation.
3. Conclusion:
The basic claim of this paradigm is that the different sources (or disciplinary matrixes) of 
explanation  should  be  enabled  to  converge  toward  an  overlap  of  the  neurobiological 
mechanisms  underlying  mental  disorder  and the  narrative  (s)  of  the  patient  in  real  time. 
Eventually such approach can facilitate the inter-domain translation of the shared terms in 
psychopathology, clinical psychology and neuroscience.
The introduction of such model has several consequences:
      A
      B
Clinical psychology
  
            A
   
            B
Psychopathology
          A
         B
Neuroscience
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• It sustains the validity of the trans-disciplinary nomothetic network, which should 
exist to connect psychiatry, psychology and neuroscience 
• Hence it sets a prerequisite for inter-domain translation
• Therefore  it  presents  a  prospect  for  bridging  the  explanatory  gap  between 
explanatory and ‘understanding’ domains of mental health knowledge.
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The Missing Self in Hacking’s Looping Effects. Forthcoming in Mental Kinds and Natural Kinds, H. 
Kincaid and J. A. Sullivan, eds. MIT Press. 
 
The Missing Self in Hacking’s Looping Effects 
Part I. Introduction 
           Significant philosophical discourse has been dedicated to the ontological status of mental 
disorders.
1
 The primary focus has been on whether mental disorders are natural kinds, i.e., whether they 
are similar to the kinds found in the non-human natural world, such as gold.
2
 Ian Hacking argues that 
mental disorders are human kinds, differing from natural kinds insofar as they are subject to the looping 
effects of scientific classifications.
3
 Mental disorders cannot be natural kinds precisely because being 
classified as having a mental disorder can bring on changes in the self-concept and behavior of 
individuals so classified. Such changes, in turn, can lead to revisions in the initial descriptions of mental 
disorders. Members of natural kinds, however, are not subject to such looping effects.  
The phenomenon of looping effects is considered a compelling challenge to the claim that 
mental disorders are natural kinds and, as such, is discussed widely by both Hacking’s followers and his 
critics. It is also widely resorted to by social scientists, especially those in critical disabilities studies, 
sociology and anthropology.
4
 Yet the inherent complexity of the phenomenon has not been addressed, 
even by Hacking himself. In particular, the causal trajectory in which looping effects are generated and 
the way in which the subject responds to being classified remain unclear. Nor it is clearly understood 
how looping effects come about in the context of psychopathology. With a view to filling in some of 
these gaps, in this chapter, I note two connected shortcomings in Hacking’s analysis of looping effects. 
First, his framework lacks an empirically and philosophically plausible account of the self to 
                                                
1
 See for example, Hacking 1986, 1995a, 1995b, 2007a, 2007b; Cooper (2004a, 2004b, 2007; Samuels 2009; Graham 2010; 
Zachar 2001. 
2
There is no uncontroversial definition of natural kinds (Cooper 2004a, 2004b). Philosophers who discuss whether mental 
disorders are natural kinds mostly work with specific examples from the natural kind family, such as water, gold, animals etc. 
(e.g., Hacking 1986; Cooper 2004a, 2004b; Khalidi 2010). I follow their lead in this chapter. 
3
Feedback effects and looping effects are used synonymously by both Hacking and his critics. Throughout this paper, I use 
the latter. 
4
 For some examples, see Carlson (2010); also Stets and Burke (2003).  
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 2 
substantiate the complex causal structure of looping effects. Second, he fails to engage with the 
complexity of mental disorder in the consideration of this phenomenon in the realm of psychopathology. 
Once the complexity of the selfhood and the complexity of the encounter with mental disorders are 
considered, it becomes clear that the causal trajectory of looping effects is more complex than hitherto 
envisioned. 
 Hacking uses the phenomenon of looping effects to articulate a dynamic nominalism, according 
to which the scientific classifications of human phenomena interact with those phenomena, leading to 
mutual changes. In other words, there is an interactive causal trajectory between scientific classifications 
and the subjects classified. Instead of describing what looping effects are, in reference to the features of 
the subject classified and the features of scientific classifications, Hacking uses examples to illustrate 
them. He includes not only mental disorders but also other human phenomena that are subject to 
scientific research, such as obesity, child abuse, refugee status. With these examples, Hacking shows 
how scientific classifications may generate changes in a subject’s self-conceptions and behavior. 
However, a full discussion of looping effects requires both an account of the way in which scientific 
classifications influence the subjects and an account of how and why the subject responds to being 
classified in the way she does. Such scrutiny requires recognition of what the self is, how self-concepts 
are formed and how behavioral changes are motivated. In addition, when the phenomenon of looping 
effects is considered in the context of psychopathology, this scrutiny requires recognizing the 
complexity of the ways in which mental disorder influences the subject. The encounter with mental 
disorder changes self-concept and behavior, and it is not easy – if indeed possible – to discriminate the 
influence of diagnosis of mental disorder on self-concepts and behavior from that of the mental disorder 
itself.  The fact that the diagnosed subject changes her self-concepts and behavior not only in response 
to being classified but also in response to her encounter with mental disorder reveals that the causal net 
of looping effects is much more complex than Hacking envisions. To the extent that he discusses the self 
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 3 
(he seems to be using self/person/subject/soul interchangeably),
5
 he is informed by a simplified account 
of personhood, which situates the subject somewhere between genetic and neurobiological dispositions 
and freedom of choice. Hacking neither offers an account of mental disorders nor embraces the complex 
ways in which they shape people’s self-concepts and behavior.  Due to his superficial treatment of the 
self and mental disorder, he fails to make explicit the necessary and sufficient conditions for looping 
effects to be generated. This caveat makes his account the target of several partially successful 
criticisms.
6
 
 In this chapter, I offer a close reading of Hacking’s work looping effects, evaluating his early 
and later works. Focusing primarily on the first arc of looping effects, i.e., how scientific classifications 
influence the subject classified, I show how he overlooks the complexities of the self and mental 
disorder. I then offer a model of the self, which I term the multitudinous self that substantiates the 
phenomenon of looping effects. To do so, in Part II, I expand on Hacking’s work on looping effects and 
emphasize his dynamic nominalism – the key to understanding the features of looping effects. In Part 
III, I focus on his application of looping effects to mental disorders. In Part IV, I zoom in on Hacking’s 
discussion of the self and indicate its superficiality. In Part V, I posit multitudinous self, a 
philosophically and empirically plausible model of the self that substantiates the complexity of looping 
effects in the context of psychopathology.  This model of the self, I point out, can help scientific 
research programs to taxonomize mental disorders and can facilitate successful interventions into the 
lives of those with mental disorders, allowing them to flourish.
7
 Thus, with the multitudinous self, I 
advocate a new style of reasoning about mental disorders in philosophy of psychiatry. 
 
Part II. Dynamic Nominalism and Looping Effects 
                                                
5
 For an example, see Hacking (2004). 
6
 See for example, Cooper (2004a, 2004b); Khalidi (2010). 
7
 Tekin (2011, 2010). 
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 4 
 The phenomenon of looping effects is the linchpin of a series of works on what Hacking calls 
“making up people,” which point to the way in which a new classification made by human sciences may 
bring a new kind of person into being.
8
 Looping effects have a double arc. The first is the influence of 
classifications on those so classified, and the second is the ways in which some of those who are 
classified – and altered – modify the systems of classification. Some people with mental disorders (e.g. 
multiple personality and schizophrenia) are subject to the looping effects of psychiatric classifications; 
but looping effects are not restricted to the domain of mental disorders. Other examples Hacking uses 
include women refugees, pregnant teenagers, child abusers, the obese and, the genius.
9
 
 Hacking’s dynamic nominalism is the metaphysical scaffolding for the phenomenon of looping 
effects; he explores “making-up people” by applying the realism versus nominalism debate to human 
phenomena.
10
 The fundamental question in this debate is whether there is anything in reality that 
corresponds to universals, or whether there are only particulars. Realists accept universals into their 
ontology as mind-independent objects, i.e., they believe that universals are given by nature and exist 
independently of any perceiving human mind. Nominalists, on the other hand, argue that there are no 
universals, and they are not to be included in our ontology. All that exists are particulars, and it is human 
convention that individuates particulars, according to human interests. Hacking applies this query to 
what he labels human kinds, e.g., kinds of human beings, their embodiment, character, emotions etc.
11
 
He asks whether human kinds are given by nature, sorted and categorized independently of human 
intellect, or whether they are artifacts of human conventions. Does our naming, conceptualizing, and 
classifying individuate phenomena in the human world? Or are human kinds determined by nature prior 
to our ordering them? Hacking’s traditional “static nominalist” would deny the existence of a mind-
                                                
8
 Hacking (1986, 1995a, 1995b, 1999, 2004, 2007a, 2007b). 
9
  Hacking (1986, 1995a, 1995b; 2007a, 2007b). 
10
 Although it is crucial to understanding the notion of looping effects, Hacking’s critics have not discussed this metaphysical 
framework (e.g., Cooper 2004a, 2004b; Khalidi 2010) 
11
 Hacking (1995b) 
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independent world sorted into neat categories,
12
 holding that all classifications, taxonomies and classes 
are imposed by human conventions, not by nature. Over time, these categories become fixed. The 
traditional realist, in contrast, is committed to the idea of a naturally ordered world; as science 
progresses, we come to recognize and name pre-given categories. These categories are independent from 
humans; we discover them through science.
13
 
Hacking’s dynamic nominalism is situated somewhere between traditional realism and static 
nominalism. He believes that “many categories come from nature, not from the human mind.”
14
 
However, these categories are not static, because the acts of sorting out, naming and classifying 
influence the individuals classified in those categories: 
The claim of dynamic nominalism is not that there was a kind of person who came increasingly 
to be recognized by bureaucrats or by students of human nature, but rather that a kind of person 
who came into being at the same time as the kind itself was being invented. In some cases, that 
is, our classifications and our classes conspire to emerge hand in hand, each egging the other 
on.
15
  
 
Dynamic nominalism, situated as it is between traditional nominalism and realism, tracks interactions 
over time between the phenomena of the human world studied by the human sciences and the 
classifications of these phenomena. It is “realism in action,” for Hacking, because “real classes of 
people” are sorted in new and specific ways; “making and moulding people as the events were 
enacted.”
16
 Another way of making sense of dynamic nominalism is thinking of it as “dialectical 
realism,” as Hacking points out. Kinds of individuals come into being as an outcome of the dialectic 
between classifications and the classified. The naming of individuals as an outcome of scientific inquiry 
“has real effects on people,” and such changes in people have “real effects on subsequent 
                                                
12
 Hacking (1986, 1995b). 
13
 Hacking (1986, 228). 
14
 Hacking (1986, 228). 
15
 Hacking (1986, 228). 
16
 Hacking (2004, 280). 
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classifications.” This phenomenon, for Hacking, can be captured neither by “an arid logical nominalism” 
nor by a “dogmatic realism.”
17
 
Hacking appeals to dynamic nominalism not only to elaborate on how sciences carve out human 
phenomena, but also to consider the implications of the study of human phenomena on the “possibilities 
of personhood.”
18
 Descriptions of human kinds influence the self-reflection of those human beings being 
described. Put otherwise, creating new ways of classifying people changes the subjects’ epistemic and 
moral relations with themselves, including their self-concepts and self-worth. New ways of classifying 
even changes how these subjects remember their own past.
19
 Hence, for Hacking, whenever 
philosophers think about persons as particulars, they “must reflect on this strange idea, of making up 
people.”
20
  
It is important to emphasize that even though dynamic nominalism provides the metaphysical 
scaffolding, there is no “uniform tale” or “general story to be told about making up people”:
21
 
If we wish to present a partial framework in which to describe such events, we might think of 
 two vectors. One is the vector of labeling from above, from a community of experts who create 
 a “reality” that some people make their own. Different from this is the vector of autonomous 
 behaviour of the person so labeled, which presses from below, creating a reality every expert 
 must face.
22
  
 
Although Hacking acknowledges the necessity to attend to both the scientific labeling from 
above, and individual’s response from below, in making sense of looping effects, I argue his primary 
focus is on how human sciences influence and change the subjects they study. This is evident in his 
strategy to explain the phenomenon of looping effects: in accordance with his dynamic nominalism, he 
provides a plethora of examples to illustrate how human sciences generate changes in the individuals 
they study. However, as I show in Part III, his analysis of how the self – the subject of scientific study – 
responds to being classified remains superficial.  
                                                
17
 Hacking (2004, 280). 
18
 Hacking (1986, 230). 
19
 Hacking (1995b, 369). 
20
 Hacking (1986, 230). 
21
 Hacking (1986, 233). 
22
 Hacking (1986, 234). 
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 Let me turn to Hacking’s understanding of how human sciences induce changes in the subjects 
they study. The goal of these sciences is to acquire systematic, general, and accurate knowledge about 
puzzling and idiosyncratic phenomena pertaining to human beings in “industrialized bureaucracies,” 
e.g., suicide, child abuse, multiple personality, obesity, refugee status. They seek to attain 
“generalizations sufficiently strong that they seem like laws about people, their actions, or their 
sentiments,” so that helpful interventions can be made.
23
 Unlike the objects of inquiry in natural 
sciences, the subjects of human sciences, i.e., human kinds, respond to how they are classified. Hacking 
demarcates between human and natural kinds by noting that human kinds are subject to looping effects 
due to the “self-awareness” of at least some of those classified:
24
 
 Responses of people to attempts to be understood or altered are different from the responses of 
 things. This trite fact is at the core of one difference between the natural and human sciences, 
 and it works at the level of kinds. There is a looping or feedback effect involving the 
 introduction to classifications of people. New sorting and theorizing induces changes in self-
 conception and in behaviour of the people classified. Those changes demand revisions of the 
 classifications and theories, the causal connections, and the expectations. Kinds are modified, 
 revised classifications are formed, and the classified change again, loop upon a loop.
25
 
 
Hacking’s best-known example of looping effects is multiple personality. Through this example, 
elaborated upon in the next section, the discussion of looping effects enters philosophical discussions of 
psychopathology, challenging the view that mental disorders are natural kinds.  
 
Part III. Mental Disorders and Looping Effects  
Hacking uses multiple personality as a “microcosm of thinking-and-talking about making-up 
people.”
26
 He wants to understand how “the sciences of the soul,” in their attempts to make the soul an 
                                                
23
 Hacking (1995b, 352). 
24
 Two other traits distinguish human kinds from natural kinds. First, human kinds pertain to certain people and behaviors at a 
particular time, in a particular social setting, while natural kinds refer to the same kinds at all times. Second, human kinds are 
laden with social values, e.g., schizophrenia is a mental condition that is “bad” and is to be “healed.” Natural kinds are value 
neutral, e.g., mud is not intrinsically good or bad  (Hacking 1995b, 367). 
25
 Hacking (1995b, 370, emphasis mine). 
26
 Hacking (1995a, 5). 
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 8 
object of scientific query, make up people.
27
 Thus, he is interested in the soul/subject/self/person
28
 
insofar as the soul is the object of scientific study; he does not consider the soul as a subject, i.e., he does 
not delve into what it is about the self that is prone to being made up.
29
 This poses a problem concerning 
the details of the mechanism of the first arc of the looping effects, namely, what it is about the subject 
that makes her amenable to changing her self-concepts and behavior after being classified.  
In Hacking’s view, the popularity of the phenomenon of multiple personality among 
philosophers in the late 1980s and the 1990s stemmed from the challenges it posed to widely accepted 
conceptions of the self. Simply stated, it “refute[d] the dogmatic transcendental unity of apperception 
that made the self prior to all knowledge.”
30
 Hacking observes that the symptoms that characterize 
multiple personality disorder changed over time, as knowledge of the illness entered popular culture 
under the combined influence of curious psychiatrists, TV show producers, and alliances of patients.  As 
Hacking sees it, those diagnosed with multiple personality start displaying different symptoms as they 
learn more about the illness and its manifestations in different individuals through popular culture, in a 
way that fits the popular descriptions of this condition. The changes in the symptoms they display, in 
turn, alter the classification of multiple personality. The following is a formulation of how looping 
effects are manifest in those with multiple personality: 
PM1: Psychiatry (as a human science) acquires systematic knowledge (K1) about human 
subjects (S1) who exhibit alternating personalities that are amnesic to one another. K1 picks out 
the perceived law-like regularities about S1 (e.g., alternating personalities). 
 
PM2: Based on K1, psychiatry forms classifications (CL1) of S1, labeling S1 “persons with 
multiple personality.” 
 
PM3: At least some individuals with multiple personality become aware of their categories, as 
K1 is disseminated in popular culture through the combined impact of psychiatrists, TV show 
producers, alliances of S1a and so on.
31
 (S1a), informed by K1, change their (b) behavior and (c) 
self-concepts.  
 
                                                
27
 Hacking (1986, 1995a, 1995b). 
28
 As noted above, he uses the self/soul/person/subject interchangeably, and I follow his lead. 
29
 Tekin (2010, 2011). 
30
 Hacking (1986, 224). 
31
 Hacking (1999, 106). 
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PM4: The awareness of being classified, the changes in the behavior and the changes in the self-
concepts of those classified (S1a) amount to changes in the perceived regularities about these 
people. S1a, different from S1, starts to feature new symptoms; e.g., they exhibit animal 
personalities. 
 
PM5: Changes in the perceived regularities of S1a lead to changes in knowledge (K1) about their 
classifications (CL1), because S1a no longer fits the criteria for CL1.  
 
CM: Thus, classification of some people as “people with multiple personality” results in the 
creation of new knowledge (K1a), new classifications (CL1a) and new kinds of people (S1a) 
(e.g., according to K1a, people with multiple personality may exhibit animal personalities). 
 
Hacking’s claim that looping effects are not manifest in natural kinds is challenged by those who 
advance what I call the Parity Argument (PA), according to which there are looping effects in natural 
kinds comparable to those observed in human kinds, and the interaction between classifications and 
individuals is not exclusive to the human or social realm.
32
 Proponents of PA suggest that our 
classificatory practices result in looping effects that alter some natural kinds, such as the influence of 
being classified as harmful on microbes, the influence of legal bans on the shape of marijuana, the 
influence of selective breeding on animals, and the influence of training on the domestication of dogs.
33
 
Corollary to PA is the failure of Hacking's claim that mental disorders are not natural kinds; if looping 
effects are not exclusive to human kinds but also are exhibited by natural kinds, it would be plausible to 
argue that those with mental disorders who exhibit looping effects can also be considered natural 
kinds.
34
  
Hacking, in his early writings, apparently foreseeing such objections, attempts to clarify 
precisely what is unique about the looping effects in human kinds. He emphasizes, through different 
examples, that in the case of human kinds, because subjects are “aware” of “what we are doing to them,” 
they are influenced by our “descriptions,” and they change their self-concepts and behavior 
accordingly.
35
 However, he is not consistent in his emphasis on the changes that occur in a subject after 
                                                
32
 See Bogen (1988);  Khalidi (2010); Cooper (2004a, 2004b). 
33
 (Bogen 1988, Cooper 2004a, 2004b; Khalidi 2010; Douglas 1986). 
34
 Cooper (2004a, 2004b) 
35
 Hacking (1999, 106). 
12-14 June 2012; Mugla, Turkey -209-
 
 10 
being classified. In particular, in some examples he postulates “being aware of being classified,” 
“changes in self-concepts,” and “changes in behavior” as individually sufficient changes that need to 
occur in the subject to generate looping effects (e.g., women refugees), while in others, all three are 
construed as jointly necessary changes for the looping effects (e.g., multiple personality). This 
inconsistency obscures his discussion of looping effects; it remains unclear whether these three variables 
are individually sufficient or jointly necessary for the looping effects to be generated. In his later 
writings, he adds new elements to the causal trajectory of the looping effects, but it remains unclear how 
and why the subject responds to being classified in the way she does.    
In his early work, Hacking takes into account that the scientific classification of certain microbes 
as harmful and the resulting interventions influence these microbes. Such influence, however, is 
different from the influence of being classified on people: 
Elaborating on this difference between people and things: what camels, mountains, and microbes 
are doing does not depend on our words. What happens to tuberculosis bacilli depends on 
whether or not we poison them with BCG vaccine, but it does not depend on how we describe 
them. Of course we poison them with a certain vaccine in part because we describe them in 
certain ways, but it is the vaccine that kills, not our words. Human action is more closely linked 
to human description than bacterial action is.
36
 
 
Hacking emphasizes here that in addition to the “intervention” facilitated by the classifications of human 
sciences, our “descriptions” guide subjects’ self-directed feelings, concerns and actions, generating 
changes in their self-concepts and behavior. Natural kinds, on the other hand, are not subject to such 
looping effects: our words do not lead to changes in the self-interpretations of natural kinds; it is our 
interventions, qua classifications, that change them.  
Elsewhere, Hacking develops this idea when he argues that naming and classifying, in and of 
themselves, do not make a difference in natural kinds: “the mere formation of the class, as separable in 
                                                
36
 Hacking (1986, 230, emphasis mine). 
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the mind, and in language, our continuing use of the classification, our talk about it, our speculation 
using the classification, does not ‘of itself’ have the consequences.”
37
  To this, he adds: 
If N is a natural kind, and Z is N, it makes no direct difference to Z, if it is called N. It 
makes no direct difference to either mud or a mud puddle to call it ‘mud.’ It makes no 
direct difference to thyrotropin releasing hormone or to a bottle of TRH to call it TRH. Of 
course seeing that the Z is N, we may do something to it in order to melt it or mould it, or 
drown it, breed it, barter it...But calling Z, N, or seeing that Z is N, does not, in itself make 
any difference to Z. If H is a human kind and A is a person, then calling A H may make us 
treat A differently, just as calling Z N may make us do something to Z. We may reward or 
jail, instruct or abduct. But it also makes a difference to know that A is an H, precisely 
because there is so often a moral connotation to a human kind. Perhaps A does not want to 
be H! Thinking of me as an H changes how I think of me. Well, perhaps I could do things 
differently from now on. Not just to escape opprobrium (I have survived unscathed so far) 
but because I do not want to be that kind of person. Even if it does not make a difference to 
A it makes a difference to how people feel about A – how they relate to A – so that A’s 
social ambiance changes.
38
 
 
Note that in the above citations, Hacking emphasizes how the classification (or naming) changes 
the subject’s epistemic and moral relations with herself. In other words, the category (the outcome 
of scientific query) into which the subject is placed, leads her to reflect on and judge herself 
differently. Being classified as A changes how she “thinks” about herself and her “self-worth.” 
Such self-related epistemic and moral changes are generated through the scientific knowledge of 
the categories and are mediated qua self and qua others (who share the same cultural and 
linguistic community). Thus, in human kinds, naming and classifying qua-self and qua-others 
change the person. But natural kinds change only when naming and classifying lead to 
interventions.  
Consider Hacking’s response to a PA proponent, Mary Douglas.
39
 Douglas, arguing for 
looping effects in microbes, suggests that microbes adapt themselves to the attempts to eradicate 
them (based on our classifying them as harmful) by mutating to resist antibacterial medications. 
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 Hacking (1992, 189-190). 
38
 Hacking (1995b, 367-368, emphasis mine). 
39
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This, in turn, eventually results in the modification of the classification scheme. To this argument, 
Hacking responds: 
My simple-minded reply is that microbes do not do all these things because, either individually 
or collectively, they are aware of what we are doing to them. The classification microbe is 
indifferent, not interactive.”
40
  
 
Hence, emphasizing the subjects’ “awareness” of “what we are doing to them” and the change in their 
self-concepts and behavior is Hacking’s way of distinguishing human kinds from natural kinds. 
However, he is not consistent in his emphasis on the “awareness” of being classified as a necessary 
condition for the generation of looping effects. Consider the following point about women refugees: 
A woman refugee may learn that she is a certain kind of person and act accordingly. Quarks do 
not learn that they are a certain kind of entity and act accordingly. But I don’t want to 
overemphasize the awareness of an individual. Women refugees, who do not speak one word of 
English, may still, as part of a group, acquire the characteristics of women refugees precisely 
because they are so classified.
41
  
 
Hacking presents women refugees’ inability to speak English as a detriment to the degree they are 
“aware” of their labels and to the extent of the knowledge they acquire about their categorizations. Yet 
lack of awareness or limited access to knowledge about their labels does not prevent them from 
“acquiring the characteristics” associated with their category. How refugee women acquire these 
characteristics is not clearly articulated by Hacking, but it appears to be closely connected to their social 
cognition. A plausible explanation may go as follows. A refugee woman's interactions with others, who 
treat her as such, may lead her to change how she operates in the world and shape her behavior in a way 
that fits the label “women refugee.”
42
  
Proponents of PA, in developing the claim that natural kinds may be subject to the looping 
effects that Hacking attributes to human kinds, point out the ambiguity in Hacking’s notion of 
                                                
40
 Hacking (1999, 106). 
41
 Hacking (1999, 32). 
42
 Changes in behavior are explainable as the outcome of “socialization,” a concept used in social psychology and sociology 
that is broadly defined as the way in which individuals are guided in becoming members of a social group. During their 
socialization, individuals conceptualize cultural knowledge like any other social information; they acquire, maintain, and 
apply these cognitive conceptualizations in their cognition and behavior (Kesebil, Uttal, Gardner 2010). The effects need not 
be conscious; indeed, they are often automatic. Women refugees may go through such socialization and unconsciously and 
automatically adapt to their labels. 
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“awareness” and discuss whether it is a necessary condition for looping effects to be generated. For 
instance, Muhammad Ali Khalidi, a PA proponent, looks at Hacking’s discussion of women refugee 
example.
43
 For Khalidi, this example is a testament to the idea that awareness is not a necessary causal 
variable in the trajectory of looping effects. Thus, “awareness of being classified” does not demarcate 
human from natural kinds. Rachel Cooper, another PA proponent, also considers Hacking’s emphasis on 
awareness. She suggests that awareness of being classified in itself does not show that human kinds 
cannot be natural kinds, because as it stands, Hacking’s discussion merely shows that “human kinds are 
affected by a mechanism to which other kinds of entity are immune.”
44
 Although this indicates a 
difference between human kinds and other kinds, she does not take it to be fundamentally significant 
because “many other types of entity can be affected by mechanisms to which only entities of that type 
are vulnerable.”
45
 In other words, PA proponents conclude that awareness of being classified is not 
necessary for generating looping effects; thus, natural kinds can exhibit looping effects. 
I will not develop it here in detail but in my view, PA proponents are seeking to deflate 
Hacking’s emphasis on the subject’s awareness of classification and the changes in her self-concepts 
upon being diagnosed. In particular, PA proponents neglect “the changes in self-concept” in Hacking’s 
premises (PM3, PM4), taking the classification-induced changes in the subject to be primarily changes 
in behavior and interpreting these as culminating in “alterations in the kind.” But Hacking himself fails 
to stress their importance: he does not offer a clear account of what a self-concept is, how self-concepts 
are formed or how exactly being labeled in a certain way changes a subject’s self-concepts. In addition, 
as the PA proponents rightly point out, Hacking is ambiguous about whether awareness of being 
classified is a necessary variable in looping effects. While I agree with the claim that natural kinds are 
subject to some feedback effects, I contend that the types of causal loops exhibited in natural and human 
kinds, especially in the case of psychopathology, are significantly different from each other due to the 
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complexity of selfhood and the complexity of the encounter with mental disorders. Once the 
shortcomings of Hacking’s account are remedied by including an empirically and philosophically 
plausible model of the self to the trajectory of looping effects (see Part V), the types of differences 
between causal loops in natural kinds and those with psychopathology are explicit.  
 Diagram 1 summarizes the causal web of looping effects in early Hacking. Scientific 
classifications influence and alter the self-concepts and behavior of those classified; this, in turn, 
influences and alters the initial classifications.  
 
 
My main concern with this framework is Hacking’s reduction of the subject/soul/person/self to 
“classified person.” Even when he considers the subject’s awareness of her label and the alterations in 
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self-concept and behavior, he does not offer a detailed scrutiny of the self – the subject of classification. 
He does not explain what is involved in subjects’ being “aware of what we are doing to them,” or how 
people are influenced by “our descriptions of them” and change their self-concept and behavior 
accordingly. Is it a rudimentary level of awareness, or is it reflective and more elaborate? What 
motivates changes in self-concepts and behavior?
46
  
 In fact, Hacking’s treatment of the “classified person” is superficial. This superficiality is 
problematic, especially when the phenomenon of looping effects is used in the context of 
psychopathology, as the subject of classification (or the clinical diagnosis) is also the subject of the 
mental disorder. In particular, the following three questions remain unanswered. First, how much of the 
change in the subject’s self-concepts and behavior is connected to the knowledge she receives about the 
diagnosis? Second, how much is connected to the particular mental disorder to which she is subject? For 
instance, if the mental disorder is disruptive of her “awareness” and connected capacities for self-
reflection, we need to take this into account. Aanosognosia in schizophrenia is a good example, as I note 
in due course. Third, how much of the change in the subject’s self-concepts and behavior is connected to 
the clinical “treatment” she receives from mental health professionals upon diagnosis? It is hard to 
isolate these, as changes in the subject can be connected to a few, none, or all factors. Answers require a 
detailed scrutiny of the self and a close examination of the mental disorder. Although Hacking fails to 
consider these questions, they have important implications to understanding what looping effects 
actually are.  
 In his later work, Hacking partially responding to PA, advocates the abandonment of the notion 
of “natural kind” altogether and offers a framework within which to understand looping effects. In this 
latter discussion of looping effects, the causal net is wider; it includes, not only the classifications and 
the individuals classified, but also experts, institutions, and knowledge as key generators of looping 
effects.   
                                                
46
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Consider first his abandonment of the concept of natural kind.
47
 He argues that there are now so 
many radically incompatible theories of natural kinds that the concept has self-destructed. Some 
classifications, he suggests are “more natural than others, but there is no such thing as a natural kind.”
48
 
This is not to say that there are not kinds in the world, but the idea of a well-defined class of natural 
kinds is obsolete.
49
 The sheer heterogeneity of the paradigms for natural kinds, for Hacking, invites 
skepticism.
50
 Calling something a natural kind no longer adds new knowledge; rather, it leads to 
confusion: 
Take any discussion that helps advance our understanding of nature or any science. Delete every 
mention of natural kinds. I conjecture that as a result the work will be simplified, clarified, and 
be a greater contribution to understanding or knowledge. Try it.
51
 
 
Corollary to this change, Hacking no longer employs the term human kind when referring to 
human phenomena studied by the human sciences. Instead, he writes exclusively about the causal net of 
looping effects and instances of making up people, continuing to illustrate the phenomenon with 
examples.
52
 He proposes a “framework for analysis” to understand the kinds of people studied by human 
sciences. In this new framework, the looping effects no longer occur on the two axes previously noted: 
classifications made by human sciences and people so classified. Rather, they occur between five axes, 
including the experts who classify, study, and help people classified, and the institutions within which 
the experts and their subjects interact. Additionally, there is an evolving body of knowledge
53
 about the 
people in question, as well as experts who generate the knowledge and apply it in their practice.  The 
interaction between these five elements leads to changes in individuals’ self-concepts and behavior, as 
well as to changes in each component of this causal network, which, in turn, change the classifications.  
                                                
47
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Thus, while in his earlier writings, Hacking focuses on how classifications lead to the alterations 
in self-concept and behavior of persons, in the new and more complex framework, the other three 
elements are equally responsible. He points to the experts involved in the research on human 
phenomena, and the connected interventions, arguing that by their engagement in these activities, they 
influence the subjects they study. Similarly, the institutional framework within which these subjects are 
studied or helped also influence the subjects’ self-concepts and behavior. Finally, the knowledge 
generated in this process is a mediator of change.
54
  Thus, the causal net of looping effects, according to 
this new framework, is much wider. See Diagrams 2 below for an illustration. 
 Hacking’s later framework is more responsive to how human sciences may generate changes in 
people’s self-conception and behaviour, with the inclusion of the instruments though which these 
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changes are mediated. However, Hacking still does not explain what it is that about the individual that 
makes her respond to being studied in the way she does. Hacking continues to overlook the complexities 
of the “classified people” and the complexities of mental disorders they are subject to. The three 
questions raised above remain unanswered. It is still not explicit (i) how much of the changes in the 
subject’s self-concepts and behavior are connected to the knowledge she receives about the diagnosis; 
(ii) how much of such changes are connected to her particular mental disorder; and (iii) how much of the 
changes in her self-concepts and behavior are connected to the clinical treatment she receives upon 
diagnosis. In other words, the course of illness and the influence of treatment remain excluded from the 
causal net of looping effects. 
Let me illustrate with a paradigm case why these three questions are important. This case, 
depicting the complexity of looping effects, exemplifies why we need to know the complexities of 
selfhood and the complexities of mental disorders to understand how, why, and when looping effects 
occur.
55
 Karl is a 26-year-old student working on a doctorate in music. He is known as a nice and 
respectful person. Although he is usually quiet, he opens up when he gets to know people. In his spare 
time, he teaches piano to children. He has two roommates. His dog has been with him since his early 
20s. While studying for his PhD comprehensive exams, he starts to hear voices and see horrifying 
images. The voices are loud; they order him to do things he does not want to do, such as hitting the walls 
of his bedroom. He sees flames burning in his surroundings. He is unable to sleep. He talks to himself in 
an attempt to quiet the voices in his head. He is confused. Due to these orientational obstacles connected 
to his condition, he behaves differently at home and at school: he does not talk to his roommates and 
ignores the walking hours of his dog. Karl sees a specialist. After a few visits, the specialist decides that 
his symptoms are best individuated with the diagnosis of schizophrenia; she prescribes a kind of 
                                                
55
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mental disorder experience, something neglected by Hacking. 
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medication that, in her experience, is effective in reducing/completely removing hallucinatory 
symptoms.  
Interrelated sets of conceptual and behavioral changes happen in Karl upon the diagnosis – the 
starting point of Hacking’s looping effects.  As Karl’s illness unfolds, he continues to hear voices and 
talk to himself, but the visual hallucinations diminish with the help of the medication. The immediate 
changes are mediated by his illness; his treatment influences how he behaves and how he conceives 
himself. For instance, after noticing people’s questioning looks when he is caught talking to himself, 
Karl spends less time in public spaces. For similar reasons, he stops giving piano lessons. His 
medication has side-effects, leading to more changes in his behavior: he sleeps too much and keeps his 
hands in his pockets to prevent them from shaking. The course of his illness and the treatment he 
receives also lead to alterations in his self-concepts. He used to consider himself a healthy person, fairly 
social, and a good dog-owner; now he considers himself ill and socially isolated, and contemplates 
giving his dog away as he is unable to care for him.   
The knowledge he gains about his mental disorder, as well as the stereotypes associated with it, 
also motivates changes in his self-concepts and behavior.  He surfs the internet, he consults books, and 
he reads the blogs and personal writings of other patients. He learns about aspects of his illness to which 
he was previously blind. After learning, for instance, that some schizophrenics have poor hygiene, he 
over-attends to his personal hygiene, to the extent that he annoys his roommates. Having encountered 
stereotypical representation of people with schizophrenia in the media about their inability to hold a job, 
he becomes skeptical of his ability to finish graduate school.
56
 He considers leaving graduate school, 
fearing that he is not well- suited to becoming an academic. Yet at times, he wants to continue. He is 
confused.  
                                                
56
 There is considerable evidence that stigma robs people with mental disorders of work, independent living, and important 
life opportunities (Corrigan, Edwards, Green, Diwan, and Penn 2001; Farina 1998; Farina and Felner 1973; Phelan, Link, 
Stueve and Pescosolido, 2000). Further, self-stigma may lead to impoverished self-esteem and self-efficacy (Corrigan and 
Holzman 2001; Corrigan and Lundin 2001; Wahl 1999). 
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Note that the changes Karl undergoes upon diagnosis are associated with (i) the knowledge he 
gains about his illness (including professional and cultural conceptions, as well as stereotypes), (ii) the 
course of his illness, and (iii) the clinical treatment he receives. Hacking’s looping effects, applied to 
psychopathology, primarily targets (i). As cited above, Hacking suggests that changes occur in the 
subjects due to their awareness of being classified, and that “new sorting and theorizing induces changes 
in self-conception and in behavior of the people classified.” In so suggesting, he takes knowledge about 
categories to be fundamental to the subject’s changes. However, in the example above , the changes in 
Karl’s self-concepts and behavior after diagnosis are not just mediated by (i), the knowledge Karl 
receives about his illness, but also by (ii), the course of his illness, and (iii), the psychiatric treatment he 
receives. It is difficult, therefore, to discriminate the influence of (i), (ii), and (iii) on Karl’s self-
concepts and behavior. If changes in the subject, i.e., “awareness of being classified,” “changing self-
concepts,” and “changing behavior” are the fundamental generators of looping effects, Hacking must 
explain what precisely leads to these changes. The course of the mental disorder and the treatment the 
subject receives are as influential as her knowledge of the illness. 
Nor does Hacking’s addition of new elements to the complex causal structure of the looping 
effects in his more recent work answer these questions.  While the explicit articulation of the interaction 
between institutions, experts, and knowledge, along with their separate and combined influence on the 
subject’s self-concepts and behavior, shows that the causal net of looping effects is wider and more 
complex than originally envisioned, it remains unclear how and why the subject responds to these 
factors in the way she does.  Hacking continues to consider the subject of human sciences as the 
“classified individual,” and overlooks the complexity of the self that is subject to a mental disorder. To 
account for precisely how and why self-concepts and behavior may change upon diagnoses, he needs to 
take into account (ii), the course of the illness, and (iii), the subject’s clinical treatment, not just (i), the 
knowledge the subject acquires about the illness. 
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These three questions can be answered by including the complexity of the self in the causal net 
of looping effects because the self is the subject of mental disorder, diagnosis, and treatment. The self is 
the agent of “awareness,” as well as the agent of the changes in self-concept and behavior – the three 
causal variables of looping effects. It is also necessary to acknowledge the complexity of the subject’s 
mental disorder. In Part V, I flesh out these contentions by including an empirically and philosophically 
plausible model of the self in its causal trajectory. 
 
Part IV. The Self/Soul/Subject/Person in Hacking 
Arguably, I am overstating my case, as Hacking did, in fact, albeit infrequently, write about 
selfhood. Be that as it may, my claim that Hacking’s “classified individual” does not depict the 
complexity of selfhood is supported by his writing.
57
 In “Between Michel Foucault and Erving 
Goffman: Between Discourse in the Abstract and Face-to Face Interaction” Hacking discusses his view 
of “making up people.” Here, he clarifies his notion of “personhood,” while developing his view that 
human sciences, in their classifications of people, their actions, and their sentiments, generate looping 
effects and make up new people. Hacking writes, and I cite at length: 
I must repeat my caution that there is not, and never will be any universally applicable theory of 
making up people. Just because dynamic nominalism is grounded in the intricacies of everyday 
and institutional life it will not lead to a general philosophical structure, system or theory. There 
is, nevertheless, a rather plausible general question in the offing. If we talk about making up 
people, we can sensibly be asked: ‘What is your idea of a person, who can be thus made up?’ I 
believe my own view was unwittingly formed in one of the heroic episodes of philosophy. 
Philosophy is heroic (in my version of events) when it tries to paint a picture of the whole human 
nature – and of the place of human beings in nature. Kant was heroic. Aquinas was heroic. 
Aristotle was heroic. I am the very opposite of heroic, not cowardly but proudly particularist. I 
think there is no fixed whole of human nature to discuss.
58
  
 
This particularist stance is shaped by Sartrean existentialism. Hacking states that he relies on Jean Paul 
Sartre’s conception of a person as a free individual with no essential features, who makes choices and 
creates his own destiny: 
                                                
57
 Hacking (2004). 
58
 Hacking (2004, 281, emphasis mine). 
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We are born with a great many essential characteristics that we cannot change. Most of us can 
change how fat or thin, how trim or flabby our bodies are. But we can make only the most 
miniscule alterations to our height. A very great many physical characteristics appear to be fixed 
at the moment of conception, and many more are determined before the fetus sees the light. We 
do not yet have the genetic technology to change that, even if it were desirable. Neurologists and 
cognitive scientists teach us the same about the brain – that a great many of our potential 
thoughts and thought processes are innate, and that many more mental traits are part of our 
biological constitution. Many of the possibilities available to us, and many of the constraints 
imposed upon us, were dealt us at birth. At most we can choose what to do with what is there, 
although we know little except the most obvious facts about what is ‘in our genes’ and what is 
the result of other developmental processes. The chances of birth, of family, of war, of hunger, of 
social station, of the supports and the oppression that can result from religion or caste – the 
chances of wanton cruelty or high rates of unemployment – once you start listing everything 
there does not seem to be much room for choice at all. But of course there is. All that stuff is the 
framework within which we can decide who to be.
59
   
 
It seems to me that Hacking places persons somewhere between “facticities” (to use Sartre’s terms) – 
one’s biological, genetic, neurological dispositions and limitations as well as social and cultural realities 
– and the “freedom” to choose whomever one wants to be in the face of these facticities, but he does not 
take into account the complexities involved in such placement. In other words, it is not straightforward 
to make choices in the face of facts; human decision-making capacities work in complex ways and do 
not allow one to “freely” make choices in the face of facticities. Consider, for instance, how he takes the 
existentialist motto “Existence precedes essence.” Despite “constraints” to freedom, one can still choose: 
I favour an almost existentialist vision of the human condition over an essentialist one. But that 
vision is wholly consistent with good sense about what choices are open to us. We take for 
granted that each of us is precluded from a lot of choices for the most mundane of physiological 
or social reasons. Social: as a young man growing up in Vancouver, I could not have chosen to 
be an officer in the Soviet Navy. Physiological: my father thought I should spend my first two 
university years at a college that trains officers for the Royal Canadian Navy, because tuition 
was free, I would get free room and board, and it would make a man of me. Happily my vision 
was not good enough for me to be accepted. So I had the moral luck not to have to make a 
choice between a fight with my family and enrolling in the naval college.
60
  
 
 But while trying to avoid an essentialistic account of the self, an attitude consistent with his 
dynamic nominalism, Hacking stumbles upon a simplistic account of the self that is not responsive to 
                                                
59
 Hacking (2004, 283). 
60
 Hacking (2004, 286).  
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the complexities of real experience, the features of selfhood that make us responsive to our social and 
cultural environments and to scientific classifications.
61
 This rather simplified account is not responsive 
to how selves actually experience the world, how they interact with others, how they develop self-
related concerns and change their self-concepts, or what motivates behavioral change and how 
individuals make choices. Empirical evidence in cognitive sciences supports these intuitions about the 
complexity of human cognition. They offer perspectives on how the self interacts with the social world, 
how self-concepts are developed, what factors motivate behavior and behavioral changes, how the self 
experiences mental disorder, and how mental disorders shape behavior and self-concepts.
62
 They point 
to the limitations of our computational capacities and those aspects of our reasoning processes that are 
driven by short-sighted reasoning strategies, cognitive biases, and opportunistic oversimplifications.
63
 
Such findings exhibit the complexity of selfhood and show that a Sartrean account is too simplistic. 
Most importantly, this simplistic account of the self does not enable us to answer the three questions 
raised above in the context of looping effects in psychopathology, i.e., how the subject’s self-concepts 
and behavior change in response to (i) knowledge about the illness, (ii) course of the illness and (iii) the 
clinical treatment. 
 
Part V. Multitudinous Self and Looping Effects 
In what follows, I substantiate the complexity of looping effects in the context of 
psychopathology by including what I call the multitudinous self in its causal trajectory.
64
 Multitudinous 
                                                
61
 Feminist philosophers have criticized Hacking’s neglect of the complexity of subjectivity and its inherent relationality, 
saying that, especially in his discussion of women’s experience of multiple personality, he neglects the importance of 
oppression on the way women remember their past. In particular, Susan Campbell challenges Hacking’s claim that the 
cultural acceptance of traumatic forgetting has allowed women to become suggestible to renarrating their past as having 
encountered and forgotten being abused as a child. Campbell criticizes Hacking’s failure to consider social and relational 
influences on how women remember their past, and to politically analyze women’s oppression (Campbell 2003, 192). 
62
 Neisser 1988; Flanagan 1991; Nisbett and Wilson 1977. Pennebaker 1993. Miller, Potts, Fung, Hoogstra and Mintz 1990. 
Marin, Bohanek, and Fivush 2008; Jopling 2000. 
63
 Gilbert 2006; Kosslyn 2006; Williams 2002. 
64
 The inspiration for this model of the self is the poem "Song of Myself" by Walt Whitman, where he proclaims, "Do I 
contradict myself? Very well, then, I contradict myself; (I am large—I contain multitudes.)" Special thanks to Owen 
Flanagan who steered me in the direction of these lines, hence the word "multitudinous."  
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self is an empirically and philosophically plausible model of the self that captures the complexities of 
mental disorders and the process in which alterations occur in self-concepts and behavior. Multitudinous 
self is a dynamic, complex, relational, multi-aspectual, and more or less integrated configuration of 
capacities, processes, states, and traits which support a degree of agential capacity subject to various 
psychopathologies.
 
To develop multitudinous self, I build on Ulric Neisser’s account of the self as a 
complex configuration specified by various kinds of information originating from the subject and its 
social and physical environment.65 Neisser argues that the forms of information that individuate the self 
are so different from one another that it is plausible to suggest that each establishes a different “self.” 
Therefore, he distinguishes five separate selves: the ecological self, or the self who perceives and who is 
situated in the physical world; the interpersonal self, or the self embedded in the social world who 
develops through intersubjectivity; the extended self, or the self in time grounded on memory and 
anticipation; the private self, or the self exposed to private experiences not available to others; and the 
conceptual self, or the self that represents the self to the self by drawing on the properties of the self and 
the social and cultural context to which she belongs. All five selves are empirically traced by research in 
cognitive sciences, including developmental psychology, social psychology, cognitive psychology, and 
neuroscience. 66   
Instead of construing these five as distinct selves, I take them to be five aspects of the self, 
forming the multitudinous self. Each aspect is identifiable from the first and third person point of view. 
These aspects are instrumental in connecting the subject to herself and to the physical and social 
environment in which she is situated.67 Multitudinous self can be construed as a self-organizing system 
of these five aspects, a locus of agency that remains more or less integrated through time. The ecological 
and intersubjective aspects of the self are based on perception and action and are present at the earliest 
                                                
65
 Neisser, 1988. 
66
 Neisser investigates each of these selves by appealing to a wide range of research in developmental, social and cognitive 
psychology.  He edited and co-edited several volumes on the different selves. For example see Neisser (1993); Neisser and 
Fivush (1994); Neisser and Jopling (1997). 
67
 Neisser (1988). 
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stages of human development. Meanwhile, the temporally extended, private, and conceptual aspects of 
the self are often grounded upon memory, reasoning capacities, the development of representational 
skills and language; they develop as the cognitive mechanisms mature.
68
 The ecological aspect is 
grounded in the body and is specified by the physical conditions of a particular environment and the 
active perceptual exploration of these conditions by the subject.
69
 It is continuous over time and across 
varying physical and social conditions.
70
 The intersubjective aspect is individuated by “species-specific 
signals of emotional rapport and communication” between the self and others.
71
 It appears from earliest 
infancy, as the infant engages in social exchange through interaction with caregivers.
72
 The temporally 
extended layer of the self is grounded on what the self remembers and anticipates. It relies on 
autobiographical memory or other stored information.
73
 What the subject recalls depends on what she 
now believes, as well as what she once stored. The private aspect of the multitudinous self contains the 
subject’s felt experiences that are not phenomenologically available to anyone else (such as pain); it 
appears when children first notice that some of their experiences are unique to them.
74
  
What is most important for the purposes of this chapter, is the conceptual aspect of the 
multitudinous self, because it hosts self-concepts, which are influential in guiding behavior. Self-
concepts selectively represent the self to the self. They are the products of the dynamic interaction 
between the aspects of the self, and the features of the social and cultural environment. In turn, self-
concepts inform and shape the aspects of the self as well as some features of the social and cultural 
                                                
68
 See Neisser (1988); Jopling (1997);  Pickering (1999); Gibson (1993). 
69
 Neisser 1988). Eleanor Gibson calls this the “rock-bottom self” that collects information about the world and interacts with 
it (1993, 41). 
70
 Jopling (1997, 2000). 
71
 Neisser (1988, 387). 
72
 See Trevarthen (1980); Neisser (1988); Fogel (1993); Murray and Trevarthan (1985); Bowlby (1969); Stern  (1993). 
73
 Bartlett (1932). 
74
 It is difficult to determine when introspective reference to private experiences develops, but many studies show that 
children are aware of the privacy of their mental life before the age of five. The four-year-olds tested by Moessler et al., for 
example, clearly understood the notion of a “secret” (Moessler et al, 1976). 
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environment. Self-concepts are thus informed by the features of the four aspects of the multitudinous 
self, the subject’s embodied experiences in the world (such as illness).
75
 Let me consider them in turn. 
Self-concepts include ideas about our physical bodies (ecological aspect), interpersonal 
experiences (intersubjective aspect), the kinds of things we have done in the past and are likely to do in 
the future (temporally extended aspect), and the quality and meaning of our thoughts and feelings 
(private aspect).
76
 For instance, my self-concept as a “friendly person” is a product of the intersubjective 
aspect of my selfhood and of the norms of friendliness in the culture I am a part of.  
Self-concepts are informed by the pathologies the person is subject to. This influence is mediated 
by: the changes that occur in the ecological, intersubjective, temporally extended, and private aspects of 
the self due to illness; the scientifically based or folk psychological knowledge available to the person 
about her illness; and her self-narratives in making sense of her condition.
77
 For example, having lung 
cancer affects my ecological self by, say, making it difficult for me to breathe, and this may lead to 
alterations in how I conceive myself and limit my actions (I may decide to stop running outside). This, 
in turn, affects my self-concept about my body, something tied to my ecological layer (I may form a 
self-concept as a person who has difficulty breathing). Or consider Karl. Due to the voices he hears, he 
talks to himself. In order to avoid being seen speaking to himself, he stops taking public transit. His self-
concept as a responsible person caring for the environment by using public transit may shift, in the light 
of his altered behaviour.
78
  
Self-concepts are shaped by folk and scientific knowledge available to the subject about her 
illness. For instance, what Karl learns about the course of his illness from various scientific and folk 
media may lead him to alter his self-concepts. Prior to his illness, he considers himself someone who 
                                                
75
 Neisser (1988).Jopling 1997, Tekin 2011 
76
 See Jopling (1997, 2000); Neisser (1988). 
77
 Tekin (2010, 2011). 
78
 Of course, not every illness experience leads to alterations in self-concepts. People with psychotic disorders such as 
delusional disorder (once known as paranoia), and schizophrenia commonly suffer from anosognosia - that is, a lack of 
awareness of their disorder, its symptoms, and its severity (Amador, Seckinger 1997; Amador, Strauss, Yale and Gorman, 
1991). Such psychiatric patients may not change their self-concepts in response to the illness experience. 
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wants to pursue a career in academia, but upon learning the scientific accounts of the course of his 
illness, he revises his self-concepts.  In addition, the narratives Karl tells himself about his illness may 
alter his self-concepts.  
Self-concepts are action-guiding; our ideas about ourselves inform how we behave. My self-
concept of my physical strength affects my physical activities: I may or may not reach out to lift a 
suitcase depending on how strong I feel and how heavy I perceive the suitcase to be. Similarly, my self-
concept about my intelligence and ability to learn new philosophical material influences what I can 
actually learn or how well I do in a job interview. Similarly, in the context of mental disorders, the self-
concepts formed or altered in this vein influence subject’s actions. For instance, Karl’s concept of 
himself as a person with schizophrenia who will be unable to finish the graduate school may in fact 
influence his decision to quit the graduate program he is enrolled. Similarly, his self-concepts may 
constrain or expand his resources in responding to his illness.
79
 Perceiving himself as someone who 
needs help he may reach out to communities of individuals who experience a similar condition. Thus, 
self-concepts motivate the subject to think, act, and behave in certain ways, restricting or expanding her 
possibilities for action.
80
 
Note that the multitudinous self incorporates psychopathology in its structure, taking it as a 
possible feature of the self. Mental disorder is broadly construed in this model of the self by considering 
how well the subject functions with respect to the layers that connect her to her self, her social world, 
and the physical world; it takes the complexity of selfhood as the norm.  As multitudinous self embraces 
the complexity of being subject to psychopathology, we can use it to make sense of how self-concepts 
change after the subject receives a diagnosis of mental disorder. Self-concepts and behavior change due 
to: (i) the subject’s knowledge of the illness, as Hacking emphasizes in his discussion of looping effects; 
as well as (ii) the course of illness; and (iii) the psychiatric treatment the subject receives.  
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 Tekin (2010, 2011). 
80
 Tekin (2010, 2011); Jopling (1997); Tekin forthcoming. 
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The multitudinous self illuminates the case study cited above. Karl’s experience with 
schizophrenia can be traced through the five aspects of the multitudinous self. The symptoms of 
schizophrenia, such as hearing voices and encountering hallucinations, are part of the private aspect of 
the self. These can also be traced through the ecological aspect, insofar as some neurochemical changes 
are associated with such experiences. Schizophrenia compromises Karl’s interpersonal relationships; he 
does not talk to his roommates and ignores the walking hours of his dog, phenomena linked to the 
intersubjective aspect of his selfhood. Schizophrenia may also compromise Karl’s plans for the future 
and his feelings about the past, thereby affecting the temporally extended aspect.  
All these alterations in the way Karl experiences himself and the world change how he conceives 
himself and how he behaves. The diagnosis he receives, the psychiatric treatment that accompanies the 
diagnosis, the onset of schizophrenia, the social treatment he receives from his community, and the 
knowledge he acquires about his illness lead to interrelated changes in his self-concepts and behavior. 
As discussed above, some symptoms may diminish while others remain: although he may continue to 
hear voices and talk to himself, the visual hallucinations may diminish with the help of the medication. 
But other experiences may present themselves; he may start sleeping excessively, for instance, or he 
may become more socially isolated. His former conception of himself as a healthy person, fairly social, 
and a good dog-owner may be replaced by the idea that he is ill and socially isolated.  Knowledge he 
gains about his schizophrenia, the cultural stereotypes and prejudices associated with it, and the self-
narratives he creates will all influence his self-concepts and behavior.  
Thus, the changes in Karl stem not only from (i) the knowledge he gains about his illness 
(including professional and cultural conceptions as well as stereotypes), as Hacking emphasizes, but also 
from (ii) the illness itself and (iii) the clinical treatment he receives. Thus, Hacking’s discussion of 
looping effects, insofar as it emphasizes (i), is only the tip of the iceberg; the changes in those receiving 
a psychiatric diagnosis are more complex, given the dynamic and multilayered nature of selfhood and 
the complexity of the encounter with mental disorder. 
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Multitudinous self bolsters our understanding of looping effects by explaining how and why the 
self responds to being studied in the way it does. To sum up, three features of the multitudinous self 
framework permit such scrutiny: (i) multitudinous self explains the reflective influence of psychiatric 
diagnosis on people; (ii) it considers the illness experience as a part of the self-experience of the subject; 
and (iii) it explains how the clinical and intersubjective treatment the subject receives changes her self-
concepts and behavior. 
In short, multitudinous self is an empirically and philosophically plausible model of the self; the 
aspects of the self are responsive to experiences of actual people as we encounter them in daily life and 
can be scrutinized by multiple, interdisciplinary scientific analyses.
81
 As unexplainable phenomena will 
remain despite the multiple approaches offered by various sciences and first-person accounts of 
selfhood, it is important to work with a model of the “self” rather than the particular layers of the self 
which can be clustered as, say, “genetic make-up,” or “moral luck” (as Hacking does). Doing so 
prevents the reduction of a complex set of questions pertaining to the self and mental disorders. Without 
the multitudinous model of the self, in other words, we will lose important information about actual 
persons. Diagram 3 lays out the multitudinous self. 
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 Flanagan, natural method. 
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Part VI. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I filled in some gaps in Hacking’s account of looping effects by introducing the 
multitudinous self in its causal trajectory. In particular, I have argued that there are two connected gaps 
in Hacking’s analysis of looping effects. First, an empirically and philosophically plausible account of 
the self is missing in the causal structure of looping effects. Second, Hacking fails to engage with the 
complexity of mental disorder in the consideration of this phenomenon in the realm of psychopathology. 
Due to these shortcomings, it is not explicit in Hacking’s looping effects how exactly classifications of 
mental disorders change the self-concepts and behavior of those diagnosed with these conditions. I 
offered an empirically and philosophically plausible model of the self that I call the multitudinous self 
which fills in these gaps. Multitudinous self, capturing the complexity of selfhood and the encounter 
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with mental disorder, makes explicit how self-concepts are formed, how they evolve, and how they 
motivate behavioural changes in the subjects. Grounded as it is in the sciences of the mind and 
responsive to the experiences of those living with mental disorders, the multitudinous self better 
explains the causal trajectory of looping effects. Multitudinous self, I further suggested, is a fruitful 
schema for both the scientific research programs in their investigation of mental disorders and the 
clinical and ethical contexts in facilitating successful interventions into the lives of those with mental 
disorders, allowing them to flourish. Thus, with the multitudinous self, I advocate a new style of 
reasoning about mental disorders in philosophy of psychiatry. 
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1. Introduction.   In their recent book, Biology’s First Law, Dan McShea and Robert 
Brandon say that they are trying to bring about a “fundamental gestalt shift in how we 
view evolutionary theory” (2010, p. xi, Cf. p. 128).  Their proposed Gestalt shift involves 
a resetting of the default, or zero-force expectation concerning structural complexity. By 
“structural complexity” they mean something like internal variance, or internal 
heterogeneity of parts.  They are not talking about functional or adaptive complexity. 
According to what we might call the received view, stasis (i.e. no change in structural 
complexity) is the natural state of an evolutionary system, and any directional changes, 
such as complexity increase, need to be explained by invoking evolutionary forces such 
as selection.  According to McShea and Brandon’s zero-force evolutionary law (or 
ZFEL), the default expectation is that complexity will increase over time.  So if we see 
certain lineages—such as, say, bacteria—that persist for a very long time with no 
complexity increase, we might explain that on the hypothesis that there is selection 
against greater complexity.  This, the proposed Gestalt shift turns the ordinary 
understanding of the relationship between selection and complexity on its head.
In this paper, I examine one initially promising strategy, which I call the relaxed 
forces strategy, for using empirical evidence to discriminate between rival natural state 
theories. The first step is to identify a case in which one has independent evidence that 
the relevant evolutionary forces are inoperative.  Then one checks to see if the default 
expectation specified by the natural state theory in question is indeed satisfied under the 
relaxed forces condition. In section 2, I show how Darwin used this strategy to defend his 
1This paper derives from comments on Biology’s First Law that I gave at an author-meets-critics session at 
the 2011 ISHPSSB meeting in Salt Lake City, Utah.  I am especially grateful to Robert Brandon, Chris 
Haufe, and Dan McShea for their thoughtful responses to the comments, and for helpful conversation about 
the ZFEL.  Thanks also for helpful comments from an audience at POBAM 2012, in Madison, Wisconsin.
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Malthusian claim that the natural state of any biological population is geometrical 
growth.  In section 3, I go on to show how McShea and Brandon use this strategy to help 
build their empirical case in favor of the ZFEL. 
I argue, however, that the relaxed forces strategy suffers from a serious defect. 
The problem is that what counts as a relaxed forces condition depends on the natural state 
theory that one already holds.  It is not possible to identify a relaxed forces condition 
without presupposing the very theory that one wants to put to the test.  I contend, in 
section 4, that this circularity problem means that the relaxed forces strategy cannot 
discriminate between rival natural state theories.  Darwin’s main argument for his 
Malthusian theory of population is circular.  This problem also weakens McShea and 
Brandon’s empirical case for the ZFEL.  In section 5, I consider some possible responses 
to the failure of the relaxed forces strategy.  
2. Darwin’s use of the relaxed forces strategy.  Consider an example of two rival 
natural state or inertial state theories about population size:
The first theory says that the natural state of any biological population is to 
remain stable at a given size.  If the population has n members at a time, and if no 
external forces or pressures impinge upon it, then it will still have n members at the end 
of some specified time interval.  If the population grows or shrinks, then the change in the 
population’s size is to be explained in terms of external forces acting upon it.  The default 
expectation is no change in population size.  Deviations from that expectation need to be 
explained.2  
The second theory—Darwin’s—says that the natural state of any biological 
population is geometrical growth.  If the population has n members at a time, and if no 
external forces or pressures act upon it, then it will have 2n members at the end of a 
specified time interval.  Thus, a population that begins with 2 individuals will contain 4 at 
the end of the first time interval, eight at the end of the next interval, and so on. If the 
population grows at a slower rate or not at all, that deviation from what is expected is to 
be explained in terms of external ecological forces.
These two theories have the same structure, but they introduce different default 
expectations.  They make different claims about which is the inertial state of the 
population.  We cannot easily discriminate between the two theories by studying actual 
populations in nature.  Suppose we observe a population that’s growing, but at a rate 
much slower than the geometrical rate that is, in some sense, “predicted” by the second 
theory.  Both theories need to explain what’s going on, but the explanations will run in 
opposite directions.  The first theory needs to explain why the population is growing at 
all; the second needs to explain why it is growing more slowly than expected.  In 
principle, both theories can handle any observed rate of growth, but they will do so in 
different ways, by appeal to different packages of external forces. 
2 Compare Sober (1980, pp. 360 ff.) on the general structure of natural state models.  
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Darwin knew well that actual populations in nature rarely, if ever grow 
geometrically, and that if they do, it’s only for a short while under special conditions. 
Virtually every population that we can observe violates the default expectation of his 
Malthusian theory of population growth.  But far from treating observed populations as 
evidence against his theory, Darwin saw them as an opportunity to put his theoretical 
machinery to work.  He offers a rich catalogue of external ecological forces—predation, 
disease, food scarcity, and so on—that serve as checks to population increase. 
There is an attenuated sense of “predict” in which a natural state theory predicts 
whatever it specifies as the default expectation.  Thus, we might say that Darwin’s 
Malthusian theory predicts that populations will grow geometrically.  This usage creates 
the impression that we can test the theory in question by checking to see whether the 
default expectation—the “prediction”—is satisfied.  This usage is somewhat misleading, 
however.  Nonconformity with the default expectation does not in itself constitute 
evidence against a natural state theory.  It is, rather an opportunity to deploy the 
explanatory machinery of that theory.
What then (if anything) would constitute evidence against a natural state theory? 
The relaxed forces strategy provides one initially promising answer to this question. 
Suppose we have independent evidence that the various external forces that may act upon 
a system are relaxed, so that the system is in something approximating the zero-force 
condition.  In such cases, where we already know that the external forces are relaxed, we 
can then look to see whether the system conforms to the default expectation.  If not, then 
that would be evidence against the natural state theory.  In other words, violations of the 
default expectation do constitute evidence against the theory, but only in those cases 
where we already know that the relevant external forces are relaxed.  [add: Natural state 
theories do seem to generate testable predictions about what the system will do when 
external forces are relaxed.]
In the Origin of Species, Darwin at one point seems to use the relaxed forces 
strategy to argue for his Malthusian principle that “each organic being is striving to 
increase at a geometrical ratio” (1859, pp. 78-79).  
But we have better evidence on this subject than mere theoretical 
calculations, namely, the numerous recorded cases of the astonishingly 
rapid increase of various animals in a state of nature, when circumstances 
have been favorable to them during two or three following seasons.  Still 
more striking is the evidence from our domestic animals of many kinds 
which have run wild in several parts of the world:  if the statements of the 
rate of increase of slow-breeding cattle and horses in South America, and 
latterly in Australia, had not been well authenticated, they would have 
been quite incredible … (1859, pp. 64-65).
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Darwin’s reference to “favorable circumstances” suggests that he has in mind cases 
where the ordinary ecological checks to population growth are relaxed.  The cases of 
introduced species that he proceeds to discuss are also plausibly cases in which many 
checks to increase, such as food scarcity and predation, are relaxed.  Darwin’s argument 
seems to be that in these cases where the forces limiting population growth are relaxed, 
rare though such cases may be, we do in fact typically see growth at the expected 
geometrical rate.  
Few biologists today accept Darwin’s Malthusian claim that geometrical growth is 
the natural state of any biological population.  This Malthusian view is no longer 
regarded as essential to the theory of natural selection.  Darwin himself, however, thought 
that he had some empirical support for his preferred natural state theory.  Insofar as 
biologists no longer find Darwin’s argument too convincing, it’s worth asking why.  Is 
there some problem specific to Darwin’s own use of the relaxed forces strategy?  Or is 
there some deeper problem with the strategy itself?  In section 4, I will argue that the 
latter is indeed the case.
Newtonian mechanics is another familiar example of a natural state theory. 
(Interestingly, McShea and Brandon draw an explicit analogy between the ZFEL and 
Newton’s theory [2010, p. 6].)  The relaxed forces strategy clearly would not work well 
as a test of Newton’s theory.  We’d have to identify an object that is not being acted upon 
by any physical forces, and then check to see whether the object exhibits uniform 
rectilinear motion.  The problem here seems like a practical one: the relaxed forces 
condition seems impossible to bring about, or even to approximate, because the 
interfering forces are always operative.  In other contexts, however, such as those 
involving evolutionary systems, we might really be able to observe a system in the 
relaxed forces condition.
3. McShea and Brandon’s predictive test of the ZFEL.  Much as Darwin argued that 
biological populations have a natural tendency to grow at a geometrical rate, so McShea 
and Brandon argue that all evolutionary systems naturally tend toward greater structural 
complexity/heterogeneity. They readily acknowledge that the ZFEL is not an ordinary 
empirical generalization of the form, All F’s are G’s (2010, p. 7).  They do insist, 
however, that it is empirically testable:
The ZFEL is not analytic.  It is not true as a matter of logic or 
mathematics, as is biology’s so-called Hardy-Weinberg Law.  Rather, it is 
synthetic, making an empirical claim about the way the world is (2010, p. 
6).3
3 McShea and Brandon’s views about the status of the ZFEL are quite nuanced.  They say that the ZFEL is 
a synthetic, empirical claim, but then they also say, elsewhere, that it is “ultimately reducible to probability 
theory,” which at first blush would seem to suggest that the ZFEL is analytic.  But McShea and Brandon 
also hold that “there is a bit of probability theory that is not pure math” (2010, p. 109).  
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In the course of the book, they argue that there is quite a lot of empirical evidence 
for the ZFEL, and they propose some empirical tests of it.  Like Darwin, they use 
the relaxed forces strategy in order to build their empirical case for the ZFEL.
McShea and Brandon take care to define the ZFEL in such a way that it only 
applies to biological systems:
ZFEL (special formulation): In any evolutionary system in which there is 
variation and heredity, in the absence of natural selection, other forces, and 
constraints acting on diversity or complexity, diversity and complexity 
will increase on average (2010, p. 3).
Strictly speaking, the ZFEL does not apply to systems that do not exhibit variation and 
heredity.  McShea and Brandon do at least consider a more generalized version of the 
ZFEL—the G-ZFEL—that would apply to all physical systems (p. 112).4   They use the 
example of a freshly painted picket fence to illustrate the ZFEL.  Strictly speaking, 
though, the picket fence would only be an instance of the G-ZFEL, and not of the ZFEL 
proper, because the picket fence is not “an evolutionary system in which there is variation 
and heredity.” 
To begin with, all the pickets in the freshly painted fence look more or less the 
same; there is very little internal differentiation among the parts of the fence.  Over time, 
however, the different pickets come to exhibit different patterns of weathering.  The paint 
peels a little more on those most exposed to the sun.  One or two of the pickets begin to 
rot away where they make contact with the ground.  One is knocked loose by a soccer 
ball.  Over time, what began as a homogeneous system becomes more and more 
heterogeneous.  The fence gets more complex, in McShea a Brandon’s technical sense. 
It’s tempting to say—and McShea and Brandon do say—that in this example, increasing 
heterogeneity is what we should expect.  If the fence remained homogeneous for a long 
time, that would be surprising and would need explanation.  Maybe someone repaints it 
periodically.  That, at least, is the kind of external force we’d have to invoke in order to 
explain why heterogeneity does not increase.
Even here, though, with this lovely stage-setting example, it’s not clear that any 
evidence compels us to set the default expectation one way rather than another.  One 
could also formulate a rival natural state theory in which stasis—i.e., no change in 
internal variance—is the default expectation and deviations from that are what need to be 
explained.  Complexity increase, for example, would need to be explained in terms of the 
differential action of external forces—sun, wind, rain, soccer balls, and the like—on the 
pickets.  The general point is that we seem to have some flexibility in determining what 
the default expectation is going to be, and hence some flexibility in deciding which 
4 This generalized version of the ZFEL is a descendant of Herbert Spencer’s law of the instability of the 
homogeneous.
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natural state theory to work with.  It’s not clear that any actual observations of the fence 
itself will tell us what the natural state is—whether it is increasing complexity or stasis. 
If we watch the fence, we’ll see that complexity does in fact increase, but both natural 
state theories can handle that observation equally well.   
In a recent review of McShea and Brandon’s book, Matthen (2011) describes what 
he seems to think is a counterexample to the generalized ZFEL (or G-ZFEL).  Imagine a 
large mural on a wall, done in the pointillist style of Seurat.  The mural has a huge 
amount of internal variance; each dot is slightly different from the others.  Over time, the 
colors fade and the heterogeneity of the system diminishes.  This increasing homogeneity 
seems just the opposite of what the ZFEL says we should expect.   
Matthen, in fact, does more than merely suggest that the fading pointillist mural is 
a counterinstance of the ZFEL.  He wants to make a deeper point that whether complexity 
is increasing or decreasing may well depend on our level of description of the mural.  It’s 
most natural, perhaps, to say that the fading of the mural involves decreasing internal 
variance.  But what if we focused instead on the spatial locations of the molecules of blue 
pigment.  Let’s imagine that there is just one bright blue region in the freshly painted 
mural.  At the beginning of the process, the molecules of blue pigment have a low degree 
of spatial variance; they’re all in the same area.  As the painting fades, and the molecules 
of pigment weather off, their spatial variance increases.  Many of them end up out in the 
environment.  And that’s an increase in complexity in McShea and Brandon’s sense.
There is a more straightforward point here that Matthen might have made but 
doesn’t. Even setting aside Matthen’s argument concerning levels of description, it isn’t 
entirely clear why anyone would think that the fading pointillist mural would be a 
counterexample to the ZFEL in the first place.  Yes, the fading mural is a system that 
violates the default expectation of increasing internal variance.  This just means that we 
have to invoke external forces—such as the sun and the elements—in order to explain the 
surprising decrease in complexity this case.  A deviation from the default expectation of a 
natural state theory is not a counterexample to that theory.  It is, rather, an occasion to put 
the theory to work by invoking external forces.
Part of the appeal of the relaxed forces strategy is that it seems to permit novel 
predictive tests of natural state theories.  Although there is quite a bit of debate about 
what makes a prediction novel, and why novelty should confer any extra evidence over 
and above the evidence we already get from showing that a theory has true observational 
consequences, some philosophers think of novel predictive success as the very best sort 
of evidence that one can give for a theory (see, e.g. Leplin 1997).  And it seems possible 
to make novel predictions about what one will observe in cases where the external forces 
are relaxed.
McShea and Brandon argue that the ZFEL passes at least one interesting novel 
predictive test, and they propose some other tests in the same vein.  I want to focus here 
on the test that they showcase a bit (2010, pp. 73-76).
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Consider the following experiment:  Subject male mice to doses of radiation, and 
then look at the effects on the vertebral columns of their offspring.  “The ZFEL prediction 
is that, absent selection and constraint, offspring will tend to be morphologically more 
complex than their parents” (2010, p. 73).  One appealing thing about focusing on the 
vertebral column is that it is relatively straightforward to arrive at a measure of 
complexity.  The mammalian vertebral column lends itself to division into part types 
(cervical, thoracic, lumbar, etc.).  In the imagined experiment, one can come up with a list 
of possible changes in the rat vertebrae that would all count as increases in complexity in 
McShea and Brandon’s technical sense.  These changes include:
• Dyssympysis, in which to pieces of a vertebra fail to fuse property during 
development.
• The total absence of one part of a vertebra, such as a neural arch.
• The duplication of one part of a vertebra.
• The fusion of two adjacent vertebra.
• Any malformation or change in size of one vertebra.
After irradiating the male mice, study the complexity of the vertebral columns of their 
offspring.  How many of the changes observed led to increases in complexity, and how 
many led to decreases in complexity?  Examining the offspring mice as newborns is a 
way of making sure that selection has no chance to operate (although McShea and 
Brandon acknowledge that there is some differential survival before birth), thus making 
this a relaxed forces case.  Does complexity increase when selection is relaxed?
It turns out that it does.  In the 1960s, some scientists at Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory actually carried out the above procedure, though obviously not with the aim 
of testing the ZFEL (Ehling 1965).  They divided the observed morphological changes 
into two groups.  The class I changes occurred in just one animal, while the class II 
changes occurred in more than one animal.  The researchers observed 20 class I changes 
in 10 animals, and 16 class II changes.  After going back and reviewing Ehling’s study, 
McShea and Brandon determined that no fewer than 17 of the class I changes involved 
increases in structural complexity, while all of the class II changes did.  The ZFEL 
predicts that when the relevant external forces (especially selection) are relaxed, 
complexity will increase.  That prediction was clearly born out in this case.  What’s more, 
the prediction is a genuinely novel one in the epistemic sense, which is the sense that 
counts.  The ZFEL was not in any way tailored to accommodate these results.  Even 
though the experiment was done back in the 1960s, McShea and Brandon presumably 
didn’t formulate the ZFEL with these results in mind.
4. A circularity problem for the relaxed forces strategy.  The relaxed forces strategy 
requires that we be able to specify in advance which cases are the ones where the forces 
are relaxed.  We are then supposed to look at those cases to see whether the default, or 
zero-force expectation is at least approximated.  But how do we know what counts as a 
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relevant interfering force in the first place?  Rival natural state theories make different 
claims about which external forces are the relevant ones.
The picket fence affords a nice illustration of the circularity problem that afflicts 
the relaxed forces strategy.  Suppose we want to test the theory (the G-ZFEL) which says 
that complexity increase is the natural state for a picket fence.  In order to do that, we try 
to identify a case where all the external forces that might act upon the fence are absent or 
at least relaxed.  What forces are those?  Should we, for instance, try to find a fence that 
is not impacted by any stray soccer balls?  No.  Since soccer ball impacts serve only to 
increase the complexity of the fence—say, by knocking loose one picket but not the 
others—the stray soccer ball would not count as an external force in this case.  What 
makes a force external is precisely the fact that it works to keep the system out of its 
natural or inertial state.  Here a painter who re-fastens loose pickets and repaints the fence 
periodically would count as an external force. In order to know which forces are external, 
we have to know which is the natural state of the system.  In order to identify cases where 
the external forces are relaxed, we have to know which forces are the external ones.  For 
this reason, the relaxed forces strategy requires us to make assumptions about the natural 
state of the system.  It requires us to assume the very claim that we thought we were 
testing.
To make the above point more vivid, imagine a proponent of a rival natural state 
theory—say, the one according to which stasis (or no change in complexity) is the natural 
state of the picket fence.  The advocate of the stasis theory would classify stray soccer 
balls as external forces, because they obviously work to keep the fence out of its natural 
state.  So the proponent of the stasis theory and the proponent of the G-ZFEL would just 
disagree about which cases are the ones in which the external forces are relaxed.  
This circularity problem also undermines McShea and Brandon’s novel predictive 
test of the ZFEL. Again, one way to bring this out is to try to envision the response that 
an advocate of a different natural state theory might make.  Consider how this experiment 
might look to a defender of the stasis theory.  According to that view, the default 
expectation is that no change will occur in the complexity of the mouse vertebral columns 
from one generation to the next.  In this case, complexity obviously increased.  So on the 
stasis view, that deviation from the default expectation needs to be explained in terms of 
the operation of some external forces.  Which external forces might those be?  Selection 
will not do the trick here, because as McShea and Brandon point out, the experiment is 
set up in a way that guarantees reduced selection.  The stasis theorist, however, has a 
different answer at the ready:  the external forces that explain the complexity increase are 
just the scientists who irradiated the male parents.  But for the radiation, the vertebral 
columns of the offspring mice would probably have exhibited about the same degree of 
complexity as those of their parents.  Indeed, the stasis theorist could propose a relaxed 
forces test of her own:  Just measure the complexity of the offspring’s vertebral columns 
without dosing the male parents with radiation.  
8
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McShea and Brandon do not treat the scientists who dose the male mice with 
radiation as an external force operating on the system.  That’s just because, given the 
natural state theory they defend—namely, the ZFEL—the external forces are, by 
definition, the ones that work against complexity increase.  Since the scientists are 
causing complexity increase, they don’t count as an external force.  This parallels the 
example of the picket fence and the soccer ball quite nicely.  Stray soccer balls don’t 
count as external forces if we are assuming that complexity increase is the zero-force 
condition for the picket fence, because stray soccer balls do not work against complexity 
increase. 
In order to identify a relaxed forces case—or more precisely, in order to show that 
the case of the irradiated mice is one in which the external forces are relaxed—McShea 
and Brandon must presuppose the ZFEL.  They must presuppose the natural state theory 
that they purport to be putting to the test.  Someone who prefers a different natural state 
theory may simply deny that this particular case is a relaxed forces case.  Nor is this 
problem an isolated one.  It affects some of the other tests they propose.  For example, 
they suggest that it might be illuminating to study the complexity of structures that are 
not under selection, such as the eyes of cave-dwelling crayfish (2010, pp. 76-77).  Do 
cave-dwelling crayfish have more complex eyes than their surface-dwelling relatives?  If 
so, then that would mean that complexity increases in the relaxed forces condition.  Here 
again, it might be open to a proponent of a rival natural state theory to challenge the 
claim that the relevant external forces are really relaxed in the case of the cave-dwellers.
Darwin’s argument for the Malthusian natural state theory of population growth 
(section 2) also runs afoul of this circularity problem.  Darwin’s idea was to test the claim 
that populations naturally tend to grow at a geometrical rate of increase by looking at 
situations in which the usual checks to population growth are relaxed—for example, 
cases in which a newly introduces species has abundant food and no predators.  However, 
someone who accepts a different natural state theory at the outset—say, someone who 
thinks that the natural state of populations is stasis with respect to size—would 
presumably not identify the interfering forces in quite the same way.  On this rival theory, 
predation might count as an interfering force (for example, if it caused a reduction in the 
population size, and hence a deviation from the expected stasis), but it also might not. 
On this rival theory, the relaxed forces condition could be one in which there is 
significant predation.
This circularity problem means that the relaxed forces strategy cannot 
discriminate empirically between rival natural state theories.  The problem, in a nutshell, 
is that the strategy assumes that we already know what to count as the relevant interfering 
forces.  But that is precisely what we are trying to find out.  There might, however, be 
other ways of subjecting natural state theories to empirical assessment.  And even if there 
were not—that is, even if the choice between rival natural state theories were 
underdetermined—such theories might still have an indispensable role to play in 
scientific inquiry.   The failure of the relaxed forces strategy raises some larger questions 
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about the status of natural state theories, and I will not be able to address those questions 
fully here.  In the next section, however, I’ll try to advance the discussion by considering 
some possible responses that McShea and Brandon could make to the failure of the 
relaxed forces strategy.
5. Possible responses to the problem.  How might McShea and Brandon continue to 
defend the ZFEL in light of the alleged failure of the relaxed forces strategy?   The most 
natural response to the failure of the relaxed forces strategy would be to seek out some 
other means of subjecting rival natural state theories to empirical tests.  While I would 
not want to rule out the possibility that some other strategy might be more promising, I 
confess that it is difficult to imagine what such a strategy might look like.  In order to test 
a natural state theory, we must examine either a relaxed forces case or a non-relaxed 
forces case.  (Every case falls into one of those two categories.)  If it doesn’t help to look 
at a relaxed forces case, why would it help to look at a non-relaxed forces case?
In fairness to McShea and Brandon, the putative novel predictive test that I 
described in section 3 is just one small piece of the larger argument they make in favor of 
the ZFEL.  It’s not clear that my critique of that “test” should derail the larger project. 
McShea and Brandon repeatedly stress the unifying or explanatory power of the ZFEL:
So what is the point of the ZFEL? First, it offers unity.  A heretofore 
unconnected set of phenomena … are revealed to be instances of the same 
underlying principle (2010, p. 71).
Indeed, in the course of the book, they show how a wide variety of biological phenomena
—from increasing disparity in macroevolution (pp. 36-38), to the observation that 
characters not under selection show greater variation (p. 70) – all seem to fall into place 
when viewed through the lens of the ZFEL.  The crucial question, though, is perhaps not 
whether the ZFEL does a good job unifying biological phenomena that were “heretofore 
unconnected,” but whether it does a better job unifying those phenomena than a rival 
natural state theory, such as the stasis theory for diversity/complexity, would do.  Darwin 
might provide a helpful comparison here:  It is fairly easy to see how Darwin’s picture of 
populations “striving” to increase in the face of myriad constraints and checks can unify a 
wide variety of biological phenomena.  The real question is whether it does a better job 
unifying those phenomena than the rival stasis theory would do. Assessing this appeal to 
the unifying power of the ZFEL is a larger project than I can take on here.
A second possible response to the failure of the relaxed forces strategy is to make 
a subjectivist move.  McShea and Brandon briefly flirt with such a move, but it is 
difficult to make out how much sympathy they really have for it (pp. 102-103).   When 
we talk about the natural state of a system, we seem to be talking about the system itself. 
However, when we talk about expectations, we seem to be talking about ourselves. 
Expectation and surprise are merely subjective, psychological notions.  One possibility is 
that there is nothing at issue here above and beyond what we expect, and hence no deep 
mind- or theory-independent fact of the matter about what the natural state of a system 
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“really” is.  We might expect biological populations to grow geometrically, or we might 
expect them to remain stable.  When we talk about populations as having a natural state, 
we are merely reading our own expectations into the natural world.  Which observations 
will surprise us and will seem to require explaining will also depend on our initial 
expectations.  But there may be no fact of the matter about which expectations are the 
right ones to have.  Moreover, each natural state theory picks out a set of relevant 
interfering forces or constraints that can make a difference to a system.  There may be no 
fact of the matter about which is the right way to identify those interfering forces.
At one point in the book, McShea and Brandon appear to make this subjectivist 
move:
[A]re there objective matters of fact that settle what count as forces in a 
particular science, and so what counts as the zero-force condition, or is 
this a matter of how we set out our theory, and so a matter of convention? 
(2010, p. 102)
We will not dare to try to answer this question in general, though we will 
share our suspicions: in some cases objective facts will settle the matter, 
but in most cases they will not.  But in the present case it is clear that we 
must take a conventionalist stance … (2010, p. 103).
McShea and Brandon acknowledge that their decision to treat complexity increase as the 
natural state of any evolutionary system is a “choice,” and in the passage immediately 
following the one quoted above, they give some reasons for this choice.  They point out 
that they have decided to focus narrowly on systems that involve reproduction, variation, 
and heritability.  (Indeed, the special formulation of the ZFEL restricts its application to 
systems that exhibit variation and heritability).  What’s not entirely clear is why the 
decision to focus on systems that exhibit reproduction, variation, and heritability would 
give us a reason to choose to adopt complexity increase (rather than, say, stasis) as our 
default expectation for evolutionary systems.
The subjectivist move may also be somewhat at odds with the larger project of 
McShea and Brandon’s book.  One of their goals, as we have seen, is to build an 
empirical case for the ZFEL.  But if one became convinced that there is no deep fact of 
the matter about whether the natural state of evolutionary systems is complexity increase 
vs. stasis—if one thought that the difference between these rival pictures is merely a 
matter of our subjective expectations—then the project of building an empirical case for 
one natural state theory over the other would seem unmotivated.  If subjectivism is 
correct, then the most we can do is try to persuade others to change their expectations. 
Thus, although they do seem to sympathize somewhat with this subjectivist move, it may 
be more charitable to read McShea and Brandon as holding that there really is an 
objective fact of the matter about whether the ZFEL is correct.
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To sum up the results of this section: There are at least three possible ways in 
which McShea and Brandon could respond to the failure of the relaxed forces strategy. 
(1) They might seek some other means of testing the ZFEL empirically, though it’s 
difficult at this point to see what such a strategy might look like.  (2) They might appeal 
to the unifying power of the ZFEL, though it would also be necessary to show that the 
ZFEL has greater unifying power than rival natural state theories.  Finally (3) they could 
make a subjectivist move and abandon the assumption that there is a mind- and theory-
independent fact of the matter about which natural state theory is true of a given system. 
This all too brief discussion is just the beginning of an attempt to map out some of the 
logical space of possible responses.  Most importantly, the failure of the relaxed forces 
strategy should be an occasion to revisit questions about the status of natural state 
theories and their role in empirical science.
6. Conclusion.  Natural state theories have figured prominently in the history of 
philosophy, from Aristotle to Spinoza.  They also show up repeatedly in natural science, 
from Newtonian mechanics to the idea that the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium describes the 
natural state of biological populations.  In this paper, I have examined one initially 
promising strategy for subjecting such theories to empirical tests. The relaxed forces 
strategy was employed by Darwin in the Origin, and it has been revived more recently by 
McShea and Brandon.  I’ve argued that the strategy fails to deliver the goods, because it 
is plagued by a circularity problem.  The failure of this strategy weakens McShea and 
Brandon’s empirical case for the ZFEL, but (as I argued in section 5) need not derail their 
project entirely. Nevertheless, the failure of the relaxed forces strategy should prompt 
philosophers to think further about the status and role of natural state theories in science.
As far as I know, few biologists today think that we even need a natural state 
theory for population size.  It’s not that biologists have abandoned Darwin’s Malthusian 
picture in favor of some rival natural state theory—say, a stasis theory.  Rather, they have 
abandoned it in favor of no natural state theory at all, and they have done so in spite of 
the unifying power of the Malthusian view.  Trends in population size are phenomena to 
be explained, but modern evolutionary theory makes no assumptions about natural 
tendencies in population size.  McShea and Brandon do show how powerful a natural 
state theory of diversity/complexity can be.  There is also a deeper issue here about which 
biological phenomena call for natural state theorizing and which do not.  The failure of 
attempts to test natural state theories just brings that question into sharper relief.
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THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF SCIENCE 
Jan Woleński 
Abstract: This paper argues that science is not dependent  on philosophical assumption and 
does not entail philosophical consequences. The concept of dependence (on assumptions) and 
entailment is understood logically, that is, are defined via consequence operation. Speaking 
more colloquially, the derivation of scientific theorems does not use philosophical statements 
as premises and one cannot derive philosophical theses from scientific assertions. This does 
not mean that science and philosophy are completely separated. In particular, sciences leads to 
some philosophical insights, but it must be preceded by a hermeneutical interpretation.  
It is frequently asserted that science assumes some philosophical premises or/and leads 
to philosophical consequences. For instance, transcendental epistemologists (Kant, Neo-Kan-
tians) argue that epistemology establishes conditions of validity for any kind of cognition, in-
cluding scientific one. According to Kant, every experience locates its objects in space and 
time. Thus, assertions about space and time, more specifically that space is three-dimensional 
and time is absolute, belong to philosophical presuppositions of science. Husserl expressed a 
similar  view,  although  oriented  more  ontologically  than  epistemologically,   particularly 
strongly (italic in the original):
If, however, all eidetic science is intrinsically independent of  all science of fact, the opposite obtains, on the oth-
er hand, in respect  of the science of fact itself. No fully developed science of fact could subsist unmixed with ei-
detic knowledge, and in consequent independence of eidetic science formal or material. For in the first place it is 
obvious that an empirical science, wherever it finds grounds for its judgments through mediate reasoning, must 
proceed according to the formal principles used by formal logic. And generally, since like every science it is di-
rected towards objects, it must be bound by the laws which pertain to the essence of  objectivity in general.  
Thereby it enters into relation with the group of formal-ontological disciplines, which, besides formal logic in 
the narrower sense of the term, includes the disciplines figured formerly under the formal “mathesis universalis” 
(hus, arithmetic also pure analysis, theory of manifolds). Moreover, and in the second place, every fact includes 
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an essential factor of a material order, and every eidetic truth pertaining to the pure essence thus included must 
furnish a law that binds the given concrete instance and generally every possible one as well.
[…]     
Every factual science (empirical science) has essential theoretical bases in eidetic ontologies. […] In this way, 
for instance,  the eidetic science of physical nature in general (the Ontology of nature) corresponds to all the nat-
ural science disciplines, so far indeed as an Eidos that can apprehended in its purity, the “essence” nature in gen-
eral, with an infinite wealth of included essential contents, corresponds to actual nature.1
Husserl ascribes to formal  ontology a very essential role, because, according to him,  all fac-
tual (empirical)  assertions have their  ultimate basis in fundamentals established by eidetic 
analysis.
Another frequently explored link between science and philosophy consists in looking 
for philosophical  consequences of scientific  theories or even singular scientific  theorems.2 
Mathematics provides a very good example in this respect. Some people maintain that classi-
cal mathematics implies Platonism, although others regard antirealism as a consequence of 
constructive mathematics. Passing to physics, Newtonian mechanics is reputed to entail deter-
minism, but indeterminism is qualified as having its inferential foundation in quantum theory; 
this connection will be exploited several times in this paper. Similarly, vitalism is considered 
as following from embryology as a part of biology, although theory of evolution goes together 
with mechanism as its philosophical output. Gödel’s incompleteness theorems are sometimes 
taken as premises in arguments for non-reducibility of mind to machines. Another use the 
same metamathematical results consists in attempts to show that knowledge is essentially un-
certain. There is a good example:
[…] I single out for discussion – the question whether the law of excluded middle, when it refers to statements in 
the future tense, forces us into a sort of logical Predestination.  A typical argument is this. If it is true now that I  
shall to do a certain thing tomorrow, say to jump into the Thames, then no matter as fiercely I resist  […], when a 
day comes I cannot help jumping into the water; whereas, if this prediction is false now […] it is impossible for  
me to spring. Yet that the prediction is either true or false is itself a necessary truth, asserted by the law of ex-
cluded middle. From this the startling consequence seems to follow […] that indeed the entire future is somehow 
fixed, logically preordained.3  
1 E. Husserl, Ideas. General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, tr. by W. F. Boyce Gibson, Collier Macmil-
lan, London 1931, p. 57/58. For more recent similar statements see, for example, I. Stein, The Concept of Object  
as the Foundation of Physics, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 1996 or M. Heller, Ultimate Explanations of the  
Universe,  Springer, Berlin 2009. See also notes 2an d 5.
2 See F. Weinert,  The Scientist as Philosopher.  Philosophical Consequences of Great Scientific Discoveries , 
Springer, Berlin 2004 for a historical survey. I choose this book for its subtitle clearly  related to the problem an-
nounces by the title of the present paper. General and special literature about philosophical  consequences (and  
assumptions as well) of science is enormous. In fact, every textbook of philosophy of science or monograph in 
this area addresses to this topic directly or indirectly. See note 5 for an additional selected bibliography.   
3 F. Waismann, “How I See Philosophy”, in F. Waismann, How I See Philosophy, Macmillan, London 1968, p. 
8/9.  Note that Waismann himself does not accept the argument from the excluded middle to logical Predestina-
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Social sciences and humanities also share philosophical import with natural disciplines (the 
science in the traditional science), although one should notice that strict borderlines between 
philosophical and non(or less)-philosophical regions are difficult to depict them univocally. 
We easily observe that the relation between science and philosophy is less and less explicit if 
we go to further members in the sequence {mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, social 
sciences, humanities}. By the way, this succession is almost identical with Comte’s classifica-
tion of abstract sciences. In order to simplify my considerations, I will entirely omit philo-
sophical problems of social sciences and humanities, and limit discussion about formal sci-
ences (logic and mathematics) to some illustrative examples. Thus, I focus on natural science, 
mostly physics.   
I will try to introduces some conceptual order into the problem of philosophical as-
sumption and consequences of science. The issue in question require some clarifications for 
several reasons. In  general and to anticipate my position, I will argue that science does not 
need philosophical assumption as well as it does not have philosophical consequences. Yet 
this view does not imply that science and philosophy are mutually independent. On the con-
trary, science suggests a lot of philosophical problems and perhaps could lead to philosophical 
solutions, although the later hope should be taken modestly and with various additional con-
straints (I will return to this question at the end of this paper). The reverse dependence, that is, 
an influence of philosophy on science,   is a much more delicate matter,  although explicit 
philosophical  roots  of  several  scientific  discoveries  (for  example,  Platonic  background of 
Copernicus’ theory) are very well confirmed by the history of science. In fact, historical stud-
ies seem to suggest that the role of philosophy as a source of scientific results continuously 
weakens through the course of time. Anyway, we need to distinguish the question whether 
there are philosophical problems of science from the issue whether science has philosophical 
assumptions and leads to philosophical consequences. The lack of this distinction obscures 
any analysis of the problem in question. And this is the first motive for trying to do a clarify -
ing work. 
Secondly, philosophers and scientists are not always clear whether they speak about 
philosophical assumptions of science or its philosophical consequences. Let me illustrate this 
once again by the relation of logic to determinism and indeterminism: 
The law of bivalence is bivalence is the basis of our entire logic, yet it was already much disputed by the a n-
cients. Known to Aristotle, although contested for propositions referring to future contingencies; peremptorily 
tion. Thus, Waismann’s text should be regarded as a reconstruction of an argument proposed by someone else 
(see below).
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rejected by Epicureans, the law of bivalence makes its full appearance with Chrysippus and the Stoics as  a prin -
ciple of their dialectics, which represents the ancient propositional calculus […]. The quarrel about the law of bi-
valence has a metaphysical background, the advocates of the law being decides determinists, while its opponents 
tend towards an indeterministic Weltanschaung.4
Łukasiewicz seems to suggests that there is a connection between bivalence and metaphysical 
positions represented by the determinism/indeterminism controversy.  However, this depen-
dence requires a further analysis. For instance, we can ask what is prior, logic or determinism 
(indeterminism), that is, what provides premises and what constitutes the conclusion. Since 
the ancients were unclear at the point, Łukasiewicz cannot be blamed that his parenthetical re-
mark is incorrect. His own reasoning, similarly as that of Waismann’s, investigates the argu-
ment from bivalence to determinism. According to him (Łukasiewicz), bivalence and the prin-
ciple of causality entail determinism. Is the principle of causality scientific or merely philo-
sophical? Disregarding Łukasiewicz’s own view, we can interpret his inference (logic plus 
causality ⇒ determinism) either as based on scientific premises or mixed (one scientific, tak-
en from logic and one philosophical). To complete this issue, let me note that most general as 
well concrete, systematic as well historical, elaborations looking at relations between philoso-
phy and science consider both as co-existing and interrelated in many ways.5
A closer inspection of the relation between logic and determinism brings us to the next 
interpretative question. There are some minor differences between Łukasiewicz and Wais-
mann. Whereas the latter speaks about the excluded middle and logical Predestination, the 
former refers to bivalence and determinism without further qualification.  Yet we can over-
come these disparities by saying, firstly,  that Waismann employed the metalogical law of ex-
cluded middle, which functions as the most essential part of the principle of bivalence (in fact, 
the latter conjoins the former and the metalogical non-contradiction), and, secondly, pointing 
4 J. Łukasiewicz, “Philosophical Remarks on Many-Valued Logic”, in J. Łukasiewicz,  Selected Works, North-
Holland 1970, p. 165 (this paper was originally published in German in 1931; tr. O. Wojtasiewicz)
5 Here is a small sample of books discussing the relation between physics and philosophy: A. Eddington,  The 
Philosophy of Physical Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1939,  W. Heisenberg, Philosophy and 
Physics, Harper&Row, New York 1958, M. Čapek,  The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary  Physics, Van 
Nostrand, New York 1961, B. Gal-Or,  Cosmology, Physics and Philosophy. Recent Advances as a Core Cur-
riculum Course, Springer, New York 1981,  J. T. Cushing,  Philosophical Concepts in Physics. The Historical  
relations between Philosophy and Scientific Theories, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998, R. Toretti, 
The Philosophy of Physics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999.  For a comprehensive and up-to-dated 
survey, see The Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, ed. by D. Gabbay, P. Thagard and J. Woods, Elsevier, 
Amsterdam. The following volumes are available (I mention only titles and dates; particular books have own ed-
itors): General Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues (2006), Philosophy of Logic (2006),Philosophy of Psycholo-
gy and Cognitive Science  (2006),  Philosophy of Anthropology and Sociology  (2006),  Philosophy of Physics  
(2007),  Philosophy of Biology  (2007),  Philosophy of Information  (2008),  Philosophy of Mathematics  (2009), 
Philosophy of Technology and Engineering Sciences  (2009),   Philosophy of Statistics  (2011),  Philosophy of  
Medicine (2011), Philosophy of Complex Systems (2011) and Philosophy of Linguistics (2012).     
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out that Łukasiewicz’s determinism and Waismann’s logical Predestination refer to the same 
philosophical position. However, other differences cannot be reconciled by so simple moves; 
Waismann explicitly says that he reconstruct Łukasiewicz’s argument, but it is not quite true. 
As I already noticed, for Łukasiewicz, bivalence plus causality entails determinism, but Wais-
mann’s reconstruction omits causality.  The crucial point is that Waismann denies that the 
(metalogical) excluded middle entails logical Predestination. He justifies his position to the 
use of “true” and “false” (details as irrelevant here). A lot of serious questions arises in this 
situation. Does Waismann’s argument hold if we add causality to the excluded middle? What 
is the actual difference between both authors? Should we say that whereas Łukasiewicz ar-
gues that classical logic plus some additional premises imply determinism, Waismann says 
“since this argument is invalid for such and such reasons, classical logic does not entail deter-
minism”? Łukasiewicz wanted to demonstrate that bivalence is incompatible with freedom 
and claimed that logic should be changed; he introduced many-valued logic for solving the 
problem. On the other hand, Waismann offered an argument for compatibility of logic and 
free action. I have no intention to decide who was right. My main task consists in showing 
how complex and many-sided is the application of logical theorems in order to derive from 
them philosophical statements.
We have to do with a fairly similar situation in the case of a famous controversy con-
cerning the relation  between quantum mechanics  and determinism (and indeterminism,  of 
course).6 The most typical description is this (I omit the idea of hidden parameters advanced 
by Bohm and other  proposals  in  the  same spirit).  Einstein  and the  representatives  of  the 
Copenhagen interpretations (Bohr, Heisenberg) appeared as the main protagonists. The for-
mer defended determinism, but Bohr and Heisenberg favored indeterminism. Einstein pro-
posed various thought experiments, for example,  that elaborated together with Podolsky and 
Rosen, in order to demonstrate that the Copenhagen interpretation was essentially incomplete. 
His opponents argued that Einstein’s  all attempts to abolish the “indeterministic” (I will later 
explain the use of quotes in this context) reading of quantum mechanics failed. Finally, Ein-
stein agreed that since the Copenhagen interpretation is empirical faithful, he recognized it as 
legitimate, at least from the physical point of view. How to interpret this controversy? Did 
Einstein use the thesis of determinism as a premise in his arguments? Is so, his strategy is 
hardly comparable with that of Heisenberg who inferred the thesis of indeterminism from the 
6 See G. Auletta, Foundations and Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics in the Light of a Historical Analysis of  
the Problems and of a Synthesis of the Results, World Scientific, Singapore 2001 for a comprehensive survey. Of 
course, the scope this monograph (almost 1000 pp.) very considerably exceeds the determinism/ indeterminism/  
quantum mechanics issue.
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uncertainty principle, but not assumed the former in his reasoning. Should we say that Ein-
stein rejected “indeterministic” consequences of the Copenhagen interpretation and thereby 
came to the conclusion that determinism was still tenable, but Heisenberg rejected determin-
ism, because he deduced non-deterministic consequences from physics? Once again, we en-
counter here a very complex issue in which philosophical and empirical questions are mixed 
and interrelated in many ways. A striking fact is that natural scientists accepting the same em-
pirical theories, share quite different, even inconsistent,  philosophical views. This suggests 
that the premises/conclusion link without further clarifications does not suffice for accounting 
relations between science and philosophy. I will return to this issue after introducing a precise 
conceptual machinery.  Looking at relevant texts, we encounter several other terms used in 
discussions about philosophical arguments based on science. Except “premise” and “conclu-
sion”, we have “supposition”, “presupposition”, “assumption”, “consequence”  or “result”. I 
propose to consider the three first words as synonymous with “premise”, but the two last as 
having the same meaning as “conclusion”. I do not deny that there are other intuitions, for ex-
ample, referring to subjective attitudes, styles of thought or even prejudices, but I tend to have 
devices subjected to logical analysis. 
We have also to do with several accounts of the relation between premises and conclu-
sions, like consequence of, entailment, derivation. following, implication or forcing. Let us 
agree that if X is a set of premises and A is a conclusion of X, we say that  A ∈ CnX,  that is, 
X is a logical consequence of X if and only if A can be formally derived from X. For simplici-
ty, I equate the syntactic concept of logical consequence with the semantic concept of logical 
entailment (the set X entails A if and only if A is true in all models in which all sentences be-
longing to set  X are true). Anyway, this description entails that rules of inference coded by 
Cn  are infallible (correct, sound), that is, true premises inevitably lead to true conclusions. 
The metalogical characterization of the premise/conclusion relation forces a similar treatment 
of other methodological concepts. Let me list some definitions (they are simpliefed to some 
extent). The set X of sentences is a theory if and only if it is closed by Cn as an operation in 
the mathematical sense, that is, CnX = X. Otherwise speaking, X is a theory if it is equal to the 
set of own logical consequences. Since the inclusion  X ⊆ CnX is trivial (it directly follows 
from the definition of Cn), the substantial content of being a theory reduces itself to the inclu-
sion X ⊆ CnX. Thus, X is a theory if it contains own consequences.  If there is a set Y ⊆ X 
such that ,CnY =  X, we say that  Y axiomatizes  X  (Y is an axiomatic for  X). Dependently 
whether Y is finite, infinite or recursive, we say that Y is finitely (infinitely, recursively) ax-
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iomatizable. A theory  T  is consistent if and only if no pair {A,  ¬A} belongs to its conse-
quences. T is (syntactically) complete if and only if for any A,  A ∈ CnT or ¬A ∈CnT, and it 
is semantically complete if its every truth is provable from its axioms  (one of my previous 
statements about Cn means that logic is semantically complete). Consistency is an obligatory 
property of theories (it practically means that inconsistent theories should be improved; this is 
common tendency in the history of science), but syntactic and semantic completeness are de-
manded, but, due to Gödel’s theorems, inaccessible on level of arithmetic of natural numbers 
and beyond). If we take all arithmetical truth as axioms of arithmetic (of natural numbers), it 
becomes complete in both senses, although he is not finitely axiomatizable, because there are 
infinitely many true arithmetical assertions. However, and this is an important methodological 
observation, every theory is an axiomatic system.
The concept of theory in the metalogical (metamathematical) sense is an idealizations. 
In particular, any set of consequences of a given set of axioms is always infinite, but the actu-
al theorizing is restricted to finite sets, because humans are able to effective cognitive acts op-
erating on such collections.  Hence we have a question how far the metalogical account of 
theories is faithful with respect to scientific practice. Since mathematics can be regarded as a 
collection of axiomatic systems, the metamathematical research widely exploits the concept 
of a theory as the logical closure of a given set of axioms. This perspective raises doubts as far 
as the matter concerns physics.  Yet Hilbert in his famous lecture on mathematical problems 
delivered in 1900, raised the question of axiomatization of physics  (problem 6), more pre-
cisely, he postulated a mathematical treatment of physical axioms, particularly of mechanics. 
Since he referred to earlier works of Mach, Boltzmann and Hertz, the issue was at stake about  
1900. In fact, if Z includes Newton’s three dynamical principles plus the law of gravitation, 
the set T = CnZ can be considered as an idealized picture of the classical mechanics. Further 
examples are provided by the relativity theory, quantum mechanics or quantum field theory.7 
Yet it would be difficult to maintain that axiomatic method became dominant in physics, even 
theoretical. On the other side, the following idealization is possible. We can consider even 
single physical laws together with their logical consequences as miniature theories. This is 
compatible with a notorious interest of physicists in particular theorems. Generally speaking, 
every theory T is formulated in a language JT. We can identify T with a triple  <JT, Y, Cn>, 
7 See H. Reichenbach, Axiomatization of the Theory of Relativity, University of California Press 1970 (German 
orinal appeared in 1924), G. Ludwig,  An Axiomatic Basis for Quantum Mechanics  I-II,  Springer, Berlin 1985 
and N. N. Bogolubov, A. A. Logunov, I. T. Todorov,  Introduction to Axiomatic Quantum Field Theory, The 
Benjamin Cummins, London 1975. One can find further examples in J. Schröter, Zur Meta-theorie der Physik, 
de Gruyter, Berlin 1996 (this is a very comprehensive monograph about physical theories from the metalogical 
point of view) and  G. Ludwig, G. Turler, A New Foundation for Physical Theory, Springer, Berlin 2006.  
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where Y is an axiomatic base, a collection of informal assumptions (postulates) or even a sin-
gleton.  Although less mathematical fields, for example, chemistry and biology, are still less 
suitable to full and strict axiomatic reconstruction, but they fall under a more general model of 
theories,  introduced above.  I  do  not  insist  that  single  assertions  with their  logical  conse-
quences should be regarded as theories in the metamathematical sense, although I think that 
the triple <JT, Y, Cn> is an admissible approximation of T = CnT.  
The proposal to regard physical theories as axiomatic systems can be (in fact, it is the 
case) questioned by physicists. They will probably say that theories are rather models than set  
of sentences. I see no conflict here. We can consider theories as sets of sentences as well as 
speak about them as models. I would like also to stress that I do not claim that theories should 
be axiomatize or formalize. My enterprise is merely methodological and entirely belongs to 
philosophy of science. In particular, my special motivation consists in the decision to perform 
an analysis of the question undertaken in this study by the concept of logical consequence in 
its literal meaning. However, one can add something in favor of the “statement view of theo-
ries”. First of all, physicists often say that theories are based on some postulates, for instance, 
that the velocity of light is constant. Secondly, they demonstrate something from the adopted 
postulates, for example that v + c = c, for every velocity v. These notorious facts allow to in-
terpret postulates as axioms and  demonstrations as proofs in the formal sense. Thirdly, physi-
cists apply several metalogical concepts to physical theories, for instance, independence (of 
postulates),  equivalence (of theories or postulates),  extension or reduction (of theories)  or 
consistency (of theories). Of course, one should be careful in using such analogies, because, 
for instance, Einstein’s objection that quantum mechanics in the Copenhagen interpretation is 
incomplete did not refer to syntactic incompleteness, but pointed out that something was over-
looked by Bohr and Heisenberg. However, such differences do not invalidate applying meta-
logic to analysis of empirical scientific theories. The skeptics with respect to the proposed 
analysis can eventually say that it does not produce so important results as it has place in 
metamathematics. I do not like to appeal to a typical answer that nothing should be decided a 
priori, although it is quite possible that investigations about computational complexity will 
find applications in physical calculations. I stress once again that my task is philosophical. I 
hope to show that treating physical theories as axiomatic systems allows to exhibit some mis-
understandings concerning relations between science and philosophy.  
If we adopt the proposed approach (even liberalized) to  scientific theories, the prob-
lem of the relation between science and philosophy can be shaped in the following way. We 
ask whether philosophical statements occur among axioms of scientific theories and whether 
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philosophical assertions belong to  CnT, where  T is philosophy-free. One should remember 
that a given theory T, independently of its understanding as  T = CnT or T = <JT,  Y,  Cn>, 
contains its axioms and their consequences and nothing more. Thus, the set  CnT forms the 
scope (or the domain of application) of T. Clearly, the scope of a given theory T determines 
its limits (borderlines) as well. This statement has a clear meaning only in the case of consid-
ering assumptions used in theories as axioms and conclusions derived from them as logical 
consequences. It is easily to confirm by numerous historical data that scientists qua scientists 
are not ready to extend the scope of theories by philosophical assertions. Let me illustrate this 
tendency by concrete examples. The thesis that every phenomenon is defined univocally by 
its mechanical parameters (position, mass, velocity) represents the core of  the mechanistic 
world-view. Materialists of the 18th century supported this view by an appeal to classical dy-
namics (CD, for brevity). However, it was a considerable extension of the scope this theory 
(see also below).  Its  standard scope contains  everything definable  inside  CD  and nothing 
more. Even if philosophers find this formula as controversial and open for a further interpreta-
tion, the physicists have no doubt that the scope of  CD  and the scope of the philosophical 
mechanistic world-view are different. This precisely suggests that the mechanistic world-view 
is neither assumed (understood as an axiom) of CD,  nor functions as its logical consequence. 
Similarly, philosophical atomism is neither an assumption of chemistry nor its consequence, 
and the same concerns the relation between vitalism and biology. Returning to determinism, 
indeterminism and physics, quantum mechanics neither assumes nor entails indeterminism, 
and classical physics has no inferential relations with determinism (see also below). This is 
the reason for writing “(in)deterministic” interpretation of quantum mechanics. To use a fash-
ionable terminology, the language of physics (science in general) is incommensurable with 
the language of philosophy. This the main circumstance blocking the use of Cn across both.
My previous remarks does not imply that physics (or other science, but I concentrate 
on physics) has no connections with philosophy. The links between both appeared at the very 
beginning of European philosophy. The Ionian philosophy mostly concerned physis, that is, 
nature. Thus, philosophy and physics had the same subject and method in the first phase of 
philosophical thought and no matter if we will refer to theories of the Ionians as belonging to 
the philosophy of nature, physics or cosmology. In fact, they combined all these fields in the 
modern sense. It was Aristotle who explicitly distinguished prote filosofia (the first philoso-
phy) as the science on being as being and physics as based on empereia. This distinction was 
respected by Archimedes and Ptolemy, two greatest  ancient scientists, and never disappeared 
again.  Newton’s  title  Philosophiae  naturalis  principia  mathematica does  not  provide  any 
9
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counterexample, because it only witnesses a terminological custom of English nomenclature; 
speaking about physics as natural philosophy still occurs in British academic life. By the way, 
Newton’s famous hypotheses non fingo can be understood as his claim that one should care-
fully distinguish philosophical hypotheses from statements based on experience.  On the other 
hand, many physicists of the first rank, Newton himself, but also Galileo, Maxwell, Planck, 
Einstein, Bohr or Heisenberg, to mention only few, studied various philosophical problems. 
They considered them as important and published  books titled  Physics and Philosophy  or 
somehow similarly (see note 5). Philosophers were (and still are) divided in their relation to 
physics as a source of philosophical insights. For example, Locke essentially used Newton’s 
optical results, but Bergson or Heidegger maintained that physics has no importance for the 
philosophical  understanding of  reality.  Disregarding thinkers  unconditionally disrespecting 
the role of physics in philosophy, we encounter the question whether a physicist who discuss-
es philosophical questions acts as just physicist or plays the role of a philosopher. In my view, 
he or she performs a philosophical job. Moreover, physicists  qua  physicists do not need to 
consider philosophical matters. This observations imply, contrary to Husserl (see the passage 
quoted from his Ideas above), that the link between physics and philosophy is factual, but not 
necessary.  Yet I do not deny that philosophical views played (and still play)  an important 
heuristic role in the development of physics. Einstein’s belief that the world is well-ordered 
by the laws of nature motivated his attempts towards so-called deterministic interpretation of 
quantum mechanics. The reverse factual connection, that is, going from physics to philosophy 
should also be noted. For instance, the rise of classical mechanics resulted (philosophically) in 
the mentioned mechanistic world view, according to which h everything, including human ac-
tion, is governed by the laws of dynamics. Since factual connections between physics and phi-
losophy, although evident and frequently pointed out by historians of science (see Weiner’s 
book mentioned in note 3), are not enough for accounting  logical links between philosophical 
assertions and statements make by scientists qua scientists. Hence, my proposal to employ Cn 
and other metalogical tools in analysis of the main issue. The conclusion is negative: there are 
no logical relations between science and philosophy, provided that being a premise or conclu-
sion is understood in the precise logical sense.           
Yet the distinction between factual connections and logical consequence does not suf-
fice for philosophical analysis  of how science and philosophy are mutually related.  To be 
more specific, the issue also concerns possible uses of scientific theories and assertions in 
philosophical debates. Let me return to some previously discussed questions in their typical 
traditional setting.  I restrict my further remarks to so-called philosophical consequences of 
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physical theories. Once again, look at the mechanistic world-view as a consequence of  CD, 
ask whether classical physics entails determinism and whether indeterminism can be derived 
from quantum mechanics. The sense of these (and similar) questions remains vague until we 
introduce references of “the mechanical world-view”, “determinism” and “indeterminism” in 
a way acceptable for physicists and simultaneously compatible with philosophical intuitions, 
because this step means a necessary condition of  using the phrases  “consequence”, “entails” 
and “can be derived” in the logical meaning. Otherwise speaking, we extend the intended 
scope of related physical theories by new phenomena. If, for example, the mechanical world-
view  is understood as the thesis that the entire reality consists of material points, which be-
have according to laws of CD, the extension in question appears as illegitimate until we show 
that, for instance, mental phenomena are mechanistic in this sense. Now the mechanistic con-
ception of psyche is either correct or incorrect. If the first case occurs, the mechanistic world-
view with respect to mental events becomes a trivial consequence of CD, but if the second al-
ternative is adopted, this world-view must be qualified as an illegal extension of the scope of 
CD. However, the main philosophical problem consists in choosing one of possibilities occur-
ring in the disjunction “the mechanistic conception of psyche is correct or incorrect” (and oth-
er similar dilemmas). For example, La Mettrie, the author of Man A Machine (the title is very 
instructive for materialism of the 18th century) was less interested in deriving his account of 
psyche from CD than in a materialistic analysis of mind. Thus, he choose the first member of 
the disjunction in question.  Consider now the question whether quantum mechanics (QM) 
entails indeterminism. The uncertainty principle (UP) stating (I simplify) that Δp1 . Δp2  ≥  h 
(the uncertainty of position times the uncertainty of momentum is greater or equal to the 
Planck constant). This formula functions as the main premise of deriving indeterminism from 
quantum mechanics. However, it is problematic, because UP does not contains the word “in-
determinism”. According to elementary logic, a term occurring in a conclusion of deductive 
reasoning, must occur in its premises or be defined by earlier available linguistic means. Thus, 
one should introduce the term “indeterminism” (or “determinism”) to QM in order to investi-
gate the importance of this theory for the determinism/indeterminism issue. Heisenberg him-
self made such a step and said that determinism consists in predictability of future states of 
objects on the base of their past states. Since UP precludes the precise calculation of the past 
(including present) states, it also abolished the thesis of determinism on the level of the mi-
croworld and entails indeterminism. This argument is correct and shows how classical physics 
(CD, the relativity theory) differs from QM. Clearly, we are tempted to say that the latter is 
indeterministic, but to view the former as deterministic. Yet we have a variety of approaches 
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to determinism and determinism. For instance, the former can be defined not only  via  pre-
dictability, but also causally, statistically, probabilistically or by partial order in the Minkows-
ki space.  More importantly, different consequences of such definitions can be derived with 
respect to determinism and indeterminism of  QM. Doubtless, all essential problems of  QM 
and their solutions, can be formulated without any reference to determinism and indetermin-
ism. On the other hand, what is important for philosophy does not directly follows from the 
literal content of physical laws. Incidentally, the same is to be said about so-called philosophi-
cal assumptions of science. In particular, they do not belong to assumptions made in deduc-
tions inside scientific theories.     
However, some interpretative work is always done when philosophers use science in 
their arguments and speak, for example, that a physical theory  has such and such philosophi-
cal consequences. The problem is that, on the one hand, we cannot handle this work as deriv-
ing philosophy form science, but, on the other hand, the reduction of the connection in ques-
tion to  merely factual  coincidences  seems not  proper.  What  is  going on? In my opinion, 
philosophers employ some hermeneutical operation (or insight), when they try to show that 
this  or that  scientific  result  has philosophical  importance or not. This operation has in its 
background a postulate (the normative aspect of hermeneutic is substantial) that something, 
for example, determinism and indeterminism, should be understood in some way. One can 
look for hermeneutic hints in science, religion, ideology, politics, morality, ordinary life, etc., 
but  I am particularly interested in hermeneutic insights motivated by science. If a hermeneu-
tic is applied, further arguments can be deductive (this is frequent in the case of scientific 
hermeneutic), but they are mediated by an interpretation. Hence, we can label such conse-
quences as interpretative. Briefly, indeterminism functions as  an interpretative consequence 
of QM, modulo the definition referring to UP. The reason for adopting a hermeneutic are dif-
ferent. Doubtless, empirical data play a role in this respect, but they do not force solutions. 
Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s approach to philosophical problems of physics was definitely episte-
mological and motivated defining (in)determinism via predictability,  but Einstein preferred 
the ontological way of thinking and believed in causality as the fundamental ingredient of de-
terminism. Anyway, this perspective does not mean that science has no philosophical prob-
lems.    
A few additional observations are in order. Firstly, every hermeneutic has its explicit 
roots in philosophical traditions. There is no other way of catching a given hermeneutic than 
embedding it into the history of philosophy, for instance, taking into account the development 
of the determinism/indeterminism debate. Secondly, there is no unique reading of data, in-
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cluding theoretical and empirical ones,  motivating hermeneutic interpretation. Thirdly, the 
adopted hermeneutic  never liquidates  a given philosophical  controversy.  Fourthly,  explicit 
logical schemes of arguments supporting philosophical proposals are important, because they 
allow us  to  control  arguments;  hermeneutical  parameters  do not  go against  this  function. 
Moreover, but it is related to my metaphilosophical view, the main philosophical aim does not 
consist in solving problems arising in philosophy, but rather making them explicit and clear. 
Thus, philosophical solutions are always relative to a given hermeneutic. Fifthly, the presence 
of hermeneutic in philosophy explains why philosophy basically remains in the same circle of 
problems and answers. However, there is no reason to be desperate by this fact. Every époque 
requires own philosophical hermeneutic, but it does not justify treating past hermeneutics as 
irrelevant. Although, as I earlier argued, indeterminism does not follows from QM, similarly 
as CD does not entail indeterminism, debating both philosophical views about the order of re-
ality without taking into account modern physics, should be considered as irrational. On the 
other hand, there is probably no chance that philosophers ignoring physics in ontological or 
epistemological discussions disappear. This situation is regrettable for philosophers sharing 
my metaphilosophy, but should be tolerated. Sixthly, the role of philosophy in so-called con-
text of discovery is obvious and cannot be denied. Even if we say that the borderline between 
discovery and justification is somehow vague, metaphysical views should not function as jus-
tifying scientific theories.  
            Let me finally consider the following view:
It is, perhaps, easier to say what philosophy is not than what it is. The first thing, then I should like to say that 
philosophy, as it practiced today, is very unlike science; and this in three respects: in philosophy there are no  
proofs; there are no theorems; and there are no questions which can be decided, Yes or Not. In saying that there 
are no proofs I do not mean to say that there are no arguments. Arguments certainly there are, and first-rate  
philosophers are recognized by the originality of their arguments; only these not work in the sort of way they do 
in mathematics or in the science.8  
Apparently, the view expressed by this quotation is puzzling. Waismann says that there are no 
proofs in philosophy, but they are arguments. We can add that philosophy has no deductive 
proofs, but deductive arguments occur in it.  The problem is not verbal and cannot be an-
swered by referring to the ambiguity of the word “proof”. My reading of Waismann’s diagno-
sis  essentially  employs  the  idea  that  hermeneutic  parameter  is  substantially  embedded  in 
philosophical  work;  this  concerns  all  kinds  of  philosophy,   not  only doctrines  guided by 
methodological  principles  of analytic  philosophy.  The hermeneutical  parameter  just  deter-
8 F. Waismann, ibidem, p. 1,
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mines  that  they are not  proofs  in  philosophy,  but  arguments,  deductive  or not,  related  to 
hermeneutic. The latter are more or less original or even completely unoriginal, dependently 
of used hermeneutic and how it is done and developed. Philosophical considerations about 
physics belong to philosophy, not to physics even if they are made by physicists acting as 
philosophers.  Otherwise, commensurability of science and philosophy can be achieved in 
philosophy via hermeneutic interpretation. 
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Ambivalence and Conflict: 
Catholic Church and Evolution1 
  
gereon.wolters@uni-konstanz.de 
I. Preliminary Conceptual Remarks  
I would like to state one important point right at the outset. The 
Catholic Church has always maintained an almost enlightened position 
with respect to evolutionary theory, when one compares it with Christian 
American fundamentalism or its Turkish Islamic counterpart.2  
There are, nonetheless conflicts. I would like to distinguish two 
types of conflict. The first is a doctrinal conflict in which science and 
religion hold conflicting, mutually exclusive, views about a particular 
situation. The most important example of this type of doctrinal conflict 
was seen in the case of Galileo and, to honour him, I term these kinds 
of conflict, Galilean conflicts. The most recent example of such a 
Galilean conflict is the debate surrounding evolutionary theory.  
The second type of conflict is not so much about doctrine itself. 
It is more about scientists’ attempts to refute that religion is a 
phenomenon in its own right. Such explanations are also called 
“naturalistic” or “scientistic”. In this vein, Karl Marx described religion as 
the “opium of the people”, Freud viewed religion as a collective neurosis 
and some modern brain researchers even regard it as an illusion 
produced by the limbic system. Others, in turn, see religion as an 
                                            
1
 This paper derives from my Ambivalenz und Konflikt. Katholische Kirche und 
Evolutionstheorie, Konstanz (UVK) 2010, parts of which are included in my “The 
Epistemological Roots of Ecclesiastical Claims to Knowledge”, in: Axiomathes. An 
International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems (Dordrecht) 19.4 (2009), 481-508.   
2
 During the meeting we got a vivid impression of the latter during a visit at Piri Reis school 
(Muğla) that is part of the Hizmet movement of the Turkish Imam and religious scholar 
Fethullah Gülen. According to Wikipedia the Gülen movement runs over 1000 Charter schools 
around the world, including 130 in the US. The schools are excellently equipped. Furthermore, 
education and science play an important role in Gülen’s somewhat opaque teaching and even 
more opaque political practice. Nonetheless, biology was not mentioned when in a 
propaganda film mathematics and physics were praised. In private conversation one of the 
teachers referred to evolutionary theory as “monkey theory”… – The visit at Piri Reis was, by 
the way, requested as part of the funding by the Turkish Prime Minister’s Promotion Fund. 
Seventh Quadrennial Fellows Conference of the Center for Philosophy of Science -262-
2 
 
important component of the evolution of social behaviour; while others 
like Richard Dawkins explain religion as a by-product of evolution. As in 
all these approaches religion appears as illusory, I would like to term 
these types of conflicts Freudian conflicts, because the word “illusion” 
appears in the title The Future of an Illusion of Freud’s book on the 
topic.  
II. Galilean Conflicts on Evolution  
The Galileo affair has been a deep embarrassment to the 
Church ever since the second half of the 17th century when it became 
clear to almost everybody in Rome that Copernicanism was far from 
being “philosophically absurd and false” or “heretical”.  
Having become sort of prudent the ecclesiastical authorities 
kept a low profile throughout the first hundred years of Darwinian 
evolutionary theory. They seemed to have learnt their lesson from the 
Galileo Affair and kept their noses out of scientific debates, at least as 
far as making any official announcements about evolutionary theory is 
concerned. This is the more surprising as the topic of human evolution 
as – among other things – also dealing with the nature of man is much 
closer to central tenets of Faith than Copernicanism.  
The first official and explicitly public and path breaking 
statement on evolution by a Church authority is the Encyclical Humani 
Generis, promulgated by Pope Pius XII in 1950. On the whole, this 
Encyclical expresses a rather relaxed position with respect to evolution. 
But although it does not instigate a Galilean conflict it nonetheless does 
intimate possible Galileo-like problems.  
The text is somewhat obfuscated, however, by the low 
epistemological expertise, which has characterized documents of the 
Church up to the present day.  
Talking about empirical science the Pope distinguishes 
between “clearly proved facts” and “hypotheses”. However, as, by 
definition, all universal statements in empirical science are hypotheses, 
it seems more likely that the Pope is actually distinguishing between 
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hypotheses that are strongly supported by empirical evidence and 
hypotheses that lack sufficient empirical evidence.  
In this light, we can say that Pope Pius XII:  
1) accepts evolutionary theory as a scientific theory as long as it 
does not contest  
a) God’s creation of the human soul and b) the monogenic 
origin of mankind (which contradicts all scientific evidence) 
2) The Pope requires that evolutionary “hypotheses” have to be 
“submitted to the judgement of the Church.” Whether this also holds for 
“proved facts”, remains unclear.  
3) does not speak out on whether he thinks that evolution is a 
historical fact of the history of the earth.  
The next pronouncement of the Church concerning evolution 
can be found in the Monitum, a warning against the writings of Jesuit 
palaeontologist Teilhard de Chardin, issued by the Holy Office on June 
30, 1962 and reiterated on July 20, 1981. 
The Monitum clearly illustrates two important points. 1) The 
Church is not interested in engaging in a Galilean conflict about 
evolution and explicitly refrains from interfering with matters of science. 
2) The Church maintains a cautious and expectant position with respect 
to evolutionary theory.  
This caution seems to be thrown to the wind in a famous letter 
by John Paul II to the Pontifical Academy on October 22, 1996. In this 
letter, Pope John Paul II confirms the position taken by Pius XII in 
Humani Generis, but with one decisive qualification: 
“Today, almost half a century after the publication of the 
Encyclical [Humani Generis] new knowledge has led to the recognition 
of the theory of evolution as more than a hypothesis. It is indeed 
remarkable that this theory has been progressively accepted by 
researchers, following a series of discoveries in various fields of 
knowledge. The convergence, neither sought nor fabricated, of the 
results of work that was conducted independently is in itself a significant 
argument in favour of this theory.” 
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But the Pope adds: “theories of evolution which, in accordance 
with the philosophies inspiring them, consider the mind as emerging 
from the forces of living matter, or as a mere epiphenomenon of this 
matter, are incompatible with the truth about man.”  
1) Pope John Paul II acknowledges the theory of evolution to be 
an adequately confirmed theory or, as formulated in Vatican 
epistemological terminology, it has risen above mere “hypothesis” and 
is beginning to be something like a “proven fact”. 
2) He, nonetheless, points to conflict areas. a) the monogenic 
origin of mankind (by implication only, because he confirms in a 
summary way what was said in Humani Generis) and b) God’s direct 
creation of the soul. The thesis of the monogenic origin contradicts 
scientific evidence about the formation of species, while the question of 
the soul is a special conceptual issue that, to the best of my knowledge, 
the pertinent sciences probably are not that concerned about. But that 
the Pope contests the evolution of mind and brain contradicts flatly his 
praise of evolutionary theory in general as well as well confirmed results 
of evolutionary theory, anthropology and palaeontology. 
Given that general policy to get out of the Galilean fire line, it is 
most surprising that recently the Church, in the person of one of its 
most senior Cardinals, seems to have taken up arms again and 
marching head-long back on to this Galilean battlefield. In an article 
(“Finding Design in Nature”) that was published in the New York Times 
on July 7, 2005 Christoph Cardinal Schönborn was widely perceived as 
siding with the most recent incarnation of American Creationism, the so-
called Intelligent Design Theory, ID for short. As this paper focuses on 
epistemological issues, I will not address all of the many other 
interesting aspects of this article but I will concentrate here on two 
pertinent quotations: 
1) “The Catholic Church, while leaving to science many details 
about the history of life on earth, proclaims that the human intellect can 
readily and clearly discern purpose and design in the natural world, 
including the world of living things.”  
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2) “Evolution in the sense of common ancestry might be true, 
but evolution in the neo-Darwinian sense – an unguided, unplanned 
process of random variation and natural selection – is not. Any system 
of thought that denies or seeks to explain away the overwhelming 
evidence for design is ideology not science.”  
As to the first quotation, I should remark that evolutionary 
biology in the course of its 150 years of existence has been able to 
explain thousands of design-like structures in living beings in terms of 
evolution, of which natural selection, as proposed by Darwin, is the 
most important but not the only factor. Before the advent of Evolutionary 
Theory, such structures were believed to have been drafted by an 
omnipotent designer. To answer Cardinal Schönborn’s first point in just 
one sentence: the human intellect, indeed, is able to discern purpose 
and design in the natural word, but explains this scientifically in terms of 
functional adaptations brought about mostly by natural selection. 
As to the second point, tens of thousands of biologists all over 
the world will be astounded to hear that by relying on the two principles 
of evolutionary theory: random variation and natural selection, they are 
ideologists rather than scientists. Taking Cardinal Schönborn’s 
assessment seriously and dismissing random variation and natural 
selection would put an end to both evolutionary biology, and most other 
areas of biology, as we know them today.  
Schönborn’s objections against evolutionary theory are, by the 
way, well known from creationist literature. Their mantra like repetition 
does not get them closer to the truth:  
Both evolutionary biology as well as the philosophy of biology 
have dealt with these objections and have disproved them on countless 
occasions – to no avail.  
Schönborn’s anti-evolutionism does not seem to be an isolated 
position, however. In September 2006 in Castel Gandolfo at a meeting 
on evolution of Pope Benedict with his former students, he praised 
Schönborn’s article in the New York Times this way.  
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„It occurs to me that it was divine providence that lead you, 
Eminency, to write a gloss in the New York Times, to render public 
again this topic and to show, where the questions are.”  
Normally, one finds even behind bizarre positions of the Church 
a rational core. This seems to hold also in this case: 
It is not clear whether Cardinal Schönborn really intended to do 
what he actually did: launching a new Galilean conflict; and whether he 
really wanted to side with ID. There is some evidence that he did not 
want this and that he merely meant to engage in a Freudian conflict but 
that he applied the arguments the proponents of ID implement in their 
Galilean fight against evolutionary theory.  
 
III. Freudian Conflicts on Evolution  
Freudian conflicts arise, when a particular science tries to 
explain away religion as a phenomenon in its own right. They do not 
specifically affect the Catholic Church, but religion in general. 
Therefore, the first task of those who wish to wage a Freudian conflict 
should be to develop an adequate definition, or at least a satisfactory 
characterization, of the concept of religion. So far nobody seems to 
have achieved this and, unfortunately, most of those waging Freudian 
conflicts hardly even acknowledge this as a major problem. The second 
task would be to adduce sufficient scientific evidence in order to 
substantiate their Freudian claims in explaining religion.  
These two defects one finds also in Richard Dawkins’ God 
Delusion. In Chapter 5 (“The Roots of Religion”), it is clear that Dawkins 
has difficulties in pinpointing the direct adaptational value of religion. 
After rejecting explanations based on group selection, Dawkins starts 
with the confession: “I am one of an increasing number of biologists 
who see religion as a by-product of something else” (174). The idea of 
by-product, i.e. the idea that a structure that at some period in time had 
evolved according to certain selective pressures is later used for other 
purposes than the one it was originally selected for, is quite common in 
evolutionary biology. This phenomenon is called “exaptation” of a 
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structure, which is distinct from adaptation. Dawkins goes on to present 
the bold idea that: “natural selection builds child brains with a tendency 
to believe whatever their parents and tribal elders tell them. Such 
trusting obedience is valuable for survival.” (176). Religion is just a by-
product of this brain structure.  
Firstly, to assume that religion is above all or even exclusively 
about “trusting obedience” seems a rather narrow view of a 
monotheistic religion let alone a non-monotheistic religion. Secondly, as 
far as evidence is concerned, Dawkins just presents us nothing else 
than a just-so-story that abounds with “might” “could” and similar 
linguistic indicators of uncertainty and speculation. If natural science 
were conducted in this way, there could be no natural science in the 
sense we know and trust. In fact, Dawkins is much aware of the 
weakness of his position. “I must stress”, he admits “that it is only an 
example of the kind of thing I mean, and I shall come on to parallel 
suggestions made by others. I am much more wedded to the general 
principle that the question should be properly put [i.e. religion as a by-
product of the evolutionary process], and if necessary rewritten, than I 
am to any particular answer.” (174). In response to this, it must be said 
that the very principle of scientific research is that ideas have to be 
supported by evidence. What is virtually missing from Dawkins’ claim is 
the evidence that religion is a “by-product of something else”.  
My criticism of Freudian attacks on evolutionary explanations of 
religion given here has two targets: 1) I would like to contest their claims 
that they have scientifically explained away religion by means of natural 
science. At best they could show some behavioural dispositions for 
religion in humans that are far away from the phenomenal richness of 
religions. Generally we see here the problem of methodological 
naturalism: are the natural sciences the right way of dealing with 
cultural phenomena?  My preliminary answer is: NO. Cultural 
phenomena are much too complex as to allow one-dimensional 
explanations.  
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 2) But I would also like contest the claim that the self 
proclaimed “new atheists” have proven atheism to be true. Even if we 
concede, for arguments sake, that their evolutionary explanation of 
religion was correct, this would only show that humans have the 
corresponding behavioural dispositions (for social cohesion through 
religious symbols, obedience etc.). – A believer could easily answer that 
this only shows God’s wisdom in creation, insofar He/She has created 
us such that it is easy for us to believe in Him/Her.   
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MOORE’S PROBLEM
1. Moore’s Original Versions of Moore’s Problem 
In 1942, Moore first presented the problem now known either as ‘Moore’s Problem’ or 
as ‘Moore’s Paradox’. It was introduced by means of the following example:
(1) Although it may be true both that I went to the pictures last Tuesday and that today 
I don’t believe that I did, it would be ‘perfectly absurd’ for me to assert the sentence ‘I 
went to the pictures last Tuesday, but I don’t believe that I did’ (cf. “A Reply to my 
Critics” in The Philosophy of G.E. Moore (ed. by Schilpp, P.). La Salle (IL): Open 
Court, 1968, p. 543).  
Later, in another essay, he used a different sentence, both in terms of content as well 
as structure, to build another example of the absurdity involved in its assertion. The 
sentence in question was the following: 
(2) ‘I believe he left, but he didn´t do it’ (cf. “Russell’s “Theory of Descriptions”” in 
The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell (ed. by Schilpp, P.). Evanston (IL): Northwestern, 
1944, pp. 175-6. 
2. The Oddity of the Absurdity 
According to Moore’s own view, the ‘absurdities’ he identified by means of the 
examples above were to be generalized to all cases in which we produce an assertion 
either of the form ‘p and I don’t believe that p’ (as in (1) above), or of the form ‘p and 
I believe that not p’ (as in (2) above).
At the same time, Moore also pointed out that the identification of these absurdities 
cannot fail to strike a critical thinker as being somehow odd.
This oddity manifests itself in the fact that, as soon as we identify the assertions of the 
forms above as absurd, we are led to ask ourselves the following question: How can 
the assertion of a meaningful conjunctive sentence, the conjuncts of which may both 
be true simultaneously on many an occasion, be absurd? 
In order to get a clear view on Moore’s problem, we need to be able to find a plausible 
answer to this question; if we are not able to do that, then the oddity Moore detected is 
probably best seen as a symptom that something is not right with the original 
diagnosis. 
1
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3. The Most Travelled Route  
In general, philosophers dealing with Moore’s problem followed the route of assuming 
the intuition of absurdity associated with the actual use of sentences of the form ‘p 
and I believe that not p’ or ‘p and I do not believe that p’ to be legitimate (i.e., they 
assumed that the actual use of sentences of these forms really instantiates a paradox). 
They then proceeded from there in order to determine where the contradiction-like 
aspect of the problem that might justify such a diagnosis lied. 
Their standpoints differed only in the different stories they presented in order to 
account for the emergence of this contradiction-like aspect. These stories admit being 
divided into two categories: those of a linguistic bent and those of a doxastic bent. 
A. THE LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS
4. Moore’s Own Way of Travelling the Most Travelled Route 
Moore himself believed that the intuition of absurdity revealed the way in which 
assertion implies belief. His contention was that, whenever a speaker asserts that p, he 
also implies both that he believes that p and that he does not believe that not p. 
This being the case, producing assertions of the above-mentioned forms would be 
absurd because what their second conjunct states explicitly contradicts what the first 
conjunct implies. 
5. What is the Nature of the Implication? Moore’s Reply. 
As a matter of fact, the contradiction Moore claimed to have detected does not follow 
immediately from the implication he claimed there to obtain between assertion and 
belief. Besides the implication, some further assumptions need to be made in order for 
such a contradiction to be effectively derivable.
But, more importantly, to state that an implication exists linking the assertion of p 
with the belief that p and the absence of the belief that not p is not enough. The 
nature of such an implication must be clarified.
 
All the more so because, as Moore was the first to point out, such an implication is 
obviously not a matter of logical entailment. So, on what grounds are we to establish 
that a speaker who explicitly asserts p implicitly believes p and implicitly does not 
believe not p? 
2
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Moore’s reply was that this implication is to be brought back to an inductive inference. 
According to him, we all learn from experience that, in the vast majority of cases, a 
man making an assertion believes what he asserts; i.e., lying, although possible, ”is 
largely exceptional”. 
6. What is Wrong With Moore’s Reply.
Moore’s reply does not seem to be a correct analysis of the problem. If it were, the 
uttering by a speaker of an assertion of one of the two problematic forms mentioned 
above would be perceived by his interlocutors as clashing against nothing more than 
an expectation based on a previously observed empirical regularity. 
However, the consequence of the perception of such a clash would probably be a 
reaction of surprise, followed or not, depending on the strength of the evidence, by a 
revision of the interlocutors’ empirical expectations concerning the frequency of 
lying; hardly the conviction that they had witnessed the uttering of an absurdity.
Indeed, a genuine absurdity should result from a violation of a conceptual connection 
and not from a clash between the observation of an unexpected case and previously 
existing empirically based expectations. 
7. The Wittgensteinian Analysis.
A more promising account of the nature of the connection between assertion and 
belief underlying the absurdity Moore detected comes from the Wittgensteinian 
tradition.
According to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, an important distinction in the deep 
grammar of ordinary language needs to be made between first-person singular present 
tense sentences with psychological content and third-person present tense sentences 
with psychological content. Whereas the latter are descriptive of the psychological 
reality of the person referred to by the personal pronoun, and thus susceptible of being 
true or false, the former are merely expressive; as such, they vocalize the 
psychological reality of the speaker; they don´t describe it. Vocalizations may be 
genuine or fake, but not true or false.
Thus, according to a number of philosophers belonging to this tradition (e.g. 
Malcolm, Heal or Linville and Ring), an assertion of the form ‘I believe that p’ merely 
expresses the speaker’s belief that p; it doesn’t describe it. The assertion of such a 
sentence by a speaker is then nothing but a semantically inert variant of the assertion 
by him of the sentence ‘p’. 
8. The Oddity Explained Away.
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Under these circumstances, the truth-conditions associated with the assertions of ‘p’ 
and ‘I believe that p’ would be exactly the same. Both would be about the world and 
not about the speaker’s psychological life. They would, namely, be about that segment 
of the world described by the proposition ‘p’. And both would express (although not 
with the same force) the speaker’s belief in the truth of the latter.
Therefore, an assertion of the form ‘p and I don´t believe that p’ or of the form ‘p and 
I believe that not p’ would be the assertion of a plain contradiction; in spite of the 
surface grammar of the propositions contained in them, both of these assertions would 
be of the form ‘p and not p’. The intuition of absurdity Moore detected would thus be 
easily justified as a consequence of the underlying presence of a logical contradiction. 
Thus, if the Wittgensteinian doctrine about the meaning of first-person singular 
present tense psychological sentences is to be accepted, no oddity associated with 
Moore’s absurdity diagnosis will remain. The oddity will have been explained away.
9. What Happens When the First-Person Pronoun Is Used Referentially? 
The main criticism the Wittgensteinian account invites us to make is that it contains 
an illegitimate generalization. That is, it is indeed true that there are cases in which an 
assertion of the form ‘I believe that p’ is used in the way the Wittgensteinian says it is; 
but there are also lots of other cases in which ‘I believe that p’ is used in order to refer  
to the fact of the speaker’s believing in p and not merely to express the speaker’s belief 
in p. 
Assuming that such cases exist, as they clearly do seem to, how can we account for the 
absurdity Moore detected when one such sentence is conjoined in an assertion with 
the sentence ‘not p’? Obviously, the Wittgensteinian solution, as it was expressed 
above, cannot tell us anything about these cases. 
10. The Speech-Act Analysis .
An alternative both to the Moorean and the Wittgensteinian analyses of the nature of 
the implication is provided by the speech-act analysis (e.g. Burnyeat or Martinich). 
This analysis may be summarized through the following sequence of steps: 
(1) It is constitutive of the speech-act of assertion that p that it be accompanied 
with the intention of providing the audience with information that p through 
their recognition that that is the speaker’s intention.
(2) A speaker cannot be recognized by his audience to have the intention to 
provide them with the information that p, unless he is believed by them to 
believe that p. That is, a speaker’s being believed by his audience to believe 
that p is constitutive of his being recognized by them as having the intention to 
provide them with the information that p. 
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(3) Therefore, from (1) and (2), it follows that it is constitutive of the enactment of 
a speech-act of assertion that p that the speaker strives to provide his audience 
with information that p by making himself believed by them to believe that p.  
In other words, if a speech-act of assertion is performed, the audience should 
recognise that it is the speaker’s intention that they should end up believing both the 
proposition that it is explicitly asserted by him and the proposition that he believes 
what he has asserted. 
Now, given the analysis presented above concerning the nature of a speech-act of 
assertion, let’s see what happens when the speaker asserts sentences of the form ‘p 
and I don’t believe that p’ or sentences of the form ‘p and I believe that not p’.  
11. How Does the Absurdity Come About?
In the case of the assertion of a sentence of the form ‘p and I don’t believe that p’, the 
propositions that the audience should recognise that it is the speaker’s intention that 
they should believe are: ‘p and I don’t believe that p’ and ‘I believe that p and I don’t 
believe that p’. Now, if we assume both the truth of the asserted sentence (remeber 
that, by itself, the sentence is consistent) and that the belief in a conjunction entails 
belief in each conjunct, an overt contradiction is derivable from them, namely, that the 
speaker believes that p and that he doesn’t believe that p. 
In the case of the assertion of a sentence of the form ‘p and I believe that not p’, the 
propositions that the audience should recognise that it is the speaker’s intention that 
they should believe are: ‘p and I believe that not p’ and ‘I believe that p and I believe 
that not p’. Assuming the truth of the asserted sentence and that the belief in a 
conjunction entails belief in each conjunct, although no overt contradiction is 
derivable from these propositions, an ascription to the speaker of two inconsistent 
beliefs is (namely, that he believes that p and that he believes that not p).
12. The Nature of the Absurdity.
In either case, the propositions that the audience should recognise that it is the 
speaker’s intention that they should end up believing have consequences that clash 
whith each other. Thus, an audience guided by rational rules of conversational 
intercourse will be unable to make sense of the speaker’s supposed assertion, given 
the fact that they will be unable to elicit from it any consistent intention of the speaker 
to make himself believed by his audience to believe the content of his own assertion. 
This proof of how the inconsistency is produced is actually not the one the above-
mentioned authors themselves present. But I think it is the right one. Anyway, and 
regardless of the details, this is why, according to this analysis, the production of 
Moore-like assertion-attempts is supposed to be self-defeating. 
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13. The Nature of the Implication and of its Violation. 
Now, although the speech-act analysis agrees with the Moorean analysis to the effect 
that assertion implies belief, it disagrees with it regarding the nature of such an 
implication. 
What the assertion of the problematic sentences violates, according to the speech-act 
analysis, is thus not an established empirical expectation but rather a set of conditions 
which are conceptually constitutive of the production of a legitimate speech-act of 
assertion. The absurdity is then the outcome of the speaker’s use of the external 
indicators of the speech-act of assertion together with his violation of the internal 
conditions that constitute such an act. 
The sentences of the form Moore identified are then deemed by the speech-act 
analysis to be unassertable, not in the sense that they cannot be uttered with an 
assertive tone of voice (which they obviously can), but in the sense that it is not 
possible to utter them and simultaneously fulfill the conditions that define the 
performance of a speech-act of assertion.
B. THE DOXASTIC ANALYSIS
14. Unbelievability. 
More recently, a number of philosophers put forth the claim that it is misleading to 
view Moore’s problem as having to do solely with linguistic expression (namely, with 
the violation of the conceptual conditions that are constitutive of the production of a 
particular kind of speech-act, viz., that of assertion). They feel that this diagnosis does 
not go deep enough.
They wish to make a stronger claim concerning Moore’s problem, namely, the claim 
that contents of the form ‘p and I don’t believe that p’ or of the form ‘p and I believe 
that not p’ are actually unbelievable, and not only unassertable (cf. Williams, 
Shoemaker, Sorensen). A fortiori, they wish to claim that it is because these contents 
are unbelievable that they are unassertable.
Thus, according to these philosophers, having the contents exemplifying Moore’s 
problem as the objects of a propositional attitude such as belief violates conditions 
that are constitutive of meaningful thought. And this is why the intuition of absurdity 
is generated. 
15. Logic as a Criterion of Doxastic Admissibility. 
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Their idea is then to replace with inner intrapersonal constraints of doxastic 
admissibility the interpersonal constraints that regulate, within the speech-act analysis, 
what is to count as an assertive move within the context of a theory of overt linguistic 
games. 
But this is easier said than done. How are we to discover what these purely inner 
criteria of doxastic admissibility might be? This is a difficult problem brought about 
by this idea. 
The view all these philosophers share regarding the nature of these intrapersonal 
constraints of doxastic admissibility is that they are of a logical nature. In particular, 
that it is the criterion of logical consistency that should do the job. 
16. Inconsistency as a Criterion of Unbelievability. 
Now, if logical consistency is the criterion in terms of which putative belief contents 
are to be assessed regarding their believability, then, if it is possible to show that a 
certain belief content is inconsistent or generates an inconsistency, then it has been 
shown that such a belief content is actually unbelievable.
Thus, the strategy followed by these authors in order to show that the propositions 
exemplifying Moore’s problem are unbelievable is the strategy of showing that their 
admission as putative belief contents violates the criterion of logical consistency.
Contrary to Shoemaker’s or Williams’s, Sorensen’s approach has the merit of not 
using in his proof of the unbelievability of contents exhibiting the forms Moore 
highlighted the principles B(p)→B(B(p)) (i.e., if the agent believes that p, then he 
believes that he believes that p) and B(B(p)) →B(p) (i.e., if the agent believes that he 
believes that p, then he believes that p). I deem this characteristic to be a merit of 
Sorensen’s approach, because I take these principles to be highly contentious. They 
assume, namely, that belief is self-intimating. But this assumption seems to me to be 
plainly false. Thus, I think that Sorensen’s views on this subject are those which best 
represent the standpoint I am now addressing. 
Let us see then how his deductive strategy is supposed to work.
17. Proof of Inconsistency. 
Let us consider first the case of my considering whether or not to accept a content of 
the form ‘p and I don’t believe that p’ as the content of a putative belief of mine. If we 
assume both the truth of the proposition that defines this content, and the basic 
principle of doxastic logic according to which belief in a conjunction entails belief in 
each conjunct, then an overt contradiction is derivable from my putative belief in this 
true proposition, namely, that the proposition ‘I believe that p and I don’t believe that 
p’ is true. 
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Let us consider next the case of my considering whether or not to accept a content of 
the form ‘p and I believe that not p’ as the content of a putative belief of mine. Again, 
if we assume both the truth of the proposition that defines this content and the basic 
principle of doxastic logic according to which belief in a conjunction entails belief in 
each conjunct, then, although no overt contradiction is derivable from my putative 
belief in this content, the holding by me of two strongly inconsistent beliefs is 
(namely, the holding by me of the belief that p and the holding by me of the belief that 
not p).
18. Blindspots for Belief.
Thus, in either case, if I am a rational and deductively competent believer, I will not 
accept holding belief contents as these.
 
As a matter of fact, if we assume logical consistency to be a criterion of belief 
admissibility, the conclusion to be drawn from the analysis displayed above must 
actually be stronger than the one that is expressed by the formulation contained in the 
previous paragraph. In fact, the conclusion must be that such contents are actually 
unbelievable, regardless of my idiosyncrasies as a believer.
According to Sorensen, the fact that we need to assume the truth of the propositions 
defining Moore’s examples in order to derive their unbelievability, reveals that they 
mark out a particular type of propositions, namely, those he calls ‘blindspots’ of 
belief. According to him, Moore’s main philosophical merit was twofold: the 
discovery that there are blindspots for belief and the discovery of what they are (cf. 
Sorensen 1988).
Moreover, the existence of such blindspots for belief is supposed to be a proof that the 
domain of the believable is only a proper subset of the domain of the true, and, 
therefore, that truth cannot be defined in terms of belief. 
19. How About the Non-Obvious Cases? 
But can logical consistency really be the standard by means of which we assess 
believability?
Bear in mind that a belief in a content of one of the forms Moore identified as 
problematic is not a contradictory belief per se. It is rather a belief from which  either 
a contradiction or a strong inconsistency is derivable. 
However, the contents of the forms Moore identified are not alone in being of this 
kind. For instance, there are contents from the belief in which a belief in a content of 
the forms Moore identified is derivable. Are those contents also unbelievable? 
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Consider the following two examples of such contents: 
(1) The lottery paradox. The man who refuses to gamble believes of each lottery ticket 
that it is not a winner; however, he is aware that one of them will be a winner. Thus, 
he can be represented to believe a content that entails the content L such that L=‘W(1) 
or W(2) or ... W(n) and I believe that not W(1) and not W(2) and ...not W(n)’. L is, of 
course, of the form ‘p and I believe that not p’.
(2) Sorensen’s own atheism example. A more or less convoluted story can be 
concocted according to which it makes sense to imagine someone ending up believing 
the following content: ‘The atheism of my mother’s nieceless brother’s only nephew 
angers God’. But belief in this content implies belief in the content ‘My atheism 
angers God’ which, in turn, implies ‘God exists and I do not believe that God exists’, 
which, of course, is of the form ‘p and I do not believe that p’. 
20. How Many Unbelievable Contents Are There Actually? 
Now, I claim that although it may be epistemically wrong to believe in the truth of the 
contents above (as it certainly is), it is highly implausible to claim of them that they 
are unbelievable.
In order to strengthen my case, I ask you now to consider the case of other contents 
not related to Moore’s propositional forms but that are also generators of 
inconsistencies.
 
As a classical example of one such case, consider the propositional content defining 
Axiom V of Frege’s Grundgestze der Arithmetik. As Russell showed in 1902, this 
axiom generates a contradiction. But are we supposed to infer from Russell’s proof 
that the Axiom V is actually unbelievable and that, therefore, between the 1880s and 
1902, Frege was actually mistaken concerning his belief in the truth of Axiom V? I.e., 
that he only believed he believed in Axiom V but that, in reality, he didn’t (because he 
couldn’t)? This does not sound right. 
21. Deductive Distance.
A possible way out of this conundrum might be to try to define a metric of deductive 
closeness and to identify within it a point separating small from large deductive 
distances. Thus, if a contradiction were deducible within a small deductive distance 
from a putative belief content, such a content would be unbelievable; if it took a long 
deductive distance to infer a contradiction from such a content, then it would be 
believable, despite the inconsistency it would lead to. This way we might get the 
means to distinguish in a rigorous way between acceptable and unacceptable forms of 
inconsistency. 
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The expectation would then be that the contents having the forms Moore highlighted 
would, according to this criterion, fall within the side of the barrier containing the 
unacceptable forms of inconsistency. 
However, the very idea that there could be an absolute metric of deductive distance 
seems not to make much sense (cf. Cherniak 1986). 
22. Sorensen’s Way Out. 
The idea of using logical consistency as a criterion of empirical belief ascription 
seems thus not to be very promising. Aware of this problem, Sorensen retreats to a 
normative standpoint according to which it is up to the rational observer to criticize 
the belief claims of the speaker. Such criticism is, in turn, to be developed in light of 
the desiderata of belief formation. 
Sorensen’s view is that avoiding error is the primary of these desiderata. And the 
structural constraint the fulfilment of which best serves it is logical consistency. This 
is therefore the criterion the following of which entitles us to criticize those who claim 
believing in contents from which inconsistencies are derivable and to urge them to 
revise their belief claims in order to eliminate the inconsistencies and preserve the 
consistency of their belief sets. 
However, avoiding error and getting truth are not exactly congruent desiderata. This 
explains the existence of ‘blindspots’ for belief – true contents, the belief in which 
generates inconsistencies. The having of beliefs with these contents would violate the 
structural constraint put in place by the need to follow the primary desideratum of 
avoiding error. Therefore, such true contents cannot constitute any of our belief 
contents. 
23. Actual Desiderata of Belief Formation. 
But is it indeed sensible to imagine that the cognitive architecture of complex 
creatures should be best served by a mechanism of belief formation that strives first 
and foremost to avoid error? 
I believe it is highly doubtful that this is so. Let me introduce what I take to be two 
counterexamples to this thesis. 
Counterexample (1) is provided by the fact that living creatures in general (and not 
only humans) are prone to err on the side of caution. Arguably, this makes 
evolutionary sense. The following of rigorous processes of belief formation primarily 
aimed at avoiding error would, in many circumstances, simply be too costly and time-
consuming. Presumably, for a whole range of creatures having to live, act and react 
quickly in the real world, the following of such a cognitive strategy would frequently 
be suicidal. 
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24. Usefulness and Truth. 
Counterexample (2) is more parochial. It is provided by psychological research on 
belief in the hot hand in sports (cf. Burns  2001, 2004). Burns found out that belief in 
the hot hand is widespread among basketball players. He also found out that having 
this belief leads playmakers to pass the ball to a player with a higher scoring average 
in the game relative to his average performance and thus increases the chances of his 
team winning. The having of such belief seems thus to lead to the adoption of an 
adaptive behavioral strategy. 
But ‘hot hand’ is defined as the higher probability in sports to score again after two or 
more hits compared with two or three misses; now, given the fact that each throw of 
the ball is actually independent of any other, belief in the hot hand is belief in a 
fallacy. The hot hand is, basically, an inverted version of the famous gambler’s fallacy.
Thus, counterexample (1) pointed out circumstances in which following the cognitive 
strategy of avoiding error is presumably detrimental to the belief holder. And 
counterexample (2) above presented circumstances in which not following the 
cognitive strategy of avoiding error seems to be beneficial to the belief holders and the 
group to which they belong. 
Taken together, counterexamples (1) and (2) suggest that the question of how useful a 
belief is in achieving some desirable goal should not be confused with the question of 
what its truth value is.
25. Cognitive Processes Ought to be Judged by Adaptive Criteria.
In reality, we simply don’t know what are the general structural constraints for belief 
formation set by our cognitive architecture. This fact notwithstanding, 
counterexamples (1) and (2), and countless others in the literature (cf. Kahneman, 
Tversky, Gilovich, etc.) lead us to conclude that a structural constraint aimed primarily 
at avoiding error is not, both empirically as well as normatively, a serious contender 
for the job of determining belief admissibility. Cognitive processes, such as belief 
generation, ought to be judged by adaptive criteria. And adaptability is connected to 
the success of the actions beliefs do trigger in relevant contexts.
In fact, and for good reasons (namely, computational ones), it is likely that, for 
creatures like us, most processes of belief formation are of a fast, frugal and dirty 
nature and are responsive to localized structural constraints only (cf. Gigerenzer 
2000). As a consequence, inconsistencies are to be expected to emerge within the 
belief system taken as a whole. 
This being the case, it seems to be a bad move in cognitive thinking to assume, as 
Sorensen does, that the mechanism of belief formation of an autonomous living 
11
Seventh Quadrennial Fellows Conference of the Center for Philosophy of Science -280-
system should ideally obey first and foremost the structural constraint of avoiding 
error, even if this is not the way things appear to have empirically evolved. 
26. Conclusion.
The linguistic diagnosis of the Moorean absurdity is based on a plausible analysis of 
the conversational constraints underlying the rules that define an interpersonal 
linguistic game of information transfer and persuasion. Within such a game of 
persuasion, a move displaying a Moorean content seems indeed to be defying the rules 
that constitute it. 
The doxastic diagnosis, however, does not seem to be able to pin down a plausible 
constraint in terms of which belief in referential contents of the forms Moore 
identified could actually be criticized as violating some constitutive condition of 
meaningful thought. Thus, I see no reason why such contents ought to be labelled as 
‘unbelievable’.
Finally, I would like to conclude by saying that, as far as we now know, and despite 
their potential for generating inconsistency, we cannot rule out on purely a priori  
grounds the possibility that true referential beliefs of the form ‘p and I belief that not 
p’ or ‘p and I don’t belief that p’ may actually be usefully believed in a number of 
contexts. 
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Newton on Matter and Space  
in De gravitatione et aequipondio fluidorum  
Hylarie Kochiras 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper explicates the concepts of matter and space that Newton develops in De gravitatione.  As I 
interpret Newton’s account of created substances, bodies are constructed from qualities alone, as 
configured by God.  Although regions of space and then “determined quantities of extension” appear to 
replace the Aristotelian substrate by functioning as property-bearers, they actually serve only as logical 
subjects.   An implication of the interpretation I develop is that only space is extended by having parts 
outside parts; material bodies are spatially extended only in a derivative sense, via the presence of their 
constitutive qualities or powers in space. 
 
 
Introduction 
Newton develops his account of material body in what Howard Stein has called the “creation” 
story or hypothesis. This account has also been called the “determined quantities of extension 
hypothesis” (Slowik, 2009), since Newton marks the account as speculative and develops it by 
associating various conditions with “determined quantities of extension”.
1
  I shall follow Stein’s 
terminology, however, for reasons concerning Newton’s account of minds, as explained later.
2
  
Understanding the account of body depends upon properly understanding these determined 
quantities of extension and their relation to space (extension) itself.  It is therefore important 
briefly to review De gravitatione’s claims about space.   
 
Features of space    
For Newton, space is an existence condition for any substance and “an affection of every kind 
of being”.
3
 This latter description refers to the manner of existing in nature, a manner of existing 
quite different from that of an abstract entity or a number, as J.E. McGuire has explained.
4
  As 
                                                           
1
 See De gravitatione in Isaac Newton: Philosophical Writings, 27: “I am reluctant to say positively what the nature of bodies is, 
but I would rather describe a certain kind of being similar in every way to bodies...”; and 28: “And hence these beings will either 
be bodies, or very similar to bodies. If they are bodies, then we can define bodies as determined quantities of extension which 
omnipresent God endows with certain conditions.” 
2
 See Stein, “Newton’s Metaphysics”, 275.  Slowik refers to that account of bodies as the “Determined Quantities of Extension” 
or “DQE” hypothesis (see “Newton’s Metaphysics of Space”, 2009, 438.)  I follow Stein’s terminology in part to avoid reifying 
the quantities of extension, and in part for a reason concerning minds, as discussed at the end of §4.   
3
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 21. 
4
  Pointing to the manuscript ‘Tempus et Locus’ (c. 1692-93), as providing “Newton’s most succinct statement of how place and 
time relate to existing things”.  McGuire explicates that statement as follows: “Newton answers the question: what is it for 
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space is an affection of every kind of being, so is it a condition for their existence.  As Newton 
asserts in a well known remark, one repudiating the concept of spirits as transcendent, “No being 
exists or can exist which is not related to space in some way.  God is everywhere, created minds 
are somewhere, and body is in the space that it occupies; and whatever is neither everywhere nor 
anywhere does not exist.”
5
   
Since space is an existence condition of substances, it is not surprising that Newton takes it to 
have its own manner of existing.  It is neither substance, he emphasizes, nor accident.
6
  That it is 
not an accident inhering in a subject means, in part, that as an affection of every kind of being, it 
cannot be localized to any one being.  Accordingly, it is independent of bodies; if all bodies were 
annihilated, it would continue to exist unchanged.
7
  Space more nearly resembles a substance 
than an accident, Newton indicates, and as we shall see later, he ascribes a degree of “substantial 
reality” to it.  Indeed, he cites it as the one thing that can in some circumstances be conceived 
apart from God—a feature he will use to attack Descartes’ account of matter as atheistic.
8
  Yet 
though it has some substantial reality, still space is not a substance.  For one thing, it is “not 
absolute in itself, but is as it were an emanative effect of God.”
9
  Its not being absolute could not 
                                                           
anything to exist in nature?  It is to exist in a place and at a time.  As the text implies, existing in place and time is what counts as 
actually existing, in contrast, for example, to existing in the manner of an abstract entity or as a number.  This contention is 
supported by Newton’s use of the phrase ‘rerum natura’.....” (McGuire, “Existence, Actuality and Necessity: Newton on Space 
and time”, 465) 
5
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 25.  
6
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 21-22.  The ultimate source of Newton’s view that space is 
neither substance nor accident is Renaissance thinker Francesco Patrizi da Cherso (1529-1597).  Patrizi additionally held space to 
be wholly distinct from body, indeed a condition for matter’s existence, and to be immutable, indivisible, and immobile.  See F. 
Patrizi, ‘On Physical Space’ (De Spacio Physico), translated and commentary by B. Brickman, Journal of the History of Ideas, 
4:2 (1943), especially 224–245.  As Edward Grant explains (Much Ado about Nothing, 206-207), Patrizi is also the source of a 
surprising explanatory remark following Newton’s claim that space has distinguishable parts, whose common boundaries may be 
called surfaces.  Newton then goes on to explain that in space there are “there are everywhere all kinds of figures, everywhere 
spheres, cubes, triangles, straight lines, everywhere circular, elliptical, parabolical, and all other kinds of figures, and those of all 
shapes and sizes, even though they are not disclosed to sight....so that what was formerly insensible in space now appears before 
the senses....We firmly believe the space was spherical before the sphere occupied it, so that it could contain the sphere....And so 
of other figures.” (Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 21-22).  
7
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 22. See also 21: as “an affection of every kind of being”, it is not 
a “proper affection” which is to say an action. 
8
 See Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 31: “If we say with Descartes that extension is body, do we 
not manifestly offer a path to atheism, both because extension is not created, but has existed eternally, and because we have an 
idea of it without any relation to God, and so in some circumstances it would be possible for us to conceive of extension while 
supposing God not to exist?”  On space’s inability to produce effects, see Newton: Philosophical Writings, p 21-22, 34.   
9
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 21. That space is not a substance cannot fully be explained by its 
dependence upon God, in virtue of being an emanative effect of God.  For as will be emphasized later, Newton accepts not only 
the strong sense of substance but also the weak sense, which applies to things dependent upon God, in particular, created minds 
and bodies.  Although I cannot here address the question of how Newton understands an emanative effect, I am sympathetic to 
McGuire’s view that the relation of space to God is one of “ontic dependence”.  (See McGuire, “Existence, Actuality and 
Necessity: Newton on Space and time”, 480:  “the relation between the existence of being and that of space is not causal, but one 
of ontic dependence”.)  McGuire’s view provides an alternative to the three that Gorham (September, 2011) identifies as 
‘Independence’, ‘Causation’, and ‘Assimilation’.  Gorham defends Assimilation, arguing that space and time are attributes of 
God, and indeed identical to God (and thus to one another); see Gorham, September, 2011, especially 289-92 and 298-304.   
12-14 June 2012; Mugla, Turkey -285-
Presented June 14, 2012 at the 7th Quadrennial Fellows Conference of the Pittsburgh Center for Philosophy of Science, convened at Mugla University 
 3 
by itself explain why it is not a substance; for neither are created substances absolute in 
themselves, being dependent upon God.  Yet created substances have a different relation to God, 
precisely in virtue of having been created.  There is also another important difference.  
Substances act, whereas space produces no effects.
10
  
Though neither substance nor attribute, space is not nothing, Newton emphasizes, for it has 
properties.  The properties he describes indicate a Euclidean space, three-dimensional, 
homogeneous, and infinite.  Space is also eternal and immutable, and though parts may be 
distinguished within it, those parts are motionless and indivisible.
11
  It is these features—the 
immobility and indivisibility of space’s distinguishable parts—that are especially significant for 
Newton’s account of body.   
 
The creation hypothesis and the definition of body    
Newton develops his creation hypothesis in two stages, first ignoring mobility but 
subsequently introducing it.  He begins from the realization that we can temporarily make 
regions of space impervious to other bodies by moving our own bodies into them, observing that 
this might somehow simulate the divine power of creation.  By his will alone, God “can prevent 
a body from penetrating any space defined by certain limits”.
12  
 Such an entity would either be a 
body, or would be indistinguishable from bodies by us.
13
  For if God made some region above 
the earth impervious to bodies and all “impinging things”, it would be like a mountain; it would 
reflect all impinging things, including light and air, and it therefore would be visible and colored, 
and would resonate if struck.
14
   
These entities would be very similar to corporeal particles, Newton notes, except for this 
important feature: he has imagined them to be motionless.  For an entity to be a body, or at least 
to resemble bodies in all humanly perceptible ways, it must be mobile.  He therefore now adds 
                                                           
10
 As I argue in §4, Newton takes God to be identical to his attributes, and fundamental to his creative power, that is, 
omnipotence; yet in doing so Newton does not eliminate substance but rather gives a reductive account of it.  I note here that I 
reject the interpretation recently advanced by Geoffrey Gorham, though his arguments are intriguing.  According to Gorham, God 
is identical to his attributes, but his attributes include space and time, and hence he is identical to space and time. (See Gorham, 
September, 2011, especially 289-92 and 298-304).  In §4, I indicate the difficulties I see with that view.  
11
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 22, 25, 26.  
12
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 27.  
13
 Newton means to emphasize that we cannot know matter’s “essential and metaphysical constitution” (De Gravitatione, in 
Newton: Philosophical Writings, 27), or indeed the essence of any substance.  This conviction reappears in later writings, 
including the General Scholium, where he writes, "We certainly do not know what is the substance of any thing.  We see only the 
shapes and colors of bodies, we hear only their sounds, we touch only their external surfaces….But there is no direct sense and 
there are no indirect reflected actions by which we know innermost substances.”(Principia, 942.)  In this respect his account of 
body is strongly empirical.   
14
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 28.  
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that the hypothesized entities are capable of being moved from place to place, and in a law-
governed way, a feature that is relatively new to conceptions of body.
15
  Additionally, the entities 
can stimulate perceptions in minds and be operated upon by minds.
16
  The hypothesized entities 
are now just like bodies, being perceptible, and having shape, tangibility, mobility, and the 
ability both to reflect and be reflected.  They therefore could be “part of the structure of things”, 
just like “any other corpuscle”.
17
  This enables Newton to provide a definition of body (insofar as 
we can know them).   
 
We can define bodies as determined quantities of extension which omnipresent God endows with 
certain conditions.  These conditions are: (1) that they be mobile, and therefore I did not say that 
they are numerical parts of space which are absolutely immobile, but only definite quantities which 
may be transferred from space to space; (2) that two of this kind cannot coincide anywhere, that is, 
that they may be impenetrable, and hence that oppositions obstruct their mutual motions and they are 
reflected in accord with certain laws; (3) that they can excite various perceptions of the senses and 
the imagination in created minds, and conversely be moved by them, which is not surprising since 
the description of their origin is founded on this.
18
 
 
One of the interesting things about this definition is that Newton sees it as serving theological 
goals, as will become evident from his commentary, and yet it is firmly rooted in experience.  
The fundamental features of our experience with bodies appear in the definition: their mobility; 
the mutual impenetrability that results in law-governed reflections of other bodies, light, and air; 
and the sensations they produce in us, such as those of color.  Newton’s remark at the end of the 
passage highlights the fact that experiences, specifically perceptions, make his description of the 
bodies’ origin possible.  For if bodies lacked the power to produce sensations, we could never 
have any ideas of them.
19
  It is notable that Newton specifies condition (3), the power to produce 
                                                           
15
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 28.  In an otherwise quite different thought experiment, which 
appears in Le Monde, Descartes imagines bodies that move "in accordance with the ordinary laws of nature"; see CSM 1, 90.  Of 
interest here is Katherine Brading’s article “On Composite Systems: Descartes, Newton, and the Law-Constitutive Approach” 
(2011).  
16
 “For it is certain that God can stimulate, our perception by means of his own will, and thence apply such power to the effects of 
his will.” (Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 28) 
17
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 28.   
18
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 28-29.  A definition given in 1678 by Robert Hooke contains 
some intriguing similarities. After asserting that the universe consists in body and motion, he writes, “I do therefore define a 
sensible Body to be a determinate Space or Extension defended from being penetrated by another, by a power from within.” He 
also speculates that body and motion might ultimately be “one and the same”. See Hooke, Lectures Potentiae Restitutiva, or of 
Spring, Explaining the Power of Springing Bodies, 1678, 338-340.  How near the similarity really is, however, is a question I will 
not pursue here.   
19
 Geoffrey Gorham interprets this remark very differently.  On his view, Newton’s remark that the description of bodies’ origin 
is founded upon sensations indicates that he takes the capacity to produce sensations to be both necessary and sufficient for body-
hood.  In connection with that claim, Gorham argues that Newton ultimately sees his conditions of mobility and impenetrability 
as superfluous; these “do no independent work of their own”(Gorham, Jan.2011, 24).  I contest Gorham’s conclusion about those 
conditions in §2.5.  
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sensations, as distinct from condition (2), impenetrability.  One reason for distinguishing them is 
that in the hypothesis’ context, the first creation of matter, impenetrability could not be sufficient 
to produce sensations in minds. For if any minds existed when God first created matter, no 
human bodies would exist to touch it, and so the mutual impenetrability of bodies could not then 
produce sensations in minds.  Yet there is another explanation for including condition (3) as 
independent of condition (2): even in the context of actual experiences, Newton does not seem to 
consider sensations as explicable solely in terms of impenetrability.  He rather seems to share a 
belief common in the early modern period—that while the contact of light particles with the eye 
and food particles with the tongue seem to play some necessary role, they are not sufficient for 
the production of sensation, and so some role must be attributed to God.
20
   
The definition’s third condition is thus the basis for Newton’s claim that Descartes’ account 
of matter leads to atheism, while his own confirms God’s existence.  As indicated above, he 
takes space to be the one thing sometimes conceivable apart from God, since it produces no 
sensations or other effects, and so by identifying matter with extension (space), Descartes allows 
that matter is conceivable apart from God.
21
  For as Newton indicates elsewhere, "we find almost 
no other reason for atheism than this notion of bodies having, as it were, a complete, absolute 
and independent reality in themselves."
22
  On his own account, bodies are not conceivable apart 
from God, because their capacity to produce sensation cannot be so conceived, and that 
inconceivability is expressed directly by his definition’s third condition.  
 
                                                           
20
 Here I disagree with Geoffrey Gorham, who argues that Newton actually intends his third condition, the capacity to produce 
sensations in minds, to resolve a problem about distinguishability (a problem that has concerned several commentators but did 
not, in my view, concern Newton, for reasons I indicate later in this section).  On Gorham’s view, if Newton did not intend his 
third condition to resolve that problem, it would be superfluous: “If the DQE’s are impenetrable, they will be solid to touch, 
reflect light, perturb the air when struck, and so on.  Since these are the means by which the senses perceive familiar bodies, why 
the need for God to affix also the special power to produce sensations?  The answer seems to be that impenetrability alone is 
inadequate to distinguish bodies from the unfavored portions of absolute space.” (Gorham, January 2011, 23).  Yet as I have 
argued, Newton does not see the production of sensation as reducible to impenetrability, either in the context of matter’s first 
creation, when no human bodies would exist even if minds did, or in his actual context, in which human bodies do exist. He takes 
a line similar to that found in Locke’s Essay.  Despairing of the ability of the mechanical hypothesis to reduce sensations to the 
shapes, sizes, and motions of particles, Locke suggests that the production of sensations must be attributed to God.  Or, on an 
interpretation associated with Ayers, Locke thinks that we invoke superaddition because our powers of understanding are too 
limited to grasp how God might have enabled matter to produce sensations; my thanks to James Hill for discussion of the point. 
21
 "If we say with Descartes that extension is body, do we not manifestly offer a path to atheism, both because extension is not 
created but has existed eternally, and because we have an idea of it without any relation to God, and so in some circumstances it 
would be possible for us to conceive of extension while supposing God not to exist?" (De Gravitatione, Philosophical Writings, 
31).  Interestingly, Newton’s language here suggests the strong mental exercise that Descartes calls ‘exclusion’, as opposed to the 
weaker one of abstraction.  For Descartes, a successful attempt to conceive something while actually separating or excluding 
another reveals that the two are really distinct, as opposed to being merely conceptually distinct but really identical; see Pr I.62, 
CSM, 214. Newton’s phrase, “supposing God not to exist”, suggests the strong mental act of exclusion; he suggests that space 
may be conceived while actually excluding God, by supposing him not to exist. 
22
 De Gravitatione, in Philosophical Writings, 32. 
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Interpreting Newton’s account: determined quantities of extension and the role of divine 
action  
Yet what exactly are the “determined quantities of extension” endowed with the three 
conditions that Newton asserts?  The question is essential to an understanding of his account of 
body, but it also has implications for the nature and extent of divine providence, as we will see.  
It is often supposed that in his creation hypothesis, Newton takes God to create bodies from parts 
of absolute space itself.  For example, Christopher Conn speaks of a body in De gravitatione as 
“nothing more than a divinely-modified region of space”.
23
  Geoffrey Gorham also takes 
Newton’s determined quantities of extension to be parts of absolute space itself, contrasting the 
“favored regions of space”, which God endows with powers, against the “normal” regions 
(though on his soft occasionalist interpretation, the favored regions of space are given only 
powers of producing sensations.)
24
  If Newton were seeking some sort of substrate in which 
properties could inhere, space might initially seem suitable, since as noted earlier, he considers it 
to be more like a substance than an accident.  Nevertheless, there are powerful reasons to deny 
that he supposes God to create bodies by modifying parts of absolute space itself.
25
 
                                                           
23
 Conn, 1999, 316, n. 23. Alan Gabbey allows the possibility without committing to it, in the following passage: “But 
alternatively, and of equal possibility, the properties of bodies might be the result of God choosing to 'inform' extensions, parts of 
absolute space, with corporeality and mobility. The parts of absolute space that God can and perhaps does endow with the 
properties of bodies are as empty of matter as the materia prima of the scholastics is void of intelligibility, or bereft of existence. 
But there is a crucial difference. Each of these parcels of empty extension is a quid, and a quale, and a quantum, whereas materia 
prima is none of these.” (Gabbey,  “The term materia in Newton and the Newtonian Tradition”, 438).  I implied this myself in an 
earlier article (Kochiras, 2009, 269).  
24
 See Gorham, “How Newton Solved the Mind-Body Problem”, January, 2011, 22:  “Newton proposes that God creates bodies 
by imposing three conditions on certain regions of space or ‘determinate quantities of extension’(DQE).”) See also Gorham, 
“Newton on Godʼs Relation to Space and Time: The Cartesian Framework”, September, 2011, esp.  297, where he speaks of “a 
favored portion of extension”.   
As a result of taking this line, Gorham understands Newton’s account of body as intended to respond to a problem of 
distinguishing the favored regions of space from the normal ones.  The problem (a variant of which was raised by Bennett and 
Remnant, 1978), may be described by the following two claims.  (i) Newton claims that the parts of space are immobile, and 
therefore the favored portions of space must be distinguishable from the normal parts of space in order to become mobile; yet (ii) 
the property of impenetrability cannot accomplish the task of making the favored portions of space distinguishable from the 
normal parts of space, because the normal parts of space are themselves impenetrable to one another precisely because they are 
immobile.  This problem, and the need to resolve it, then motivates Gorham’s interpretation of Newton’s account of body.  In 
Gorham’s view, Newton intends the third condition of his account, i.e., the capacity to produce sensations, to resolve the 
problem, for in his view, that condition would be superfluous if not intended for that purpose.  (Gorham writes, “Condition (3) 
solves this problem by ensuring that the favored regions of space stand out because God superadds to them something lacking 
from the unfavored regions: the power to produce sensations.” Gorham, January, 2011,  23.) 
But the third condition would not be superfluous absent that problem, as I argue in §2.5.  Nor is it clear that the problem 
about distinguishability, which motivates Gorham’s account, is genuine.  For one thing, if God did modify parts of actual space, 
surely he himself could distinguish them from one another (as indeed he would have to be able to do, if he were to confer any 
properties at all upon them.)  For another thing, as I argue, Newton’s creation story and its associated definition of body does not 
suppose parts of space itself to be modified.  And there is an even more important consideration: even if the problem were 
genuine, why should we allow the need to resolve it to color our interpretation of Newton’s account, given that he himself is not 
addressing such a problem?  Even if the problem were genuine, it should be invoked only to evaluate Newton’s account, not to 
interpret it, since again, Newton himself is not addressing that problem.   
25
 It should be noted that despite taking parts of space itself to figure in Newton’s account of body, Gorham ultimately defends a 
soft occasionalist interpretation, on which Newton takes the regions of space to be modified only to the extent of temporarily 
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The starting point of the creation hypothesis, though hardly decisive, is potentially significant.  
That starting point is the observation that we can make spaces impenetrable by moving our 
bodies into them—an action that does not, notably, alter the nature of space itself.  Also 
significant, I think, is the “metaphysical truth” that God “has created bodies in empty space out 
of nothing”
26
; to square his account with that truth, as he means to do, Newton cannot say that 
God creates bodies out of space, since space is not nothing.  A consideration that should be 
decisive, however, is the nature of space as he describes it, together with the implications of 
supposing that actual parts of space figure in his creation story and definition.  He described 
space as being eternal, immutable, immobile, unable to produce effects, and as having parts that 
are distinguishable but indivisible.  To suppose that certain parts of space could be divinely 
modified, rendered able to produce sensations, solidified and set into motion, is to suppose a full 
contradiction of Newton’s claims . It is to suppose that space is not eternal, because some parts 
of it may be turned into bodies; that space is not immutable, because some parts could be made 
impenetrable and able to produce sensations; and that its parts are not immobile and indivisible, 
because some parts, once made impenetrable, could be torn away from their neighbors and set 
into motion.  And if some parts could be torn away, what exactly would ensue—would space be 
left with gaps, or would additional space appear to fill the gaps?   
These are the sorts of conceptual problems that Newton points to when clarifying the first 
condition of his definition.  Mobility is the first stated condition with which determined 
quantities of extension are endowed, and since space is immobile, he immediately clarifies that 
he is not speaking about the parts of space itself, but rather about their quantities: “therefore I did 
not say that they are numerical parts of space which are absolutely immobile, but only definite 
quantities which may be transferred from space to space.”
27
  Significantly, a quantity of some 
part of space is not identical to the part of space itself—after all, some numerically distinct parts 
of space have the same volume.  Thus as Newton’s own clarification indicates (a clarification we 
should keep firmly in mind when he seems to stray from it by employing more abbreviated 
                                                           
assuming powers to produce sensations in minds.  For as noted in §2.5, Gorham argues that the first two conditions of Newton’s 
definition turn out to be superfluous, and the “favored” parts of space, instead of being made actually impenetrable and actually 
torn away from the “normal” regions of space, are simply “spatial occasions” for God to produce perceptions in minds. Denying 
that Newton takes the parts of space to be altered and torn apart seems especially important for Gorham since he also argues that 
space is ultimately identical to God.  Therefore, allowing that space could be altered would not only conflict with Newton’s claim 
that space is immutable, it would also imply that God is not immutable; Gorham avoids that implication by arguing that 
conditions (1) and (2) of the definition “do no independent work”.  
26
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 31.  
27
 Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 28. 
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locutions
28
), it is a mistake to reify his determined quantities of extension, by mistaking them for 
parts of space itself.
29
   
Since Newton associates only quantities with the qualities or powers identified by his three 
conditions, and not parts of absolute space itself, bodies are constructed from powers alone.  
Insofar as it is useful to speak in terms of subject and the properties predicated of it, the quantity 
of any given region of space in which the powers are present may serve as a logical 
(grammatical) subject, but the utility of such locutions should not lead us to suppose that bodies 
consist in anything beyond powers.  There is nothing like a substrate.  Rather, bodies consist in 
sets of powers, distributed at multiple points of one region of space if the body is resting, or at 
points of successive regions if the body is moving.  This interpretation does require that 
Newton’s first condition, mobility, be considered differently from the other two, in that mobility 
must apply to something.  I therefore suggest that Newton takes bodies (insofar as we can know 
them) to consist in mobile sets of spatially configured powers for mutual impenetrability and 
production of sensation.  These mobile sets of powers must somehow be unified, so as to 
maintain their characteristic configurations as they either rest or move through space, and I 
propose that he assigns the task of unifying them to God.  The powers are unified and maintained 
as enduring configurations by God—by y
e
 divine arm, to borrow a phrase that Newton uses 
elsewhere.
30
  The divine will accomplishes the task that he takes to be performed in the 
Aristotelian account by prime matter or substrate.  
This interpretation fits well with his emphasis upon perceived qualities as the basis of a 
substance. In one of the explanatory points following his definition of body, he explains that the 
entities he has described are no less real than bodies and may be called substances bccause 
                                                           
28
 At one point, for instance, Newton speaks of the form that God “imparts to space”.(De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical 
Writings 29)  Because of such instances, commentators must choose between (i) accepting the surface meaning of such remarks 
and thus understanding bodies as mobile, solidified regions of space, while paying the price of implying a serious conceptual 
problem (the question of what would remain, if regions of space could be torn out) as well as conflicts with Newton’s own claims 
(i.e., that space is immutable and immobile, and that his definition concerns definite quantities, not the numerical parts of space); 
and (ii) avoiding any conflict with his claims that space is immutable and immobile, while paying the price of implying that some 
of his locutions are abbreviated or careless.  I argue for the latter option, as indicated throughout.  
29
 My interpretation can be reconciled with the definition that Newton gives of body at the outset of De gravitatione (and I thank 
Eric Schliesser for reminding me, at the conference at Ghent, of the need to reconcile them).  As is well known, the bulk of De 
gravitatione consists in a lengthy digression, in which Newton attacks Cartesian physics and addresses various metaphysical 
questions, including those focused upon here.  But Newton begins the manuscript with the intention of treating the weight and 
equilibrium of fluids and of solids in fluids, and while still engaged in that project, he defines body as “that which fills place” (De 
gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 13.)  On the interpretation that I develop, that definition can be retained, since a 
set of spatially distributed powers of mutual impenetrability will repel any other such set; and while such sets do not fill place by 
actually having parts outside parts, the phenomenal effect is the same.  
30
 The phrase is from Newton’s second letter to Bentley (17 January, 1692/93; 240 in Turnbull):  “Secondly I do not know any 
power in nature wch could cause this transverse motion without ye divine arm.”  
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“whatever reality we believe to be present in bodies is conferred on account of their phenomena 
and sensible qualities.”
31
  And a remark elsewhere in the manuscript, which I discuss in more 
detail in a subsequent section, points to attributes as the basis of “substantial reality”.  An 
interesting implication of my interpretation is that the extension of bodies is parasitic upon the 
extension of space.  Since bodies are extended in virtue of the presence of their constituent 
qualities or powers in space—a view whose conceptual predecessor is a concept of immaterial 
spirits as spatially located powers, as noted later
32
—only space is extended in the sense of having 
parts outside parts, a complete reversal of the Aristotelian view that all extension is corporeal, an 
attribute of matter.  
 
The account of body and the extent of God’s providence  
In another of the explanatory remarks following the definition of body, Newton states that the 
entities he has described subsist “through God alone”.
33
  The interpretation I have given provides 
a specific way of understanding this: the entities subsist through God alone in that the sets of 
powers are unified and maintained in their configurations by divine action.  Since this action is 
direct, God’s providence is much greater than if he merely concurred with the bodies’ continued 
existence.  Still, Newton also leaves ample room for secondary causation, for as indicated earlier, 
he sees the account of body and thus God’s direct action as limited to corpuscles.  This suggests 
a view similar to that found in a much later text, Query 31 of the Opticks.  Query 31 sidesteps the 
problem of cohesion at the sub-corpuscular level by suggesting that corpuscles are created by 
God, but it speculatively attributes the cohesion of aggregate bodies to interparticulate forces, 
and thus to secondary causes.
34
  Here too, by restricting his account of bodies to corpuscles, 
Newton leaves the cohesion of aggregate bodies to secondary causes.   
The role that Newton assigns to God in De gravitatione therefore falls considerably short of 
occasionalism.  This is consistent with the expectations that he evinces in other texts. In a letter 
of 1680, Newton writes, “Where natural causes are at hand God uses them as instruments in his 
works”.
35
  And as I have argued elsewhere, Newton never endorses the hypothesis that God 
                                                           
31
 This claim appears in the second of the four explanatory remarks following Newton’s definition of body; De gravitatione, in 
Newton: Philosophical Writings, 29.   
32
 For a discussion of concepts of spirits and space, see Kochiras, 2012.  
33
 Ibid.  Newton, De gravitatione, in Newton: Philosophical Writings, 29.   
34
 An illuminating discussion of Locke and the foundational problem about cohesion may be found in James Hill (2004), 
“Locke’s Account of Cohesion and its Philosophical Significance”.  
35
 Newton to Burnet, 1680; Newton, The Correspondence, II, 334.  
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causes gravitational effects directly, and his ongoing search for an explanation expresses his 
expectation of secondary causes.
36
   
I therefore disagree with the interpretation defended recently by Gorham, who attributes 
occasionalism to Newton, albeit a soft sort.
37
  The occasionalism is soft in that God does not 
cause perceptions in minds directly, instead endowing varying regions of space with the power to 
do so, in a continuous creation of matter.
38
  Yet it is still a kind of occasionalism, because 
Gorham argues that that the first and second conditions of Newton’s definition of body are 
superfluous, doing “no independent work of their own”,
39
 and that bodies consist in only the 
powers to produce sensations. Regions of space are the “spatial occasions” for the sensations, 
and God creates matter continuously by creating the powers to produce sensations in varying 
regions of space.
40
  Gorham claims a powerful advantage for his interpretation: it implies that 
Newton solves the mind-body problem, avoiding problems about mental causation “by 
embracing a quasi-idealistic ontology of matter.”
41
  Yet his interpretation requires us not only to 
accept that conditions (1) and (2) of Newton’s definition are superfluous, but also that condition 
(3), the power to produce perceptions in minds, is not merely necessary for body-hood but also 
sufficient.  Gorham reaches this latter conclusion partly through his reading of the comment that 
Newton adds to this third condition—that it is not surprising that bodies have the power to cause 
perceptions in minds, “since the description of their origin is founded on this”.
42
  Yet there is a 
                                                           
36
 See Kochiras, 2009, 2011.  
37
 Gorham indicates that he sees Newton as belonging to a tradition that locates the ground of causation in God’s will (Gorham, 
January, 2011, 25).  
38
 See Gorham, January, 2011, 24. 
39
 Gorham, January, 2011, 24.  
40
 See Gorham, January, 2011: “The continuous creation of matter amounts simply to the distribution within space of God’s 
power to produce sensations”(24); and “various quantities of extension are the mere ‘spatial occasions’ for God to bring out our 
perceptions in the successive and law-like ways we associate with moving bodies.”(25). 
41
 Gorham, January 2011, 30. 
42
 De gravitatione, 29.  There is another passage that Gorham interprets as showing that Newton takes condition (3) to be 
sufficient as well as necessary for being a body.  In that passage, Newton is attacking the Cartesian view of matter:  
“Let us abstract from body (as he demands) gravity, hardness, and all sensible qualities, so that nothing remains except 
what pertains to its essence.  Will extension alone then remain?  By no means.  For we may also reject that faculty or power 
by which they [the qualities] stimulate the perceptions of thinking things.  For since there is so great a distinction between 
the ideas of thought and of extension that it is not obvious that there is any basis of connection or relation [between them], 
except that which is caused by divine power, the above capacity of bodies can be rejected while preserving extension, but 
not while preserving their corporeal nature.”(Newton, De gravitatione in Isaac Newton: Philosophical Writings, 33-34; 
emphasis added)   
Commenting upon this passage, and quoting the italicized portion, Gorham writes, “So, the capacity to produce sensations in 
minds is sufficient and necessary for a quantity of space to possess the nature of body. This explains why Newton privileges 
condition (3) when he introduces his theory of creation: “The description of their [bodies’] origin is founded on this” (De Grav 
29).”(Gorham, January, 2011, 24.)  I do not see how Newton’s remarks imply that condition (3) is sufficient as well as necessary 
for body-hood, as Gorham takes it to do.  There is certainly a way of understanding the passages that does not imply any such 
thing.  As I read the passage, Newton is saying that if one mentally abstracts qualities such as hardness away from a body, one 
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natural reading of that remark which does not require either dismissing the definition’s first two 
conditions as superfluous or supposing the third to be sufficient.  That natural reading, which I 
explained earlier, is simply that if bodies lacked the power to produce sensations, we could never 
have any ideas of them. The remark is an instance of Newton’s oft-repeated acknowledgement 
that we can  know only perceived qualities, not the “essential and metaphysical constitution" of 
things.
43
  Since I reject the occasionalist interpretation, I also reject Gorham’s conclusion that 
“Newtonian bodies do not seem to qualify as self-standing substances”.
44
  On my interpretation, 
Newton considers bodies to be created substances.  This is a desirable result, since bodies would 
have to be substances in order for Newton to accept a substantial distinction between mind and 
body—and he does, as I argue elsewhere.  
In closing, I suggest that the account of body Newton develops in De gravitatione might have 
indirectly helped facilitate a concept belonging to his later rational mechanics, that of point mass. 
On the interpretation I have given, his concept of body has as its conceptual ancestor a spirit 
which consists in causal powers, which lacks parts outside parts, and which is extended only in 
the derivative sense that its constituent causal powers are present in some extension.  An entity 
consisting in spatially present causal powers, as opposed to one possessing parts outside parts, 
may more easily be conceived as existing in a larger or smaller area—even as contracted to a 
point.  Thus the bodies of De gravitatione, which consist in powers of mutual impenetrability or 
resistance, might have helped facilitate Newton’s realization that mass can be considered at a 
point.  Or at least, because they lack parts outside parts, such bodies would not stand in the way 
of that realization.   
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Arto Siitonen
On Reichenbach's Dissertation from 1916
Preface
The German philosopher Hans Reichenbach (1891 - 1953) is well known as 
one  of  the  representatives  of  the  stream  of  thought  called  'logical 
empiricism'. It is less known that in his youth he was a devoted Kantian 
philosopher. This can be seen in his doctoral dissertation that he defended 
at the university of Erlangen on March 2,  1915. The title of this work was 
Der Begriff der Wahrscheinlichkeit für die mathematische Darstellung der Wirklichkeit, and 
it was published 1916 in the journal Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische  
Kritik. 
In his curriculum vitae (p. 2 of the dissertation), Reichenbach tells that he has 
studied philosophy, mathematics, physics and pedagogy in Berlin, Munich, 
and  Göttingen.  He  mentions  among  his  teachers  Ernst  Cassirer,  Max 
Planck,  Alois  Riehl,  Carl  Stumpf,  Ernst  von  Aster,  David  Hilbert  and 
Edmund Husserl. He characterizes himself as "a Kantian philosopher".  
As far as I know, Reichenbach's dissertation has not been translated into 
any other language. A direct translation of its title in English would be: The 
Concept  of  Probability  for  the  Mathematical  Presentation  of  Reality.  In what follows 
below, is  an analysis  and commentary of  the main lines of  thought of 
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Reichenbach's dissertation.    
1. Subjectivism vs. objectivism
Reichenbach vigorously argues in favour of the  objective interpretation of 
the concept of probability. Probability belongs to reality and not only to our 
knowledge of reality. He considers the question of probability part of the 
debate on the basic concepts of our knowledge of nature. The subjectivists 
have given up their belief in objective knowledge and consider science a 
game of human thoughts, whereas the objectivists rely on the real validity of 
scientific results. The question for objectivists concerns the issue: which of 
the necessary elements of knowledge are characterized as true? Kant's 
critique of reason is a method for the systematic study of this question. 
However, in spite of his great discovery, until recently only a few critical 
studies have been dedicated to the concepts employed in the positive 
sciences.  Only  a  few  philosophers  have  followed  up  their  inquiries  in 
mathematics  and  physics,  and  used  their  critical  acumen  with  the 
methods constantly applied therein.  
As  Reichenbach  sees  it,  the  analysis  of  the  concept  of  probability  is 
divided between the claims of the exact science of probability calculus 
and  those  of  the  unclear  and  vaguely  applied  concepts  employed  in 
everyday life. Philosophical investigation has too often started from the 
latter, thereby admitting neither a precise statement of the problem nor 
its solution. Moreover, this form of inquiry has led to subjectivism.
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His dissertation has the following structure: The first chapter "Das Problem" 
presents the basic difficulty and its treatment in recent philosophy. The 
second  chapter gives  an analysis  of  specific  problems  of  probability.  It  is 
divided into four sections that concern the so-called "probability machine", 
games of chance, the theorem of combined probabilities, and the theory 
of  errors.  The  third  chapter is  entitled  "Deduktion  des 
Wahrscheinlichkeitsprinzips"  (Deduction  of  the  Principle  of  Probability), 
and the fourth chapter studies the relation of probability judgments to reality. 
Reichenbach thought that there was a curious contrast between probability 
and the principle of causality, to the effect that when the causality principle 
is  inapplicable,  the  connections  between  the  phenomena  are 
accommodated under the concept of probability. This leads to a  probability  
paradox:  it  seems  that  only  because  we  are  unable  to  determine  the 
specific connections must we be content to suppose that the case under 
investigation is probable or improbable. However, may such a supposition, 
conditioned only by our ignorance, be expressed as a claim of objective 
validity?       
Reichenbach  goes  on  to  consider  the  subjective  interpretation  of 
probability as represented by Carl Stumpf, and the objective interpretation 
as represented by Johannes von Kries. According to Stumpf, probability 
concerns  the  relation  of  the  positive  to  the  possible.  A  probability 
judgment presents the given state of our knowledge. Stumpf's concept 
cannot  give  a  measure  of  reasonable  expectation,  because  such  a 
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measure  must  say  something  about   real  things  and  not  only  about 
knowledge.  Reichenbach  remarks  ironically  that  it  may  be  that  our 
expectation is regulated in accordance with our knowledge, whereas real 
things are certainly not thus regulated (cf. p. 6 of his dissertation).  
von  Kries  formulated  the  following  four  principles:  (1)  probability 
judgments are true or false, (2) they give a definite structure to reality, (3) 
they contain a prediction of future occurrences, and (4) what is expressed 
in them is based on a non-empirical principle, that of variability within a 
given  scope  ('Spielräume').  Reichenbach's  main  criticism  of  von  Kries' 
analysis  is  that  it  yields  only  a  subjective certainty to the principle  of 
causality. Von Kries does not think that there is an objective foundation for 
predictions.
The  correctness  of  applying  the  principle  of  causality  has  been 
proven by KANT in his Critique; if this had not been possible, then we 
would  not  be  justified  to  draw  a  subjective  certainty  from  this 
principle. (p. 11).1
  
2. Probability judgments
The philosophers F. A. Lange, E. F. Apelt, A. Fick and Kurt Grelling represent 
the following view: probability judgments are disjunctive or hypothetical, 
and the  implicans of the hypothetical judgment gives the total area of a 
condition whereas the implicate expresses a certain conclusion. Probability 
is  then  identifiable  with  the  relation  between  the  extensions  of  the 
expressions contained in the judgment. Reichenbach says of Fick's view of 
probability judgments:
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Fick is right in calling these sentences, like mathematical sentences, 
synthetic  judgments  a  priori.  GRELLING has  followed  him in  this 
conception.
These mathematical sentences are not confirmable by experience; 
but  whether  they  are applicable  to  reality  is  a  special  problem, 
which has to be solved outside the discipline of probability calculus 
through philosophical inquiry. (p. 12).2
Fick formulated the problem as the assumption that there seems to be an 
asymptotic relation between probability and reality. Reichenbach stresses 
the  important  role  that  probability  plays  in  everyday life,  in  games of 
chance,  in  insurance  firms  and  in  modern  physics.  All  this  makes  it 
reasonable to suppose that probability laws are objective laws of nature, their 
validity  being  philosophically  justifiable.  For  a  general  strategy  of 
research,  he  suggests  the  following:  let  us  act  as  if the  validity  of 
probability laws were already proven, and let us then study, on the basis 
of this supposition, what kind of organization has thus been presupposed. 
This is the natural route to a critique of reason, he claims, because the 
mathematician presupposes as valid the principles that the philosopher 
seeks to put under criticism.                      
3. Special problems of probability
After having stated the general problem to be dealt with, Reichenbach turns 
to  an  analysis  of  special  problems of  probability,  taking  a  "probability 
machine", games of chance, the theorem of combined probabilities, and 
the theory of errors of measurement as examples. 
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The  probability  machine  is  an  idealization  (comparable  to  the  more 
famous machine that Alan Turing invented later). It features a rolling band 
in which a piston moving in a cylinder strikes holes. The band consists of a 
sheet  with  regularly  changing  white  and  black  stripes.  The  probability 
distribution  for  white  and  black  holes  is  1:2.  But  why  is  this?  The 
conditions are: (i) that the piston strikes a hole very frequently, (ii) that 
both of the occurrences (the rolling of the band and the striking the hole) 
are mutually independent, (iii) that these occurrences have a joint effect, 
and (iv) that there exists a probability function in accordance with which the 
occurrences can be classified. 
The probability function can be given a form which contains the number of 
the values x for the time of striking (between an arbitrary interval from a 
to b), and N for the total number of the times of striking. The conditions 
under  which  probability  sentences  can be applied,  are:  (1)  it  must  be 
decidable which regularity underlies the occurrences in the event that the 
results of the probability calculation are correct, (2) the regularity must be 
observable  through  its  physical  effects.  While  the  second  condition  is 
empirically ascertainable, the existence of a probability function is not an 
empirical affair; rather, the question here is of "a metaphysical principle of 
the  knowledge  of  nature"  ("ein  metaphysisches  Prinzip  der 
Naturerkenntnis", p. 26).           
As  in  the  case  of  the  probability  machine,  one  has  to  suppose  the 
existence of a probability function when confronted with games of chance 
(Reichenbach refers  to  roulette),  with  combined probabilities,  and with 
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measurement errors. The necessity for this implicit presupposition leads to 
a philosophical question: how do I know that there is such a function?  It is 
the task of experience to determine the special form of such a function, 
but  no  experience  can  teach  that a  probability  function  exists  for  any 
thinkable case. Observation can only tell us something of a finite number 
of cases.  
The situation is similar to the case of causality: its special content is always 
empirically given, but no observation tells us that what is observed in a 
single case is universally valid, or that from now on any case whatsoever 
will comply with this law. However, the regularity in the case of probability is 
different from causal regularity in that it concerns occurrences that are not 
causally combined. The  law of  probability states the following: in cases in 
which the law of causality is inapplicable, the principle of probability is 
valid.  
4. Justification of the law of probability
One  may  wonder  how,  if  the  law  of  probability  does  not  stem  from 
experience,  it  is  to  be  justified.  The  fourth  chapter,  "Deduction  of  the 
principle of probability", is devoted to this question. The basic premise is 
the same as in Kant's transcendental deduction of the fundamental principles of 
knowledge – among them the principle of causality, challenged by Hume. 
According  to  Reichenbach,  Kant  was  able  to  prove  that  the  axioms of 
geometry  are  synthetic  judgments  a  priori.  Because  geometry  was  an 
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established branch of science, the a priori foundation Kant gave to it was 
considered as valid as geometry itself. However, the situation is different 
with the theory of errors and the theory of games of chance – which do 
not have the same reputation as geometry. It thus became Reichenbach's 
task to find corresponding validation of the probability principle.      
     
Reichenbach's  strategy  was  basically  the  same  as  Kant's  in  his 
transcendental deduction. Reichenbach sought to show that the necessity 
of probability function follows from the idea of knowledge of nature; that 
probability theory is justified due to its connection to other principles of 
knowledge and to the unity of knowledge. He even called his procedure 
"transcendental proof" (p. 48).  
The judgments of mathematics are hypothetical, whereas those of physics 
(or, in general, reality judgments) are categorical. The former are given us 
through pure intuition, the latter are determined by empirical intuition and 
given  through  perception.  In  spite  of  their  empirical  character,  reality 
judgments contain an uneliminable  apriori core,  due to which perceptions 
are embedded in a net of relations. The terms of these relations are not 
empirical  concepts,  but contain syntheses of  further relations.  In  other 
words, the Kantian 'transcendental unity of apperception' is not limited to 
judgments,  but  also  applies  to  their  elements.   Synthesis  through 
transcendental  apperception is "the highest point" in Kant's analysis of 
knowledge. Reichenbach points out to page A 109/B 134 of Critique of Pure 
Reason in this connection, and concerning the constitution of an empirical 
object to page A 116/B 146. 
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The  principle  of  transcendental  synthesis  is  that  an  ideal  structure  is 
thought to be applicable to real occurrences. Accordingly, judgments of 
physics maintain that certain mathematical structures are true of given 
segments  of  reality.  Nevertheless,  one  is  not  allowed  to  say  that  the 
mathematical structure and reality correspond to each other, because real 
occurrences are  always  determined by infinitely  many such structures. 
What happens is that certain objects of empirical intuition are  coordinated 
with the equations of mathematics: for instance, certain kinds of gases 
are  thus  coordinated  with  Boyle's  law  p  .  V  =  R  .  T.  It  is  through  the 
mathematical formulas that the quantitative dimension of the objects is 
determined.  Without  this  supposition,  empirical  knowledge  in  general 
would be impossible.  
5. Mathematics and physics
Mathematical  equations  are  ideal  structures;  they  signify  the  relations 
between  the  objects  of  pure  intuition.  Physical  judgments  apply 
mathematical  equations  and  use  them  to  give  an  approximative 
presentation of reality. They do not exhaust reality – empirical objects also 
contain uneliminatory irrational elements. The theories of modern physics 
are systems of equations. The possibility of physical knowledge means the 
possibility  of  giving numerical  approximations.  Physics  proceeds in  two 
directions: towards concrete, singular phenomena by way of continuous 
specialization,  and  towards  more  and  more  general laws  and  theories  by 
12-14 June 2012; Mugla, Turkey -305-
transforming the former constants of nature into functions.
That  mathematics  can  be  applied  to  real  objects  is  not  an  empirical 
sentence,  but  rather  the  methodical  presupposition  of  physics  –  this 
means  nothing  else  than  the  great  basic  idea  in  Kant's  theory  of 
knowledge.  The  principle  of  probability plays  an  uneliminable  role  in  the 
application of mathematical equations to reality. It contains the idea that 
there is, for a series of repetitions of the same magnitude, a probability 
function. The probability principle is "an objective law of nature" (p.71) 
that is necessarily valid for the occurrences of nature. For instance, when 
we throw a standard six-sided dice, the probability principle states that 
there is a finite number N of throws to the effect that the distribution 1:6 
for each of the sides is reached within limits that are not larger than an 
arbitrary number e for deviation from the distribution. In accordance with 
Bernouilli's theorem, each of the numbers 1-6 appears as frequently as any 
other.          
6. Probability and reality
The last chapter (Chapter 4 of the dissertation) concerns the relation of 
probability judgments to reality. At the outset, Reichenbach expresses his 
indebtness to Kant as follows:
Thus the existence of the probability function has been deduced in 
the  sense  in  which  KANT  uses  the  word  deduction  in  his 
transcendental philosophy. The necessity of such a law is in the last 
instance only to be grasped by an insight, and it has therefore been 
called a synthetic judgment a priori; it is not logically derivable from 
other  principles  of  knowledge.  But  in  this  deduction  has  been 
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shown, how this law is connected to the whole knowledge of nature 
in general; and while it has been shown that that principle means a 
necessary condition of all physical knowledge, its validity concerning 
experience has been proven. (p. 65).3
Reichenbach claims that the existence of the probability function cannot 
be  deduced  from  other  principles  of  knowledge.  The  judgement  that 
suggests that there exists a probability function is synthetic a priori.  
It is even the criterion of a priori laws that they cannot be confirmed 
or  refuted  by  any  special  experience  but  are  rather  forms  of 
ordering that make experience possible. Experience in the scientific 
sense is a presentation of reality connecting the given contents of 
perception in the sense of stable, a priori ordering forms. (p. 70).4
No  experience  can  contain  anything  to  contradict  the  principle  of 
probability, just as  deviation from the law of causality can never appear. 
We can neither prove nor disprove these laws empirically. An experiment 
designed in order to confirm the principle of causality would presuppose 
the very principle,  just  as  an experiment to prove that  the probability 
function  exists  already  presupposes  that  it  does.  If  the  law  of  the 
distribution of approximate values were to contain a definite numerical 
value for 'N', it would lose its a priori character and become a special law of 
nature, confirmable or refutable by experiment. On the other hand, we 
interpret  apparent  deviations from the law as a conformity to the law. 
Although there may be, say, thirty throws of 6 in a row, we would say that 
in  the  long  run  the  probability  of  getting  6  is  1:6.  In  the  case  of  a 
continuous anomaly, we would rather suspect that the dice is unbalanced 
than call the probability principle into question.  
Accordingly, the principle of probable distribution of values is an objective 
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law of nature, which is valid with certainty. That there exist probabilities is 
itself  not  another  probability,  then,  claims Reichenbach,  and some law 
must  be  valid  with  certainty  in  order  for  some other  to  be  valid  with 
probability.  It  is  probable  that  single  instances  conform  to  the  law  of 
probability distribution; it is certain that with a growing number of cases, 
an approximation to this law will be reached with evolving accuracy.       
The  relation  between  the  principles  of  causality and  probability is  a 
complementary  one:  when  the  probability  principle  is  added  to  the 
causality  principle,  knowledge of  nature  becomes possible.  The former 
connects phenomena together in a  vertical direction, the latter  horizontally, 
as it were (cf. pp. 62 and 73 of the dissertation). Let us display this by the 
following figure:
     Probability
           I
I
–––––––––––––––––––––––>     Causality (causes and effects; a time line) 
       I
I
Reichenbach  considered  that  he  had  thus  clarified  the  relation  of 
probability  judgments  to  reality.  Fick  has  shown that  the  sentences  of 
probability calculus are synthetic sentences a priori, presenting a system that 
is analogous to the sentences of geometry. According to Reichenbach, it 
has been shown that these sentences must necessarily be true of reality, 
i.e.  that  real  things  are  necessarily  subordinated  to  them.  This 
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subordination is due to the principle of the probability function, which is 
an objective law of nature. It is because of this proof that the  parallelism 
between the principles of probability and of geometry has become complete.  
At  the  end  of  his  dissertation,  Reichenbach  remarks  that  theoretical 
physics  in  its  modern  form  is  essentially  based  on  probability 
considerations,  it  being  a  further  task  to  explicate  the  underlying 
philosophical principles behind the law of entropy and behind the Maxwell-
Bolzmannian statistics.   
7. Comments
The  following  features  of  Reichenbach's  dissertation  deserve  to  be 
underlined:
(1)  One cannot overestimate the thoroughly  Kantian spirit of the book. It 
accepts  the  idea  of  synthetic  a  priori principles  of  knowledge.  Its  basic 
principle, that of the probability function, is presented as independent of 
experience and as necessarily valid for all future experience. Moreover, it 
offers an aprioristic perspective on all knowledge. Although reality judgments 
are distinguished from judgments of mathematics, they are considered a 
priori judgments in so far as their structural core is a priori. Their empirical 
part is their contingent content. 
Reichenbach sees knowledge as a synthetic product of our conceptual and 
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perceptual  capacities,  as  Kant  does.  He  also  uses  Kant's  transcendental  
method of reasoning. He accepts Kant's view of geometry and applies his 
leading question to probability: how is the probability function possible? He even 
claims,  in  the  spirit  of  Kant's  transcendental  dialectics,  that  reality  is 
partly irrational: our knowledge can only approximate but never exhaust 
it.  
What is most remarkable in respect of Kantianism is that Reichenbach in 
fact complements Kant's analysis of categories with the probability function. 
Causality  is  one of  the categories  in  Kant's  transcendental  analytic;  in 
stressing that probability is independent of causality, Reichenbach makes 
it  an  extra  category.  One  could  accordingly  see  Reichenbach's  early 
philosophy as strengthened Kantianism. His subsequent progress towards pure 
empiricism required a profound change and transformation of the ideas of 
his dissertation period. Perhaps one could call the philosophy presented in 
the dissertation Kantianism with a probability accentuation. 
 (2) Reichenbach's dissertation presents a strong case in favour of the 
objectivistic interpretation of probability, according to which probability is 
an objective feature of reality, independent of our suppositions and of our 
knowledge. Knowledge is based on probability, rather than the other way 
around.  This  idea  remained  Reichenbach's  conviction  throughout  his 
career. He gave it more and more precise articulation in order to attack all 
forms of subjectivism. He always thought, as he argues in the introduction 
to his dissertation, that if the subjective interpretation were allowed, the 
idea of scientific knowledge would be given up. It is possible that this view 
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became  one  of  the  sources  of  his  conflict  with  Kantianism,  because 
Kantianism stresses the importance of the world of appearances, a world 
constituted by human perceptual and rational capacities.  
(3) The laws of causality and probability are harmoniously connected in 
the  dissertation.  Both  are  a  priori and neither  is  superordinated to  the 
other.  In  this  respect,  there  was  a  change  in  Reichenbach's  later 
philosophy when he took the concept of causality under closer scrutiny. In 
doing this, he continued Hume's dissolution of the causality principle – an 
undertaking that took him further away from Kantian ideas. 
(4) Reichenbach's stresses in his criticism of Stumpf that the probability 
calculus has to give us a measure of reasonable expectation ("ein Mass 
der vernünftigen Erwartung", p. 6) in respect to future. This would yield a 
foundation for predictions. Likewise, in his criticism of Kries he put it in 
question,  whether Kries'  probability judgment does express anything of 
the future reality ("zukünftigen Wirklichkeit",  p. 9).  He was to return to 
these themes – notably in his work  Experience  and Prediction.  He was also 
later to seize the explication task of the law of entropy and the Maxwell-
Boltzmann statistics, indicated at the end of his dissertation. This he did in 
his last, unfinished, work The Direction of Time.
Translated Citations as these Appear in the Original Text 
1) "Die Rechtmässigkeit der Anwendung des Kausalprinzips  ist von KANT 
in der transzendentalen Deduktion der Kritik dargetan worden; wäre dies 
nicht möglich gewesen, so hätten wir nicht das Recht, aus diesem Prinzip 
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eine subjektive Gewissheit zu entnehmen." ((1916), p. 11).  
2)  "FICK hat  Recht,  wenn er  alle  diese  Sätze  wie  die  mathematischen 
Sätze  synthetische Urteile  a  priori  nennt.  In  dieser  Auffassung ist  ihm 
GRELLING gefolgt. 
Diese mathematischen Sätze sind durch die Erfahrung nicht zu bestätigen; 
ob  sie  aber  auf  die  Wirklichkeit  anwendbar  sind,  ist  ein  besonderes 
Problem, das jenseits der Disziplin der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung durch 
philosophische Untersuchung gelöst werden muss." (p. 12). 
3) "Es ist somit die Existenz einer Wahrscheinlichkeitsfunktion deduziert 
worden  in  dem  Sinne,  wie  KANT  das  Wort  Deduktion  für  die 
Transzendentalphilosophie  gebraucht.  Die  Notwendigkeit  einer  solchen 
Gesetzmässigkeit  lässt  sich  letzten  Endes  nur  einsehen,  und  sie  ist 
deshalb ein synthetisches Urteil  a priori  genannt worden; sie lässt sich 
nicht logisch aus anderen Grundsätzen der Erkenntnis ableiten. In dieser 
Deduktion aber ist gezeigt worden, wie jenes Gesetz im Zusammenhang 
steht mit der gesamten Naturerkenntnis überhaupt; und indem dargetan 
worden  ist,  dass  jenes  Prinzip  eine  notwendige  Bedingung  aller 
physikalischen Erkenntnis bedeutet, ist seine Gültigkeit von der Erfahrung 
bewiesen worden." (p. 65). 
4) "Das ist gerade das Kriterium apriorischer Gesetze, dass sie nicht durch 
irgendeine spezielle Erfahrung bestätigt  oder widerlegt werden können, 
sondern die vorher gesetzten Formen der Einordnung bilden, die erst die 
spezielle  Erfahrung  möglich  machen.  Erfahrung  im  wissenschaftlichen 
Sinne  ist  eine  solche  Darstellung  der  Wirklichkeit,  die  die  gegebenen 
Wahrnehmungsinhalte  im  Sinne  fester  apriorischer  Ordnungsformen 
zusammenfügt." (p. 70).
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